

TOLERANCE AND A SECULAR STATE :
THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Every society has certain guiding principles and norms which it cherishes and intends to realize them through its declared policies and consequent activities. We in India have given to ourselves a constitution which proclaims that the Indian society is a secular one from the point of view of religion. Not only implicitly, in many of its public declarations the Government of India has extolled the virtue of tolerance and the secular character of the state has been consistently emphasised. Very recently, (March 2-5, 1983) a four day Seminar on *The Concept And Role Of Tolerance* (in India) was organised at the University of Madras under the sponsorship of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the late Prime Minister of the country, was a persistent advocate of the virtue of tolerance and in her meeting with the members of The National Commission on teachers on March 26, 1983, she expressed herself enthusiastically in favour of inculcating the spirit of tolerance through education and accept it as one of the guiding principles of our educational system. The very composition of the Indian society is multi-lingual, multi-religious and having a plurality of ethnic and cultural groups, perhaps tends it to the preaching and practice of tolerance as in any other pluralistic democratic society. Some would like to hold that tolerance as a virtue of the modern pluralist democracy has emerged in contemporary America.¹ It is firmly believed by many in India that the concept of tolerance is rooted in the very tradition of Indian thought and action and Gandhiji has tried to put it in practice in the contemporary context. So it has become an important factor in shaping the current pattern of thought on society in our country in as much as the long standing tradition of any old country does influence its practices and actions. The progressiveness of a society depends, among other things, on its capacity to assess its cultural tradition judiciously so as to be able to retain what is living in it and to discard what is dead. This decides whether a country is mainly conservative

or progressive, though it is hardly likely that any country can be exclusively one or the other.

I shall try to analyze here in brief the concept of tolerance, arguments put forward in its favour, and the role it plays in contemporary India. In this context an assessment has also to be made regarding the claim of tolerance being a traditional virtue in our country. I am painfully aware that I am badly deficient in the historical competence needed for the job and scientific orientation required for any such theory construction. My only excuse is that I consider it worthwhile and the distinguished academic society will tolerate one more such venture made by a student of Philosophy. This attempt may also be construed to exhibit the social relevance of the pursuit of philosophy in our country today. In this context I shall use both terms—tolerance and toleration—indifferently without caring to consider the semantic niceties involved.

In making this study one methodological caution may be in order. One has to avoid, though it is quite difficult to do so, the dichotomous or straight-jacket mode of understanding the problem. It becomes very difficult when one has to deal with one's own tradition and culture where 'fact' and 'value' are intricately intermingled. We might suffer from the unconscious tendency of reading too much in the tradition in terms of our contemporary understanding or, consider them from a particular alien point of view. To avoid the 'conservative' point of view we might become too 'radical' or, to avoid the 'imperialistic' distortion we might become too chauvinistic. To avoid the 'imperialistic-nationalistic', the 'materialistic-spiritualistic', the 'idealistic-socialistic', 'model-based and model-free' dichotomies, to name only a few, is a very tough job, and the historical-philosophical evaluation of the Indian cultural tradition has as a matter of fact quite often suffered from one or the other of the maladies. It has now gained some acceptance that it is not perhaps possible to have 'objectivity' even in History in the purest form one would like to have as every action qua human must have its 'subjective' imprint and from this angle of thinking historical 'relativism' may not be as obnoxious a theory as some would like to think. This, however, is a peripheral issue here and I shall not engage myself or commit myself in favour of either point of view in the present

context. I only claim that our study may be a second-order one and all we want is, to be free from dogmatism.

II

Tolerance/toleration has both a positive and a negative import and its significance can be best realised in a *particular context*. These contexts may be ontological, moral, religious, social, cultural and political and this might lead to the different dimensions of the use of the term. With the change of the context not only the meaning but even the criteria of identifying tolerance might change and a uniform pattern cannot be prescribed for all contexts. The Pocket Oxford Dictionary gives for the meaning of the term 'tolerate'—'allow the existence or occurrence of, without authoritative interference, leave unmolested, put up with, find or treat as endurable (t. Jews, polygamy, sweating infringement of copyright, slang, crude colours, bores), and for tolerance—'tolerant temper or ways' and for 'toleration' 'tolerating, esp, the recognition of free thought and practice in religious matters as a policy or institution'. All these meanings seem to have a negative sense rather than a positive one. In the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy² toleration is regarded 'as a policy of patient forbearance in the presence of something which is disliked or disapprove of'. Toleration must thus be distinguished from freedom or liberty precisely because 'it implies the existence of something believed to be disagreeable or evil... Toleration has an element of condemnation built into its meaning... To tolerate is first to condemn and then to put up with or, more simply, to put up with is first to condemn and then to put up with.' If tolerance/toleration is understood in this way it certainly cannot be accepted as a virtue. In Plato's list of 'cardinal virtues' toleration in this sense does not figure. And it becomes really difficult to distinguish tolerance from *compromise* which normally means acceptance under duress or constraints. So, in the senses given above tolerance may well be antithetical to the exercise of freedom and may lead to utter impotence and inactivity.

No wonder that there is no counterpart or synonym for tolerance in Sanskrit understood in the above senses. *Paramatasahisnutā* is rather a literal translation and does not capture the positive sense in which cognate terms have been used in our tradition. Some would like to think that in the

context of Indian tradition tolerance is to be identified with the positive virtues like *Maitri*—implying friendliness and communion with fellow beings. Some suggest *Karunā* (compassion for man and other animals), or, *Muditā* (expression of happiness at other's happiness), and *Upeksā* (ignoring misbehaviour from others, forbearance), and also *Kṣmā* (forgiveness). These are regarded as *Sadvāsanās* (noble intentions which drive away the *Durvāsanās* (bad intentions)). One single term which to my mind comes closest to tolerance understood as a positive quality of human character is *Ahimsā* (in the sense in which Gandhiji has also used³ it in recent times. Gandhiji, not an academic philosopher by any means, nor even an intellectual in his own proclamation was groping about the exact creeding of *ahimsā* and has certainly used the term in a very comprehensive and positive sense. It is anybody's guess as to him for his idea of *ahimsā* was influenced by his exposure to western culture and education, but he was without doubt centered in the Hindu tradition very strongly. *Ahimsā* is not mere non-violence which has a negative import. In its positive significance it means a strong man's free choice to be compassionate and kind when he could dictate the terms. It is the worthy man's free choice to be decent to others when he has the capacity to be otherwise and assist them in the manifestation of their inherent potentialities. It is man's deep feeling for others, even animals, and suitable action for their improvement. In this sense it has been practised in *Mahāyāna* Buddhism. Gandhiji claims it to be a moral force superior to physical force and if applied *properly*, capable of conquering over far stronger physical force. It is the way of love and affection which is capable of touching the similar chord in every human heart. Asoka's example of relinquishing the fruits of a total conquest bought at a very heavy price is cited as an example of the practice of *ahimsā*. It certainly includes among other things *karunā*, *ksamā* and *maitri*. It seems that the concept of tolerance can be placed in a scale—on the one end of which is nobility and magnanimity and on the other is compromise or abject surrender, impotence and inaction. Viewed thus, tolerance varies between an extremely comprehensive and positive virtue and a negative conception of inactivity and passive acceptance where there is no exercise of genuine freedom as there is no power of protest. The exact identification of its nature

depends on the context in which we find it.

The basic ontological arguments in favour of tolerance are at least two—one positive and the other negative in character—both emanating from certain beliefs about human nature. The positive argument has its genesis in the acceptance of man's freedom of choice and action. In so far as a particular individual has freedom his fellow beings are under obligation to allow or tolerate his exercise of freedom, otherwise civil society becomes a 'state of nature'. This is mutual recognition of rights and duties in the normal sense and practice. The other argument arises from the fact of fallibility of man,—'to err is human'. Since man is fallible i.e., liable to error, he is to tolerate other's views/beliefs/actions in as much as that view might be the correct one. We come across classical arguments in this regard in Locke's Essay on Justice and Mill's Essays on Liberty. It seems to me that both these considerations are present, in germinal or developed form, in the tradition of Indian thinking. They seem to appear in two types of arguments apparently antithetical. One follows from the fact of unity and continuity of man's life and the other from the fact of plurality of views. The Hindu concepts of *Sadvāsanās* and *Samanvaya*, the Buddhist theory of *Panchsheela* and *Ahimsā*, and the Jaina theory of *Anekāntavāda* with its logical epistemological counterpart in *Syādvāda* are all conducive to the creation of an atmosphere of tolerance as a positive virtue—as of mutual trust and respect. It has been regarded as a complete view of the way of life—the *dharmic* view which certainly is much wider a concept than religion as we understand it in the context of religions like Christianity or Islam which accept proselytizing as a part of religion. The Indian tradition is positively and basically tolerant despite the internal tensions within some views as it does not offer any special creed to cling to or convert others to, and so, the question of proselytization does not arise at all. Everyone has the right to the way of his/her life and this way of life is *Dharma*. Each person has his *Svadharmā* and all that has to be done is to encourage him to live in a noble (human) way—way that is conducive to the realization of *man's ultimate goal*. According to some⁴ one basic reason for this very catholic attitude and openness of the Indian tradition is that it is prompted by the consideration of the unity of the spiritual and

material life—the former having precedence over the latter. The understanding of the basic unity beneath the surface of diversities generate a type of catholicity which is positive and respectful of other views. The answer to the question as to how one should pursue his values is open to the individual concerned. I am reminded of a parable⁵ in this context. On completion of their studies at their father's place god, man, and demon asked *Prajāpati*, their father, for the last advice. To each one of them he uttered the syllable *da*, and asked each in turn if he had understood what was meant. 'Yes' said god, and explained, 'you asked me to practice *damayatā*, (self-control). 'Yes' said man, 'you asked me to practice *dāna* (giving). 'Yes', said demon, 'you asked me to practice *dayā* (compassion). *Prajāpati* said that indeed they had understood the lesson. Ever since that lesson, in thunder of the sky - *da da da*. To gods given to enjoyment; Self-control; to men given to acquisition; charity; and to demons given to violence; compassion. This sort of understanding flows from 'constant intuition of the unity of all life, and the instructive and ineradicable conviction that the recognition of this unity is the highest good and the uttermost freedom'.⁶ Tolerance is rooted in the conviction of unity (*aikya*) and *samanvaya* (*harmony*) as also in the acceptance of the fact of plurality as formal in the Jaina theory. This quest for unity or the unifying principle permits diversities to remain not discordantly, but in concord with the basic principle. With the conviction in an abiding unifying principle tolerance is the only reasonable attitude. I think there is one more factor which has shaped the tradition for tolerance, but I am not very sure about its positive role. The theory of *Karma* also has helped to generate an attitude of acceptance; but this might also work to foster the sense of helpless surrender to the realities through a belief in an ontological principle. I shall have occasion to refer to it tangentially later in the paper.

In the field of action King Asoka's name is often mentioned, and to my mind justifiably, to show how a spirit of positive tolerance has been fostered through his preachings and practices. The episodes regarding Asoka's own cruelty (specially that relating *Kunāla*) are not generally taken seriously as there is not much evidence in its favour. The myth of Asoka's killing all his ninety nine brothers for capturing the throne has been exploded through his own inscriptions. In a number of Rock Edicts - specially in

the Rock Edick xii we get a clear formulation of what we now call secularism or religious tolerance. 'Asoka says that he does not think of liberality and outward reverence (*pujā*) to one's religion so much as of the growth of its essentials (*sarabodhi*). This growth of the essential is of various kinds, but at the root of it is restraint of speech. In other words, a person must not make an exhibition of reverence to his own sect and condemn another's without any good reason. On the contrary the other sects should be shown reverence for this and that reason. By so doing a person exalts his own sect, and does service to another's sect.'⁸ Asoka has the insight to see that of the two aspects of every religion—ritualistic or external and the internal core—there is divergence only in the former; but regarding the latter each has the same core, *dharma* is the same for all of them. The religious tolerance of the Guptas is now well-established.⁹ References are sometimes made to the conflict between the *Saivas* and *Vaisnavas* in the South during the Pallava reign (6th century A. D.). But it has not been established at all that they had anything like the religious wars in Europe. It was more of the nature of a Psychological tension which was settled through the partition of the Capital City *Kanchipuram* into *Siva Kanchi* and *Visnu Kanchi Puram*. The settlement gave rise to very constructive activities in fine arts, music, sculpture and architecture. The excellent hymns composed by both the groups in praise their respective deities became the common possession of both of them. Another such supposed religious conflict is related to the overthrow of the Maurya dynasty. Pandit Haraprasad Sastri thinks that Pusyamitra Sunga, a Brahmin, overthrew the Mauryas as the Hindus were feeling oppressed by the Maurya kings who were Bauddhas. This view has now been conclusively proved to be wrong by historians like Dr. D. R. Bhandarkar, R. C. Mozumdar and R. K. Mukherjee. It is common sense that if the Mauryas were intolerant of the Hindus how could Pusyamitra Sunga, a Brahmin, rise to the position of the Commander-in-chief. The Maurya dynasty was overthrown because of its internal weakness and it is an accident that the process was spearheaded by a Hindu.

Historically there is very inadequate evidence to show that there has been religious persecution in India of the magnitude of what we come across in other parts of the globe. Hindus, Bauddhas and Jainas have co-existed peacefully for centuries and have

mutually influenced each other. The fact that India has been one of the places of early settlement of the Christians who still flourish goes to prove the religious tolerance prevalent in the country. This fact becomes more poignant when we look to the history of Europe where numerous bloody battles have been fought in the name of religion and hundreds of persons have been subjected to inhuman torture and even put to death in the name of Inquisition. It is true that from the seventh century A. D. when India faced the challenge of a militant proselytizing religion in Islam the *Sanātana Dharma* suffered a jolt; but the result was not counter militancy but a recoiling within its own shell as it were and this certainly led to the loss of dynamism of the Dharma and occasional frictions within its own different sects. But Islam could not conquer India culturally. There was a fruitful fruition of the two, leading to the emergence of excellent creative arts, music, dance, sculpture, painting and architecture. The genuine challenge in the cultural field came during the British rule and it led to cultural ruination of the country, if not total but at least substantial, from the beneficial results of which the country has not still recovered. The imperial rule not only challenged the religion but wanted to create a division among the population through propagation of their language and culture so as to have a cleavage among the elite and the masses. This had far reaching effects. The elite, who would hold the power or serve the power that he became almost culturally rootless so as to forget its identity or more seriously, to accept an implanted identity. Under such conditions the problem of what constitutes 'Indianness' poses as a genuine problem. But there has been a silverlining too. Some of the lofty traits of liberal intellectualism, democratic pattern of government and scientific outlook have been imbibed from this exposure of India to the West and a new sense of nationalism has grown which is the result of cultural cross-fertilization. The imperceptible shift that has taken place at least in the mind of the English educated elite has resulted in the acceptance of a more secular, scientific outlook in preference to the spiritual one. And this shift constitutes a major factor in the contemporary social thinking in present India. The search for the 'Indian identity' has begun in right earnest and attempts are being made to restore the communication between the elite and the masses that was snapped as a result of colonisation and total cultural domination by the imperial power. Gandhiji's emergence

as a leader of the Indian National Congress, basically an elite organization, has played a significant role in breaking the barrier between the two sections of the population but to what results it has led to is another question. In this context of the results of British cultural domination, one may profitably rewrite the foresight of Rabindranath Tagore who in a number of essays already explained the emergence of new caste division on the basis of English education.

III

Whatever the results, the fact is that India had to take to English system of education and whatever we now find in contemporary India is certainly influenced by Western education and culture. The constitution of independent India was drafted by persons who were products of British educational and cultural atmosphere and this has been amply reflected in the constitution, along with the attempt at incorporating India's own tradition in it. However, one might have a lingering suspicion that the document is more western than Indian and the entire course of the later development of the country would have been different if the Constitution was more indigenous.

In the fortysecond amendment of our Constitution (1976) the terms socialist and secular were added to sovereign democratic Republic (as adopted in 1950) and now we have declared ourselves as a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic. Secularism in the matter of religion has been a policy from the very beginning of Independent India. Secularism does not merely mean the acceptance of the fact of existence of a plurality of religions and faiths nor only to allow them to exist; it basically means that there is no religion which is specially chosen as the state religion. The state accepts every religion as equal and each is given as much preference as the other with a slant of special care for the minority religions. There may not be any reasonable doubt about this stand of India as its practice on this matter has been uniform. This is specially significant in the context of what is being preached and practised in other countries of the subcontinent. Religious tolerance with its embeddedness in our tradition and also strengthened by the exposure to western scientific outlook has struck strong roots in contemporary India and I do not think that there can be any serious doubt about

this fact. Communal disturbances have certainly taken place but the state has always tried to control it and this has been proved by the fact that there has been no largescale massacre as we saw during the partition days. Persons of minority communities have risen to the highest positions of the country and this has been nationally accepted. Sometimes the weakness in the opposite direction has rather been exposed. The fanatic and unreasonable demands of the religious minorities have created tensions and have raised questions regarding the limits of toleration. Toleration, as noted above, is context-bound and dangers to its practice may come not only from a dominant majority but also from a militant and fanatic minority or a combination of them. The ultimate court of appeal or moral legitimacy is human reasonableness which also may have its limits. Fortunately for us, no major communal shake up has taken place and the increasing emphasis on religious secularism has fostered greater understanding among the people. Not only, though mainly, the traditional attitude has helped but the spread of secular thinking too has contributed in the strengthening of the secular attitude in our country.

One factor in this context appears to be interest of. It is found that in the West after the bloody battles over religious and allied issues, there came about a state of tolerance when, it appears, every religious stuarts tolerating the other in consideration of mutual benefit. So, tolerance appears not as a positive virtue but as a pragmatic expedient, if not anything else. The breakthrough in science and technology manifested through Industrial Revolution also makes the issue of religion secondary.

The role of tolerance in contemporary Indian social perspective seems to be different. Gandhiji preaches it not as a compromise or a negative virtue, but as a very positive one. It is almost like Kant's Categorical Imperative that it has to be practised, not for the sake of anything else, but for its own sake. Gandhiji has emphasised the supreme role of *ahimsā* in the individual's and the society's life as positive virtue of mutual love, respect and trust. This is, however, very difficult to practice and the Indian Constitution is not exactly a document which Gandhiji himself would have liked on this point. But this is not to suggest that tolerance can be practised by any society as an absolute virtue.

In this context I intend to discuss briefly the role tolerance plays in the wider social situation in India. This is quite in order as religious tolerance does not *ipso facto* lead to social tolerance. Again tolerance in some fields may have a depressing effect on the society. This may specially be applicable in the economic matter. It may be seen that not only the meaning but even the criteria for the application of the term 'tolerance' might vary in relation to the context in which it is applied. So, the insistence on its preaching and practice may vary well be opposed to human interest and freedom and it may be clearly seen that tolerance is a context-bound concept. Religious tolerance and political tolerance are not the same and tolerance in the field of economic institutions and practices may lead to devastating results on a large section of the community. What is healthy for religion may not only be so for political practices; it may be even antagonistic to the interest of the larger section of mankind in economics.

After the initial hesitations, tensions and miscalculations, it may now be said that the democratic set-up in our country has come of age. Political toleration is practically noticeable at the national level. The instalation of a number of state governments under the leadership of political parties opposed to the one at the helm of affairs at the Centre and the break in the monopoly of the same political party remaining in power at the Centre for about three decades continuously has added substance to the actual existence of political tolerance as is required in a democratic pluralism. The constant fear psychosis, fake or genuine, expressed by some state governments relating to supposed toppling by the Centre has proved false and it now appears more as a political stunt rather than anything else. The peculiar composition of India with its diverse linguistic and ethnic groups and the traditional nature of Indian polity¹⁰ dominated by enlightened tolerance and lofty social organization on a spiritual basis, though badly changed and shattered gradually through foreign invasion, has made the democratic set-up possible on a solid foundation. Many of the difficulties we find are shared by any open society and specially a society with a rich cultural heritage but marked by scars of foreign invasion. However, the danger may lurk from another direction. Quite often acceptance of whatever goes on might lead not only

to misadministration, but also encourage regionalism and support disintegrating forces. Tolerance in a society like ours may become harmful to the total national interest for being much too permissive. The encouragement of different group interests might generate narrow regionalism and the forces of disintegration might masquerade as justified group interests. It seems sometimes that we might need to give up the image of the Society as the battleground of competing interests and think of an exalted community based on human reasonableness which is beyond pluralism and tolerance.

Political tolerance may be parasitical on and, in a way the supporting ground of, cultural tolerance. In a country like India with a very rich cultural heritage there might be a natural tendency to cling to whatever is handed down as a part of traditional culture and this is likely to be reflected in the political posture of the country. But the history of the Indian cultural tradition is not unlinear. In the British rule India found a serious challenge to its tradition which wanted to dominate and finally to wipe out the indigenous culture. This led to the unfortunate division of the society into the English-educated elite and the non-elite masses a sizeable section of whom might be otherwise quite cultured in the traditional way. The cultural confusion we find in the country today is reflected in a number of ways and it becomes more poignant when power is held by the elite. A vigorous attempt and clear thinking is needed to regain the cultural texture of the country. But in the absence of clear understanding of the situation, there might come up difficulties from two opposite directions one of nationalistic traditionally oriented Chauvinism trying to preserve everything that is there in the tradition or supposed to be that without caring to make a judicious distinction between what is living and what is dead in it. On the other hand, there might be a wholesale rejection of the traditional culture and an attempt might be made at apeing the modern industrially developed countries of the West and Westernization might be the substitute for modernization. Tolerance of either of these attitudes is as harmful as the other. There are a few thinkers in India today who have taken up this problem seriously and a cultural rejuvenation may be on the cards.

Tolerance has perhaps its negative role in the economic field

in our country. The philosophy of tolerance when applied in this realm serves the interest of the dominant economic group in the best possible way. Under the guise of free competition and equal rights for all it tends to shatter the interest of the economically weaker sections as the result of a competition between unequals is a foregone conclusion. In a Pluralistic society there may be uncertainties in many matters but not in the economic field. Tolerance here is 'repressive'¹¹ and most harmful for the vast majority of the weaker section and must have its limits somewhere. And as political power in most of the democratic societies has a tendency to go the way of the purseholders the scene in the political arena also takes a definite shape. Within the frame-work of pre-established inequality in economic power tolerance becomes total surrender to the power that be. Under such conditions one has to rethink about the entire ideology of tolerance which serves best the economic interest of the strong. Our socialist professions taken seriously can only change the situation through a revolutionary orientation and praxis.

IV

I shall close this paper with a not very concordant note. I do not think that tolerance is an absolute virtue in the sense that it must prevail under all conditions. It is, as already noted, context-bound. To tolerate an intolerable situation is tacitly conniving at the continuance of that state of affairs and is positively condemnable. I cannot persuade myself to accept Gandhiji's or Popper's¹² preference for tolerance and persuasion even when one knows for certain that such a course of action will not work. Under such conditions of repressive tolerance we have to think of its alternative, even of violence in a limited scale as only an alternative means. I am not convinced that there is a necessary antithesis between violence and reason and violent means are always unreasonable. If institutionalized violence is pardonable and no question is raised about its rationality; but used by an individual or a group, it becomes inspect. Some time our collective commitment to anti-violence in an effective way may be considered reasonable. The ultimate court of appeal in problems of justification or legitimization is man himself—his reasonableness (rationality is not my favourite) which might opt for counter-

violence to preserve human life, dignity, freedom and creativity. It is the question of preservation of man qua man as a social and historical being, as a free and creative agent that will finally decide if tolerance is the last word or will have to go for something else—beyond tolerance but conducive to man's expansiveness to others in communication and communion, finding his identity through fellow beings and interpersonal relationship. No compromise is justified where man's freedom is challenged or negated.

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NOTES

1. Robert Paul Wolff : *Beyond Tolerance - In A Critique of Pure Tolerance*. Ed. R. P. Wolff, B. Moore, Jr., H. Marcuse, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p. 4.
2. *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. Ed. Paul Edwards, Vol. 7 & 8, pp. 143-46.
3. *Selections from Gandhi*. Ed. N. K. Bose, Chapter IX, Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad.
4. See Ananda K. Coomaraswamy : *The Dance of Siva*, Sagar Publications, New Delhi, 1968.
5. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, V. 2. 3.
6. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *Ibid* : p. 4.
7. Law of Karma, see any standard book of History of Indian Philosophy.
8. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar : *Asoka*, The University of Calcutta Press, 1955, p. 271.
9. Ceylonese Chronicle—King Meghavaran of Sri Lanka (Dipa vamsa—Maha vamsa) asked for permission from Emperor Samudra Gupta of India to build a monastery at Bodh Gaya for the Buddhist students living there. The Emperor not only permitted it, but also gave the revenue of some villages for the maintenance of the students. From Fa Hien's account also we come to know about the flourishing condition of the Buddhist monasteries all over the Gupta Emperors.
10. See Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library, Vol. 114, *The Foundations of Indian Culture*, Pondicherry, 1972, pp. 328-384.
11. H. Marcuse in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Repressive Tolerance, pp. 111-123.
12. Karl Popper : *Utopia and Violence*, in *Conjectures and Refutations*, 1963. On the problem of Reason and Violence one may consult Roy Edgley's excellent article in *Practical Reason*. Ed. Stephen Corner, Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1974, pp. 113-1135.