

IS WITTGENSTEIN PARADOXICAL ?¹

The objective of this paper is to consider some of the views and the thesis stated by Professor Rudy Kreijci in his paper "Wittgenstein and the Paradoxes in Philosophy".²

The title of his paper is quite misleading. In the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* Wittgenstein says, "Something surprising, a paradox, is a paradox only in a particular, as it were defective, surrounding. One needs to complete this surrounding in such a way that what looked like a paradox no longer seems one."³ In the light of this remark one may be led to think that Prof. Kreijci aims at a discussion of Wittgenstein's attitude towards paradoxes and how to make philosophical paradoxes disappear. But it is not so. The most appropriate and non-misleading title for his paper would be: "Paradoxical Wittgenstein"; for Prof. Kreijci says, "It is commonplace nowadays to bypass a series of contradictions Wittgenstein's philosophy represents, paying attention only to the 'essential' core of his life's work. Against this very trend, the thesis of this paper will be to try to show that Ludwig Wittgenstein will always rank with the great philosophers of the past *because* of a whole series of both the existential and philosophical paradoxes he personally was never fully aware of, since they comprised an integral part of his life. His life's drive can be captured by a motto: I philosophize, therefore I am."⁴ Prof. Kreijci states his thesis in Section IV of his paper wherein he states 12 existential/philosophical paradoxes found in Wittgenstein's life and philosophy.

Before we discuss the 12 so-called Wittgensteinian paradoxes, I would like to consider a few other related views of Prof. Kreijci's.

In Section I of his paper he talks of a Creator, Apostles, Apostles's pupils and general followers; organization of "a church with a hierarchy, orthodoxy, sacred places where the members congregate to commemorate the Creator"⁵; the defence of orthodox interpretation of the Creator's words and the appointment of a committee of inquisitors even against the "Creator-

Master" himself if he comes back again to the world of man to challenge the given orthodox interpretation. If this is set in the Wittgensteinian context then Wittgenstein becomes the Creator-Master, his students the Apostles, their students the Apostles' pupils, and people like me are the general followers. These people are said to be part of the church which defends the orthodox interpretation and which will not hesitate to set up a committee of inquisitors even if Wittgenstein himself comes back to life to challenge the given orthodox interpretation. It appears to be a charge against Wittgenstein's literary executors, their associates and the people who look at Wittgenstein from more or less the same angle. The charge is unjustified. Except the episode⁶ in connection with Bartley III's *Wittgenstein*, which created quite a bit of sensation, no other episode has surfaced. Moreover, the fact that Prof. Krejci's paper itself was heard in a church gathering and his paper included in a volume which also includes the papers of Apostles, Apostles' pupils and pious general followers disproves the charge. On the contrary, it proves that there is a lot of freedom in interpreting Wittgenstein and this freedom even allows one to say that Wittgenstein is paradoxical.

In Section III, he gives the examples of a number of philosophers and says how they were paradoxical. The most interesting example is that of Marx. About Marx he says, "Karl Marx' philosophy of history would not have permitted him to produce the work he did produce. His materialistic and economic interpretation of history is contradicted existentially by a highly idealistic life ignoring all the materialistic and economic necessities."⁷ It may be noted here that in Marx's social theory the society is the basic unit and not the individual. His materialistic and economic interpretation of history does not mean hedonism—either at the individual or at the social level. The building of such a society needs sacrifices both at the individual and the societal level and thus sacrifice is a constituent element in the process of building that society. Instead of merely *saying* Marx was *showing* the way of life that is needed to build such a society—not like some of the so-called Marxists who would like to roll in luxury and *talk* of Marxism.

Now, let us come back to his thesis itself. Defining a paradox he says, "The concept of a paradox as presented in this paper defines the paradox as statements representing a symbolically organized model expressing an internal struggle of the philosopher's life. The paradox of the first order emerges when it transcends itself as a theoretical consideration and becomes imbedded in the existential life of the philosopher."⁸ If within the framework of a philosophy there are propositions which contradict each other, then we may say that the philosophy is paradoxical. But if there is disparity between the thought of a philosopher and the way of life he leads, then we may say that the situation presents an existential paradox. Therefore, we may say that the people who say, "I know what is good, but I have no inclination to follow it and I know what is bad, but I cannot desist from it" or "Do what I say, don't do what I do" are existentially paradoxical.

Wittgenstein, who said that a paradox is a paradox only in a defective surrounding and would no longer be a paradox if a proper surrounding is provided for, is pictured here by Prof. Kreijci as a paradoxical philosopher. He says that Wittgenstein was paradoxical in 12 different ways. He does not state the premises elaborately and as they stand the conclusions appear to be unfounded. I would like to discuss each of the so-called paradoxes and, following Wittgenstein, say that they appear to be paradoxes only when one considers them out of context. The context of a so-called paradox would contain a number of factors, but the most fundamental of them is Wittgenstein's drive to philosophize. For him, it was the very meaning of life : To be is to philosophize. This Prof. Kreijci recognizes and expresses with the help of a motto : "I philosophize, therefore I am."

- (1) "Wittgenstein strives to show zealously that philosophical systems or metaphysics consists of nonsense, while he himself produced two philosophical systems in succession."

In this passage the word "philosophical" occurs twice. Prof. Kreijci thinks that in both the occurrences the word is used in the same sense and, thus, thinks that Wittgenstein is involved in a paradox. So far as the expression "philosophical systems or metaphysics" is concerned, it can be said that it is a body of

propositions claiming to be the ultimate truth about the world and organized into a system. For Wittgenstein the word "philosophy" never meant a body of such propositions—not even in the *Tractatus*. Sometimes people talk of the *metaphysics* of the *Tractatus*, whereas the book is only about a method to do away with metaphysics. If doing away with metaphysics is also a kind of metaphysics, then Wittgenstein was aware of this and because of this awareness he says, "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way : anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." (6.54) What one can learn in the *Tractatus* is a method, not a body of propositions claiming to be the ultimate truth about the world. For Wittgenstein, philosophy is a kind of activity—a method of elucidation—to free mankind from the bewitchment of language. Neither the *Tractatus* nor the *Philosophical Investigations* is a system from the traditional standpoint.

Moreover, a follower of Plato is called a Platonist and an opponent an anti-Platonist. But a treatise which opposes metaphysical philosophy is not branded as anti-philosophical. Rather, it too is called philosophical. It appears that as a matter of accident in language the word "philosophy" embraces and absorbs its own opponent. An activity to do away with philosophy is also a philosophical activity. This is because of a peculiar characteristic of philosophy which other disciplines lack. This characteristic is the self-reflectiveness of philosophy. The reflections on history is not history; it is philosophy of history. The reflections on science is not science; it is philosophy of science. And so on. Whereas the reflections on philosophy is not philosophy of philosophy; it is just philosophy. The concept "philosophy" not only includes the first order philosophy, but it also includes all its subsequent orders.

- (2) "Wittgenstein is convinced that, in essence, the philosophical problems are solved, abandons philosophy and returns to it."

So far as the *Tractatus* is concerned a number of problems had gripped Wittgenstein's mind and he considered them to be

very fundamental and important and in need of solutions. What ever he thought to be their solutions he offered and being honest to the core he did not linger himself and whileaway the time in the workshop of philosophy. Thus, he abandoned philosophy. But thereby he did not mean that no philosophical problems would arise in future either at this personal level or at an inter-personal level. New problems offered him a challenge and he returned to philosophy to brave the challenge. G. H. von Wright says, "Wittgenstein said that he returned to philosophy because he felt that he could again do creative work. An external circumstance of this important step may have been that in March of 1928 he had heard Brouwer lecture in Vienna on the foundations of mathematics. It is rumoured to have been this which stirred him to take up philosophy again."⁹ Why should this be thought of as paradoxical ?

- (3) "Wittgenstein who was opposed to the traditional professional philosophy became a professor of philosophy himself and established his own tradition."

It is true that Wittgenstein was opposed to the traditional professional philosophy. It is also true that he became a professor of philosophy. But thereby he did not contradict himself, for after becoming a professor he did not do the same kind of philosophy he was opposed to. His attitude to the traditional philosophy may be imagined from the remark he makes about the Socratic dialogues : "Reading the Socratic dialogues one has the feeling : what a frightful waste of time ! What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing and clarify nothing ?"¹⁰ Prof. K. J. Shah informs me that Wittgenstein was of the opinion that the traditional philosophy as practised lacked breadth and depth. How are we to understand this Wittgensteinian opinion ? This is how I understand it. The traditional philosophy lacked depth because it proved nothing, it clarified nothing. It lacked breadth because nothing concrete was in it, nothing useful to humanity at large. He says, the "characteristic of my philosophy" is that it "heads straight for what is concrete."¹¹ His aim is to free mankind from the bewitchment of language.—To bring mankind back to "what lies in front of everyone's eyes" through an analysis of language. Keeping in mind the traditional philosophers he says, "A philosopher is a man who has

to cure many intellectual diseases in himself before he can arrive at the notions of commonsense."¹² And "God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone's eyes."¹³ The depth lies in theoretical consistency, clarity, etc. and the breadth lies in the practical consistency—having practical consequences in the manner of being useful to society. So he had his own way of doing philosophy and he was doing it. He says, "I still find my own way of philosophizing new, and keeps striking me so afresh...."¹⁴ He did not succumb to the demands of the then dominant tradition.

So far as the establishment of a tradition of his own is concerned, he himself did not do it. Rather, he was completely averse to it. About founding a school he says, "I cannot found a school because I do not really want to be imitated. Not at any rate by those who publish articles in philosophical journals."¹⁵ If by this Prof. Krejci means the small circle of people who were around him, then it can be said that they were a very small group of friends—not necessarily philosophers—whose hands he could hold and talk at ease—who formed his "cultural milieu"—who were his "fellow citizens". He says, "If I say my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if it can be called a circle), I do not mean that I believe this circle to be the elite of mankind; but it does comprise those to whom I turn (not because they are better or worse than others but) because they form my cultural milieu, my fellow citizens as it were, in contrast to the rest who are *foreign* to me."¹⁶ Thus, if there is any tradition now that can be called a Wittgensteinian tradition, then it is the other people involved who are to be blamed but not Wittgenstein himself. Even they cannot be blamed!—For doing philosophy in a particular manner may even unconsciously build up a tradition. Anyway, in essentials, the pro-Wittgensteinian tradition is radically different from the pre-Wittgensteinian tradition.

- (4) "As a teacher of philosophy Wittgenstein advises students to give up philosophy for some more useful activity."

There may be various reasons for this kind of advice, but that does not involve him in a contradiction, for he did not lead the department to the stage of abolition. On the other hand,

he used to talk philosophy to the people—philosopher or no philosopher—with whom he felt at ease. Wittgenstein himself was a genius and he had his own standards to measure people who can do philosophy and those who can only drive the cart on the ruts made by their predecessors, or even by their contemporaries. Added to this, Wittgenstein's sense of honesty to himself and his work; and a student's inherent aptitude for a particular kind of study in which he/she could actualize the potency *in toto* might have led him to advise some of his students, not all, to take up other studies like medicine so that they could be socially useful. Wittgenstein's name and fame were enough to attract a number of students and just to satisfy his ego he did not crowd them in his class-room to turn them later into philosophical hacks, whom he might not have considered to be socially useful. His principle of life seems to be : Do your best in any field you have the aptitude for and be socially useful.

In this regard Prof. K. J. Shah informs me that according to Wittgenstein the futility of not doing well in philosophy is complete, but not so in other areas. A philosopher who does not do well in philosophy is haunted by a sense of frustration and his philosophy is totally futile.—Either he shines or is lost in oblivion; he cannot go on flickering now and then. A doctor, for example, if he does not do well in his profession can be a mediocre doctor, but according to Wittgenstein there cannot be a category of mediocre philosophers.

(5) "During the second World War Wittgenstein gave up his professional position and became a hospital orderly."

I don't see any contradiction here, rather it is a unique example of Wittgenstein's to be more useful to the society in its hour of necessity. Given the national custom of defending the motherland from external attacks and Wittgenstein's responsibility in this regard as a naturalized citizen; given the waves of Hitlerian terror haunting the whole world at large and Europe in particular; given the fact that had England been defeated and come under Hitler's rule, Wittgenstein himself might have been treated exactly the way the other Jews were treated, it was quite natural on his part to contribute his mite to the war efforts. It can be said that it was not because that he was afraid of dying that he worked as a porter, rather it was his philosophy which deman-

ded that—to live in a free country, to give shape to the ideas that were germinating in his mind and not to be subdued, suppressed and killed by Hitler so that along with his death, the new philosophy would die before it was born.

Prof. Shah informs me that during the war Wittgenstein was offered officers' jobs, but he refused such offers and preferred to be a hospital orderly. By this he avoided the drudgery of dealing with files and papers. He chose the job of an orderly because by this he could be directly in the service of really suffering people and thus he more human.

- (6) "Wittgenstein's own work became a victim of professional philosophy."

Though Wittgenstein was against professional philosophy, his own philosophy might have become professional in nature in the hands of the upholders of his philosophy once they lost sight of the Wittgensteinian "consciousness of the *uniqueness of my life*."¹⁷ But for that how can Wittgenstein himself be paradoxical? Wittgenstein wrote philosophy, but once it was written and made public it had its own dynamics. Wittgenstein might be held responsible for the contradictions, if any, in what he wrote, but not for the later history of his philosophy.

- (7) "Wittgenstein who during his lifetime published only one slim book which is philosophical in nature—*Tractatus*—received 6 years after the book was published his Ph.D. from his two doctoral supervisor-friends, Russell and Moore."

Though Wittgenstein's book is slim in size, it is not slim in ideas. It has continued to be seminal for very many people since its publication and it will continue to do so in future.

He received his Ph.D. 6 years after the publication of the *Tractatus*. Did he do so against all his moral standards—say, in any dishonest manner—did he contrive to get it against the rules of the university? No.¹⁸ Rather in order to clear the way for a fellowship other people were interested to award it to him, so that the genius in Wittgenstein could have an opportunity to pursue and do philosophy. And it was proved by the life of Wittgenstein that they were right in their judgement. Here it may just be noted that the talk among Wittgenstein, Russell

and Moore after the *viva* is quite interesting. It was not the case that Russell and Moore were trying to make a philosopher out of Wittgenstein, simply because he was a friend of theirs. On the contrary, he was a friend of theirs as he was a philosopher in his own right and they were working in somewhat the same area. For these people it was philosophy which mattered, not just friendship—philosophy was the basis of their friendship. So the kind of strained friendship they had during the later period of their lives was the result of the lack of mutual agreement as to philosophical positions. Moreover, if it so happens that sometimes people with less meritorious theses boastfully walk out of the university with the Ph.D.s in their hands, where is the occasion for so much lament for Wittgenstein getting the Ph.D. for his profound and seminal thoughts contained in the *Tractatus* ?

(8) "Wittgenstein's work will be by mid 1980 represented by some 14 volumes of 500 pages each (ca. 7000 printed pages). Thus every word Wittgenstein wrote will be preserved for posterity—a triumph of professorial scholarship."

It is a matter of great regret that the promised volumes have not yet come out—at least I do not know now whether they are already published. When the total corpus of Wittgenstein's writings is published, that will be heartily welcomed by the Wittgensteinians as well as his opponents—for that will be an aid to a better understanding of Wittgenstein himself and to some extent ourselves. Here Prof. Shah is of the opinion that had the total corpus of Wittgenstein's writings been published perhaps lesser evil would have been done to Wittgenstein as the standard of many of the books on him show. If that is the case, why should one regret that it is "a triumph of professorial scholarship" and that every word he wrote was being preserved for posterity ? Is the philosophy of Wittgenstein a work of "professorial philosophy" ? A philosophy in which a man's whole being was involved, cannot be an instance of "professorial philosophy". Moreover, the volumes are not being published by Wittgenstein himself to make an advancement in his professional career and to perpetuate his position in the history of philosophy (had he done that Prof. Krejci would have been right), but

they are being published by people who realize the profundity of thought contained in them—who feel that every word he wrote should be preserved for the benefit of mankind. Notwithstanding all that even after 3 decades of his death they are yet to be welcomed.

- (9) "Wittgenstein became a seeker for a cure to heal mankind from the bewitchment of language during a time determined predominantly by social philosophies of 19. century thinkers, Marx and Engels."

Wittgenstein's attempt to free mankind from the bewitchment of language "during a time determined by social philosophies of 19. century thinkers, Marx and Engels" does not make Wittgenstein himself paradoxical. Rather, as Rolf Zimmermann in his paper "Wittgenstein and Historical Materialism" printed in the same volume as Prof. Krejci's suggests, Wittgenstein's philosophy and Marxism are complementary to each other. He says, "Marx lacks a systematic theory of language as Wittgenstein lacks a systematic theory of non-linguistic actions. This is a product of chance which it is time to overcome."¹⁹ So Marxists have to learn Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and the Wittgensteinians Marxism.

- (10) "Wittgenstein himself produced a highly individual social philosophy by his example of giving away his inheritance and living in simplicity and modesty for the rest of life."

If we understand that by giving away his inheritance and living in simplicity and modesty for the rest of his life Wittgenstein was trying to produce "a highly individual social philosophy", we are, in fact, misunderstanding him. Here, he was really acting on the basis of the moral principles which he entertained for the conduct of his own life. Being devoted to philosophy, he could not have fulfilled the family obligations which the sharing of the family inheritance would have brought in; so he might have thought that he had no right to enjoy such inheritance. Moreover, the distractions because of the inheritance would have been greater and more harmful to philosophy than the benefits it would have given to it.

(11) "Two western philosophical traditions claim that Wittgenstein is an integral part of them. The Anglo-saxons like to see him within their tradition of Berkeley and Hume. Continental philosophers see in his work an elaboration of central-European, predominantly Viennese influences, constituting a unique work."

From the very beginning the Anglosaxons took interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy and thought him to be in the British empiricist tradition. Later on the continental philosophers gradually began to take interest in him and they thought him to be in the idealist tradition of the Continent. As these two opposed groups of philosophers claim Wittgenstein to be in their opposed traditions, Prof. Kreijci thinks that Wittgenstein is paradoxical. Neither the foundations of empiricism nor the foundations of rationalism are the foundations of Wittgenstein's philosophy. He had laid foundations of his own. He did not go to the beginnings as the rationalists and the empiricists did. He says, "It is so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or, better : it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to further back."²⁰ "My life consists in my being content to accept many things."²¹ So, in order to pronounce Wittgenstein to be paradoxical one has to see whether there is a crack in the foundation he provided for the edifice of his philosophy and not just occupy one room and claim ownership over the whole building. Taking two such claims into consideration Prof. Kreijci thinks Wittgenstein to be paradoxical.

(12) "During the thirties Wittgenstein seriously considered to settle in the Soviet Union. Probably only the lack of immediate response from the side of the Soviets preserved Wittgenstein for the West."

During the thirties Wittgenstein had the thought in his mind, In this connection one has to keep in mind that so far as Wittgenstein is concerned the meaning of his very existence was to do philosophy. To do that he intermittently ran away from the maddening crowd to far off and remote places in Norway, Ireland, etc. and this he was used to do till the very end of his life. He even gave up the chair of philosophy to do it whereas we find people clinging to such chairs even when they are philosophically dead. The object of settling down in the Soviet Union was to do

philosophy and to do that he did not have Moscow in his mind, but Tolstoy's countryside. It was not that the lack of immediate response from the side of the Soviets might have preserved Wittgenstein for the West, but most probably it was the Stalinist terror²² sweeping the length and breadth of the Soviet Union during the thirties and forties which made Wittgenstein change his mind because he might have thought that it was impossible to work under those circumstances.²³ A decadent society may provide better opportunity to do philosophy than a society which keeps its head bowed before the reign of authoritarian terror. Fania Pascal says, "...the over-riding need to do his work always won in the end, and being at heart a rational man with good horse-sense, he could and did put up with a place that served this purpose. This place was England."²⁴ So it was his total involvement in philosophy, which probably decided that he should live in the West and not that he was staying there against his will.

Further, Prof. Krejci's statement that "...Ludwig Wittgenstein will always rank with the great philosophers of the past *because* of a whole series of both the existential and philosophical paradoxes he personally was never fully aware of, since they comprised an integral part of his life" seems paradoxical in the Wittgensteinian sense for it does not take into consideration Wittgenstein's attitude towards himself. As we have seen there are no such paradoxes in the life of Wittgenstein. As there were no such paradoxes he was not aware of them. By saying that there are such paradoxes one injustice is done to the life of Wittgenstein as a philosopher and by saying that he was not fully aware of them another injustice is done to his self-critical attitude. For how can such a self-critical man be not aware of something which "comprised an integral part of his life" ?

So, in conclusion it can be said that all the twelve charges that Prof. Krejci makes against Wittgenstein are quite trivial and if this triviality be the standard then any person not excluding Prof. Krejci himself can be said to be paradoxical. Even from his paper one can say that Prof. Krejci is paradoxical in at least three ways :

(1) His use of the word "paradox" is itself paradoxical in a strict Wittgensteinian sense.

(2) He has a grudge against the Apostles, Apostles' pupils and general followers (... a church congregation !); but he likes to be one of them. That too not as a follower but as a priest. He gets his article too published along with theirs.

(3) He talks a lot against the so-called professional philosophy, but his paper itself is an instance of such philosophy.

Thus, Wittgenstein does not "rank with the great philosophers of the past *because* of a whole series of both existential and philosophical paradoxes", but he ranks among them for his profound thoughts. I don't think that his followers were inspired to follow him "because of the paradoxes governing his work and life"²⁵ for as we have seen there are no such paradoxes. They followed him because his philosophy (though, no doubt, the culmination of a trend of thought) provided a new perspective to look at philosophy itself and his life had the uniqueness of living that philosophy.

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NOTES

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2. Leinfellner, Elisabeth, *et al.* (eds.), *Wittgenstein and His Impact on Contemporary Thought*. Vienna : Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1978, pp. 82-85.

3. Wittgenstein, L., *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. 3rd edn., Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1978, p. 410. Cf. my paper "Wittgensteinian Approach to Paradoxes", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 1, Oct. 1982 (Students' Suppl.), pp. 8-13.
4. Leinfellner, E., *et al.* (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 83.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
6. Bartley III, W. W., *Wittgenstein*. Philadelphia/New York : Lippincott, 1973. And the letters to the *Times Literary Supplement* (16 Nov. 1973), from G.E.M. Anscombe; (7 Jan. 1974), from G. E. M. Anscombe; (11 Jan. 1974), from W. W. Bartley III; (18 Jan. 1974), from W. Miller, B. McGuinness; (8 Feb. 1974), from F. A. Hayek, W. W. Bartley III, R. Koder; (22 Feb. 1974), from M. O. C. Drury, I. Strickland.
7. Leinfellner, E., *et al.* (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 84.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
9. Wright, G. H. von, *Wittgenstein*, Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 25.
10. Wittgenstein L., *Culture and Value*. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 14.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
17. Wittgenstein L., *Notebooks 1914-1916*. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1969, p. 79. He says, "Only from the consciousness of the uniqueness of my life arises religion—science—and art." The German original is already quoted by Prof. Kreijci in his paper.
18. Prof. Shah tells me that Wittgenstein was awarded the degree of Ph.D. neither against the rules nor in accordance with them. During the First World War Wittgenstein joined the Austrian Army. Before doing so neither did he submit the results of his research to the university nor did he apply

for extension of time. So a special permission was obtained by his friends from the Registrar of the University and then the *Tractatus* was submitted for the degree of Ph.D. His friends did this because it was within the competence of the Registrar and because they wanted to give an opportunity for research work to an original thinker and genius in the person of Wittgenstein.

19. Leinfellner, E., *et al.* (eds.), *op cit.*, p. 63.
20. Wittgenstein, L. *On Certainty*. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1969, Sect. 471.
21. *Ibid.*, Sect. 344.
22. Kenny, A., *Wittgenstein*. Middlesex, England : Penguin Books Ltd., 1975. p. 12. He says, "In 1935 Wittgenstein visited the Soviet Union : had it not been for the growing tyranny of Stalin, it seems, he might have settled there."
23. Wittgenstein once mentioned to Prof. Shah that his life would have been quite intolerable in the Soviet Union because even though he knew Russian he was not left alone to talk with others or to discuss with others. He was always accompanied by someone who claimed to be an interpreter, but could very well have been in the pay of the secret service.
24. Pascal, Fania, "Wittgenstein : A Personal Memoir" in Rush Rhees (ed.), *Ludwig Wittgenstein : Personal Recollections*. Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1981, p. 55.
25. Leinfellner, E., *et al.* (eds.), *op cit.*, p. 84.

