

THE CONCEPTS OF DUKKHA, TRISHNA AND VAIRA AS FOUND IN DHAMMAPADA

Today Buddhism has become a very rich scholastic philosophy. This is perhaps due to the fact that it had to fight out orthodox philosophies of India like Purva Mimāṃsa, Advaita Vedānta, Sāṃkhya and Nyāya Vaisesika. But it is also due to the fact that great logicians, metaphysicians and Sanskrit Pandits like Dinnaga, Dharmakirti, Nagarjuna, Asanga, Vasubandhu, Dharmottara etc., embressed Buddhism and created methodology, logic and metaphysics which could potently fight out the orthodox schools of India on the one hand and Jainism on the other. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Buddhism started with certain codes and prescriptions of conduct, what men ought to and ought not to do, what is generally beneficial to man and what is not. Although I have used the word 'code' in the above sentence, in the first stage, this code or canonization was only oral; perhaps for a very long time the code of these practices remained only oral. They are more or less what Lord Buddha must have said along with certain parables or stories from time to time. We do not have any direct writings of Buddha. We have only to depend on oral tradition, which ofcourse is rich with truths. All these sayings were ultimately developed and systematized into Buddhist theory.

These prescriptions and parables are found in different Buddhist literature, Tripitaka being traditionally the earliest. Of these Tripitakas, Dhammapada is a very small part of what is known as Suttapitaka. But even then Dhammapada has become extremely important both from the point of view of the theory and practice of Buddhism. All this early literature is in Pāli. But now we also find that there are Prakṛita, Burmese, Tibetan and Chinese versions of Dhammapada. In addition, an hybrid version of Dhammapada is also found. Pāli Dhammapada is a collection of 423 Gāthas. Some of them, ofcourse, find place in the other versions of Dhammapada, but some of them are also

missing from other versions. These Gāthas must have been instantiated with certain parables and stories. This is clearly seen from the Chinese version of Dhammapada which abounds in such parables. However, it is possible that in the oral tradition of India each prescription must have been substantiated by some stories. *Katha Vattu*, for example, is one such book. But several stories are found in *Madhyama Nikāya* and such other literature. That the tradition should be only oral is not Buddhist speciality. All our traditions were originally oral only.

While studying Dhammapada some 40 years back, I had a feeling that Buddhism stated a problem which was essentially social and which in a way was not dwelt upon by other schools of thought. I also had come to the conclusion that Buddhism aimed at educating culturally the common man keeping before him the aim of happiness and prosperity. It may be remembered that 'Bahujana Sukhāya Bahujana Hitāya' is a Buddhist Motto. No other philosophy of Indian origin seems to have tackled the social problem, the Buddhist way and through rational approach. Buddhist aphorism *Sangham Saranam Gachhami* is a clear indication that we must submit to the will of the group, the will of sangha. He did prescribe individual discipline; but that was because the individual discipline was a necessary element in social behaviour.

The Buddhists begin their inquiry with *Dukkha* or misery. It may be borne in mind that it is not 'my' misery but the human misery with which they are concerned. *Sāmkhya* also talks of misery. It is not material to me which is the earlier doctrine. But I must point out that they are two different doctrines. Buddhism talks of *Dukkha* in terms of relation between one man and another. The Gātha in Dhammapada clearly indicates this:

Nahī Verena Verāni Sammatidhā Kudācana

Averena ca Sammati Esa Dhammo Sannantano.

— Dhammapada 5.

Sāmkhya talks of *Dukkhatraya* — *Dukkhatrayābhighāta jig-nyāsa tadbhigatake hetou*.

The vaira or enmity cannot exist between a man and an animal. It clearly shows a relationship between man and man. Buddhism also talks of Karuna which is evidently different from individual Dukkha but is nevertheless Dukkha. It mentions Ahimsā in the Panchasheela but there it does not necessarily indicate an attitude between man and man. The relation between man and animal may also be indicated by this.

Dhammapada means a step of Dhamma. It is concerned with the diagnosis of (human) nature, the misery and how to get over it. What kind of misery or Dukkha, it may be discussed here, was in the mind of Lord Buddha? Dukkha is an ambiguous word. It means both physical pain and misery. That which cannot be destroyed has to be borne by us. This is the case with the physical calamities or pains. But this is not necessarily so with miseries which are social. Lord Buddha who says that everything is misery also talks of Sukha. He says :

Upasanto sukham seti hitvā jayaparājayam
He Sasukham wata jivam ye sannonanti kinchan.

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We who have nothing, how happily do we live! Naturally the problem of Dukkha which Buddha emphasises on, seems to be the problem of social misery and for which there is, for him, a solution also. It is because of this that he not only talks of Dukkha but talks of Sukha also. It is from this point of view that what he calls Dvādashā Nidāna has to be looked at.

That early Buddhism should not mention the word Ahimsā except once in Dhammapada Verse is certainly strange enough. But in order to distinguish themselves from the Jains and the Hindus of the cult of Gītā and Yoga the Buddhist must have abstained themselves from using it.

Let us see how Buddha formulated the problem of Dukkha. The word Dukkha, as is seen above is ambiguously used. It may mean pain or it may mean misery. In the story of Gautam Buddha, when he went from his palace to the Court, he came across an old man, a man suffering with disease and a dead body. Perhaps, some of these Dukkhas can be classified under

pain and are individual Dukkhas. But when one begins to talk of misery one also transcends the individuality of Dukkhas and considers them in social context. For whether conscious or unconscious, misery presupposes a certain communication amongst men. It also presupposes self-consciousness and awareness of man's suffering. This misery, again, may be of two types. Suppose A is prosperous and B is jealous of A's prosperity. Here is a situation where we will find that B's misery is due to A's prosperity and B's knowledge of A's prosperity. This is also the case when we want something but do not get it. What our seers have enumerated under the category 'Shadripu', Kāma, Krodha, Moha, Lobha, Mada, Matsara — these Dukkhas (or the generators of the Dukkhas) can be classified under the first. But all these Dukkhas will, of course, be social.

There will be another category of Dukkhas also. A is in misery and B notices this misery. Suppose A is starving and B is unhappy on that account. B's unhappiness is due to sympathy for A. B's misery is a second order misery. It is dependent upon and generated from A's misery. Such misery is called Karuṇā. Karuṇā is also a kind of misery. But there is a difference between misery i.e. Karuṇā and misery that arises through Kāma, Krodha, Lobha, Moha, Mada, Matsara etc. Karuṇā has strength to reduce misery, to remove the misery of others. Karuṇā also presupposes certain order of self-consciousness. But this order of self-consciousness is far higher than, and different from the self-consciousness which is required when man is under the spell of Kāma, Krodha, Lobha, or even fear. Whereas Karuṇā has capacity to reduce Dukkha or misery, this other misery arising out of jealousy etc., increases the misery. But both these require a social context and it can be seen from the context of sermons and parables that Buddha definitely had social misery in his mind. Buddha's problem of Dukkha, therefore, is of a different kind from the one about which one talks in Sāmkhya Philosophy. Sāmkhya says, 'Dukkhātrayābhigāhatat Jijnyāsa Tadbhigātakehatau'. What are these Dukkhātrayas? They are Ādhibhautika, Ādhidaivika and Ādhyatmika. In a sense, they also have a social context. For man is a social being. But the

social context of these miseries does not seem to have been taken notice of, by the Sāmkhya system. That is why Sāmkhya talks of Kaivalya i.e. loneliness. It is individualistic and having no social significance. Buddha does not talk of such purely individualistic Dukkhas. Ofcourse, in a way all our social Dukkhas are Ādhyatmika Dukkhas, they are concerned with our awareness and have a reference outside the concerned individual. But sometimes Ādhyatmika Dukkhas seem to be projected outside this world. The Dukkhas about which Buddha talks are concerned with this world, concerned with society. This is clear from Dhammapada verses 197, 198, 200 and 201.

It is very interesting to notice how Buddha talks of Dukkha or misery in Dhammapada. He says, "Oh, Bhikhu, misery is a prime truth, Birth is misery, ailment is misery, Death is misery. A relationship with disliked is misery, and the Viyoga of the liked is also misery". But Buddha does not ask the question as to why misery arises in this world, or what the cause of misery is. In the fashion of a physician he wants to diagnose several aspects or dimensions of misery and calls them Dvādashā Nidāna. In fact, Buddha does not, like Mrs. Rhys Davis, say that Pratityasamutpāda was the law of causation.* But I would like to point out that when Buddha talks of Dvādashānidāna, he is, in fact, talking of twelve symptoms, Nidāna is a medical term for diagnosis. Avidyā, for example, is one of these twelve. We have seen that Buddha says that misery arises due to Avidyā. Avidyā means ignorance. It is one of the necessary conditions for the manifestation of misery. (It also develops through Samskāra i.e. through culture.) Avidyā, it must be remembered is an epistemic category. Awareness is as much implied in Avidyā as it is in Prajñā. As a matter of fact the whole development of the human world is two-fold. Either it develops through Avidyā i.e. through belief system or it is developed through Prajñā i.e. through knowledge system and through Samyama i.e. through control and Sankalpa i.e. determination.

* I have elsewhere in my paper on Pratityasamutpāda have tried to show that Pratityasamutpāda does not mean the law of causation and so I shall not refer to it here in this paper.

As we have seen earlier, Buddha refers to both these epistemic concepts, Avidyā and Prajñā, and also to the concepts of Samyama (control) and Sankalpa (determination). Why does misery arise? The basic answer is, because man has Vedanā developing into Trṣṇā; (blind appetites) Avidyā and Samskāra help the continuation of growth of this Trṣṇā. For so long as human being is living and so long as he is not controlled rationally by Prajñā and by Samyama, there is no possibility of Dukkhanirās or Sukkha or Nirvāna; for there would be neither Trṣṇākṣaya nor Trṣṇānāśa. Buddha in verses 190, 191 and 192 talks of four noble truths. Two of them are concerned with misery itself, Dukkha and Dukkhasamudāya, and the remaining two are concerned with control of Dukkha and the eight-fold path (Ashtāṅgikamārga) by which the Dukkha can be controlled. This path of control of Dukkha is called Mārga and consists of eight constituents, proper reason (Samyak Prajñā), proper determination (Samyak Sankalpa), proper speech (Wac), proper action (Karmanatā), proper Ājiva, proper Vyāyāma, proper Smṛiti and proper Samādhi. It means that misery can be controlled if one follows proper discipline. Buddha also tells us here that misery is concerned with transitoriness or Anityatā. The base of misery is, Trṣṇā. It is the development of Sparsa and Vedanā through Avidyā. Sparsa, Vedanā and Trṣṇā (partly) are the constituent conditions of misery. Avidyā and Samskāra are its epistemic conditions. These epistemic conditions through a different focus can change or transform Trṣṇā. Prajñā supplies such a focus.

As soon as the epistemic conditions operate with a different focus one starts recognizing that Trṣṇā is futile and so are birth and death, or old age. The basic Vedanā now becomes Trṣṇā. The basic misery, therefore, although it takes the form of enmity and is social, arises in our blind desire to **have more and more**. It is the same appetite which has developed into Imperialism. Man wants to preserve his mental empire everywhere and so unless one becomes* mentally anti-imperialist one cannot get over the misery which in social sphere takes the form of Vaira or enmity. Buddha tells us that Sparsa and

Vedanā are two important concepts which cannot be got rid of if a man is living. He is bound to have sensations and feelings. But very soon these sensations and feelings take the form of appetites and desires and attachment. Through all these man develops a world of his own. He wants to get rid of miseries; but what happens is exactly the opposite. Tṛṣṇā starts controlling the man and once this happens, instead of getting rid of miseries, he gets more and more involved in miseries. The only way, therefore, to get rid of miseries is through the Ashtāṅgikamārga, the eight-fold path. This leads to peace. But rational efforts have to be made in every respect in order to be on the right track. Instead of Avidyā controlling one's feelings one must now be controlled by Prajñā. Instead of Samskāra, you must now have Sankalpa i.e. will to do. You must not only have the will, you must also speak it out and communicate it to others. It must also develop into action. It must continue throughout your life. This must be like an exercise. This must be like a memory. This must be like a Samādhi. Only then can the social misery be controlled.

Although Buddha talks of twelve-fold diagnosis of Dukkha, to my mind three of them Sparsa, Vedanā and Tṛṣṇā as pointed out above, are basic. In fact the only difference between Sparsa and Vedanā on the one hand and Trishnā on the other is that Tṛṣṇā gives us not just a fact of experience but a tendency to have Vedanā or Sparsa. Tṛṣṇā indicates a tendency, a disposition manifesting itself from time to time, of a certain kind of feeling of our not having something or others having something. On account of Avidyā and Samskāra this concept of our owning or possessing something develops. One starts having a fixed idea of possessing something and this is what is called Āsakti, this is also Parigraha. This naturally requires an epistemic state. The person who has Vedanā must be conscious of what he wants and conscious that others should not have something and that he alone should have it. But this is not rational awareness. It is blind and to indicate this Buddha brings in the epistemic factor of Avidyā. Again this tendency develops and becomes complex on account of the social habit

which is called *Samskāra*. *Sparsa*, the sensation and *Vedanā* the feeling thus get transformed into emotional dispositions and tendencies. And if these dispositions and tendencies are first to be got rid of one must know that the basic *sparsa* or *Vedanā* cannot be got rid of. It can only be controlled and this control must also have awareness as a constituent. But this awareness will be rational awareness. Buddha therefore brings in the factors of *Samyama* and *Prajñā*. These are again the epistemic factors though of a different kind. It must be remembered that *Samyama* is also determined by *Prajñā*. And when *Samyama* plays its part although the *Sparsa* and *Vedanā* have developed into *Trṣṇā* due to *Avidyā*, *Trṣṇā* now starts withering away. But, for this withering away, one more epistemic factor has to be necessarily thought of. And this is the factor of will which is at the back of *Samyama*. This 'will' is indicated in Buddhist theory by *Samkalpa*. So just as through *Avidyā* and *Samskāra*, *Sparsa* and *Vedanā* grow into *Trṣṇā* similarly through *Prajñā* and *Samkalpa* *Samyama* is established and it leads to the decay of *Trṣṇā*. Thus when *Trṣṇā* decays although the basic *Sparsa* and *Vedanā* remain, they do not develop into hate of others and selfishness for oneself. Of course this *Samkalpa* cannot merely remain as *Samkalpa*, it has to be brought into practice, it has to be expressed, it is to be practised with devotion as an exercise, it has to be continuously remembered. Because of this Buddha also talks of *Vaca*, *Karmanta*, *Ājiva*, *Vyāyāma*, *Smṛiti* and *Samādhi*. Just as *Dvādaśa-nidāna* gives us the diagnosis of *Dukkha*, similarly *Astāṅgikamārga* now gives us the steps in the cure of the *Trṣṇā* or *Dukkha* itself.

Let us begin with the concept of *Vaira* or social misery. How is it to be understood? First, it is a relation between two or more terms. Secondly, the terms of this relation must necessarily be men, that is, self-conscious beings. There cannot exist a relation of *Vaira* between two trees or two animals other than men. Again, this relation though asymmetrical in logic appears symmetrical in practice, perhaps due to *Ajñāna*. That is, if there is a relation of *Vairā* between A and B, then the counter-relation between B and A will also usually be the relation of

Vaira. So in practice i.e. in human world it would not be one-sided. For if A has a relation of Vaira with B, then in this human world it is also usually found that B has also the same relation with A. That such a relation must naturally be between two self-conscious beings is clearly indicated in the very first verse of Pāli Dhammapada. It points out this unambiguously when it says that mind is the source of all human attitudes and action. It pursues man's behaviour and generates Dukkha in the same way as a wheel of a cart follows the steps of an ox.

Buddha's solution to the problem of Vaira has also to be understood properly. Buddha wants to tell us that we should recognise that if A has enmity with B it is not necessary that B should have enmity with A. In fact, it is a recognition of this fact which is going to reduce or abolish enmity altogether and bring about peace. The fifth verse in Dhammapada is very eloquent in this regard. It says, enmity does not end enmity. It is the non-enmity on the part of one which would end enmity.

It may be interesting to contrast the concept of Vaira with that of violence (*Himsā*). *Himsā*, too, requires two beings such that one is the agent and the other is acted on. It is possible that the Vaira may end in *Himsā*. But Vaira is a mental relation where both the relata of the relation have capacity to be agents. Each one can be violent to the other. But this violence is also due to well developed self-conscious act, although it may not be desirable. If an animal reacts to a certain action by man and kills him even then the situation cannot be regarded as that of Vaira. Vaira further requires a prolonged tendency to behave in a particular way towards each other.

It is against this concept or tendency of Vaira that Gautama the Buddha is protesting or reacting. He is pleading for Avaira (or Avera in Pāli). 'The Vaira cannot end Vaira', it can be ended only with Avaira. And this is possible because, as a matter of fact, Vaira is not a symmetrical relation. Vaira seems to be the psychological or natural tendency, Avaira seems to be the human answer to it. In Dhammapada it is clearly stated that those who do not give abode to such thoughts as 'he has abused

me', 'he has beaten me', 'he has conquered me' from them the Vaira withers away. In Tripitaka there is a story of the people from two different Gaṇarājyas; perhaps one of them was Shākya Gaṇarājya. A dispute had arisen between the kingdoms on the question of the right to own, possess or use some river water. The dispute grew so intense that almost every man and woman on each side appeared on the scene with the determination to exterminate other. Hearing about the dispute Lord Buddha appeared on the scene and said, "can the fight between you bring peace to this holy land? Will your problem be settled if you resort to fight? The waters of the river are for the use of both. If you start quarreling about the river waters, you will only kill one another and no one will get the water about which you are quarreling?" It is only when by some sustained thought you get over the concept of Vaira and refuse to quarrel then alone the quarrel comes to end. If there is a quarrel or Vaira between A and B then both A and B must give up Vaira. If this is not possible then wisdom must dawn either on A or on B, that Vaira will be futile. In such a case the situation will be very interesting, A wants to quarrel, but B does not want to. He will not just submit to the other as the Kapota submitted to Shyena in the Mahābhārata story. He will now 'fight' with non-violent means. He will insist on what is today known as Satyāgraha. That Vaira does not end Vaira, is Satya, an eternal truth and one has to insist on it. The teaching of Dhammapada was not only the teaching of Buddha, it was also the teaching of Christ, the teaching of Gandhi, if the import of this teaching is properly understood. If somebody slaps you on one cheek give him the other, Christ said. This was certainly not a case of cowardice or weakness; this was a case of strength. Gandhiji did the same thing. When he was awakening the Indian masses he asked the revolutionaries whether their handgranades or revolvers, could bring about freedom and peace to India. Ultimately peace comes by converting others' heart and this was the real message of Buddha when he said,

**Nahi Verena Verāni Sammaniha Kudanchanam
Avairen ca Sammanti Esa Dhammo Sanantano.**

What Gandhiji called Satya was for Buddha the Dhamma, the human nature.

Lord Buddha talks of Sukha or happiness. He says, "One who has given up Vaira can happily live amongst those who are still inhaling the concept of Vaira. How happy all of them would be if all of them had given up the concept of Vaira".

Avaira, non-enmity has to be distinguished from Ahimsā or non-violence. Nevertheless, the basic concept of affection or kindness must be at the back of both Ahimsā and Avaira. That is why Buddha, when he talks of Panchasheela, talks of Ahimsā. It is the basic element in every individual and has a potentiality to end enmity. But Buddha's philosophy seems to be basically concerned with human relations. This is very clearly seen if we try to understand the verses 203 and 204 in Dhammapada. In 204 he says health is the great game, satisfaction is the great wealth, **trust is the great principle of binding one man to another** and Nirvāna i.e. complete extinction is the greatest happiness. Now one can easily see that barring health everything else is really of social nature. Both in the hands Jñāneshwara and Gandhi the concept of Ahimsā is magnified. Jñāneshwara for example says 'Aani jagachiya sukhoddesha, kayavacha manase. rahatne te ahimse, roopa jana'. But Buddha does not seem to philosophise this concept of Ahimsā.

All Dukkha, we have seen, is basically mental and because it is mental, and belongs to the human world, it is possible to get rid of it. This Dukkha originates in relation of one man to another. It arises from my reaction to what others have and what I do not have. It is clearly indicated in the 3rd and 4th verse of Dhammapada — 'Akochhi mum avadhi mum ajini mum ahasi me'. So long as one has an ill-will towards others one is not going to get rid of Dukkha. But if we are able to control it man's Dukkha can wither away. It is said in the 4th verse of Dhammapada :

Ye tam no upanahyanti vairam tesu upasammati.

Those who do not give abode to such thoughts as the other has abused me, the other has beaten me, the other has conquered

me, they alone can get rid of the Vaira. Thus the Dukkha which arises in human mind always arises in contrast with others' state of affairs. It is a relationship of me with others and therefore the Dukkha which Buddha talks of is a social evil, social Dukkha. This Dukkha is not of the nature of pain, it is of the nature of Vaira or hatred. Sparsa and Vedanā which have already grown into Tṛṣṇā take the form of Vaira when one finds that one does not have what one wants whereas others have it. The problem of Dukkha which Buddha raises thus belongs to the human world. Buddha thinks that if I know that my life itself is transitory and that I would not be able to possess anything beyond a certain time I will easily understand that if somebody hates me it does not mean that I should hate him too. So long as I begin to hate somebody when he hates me, the hate grows, the hatred grows. When it dawns on me that I need not hate somebody when he hates me, the hate decays and ultimately vanishes. Recognition of this is the recognition of the fact that X hates Y is not a symmetrical relationship, that is, the counter relation, 'Y hates X' need not necessarily be true. And that which is not necessarily true has to be realized. One must also know that the opposite of hatred is friendship. This however is a symmetrical relation. If I am a friend of B there cannot be a friendship between me and B unless B is also my friend. So the only solution for the elimination of Vaira is the inculcation of friendship. Friendship also requires awareness as a constituent. But this awareness is not of the nature of Avidyā. It is a conscious awareness, not a blind awareness. Dukkha in human world thus can be got rid of only by invoking friendship, only by invoking love of others, only by compassion for others, for others' misery, and not by hatred. One can easily see that this message of Buddha is very much pregnant with truth even today.

Today we are on the brink of destruction. Each one is living in the shadow of atom-bomb. Great powers are manufacturing atom-bomb and common man has to live continuously in an atmosphere of fear generated by the atom-bomb. How is this problem going to be solved? Is it going to be solved by

creating more atom-bombs? If one party wins and the other destroyed, will the problem be over? The answer is no. The great Mahābhārata war is an instance of it. Pandavas and Kauravas fought this great war to become the emperor of Hastinapur. What happened in the end? Only five Pandavas, Draupadi and Subhadra remained on Pandavas side and Dhritarashtra and Gandhari remained on Kauravas side. Pandavas could not even rule over the people over whom they wanted to rule. Lord Buddha very correctly says,

Jayam vairam pasawati dukkham seti parājito
Upasanto sukham seti hitva jayaparājayam.

Victory gives rise to Vaira. The man defeated sleep in agony or misery. It is only one who has gone beyond victory or defeat can sleep happily. The story of Angulimala is most relevant in the context where Buddha proves that love, fearlessness and absence of enmity can alone change the world. This is the only solution to the world problem. "Only one who is able to transcend the concept of victory or defeat can reach the State of happiness and perfect peace." (Pp. 179 and 291 — Dhammapada) It is of significance here that after discussing the concept of Dukkha and Sukha, Buddha also gives the criterion for deciding which is a good act and which is a bad act. According to him, if the action does not lead to repentance or lamentation then that action can be regarded as good. It is certain that this criterion is also social, and it is forgetting this criterion which has brought about misery today, even in international sphere. Let us take the case of atom-bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Perhaps, at the time of bombing the Americans were not aware of what they were doing, but after seeing the havoc that had taken place even they would have been shocked. They would have to have repentance and they would lament for what they have done. Thus, bombing with atom-bomb would never be justified.

Today many a time the concept of Ahimsā is equated with that of Avaira. Gandhiji's preachings particularly are responsible for this. I, however, want to point out that although in effect both the concepts come to the same thing, Avaira is a

response to Vaira and therefore points to the social problem. Ahimsā necessarily does not do that. It is worthwhile noting that Lord Buddha does not talk of Ahimsā when he is referring to social situations. He is of course talking of Ahimsā when he is talking of individual virtues — Panchasheelā. One must cultivate non-violence but to end Vaira or enmity it must be manifested in social situation in the form of Avaira.

Thus according to Buddha the misery or Dukkha, the basic truth, has several constituents. First as suggested above it is mental, i.e., belongs to the human world. Naturally, that which belongs to the human world must be of the nature of correlation between two or more human beings or it might be a correlation between the natural world and the human beings. To me it appears that the concepts of Sparsa (and Vedanā) suggest this contact. Sparsa gives us the relationship of either man or the natural world to human beings. It suggests a sensation or some kind of cognizing element which brings about this contact. But the Sparsa does not merely remain Sparsa, it evolves into some kind of feeling which is suggested by the word Vedanā. Both Sparsa and Vedanā have epistemic element in them and this is very clearly stated in Dhammapada, when it is pointed out that all miseries are 'Mānasika or mental'. This, ofcourse, means that miseries may be all epistemic or they may arise due to interaction with natural things although epistemic elements must be their accompaniment. But if Vedanā had been the only element in misery then it would have been only momentary. It should in fact be momentary. But due to its epistemic nature, that is due to Avidyā it appears to be continuous and grows in the fashion of factus. This Vedanā takes the form of appetite and a blind desire to get more and more. It is not just one Vedanā which controls human beings, it is Vedanā-vaipulya, it is the multitude of Vedanā which gives us a feelings of length in time and is the beginning of the problem. Although this is of the nature of misery man has a desire to possess it. It is colourful, it is tasteful and man feels a strong aptitude to have it. This element is called **Āsakti**. Jains call it **Parigraha**. But what is important to note

is that all these are elements of ego. The ego itself is of the nature of epistemy and on account of the feeling of continuation the ego begins to act as something permanent. My identity is marked by a continuity in time, and my ego becomes a proto-universe. If there are number of men then naturally their different aptitudes will determine the relation amongst them and the most dominant ego will rule. This concept of ego is called *Ātman* and the Buddhists have tried to disown the *Ātman* by bringing in the concept of impermanance — *Anityatā* — *ksanikatā*. But the fact is that a human being is continuously under the epistemic spell which creates an impression in us that the ego is constant and our desires are also constant. Thus in this pseudo-constant-world the *Sparsa* and *Vedanā* tend to become continuous and 'persecute'. The continuous tendency that I should have something is suggested by the word *Tanha* or *Trṣṇā* and therefore it would be adequate to say that our miseries in which we get lost have their origin in *Trṣṇā*. This tendency of *Trṣṇā* may have also sometimes be called interest and each individual may have his own interest. If the interests are conflicting then sometimes it may take the form of violence or at least enmity — *Vaira*. If the self-interest becomes a common interest then there may be friendship or *Maitri*. This common interest may also be due to two things. It may become a more developed *Trṣṇā*, not of one man but of group, one may remember the word '*Mamatā*' in *Gītā*. In that case the nature of misery will remain as it is. Or one may transcend one's ego and look to others' misery with compassion and sympathy. This takes the form of *Karuṇā*. *Karuṇā* itself is a form of misery but it has capacity to make others' misery bearable and reduce one's own misery also. It is a recognition of the fact that there are other beings. One has already transcended the selfish universe and is now looking at the universe from objective point of view. This is again due to awareness. But this awareness is of a different kind. It is no more *Avidyā*, it is now *Vidyā* or *Prajñā*. When *Prajñā* dawns on us one begins to look on *Trṣṇā*, *Vedanā* and *Sparsa* in a different way. The feeling that I should want more and more no longer exists. I am not controlled by the appetites; *Prajñā* now begins to

control the appetites. This is what is called *Samyama*. That something must be controlled gives us one more factor in the analysis and this is the factor of *Samkalpa*. There is a determination to do something. Without such determination the *Trṣṇā* cannot be reduced to mere *Vedanā* which *ipso facto* must continue all the while with its temporal length reduced to a point. One cannot get rid of *Vedanā* but one can get rid of *Trṣṇā*. To be able to get rid of *Trṣṇā* is to be able to get rid of *Dukkha*, is to be able to get rid of *Vaira-enmity*, the cause of social misery. This removes the multiplicity or *Vaiṣaṇā* or the attachment of ours to the things. *Prajñā* removes this *Āsakti* or attachment.

In Chinese version of *Dhammapada*, there is a story of a King and Lord Buddha. I would like to end my paper with that story. Once upon a time there was a Brahmin King, *To-mi-seay*, by name. The King thought that by distributing the precious treasure to people he would be able to remove their misery and so he invited them to his court. He asked each one of them to take handful of precious stones. The King had forgotten that the worldly wealth was of the nature of attachment and was the very embodiment of misery. Lord Buddha thought that it was necessary to make the King understand the shortcoming of such kind of distribution. Lord Buddha assumed the form of a *Brahmacarin* and went to the spot. The King gave him due respect and requested him to ask whatever he wanted. The *Brahmacarin* said, he had a desire to build a house, (He had a *Vedanā* for wealth) and therefore he wanted a few jewels. The King said that he could gladly take them. The *Brahmacarin* took a few jewels, went a few steps but came back and put the jewels back on the heap. The king asked as to why he did it. The *Brahmacarin* replied, "Oh King, this handful is indeed enough to enable me to build a house. But if I build a house, I would also want to have a wife and then these jewels would not be enough". (The *Vedanā* is now getting multiplied into *Trṣṇā*). On this the King asked him to take a few more jewels. The *Brahmacarin* took more jewels, again went seven steps and came back and put the jewels on

the heap. The King again enquired as to why he did it. Lord Buddha in the form of Brahmacerin replied, "These might be enough to provide me with house and wife, but would not be sufficient for me to maintain the house-hold". King on this asked him to take some more treasure. Brahmacerin accepted the King's offer, went a few steps and again returned. And when questioned by the King replied, "These would not be sufficient for the maintenance and welfare of children". The King therefore asked him to take the whole heap of the jewels. On this the Brahmacerin appeared in the form of Lord Buddha and said that attachment and increase of wants would indeed be "the over accumulating mass of sorrow and pain that resulted from the worldly life". Increase of wants would grow in increasing progression and would never bring peace. Our wants or *Trṣṇā* must not be allowed to increase wildly. This would only 'make vice resemble and love resemble hate' (creating such confusions is the function of *Avidyā* and removing such confusions is the function of *Prajñā*).

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Poona University, PUNE 411 007.