

WHAT WE DO AND SAY IN SAYING AND DOING SOMETHING¹

An Exploratory And Experimental Move From Austin To Advaita²

(1)

We are all familiar with Austin's useful and insightful notion of what we do in saying something, as opposed to what we bring about by saying something through the intricate causality of our linguistic utterances.³ To recall: My utterance of the words "I am sorry!", e.g., may or may not intricately or coarsely causally bring about a state of mind of gratitude or irritation in you, my audience, and this may or may not be my intention; but my words "I am sorry!" are an act in doing which I apologise to you quite simply because of the meaning of the words and the appropriateness of our situation in the world and the nature of our relationship and conventions and rules that identify the utterance of those words as an apology in appropriate standard circumstances. Likewise in standard felicitous circumstances the words "I promise!", "I forgive!", "I command!", "I stipulate!", etc., constitute acts of promising, forgiving, commanding, stipulating, etc., whatever be the causal consequences of the acts of uttering them. Here *in* uttering words we *do* things, we do not merely do something by uttering them—the very utterance of them autonomously in appropriate standard circumstances constitutes the performance of crucial human actions. This notion of Austin's, the notion of a performative utterance, has rightly been much discussed in recent philosophy and has rightly been well made use of in diverse branches of philosophical and theoretical enquiry. However, there is, unfortunately, in Austin's own work, a drowning of the general significance of the notion in a mass of classificatory and terminological detail, whatever be the importance of such detail to a systematic study of language.

What tends to be forgotten often and remains underdeveloped theoretically is the insight at the heart of the notion of a performative utterance that human language is not only an ingredient, perhaps the most powerful ingredient, of ritual in human life, that it is itself ritual, not in the way of a piece among other pieces of doing in a complex ritual or ceremony, but internally, in itself, ritual; and not only when utterance constitutes the ritual of Austinian performative actions but generally, barring compromisedly voluntary emissions of linguistic noise such as in drunkenness, although something of the ritual of language unavoidably attaches even to such noise.

I do not wish here to enter into the rich classificatory world of Austin's own treatment of the notion of a performative utterance, fruitful though entry into that world always is in philosophical inquiry and linguistic cartography. I wish instead to ask heretically the un-Wittgensteinian and even un-Austinian question as to whether there is any one very general kind of non-trivial thing or action we do in saying anything at all, a substratum of necessary ritual performance which accompanies and even vehicles all specific illocutionary actions—the variety of Austinian things we do in saying something. I believe there is such a substratum of ritual performance, an abiding *vāhana* of all meaning in communication.

(2)

Any linguistic action at all is a very self-conscious piece of intentional doing, self-consciously an exercise in freedom as opposed to the passivity of being merely grossly or subtly causally pushed along and about by the past. Of course often belief in freedom of choice and action is deluded, but such delusion itself points to the general possibility of undeluded freedom and action, even if the scope of these is far more restricted than we in our egoistic disavowal of our causal/vulnerability are willing to allow. The tiniest bit of linguistic action, a half utterance or even a mumbled drunken linguistic noise, is proof of intentionality, manifestation of our independence of causality in the narrow but humanity-defining area of our lives where self-consciousness explicitly regions. The incompletest linguistic utterance is such a proof, it is an announcement and celebration of self-consciousness in its aspect of independence from causality. This is very minimally

what we do in saying anything at all and in all that we say : we pointedly and unambiguously taunt the purely causal power of the past, something we no doubt do in all intentional action but not explicitly self-consciously as in linguistic action. One might even say that language is at least the explicit self-consciousness of freedom.

There is no mistaking what might be called the general moral and political character of even a fragment of linguistic action, it bears the stamp of self-conscious intentionality. Linguistic noise-making may or may not in given cases prove causally efficacious in desired ways; it may or may not rhetorically or dialectically move men and nations; it may or may not achieve literary or colloquial significance and excellence. But unfailingly speaking establishes and celebrates the massive causal independence of self-consciousness by reason of its pointed confession of human authorship. The least that we do in saying anything at all and in saying all things great and small is announce and celebrate human authorship, not merely activity, i. e., our status, however partial and obscure, as creators and cause of ourselves, a divine image. Man's linguistic communicative capacity is an unmistakable sign of his godlikeness.

But we do more in saying anything at all than celebrate causal independence, the substratum of ritual performance in all linguistic activity has another equally fundamental dimension. We establish or seek to establish a relationship of causal independence between ourselves. For the actual or imaginative communicative intention in all linguistic action is such that I necessarily seek in you, my would-be or fancied audience, a contemporary witness to myself in my linguistic stance or dance or act or whatever, and not a mere causal target of my action. In the absence of or in abstraction from your actual or imagined contemporaneity with me, my linguistic action cannot be described as a communicative venture; and your contemporaneity, actual or imagined, establishes or envisions you in causal independence from myself, immunising you utterly in your role of pure witness against my causality. All initiation of communication has this unfallenness, symbolised perfectly by the deity of initiation and inauguration, Vināyaka, who is imaged massively and yet as so causally uncoercive as to be able to ride a little mouse.

Beyond initiation, however, presupposing and yet perverting the purity of that rite of emancipation, the historical development of communication and its function in personal and social life exhibit every variety and weight of causality and manipulativeness, a fall from grace. And yet the two-fold grace of Sarasvati, Goddess of speaking, does not abandon us. The tiniest bit of linguistic action suffices to wrap intentionality in self-consciousness, and the timidest communicative venture in its vocativeness surrounds and suffuses with self-consciousness the sense of mutual causal independence which contemporary human beings enjoy in their deepest self-image, their root ānanda of a many-centredness of unexploiting self-hood. (Mutual causal independence in the simultaneity of vocative identification does not monadically isolate addresser and addressee from one another. Logically such a relationship of mutual causal independence can only be between secretly identical realities which therefore must affect one another in the profoundest possible way—by identity, via an eternally established oneness). In saying anything at all to another I victoriously celebrate my independence from the causal past, and gallantly establish causal independence also in the present between myself and fellow communicative beings by holding them and myself in a framework of pure witnessing contemporaneity at least in the main vocative thrust of my communicative action. If language is the self-consciousness of intentionality and thus an image of divinity in its aspect of power, as a framework of non-causal contemporaneity it is self-consciousness in plurality of centredness and bears thus in its undegenerateness the stamp of divinity in its aspect of love which stimulates without coercing, hearkens without possessing.

Thus in saying anything at all and in saying all things great and small I announce victory and confess love, both announcement and confession being an overcoming of causality, by transcendence as in intentionality and by disavowal as in contemporaneity—underscoring vocativeness. I overcome the world in Christ's sense and in the advaitin sense in both cases, world and worldliness. In causally impinging upon you I am worldly, I am in relation to you what the world is in its causal power in relation to me. In vocatively disavowing causal coerciveness in relation to you I disown my worldlike or worldly possible power over

you. My self-conscious intentionality could hardly credibly and creditably be an overcoming by transcendence of the world as the causality of the past if my self-conscious relationship with you were essentially and unmitigatedly that of causal enslavement, i.e. if I were to be in relation to you, or you were to be in relation to me, unqualifiedly and unalterably a world of causal power. I overcome the world in self-conscious intentionality and renounce worldliness in self-conscious, i.e. characteristically linguistic, communication. Helpfully rhetorically one could say that in saying anything at all and in saying all things great and small we boast our transcendence of causality and avow our renunciation of it. And this is the substratum of ritual action which we unfailingly do in all speaking and linguistic communicating, the abiding performative Austinian action which vehicles all the indefinite variety of illocutionary acts noticed and unnoticed by Austin himself. In drawing attention to such a ground ritual I have not been partial to one among several performative actions of the same kind, which would indeed involve the kind of essentialist fallacy which Wittgensteinian and Austinian pluralism rightly pounce upon. The ritual of victory and renunciation to which I have drawn attention is related as ground to figures, whole to parts, system to detail, to all specific illocutionary acts and communicative interchanges; and it is not in competition with them.

In what follows I develop the notion of what we say in doing something, the exact opposite of the Austinian notion of what we do in saying something. Also I distinguish between what we say in doing something in the sense of some specific message or other which what we do contingently and contextually varyingly may convey, from what all doing necessarily says, a substratum of message which necessarily accompanies and underlines all communicativeness of doing, vehicles all specific messages explicit or implied in doing. There is an analogy here with the distinction between the variety of Austinian illocutionary actions which we do in saying something and the substratum of ritual performance which accompanies and vehicles all specific items of illocutionary doing.

Is doing always only pushing and pulling and bringing about and straining and winning and losing? Surely not, and the most effective argument against such an activist view of doing

would be not an example or set of examples of quiet action or mild contemplation, but that hard to acquire and strangely difficult to comprehend thing which is being absolutely still and quiet, not forcibly nailed to one spot but rooted massively and simply in one's own being. Śrī Ramaṇa Maharṣi recommended this as the most perfect sādhanā and in support often quoted the words of God in the Bible "Be still and know that I am God", of course interpreting these words not dualistically and alienatingly but in an advaitin and liberating way to imply that when we are still, absolutely still, we know that we are God and that all is God and that there is nothing else. Being thus still is freedom from thought also, no attraction or temptation of cogitation disengages us in that state from stability and eternity of being, nor are we dislodged by any whisper or storm of feeling, nor hurled into whirling behaviour by desire or will. The condition is not necessarily that of physical immobility—the sthitaprajña sage can be in Kurukṣetra or Vṛndāvana in battle or dance, he could permit the manifestation even of wailing as did Rāma when he lost Sītā in the forest. At all times and in all externality of situation, however, the sthitaprajña sage is absolutely still in the centre of his being. And this stillness is no inertia; it is infinitely vibrant in self-consciousness, the incessant becoming—conscious-of-itself-and-its-objects which is self-consciousness, spanda of eternal creativity.

In self-consciousness, quiet yet intensely vibrant, what do we say? Suddenly emptied of rāga, dvesa, and moha, bhaya and krodha, not as a result of deliberately executed sādhanā necessarily but by reason of that play of probability which is divine grace, we are incredibly stilled and fill the universe with the vibration of our still centredness. What do we say wordlessly in that vibrant stillness? This : I-am-that-I-am, Soham, I am all that as well, all is me and I am all, I am not separate from and do not separate anything or anyone. God and nature and beast and saint and sinner am I. In being still we speak the truth of advaita, and when we are not still as in laziness or as in activity clamorous with separateness, we deny advaita, we say there is I and absolute others, that you and I and nature and God are precariously contingently related to one another, manageably at times but mostly hopelessly. All men are others, not brothers, we

imply. But none and nothing is other in the stillness of self-consciousness. We are false when not still.

And in speaking advaita sincerely and not merely professorially, in soliloquy or in earnest speech, what do I do ? What do I do in thinking advaita ? In imagining advaita ? This : I love as myself all that is, even in its grossest camouflage of appearance as not-self. I love truly and not compulsorily or self-deceivingly or limitedly and conceitedly altruistically and reversibly all others because I see none and nothing as other than myself. But to live advaita is not easy. It requires a ceaseless holding fast to the image and idea and power and glory of self and self-consciousness, one in all and as the sole central reality of all, hateful or harmful or hideous appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Advaitin love is constantly threatened by dualistic doubt, but the gates of hell do not prevail against it because it is founded on the indubitability of self-consciousness and is a flowering of it, a lotus of self-certainty springing out of unpromising self-doubting dualistic mud, *pankaja*.

Is it not ironical that in what appears to be minimum doing, i.e. being still, we say the maximum, we claim the maximum, we claim advaita ? Equally ironically, in what logically is the most economical speaking, the speaking of advaita, we *do* the maximum conceivable, love all that is and can be as ourselves.

We cannot think advaita and speak advaita without living advaita. The doctrine that we do something in saying something manifests itself as a necessary truth in the context of speaking and living advaita. If advaita is right, to think separatively is to try and separate, and to think unitively is internally simultaneously to begin to undo separativeness and separation. Likewise, to live advaita, i.e. to be absolutely still in the self, is internally and simultaneously to make the most catholic claim conceivable. This thought should throw some explanatory light on Śrī Rāmāṇa's declaration that *mauna* is the most incessant eloquent speech. For as we advance towards the perfection of *mauna*, what we say in our advance claims more and more of subject-matter until it claims all in the *mahāvākya sarvam khalvidam brahma*. Equally significantly, if we can imagine Arjuna asking Śrī Kṛṣṇa after the battle of Kurukṣetra, after all that slaughter and agony and loss, what it all comes to, what it all means and

says, can we not imagine Acyuta declaring that all says just this, inconceivably economically, that I (Vāsudeva) am all ?

Austin distinguished between what he called a *locutionary* act, which is the act of uttering certain words with specifiable meanings and standard force, and an *illocutionary* act, which is what we do *in* performing a locutionary act, such as promise, command, assume, etc. something, and between these and what he called a *perlocutionary* act, which is what we bring about as a result, as a causal result, of performing a locutionary and an illocutionary act. Putting to use the notion of what we say in doing something, we can say : a locutionary act is what we minimally relevantly do *by* uttering certain noises intentionally⁴; an illocutionary act is the saying of something *in* producing those noises, the *language* we utter; and a perlocutionary act is what we minimally relatively do *by* our illocutionary act, a causal consequence of the noise-sequence and not merely its temporal realisation, the difference we make to the world relevant to our uttering of language and the language we utter. Since it is the illocutionary act in Austin which is a proper piece of communication, i.e. a vehicle of meaning, it is helpful to regard it as the specific saying of something in doing the locutionary act. Thus the notion of doing something in saying something which is most clearly exemplified in the idea of an illocutionary act becomes clarified by the notion of saying something in doing something, because that is what an illocutionary act turns out to be.⁵

It may therefore be maintained that the notion of saying something in doing something is more primitive than the notion of doing something in saying something. Austin's theory of performative utterance importantly protects linguistic theory from behaviourism by attributing to the heart of language, namely illocutionary meaning, a status not of a causal outcome of uttering semantic noises but of an accomplishment internal to and constitutive of such utterance in appropriate contexts and given undisqualifying backgrounds. But there remains the following difficulty or possible difficulty in Austin's general communicative theory. Saying remains locutionary and the heart of linguistic communication, namely illocutionary meaning, becomes a piece of doing or a class of doings. On the other hand, the notion of saying something in doing something both protects saying

from behaviouristic reduction by making it not a causal consequence of doing but the inherent speaking of doing, and by retaining the notion of saying as characterising the essence of linguistic communication. An atomistic acts-oriented account of linguistic communication is avoided at the same time as preserving Austin's insight regarding the non-causal status of linguistic meaning. The notion of saying something in doing something has also many other dimensions of explanatoriness which I cannot here explore adequately.⁶

One chief *prima facie* objection to the notion of saying something in doing something could be that doing is crass, not a candidate for the status of vehicle of meaning at all. The most general overcoming of this objection that I can think of is via drawing attention to being still, doing nothing overtly and yet being intensely dynamic, the stance being the very heart of maximal saying, the saying of *advaita* in its all-claiming sweep. Considered in this light, doing is a very appropriate vehicle of meaning. Philosophy of language does not need to separate meaning from doing, it needs a more satisfactory notion of doing than behaviourism or voluntaristic activism permit. Self-conscious intentional doing, as opposed to process, is deliberately discontinuous; and deliberate discontinuity in behaviour is inescapably an invitation to interpretation and witnessing, hence a saying and a speaking. Self-consciousness is a ceaseless beholding and upholding of itself in all things in *āścaryam*, mother-tongue of all speaking whose basic idiom is "Am I this !", "Am I not that ?"

(3)

In being still we say everything because there remains nothing to be said once *advaita* has been found. When is it that we say nothing ? If I see nature and the world as other than myself, and if I see you and him and her and God separately and as essentially other than myself, and with my effort to overcome my alienation from all things and beings great and small consuming all my energy and life, how can I possibly have any time to say anything to anyone ? Even what appears on a dualistic basis to be a piece of saying would really be a piece of attempted overcoming of imagined others. All manipulation of human beings by one another is founded upon a failure of vision, a failure to see oneness, self, one in and as all things and everyone.

And manipulation is not communication. So when we manipulate nature or man or gods or God, we say nothing. And when we are still in oneness with all we say everything that has to be said.

But is there not between saying everything and saying nothing a region of saying something as opposed to nothing which is inhabited by most human communication? What does human communication come to exoterically? In answer to this question let me summarise a consideration which I have developed at length in my book *Presuppositions of Human Communication* (O.U.P., Delhi, 1974). The heart of the argument is this. If I am to tell you something, tell you that something is the case or tell you to make something the case, I must not openly, and I don't have to at all, try to get you to believe that something is the case or to make something the case, bring it about that something is the case. I must adopt a style of behaviour which has the *form* of an act of trying to get you to believe or do something, but manifestly not the *force* of such an action. And if my behaviour directed towards you is of a vocative kind, i.e. if it involves inviting your attention to myself as opposed to merely causally securing it, then and then alone can my behaviour be interpretable by you or anybody else as conveying meaning, as meaning that something is the case or that you are to do something or that I want you to believe that something is the case or make something the case of your own free accord. Indeed vocative action itself exhibits such a style of behaviour. In addressing you I openly pretend to be trying causally to attract your attention to myself, I unconcealedly simulate attention-attracting behaviour, in consequence enabling you to interpret what I am doing as expressing the *meaning*, as saying, that I want you to attend to me. Here we have the outline of just that region between saying everything and saying nothing which we wanted to locate. In openly pretending to be trying to get you to believe or do something I make it clear to you in essence that I do not regard you as other, an other who can be causally manipulated by me. My behaviour denies dualism. In a sense it also like being still says everything because it implies advaita. But the specific way in which it denies dualism becomes a vehicle of less than total saying, so that I am able to say quite humdrum things

to you or important things even which are not the explicit saying of advaita.

Thus if by the use of an indicative sentence in communication with you I make it clear to you that I am openly pretending to be trying, by deploying the mechanism of conditioned response, to get you believe the proposition indicated by the indicative sentence in question, I not only at the highest level of generality enunciate advaita, I also express the meaning that something more mundane is the case, let you know that I want you to believe something of your own free accord. The humdrum becomes possible in communication because of the profound and the total. Quite truly in communication we first seek the kingdom of Atman-Brahman and secure it and all vyāvahārika meanings become available to us. This is how we are able to say everything and also something as opposed to nothing.

There is another way of looking at this whole question of saying everything, nothing, and something as opposed to nothing. My unconcealed simulation or open pretence in communicative behaviour can be regarded as *niṣkāma karma*, as action done essentially for its own sake. This is because my action or behaviour involves a manifest surrender of efficaciousness to you, my audience. You interpret my action as expressing my wish that *you* believe or do something and as meaning something, and not at all primarily and identifyingly as an attempt to *make* you believe or do anything, the question of believing and doing having been left entirely to you. Indeed there would appear here to be not only *niṣkāma* but also an absence of that sense of agency which we are asked by Sri Kṛṣṇa to surrender to Him, agency being surrendered by me to you in relation to the matter of your coming to believe or do something. And indeed in its advaitin insightfulness, communicative action must regard the audience as Ātman-Brahman, Vāsudeva, who is all secretly, and therefore communicative action appears to exhibit powerfully the teaching of the Gītā interpreted in an open-endedly advaitin way. I tap you on the shoulder, making it communicatively clear to you that I was not in my action trying causally to turn you round to face me, that my shoulder-tapping action in consequence expressed the meaning that you are to attend to me where you and I could be anyone. Now it cannot be that you and I could be anyone but not one

another! It would be a travesty of the idea of universality which goes with meaning if this were the case. Somebody may wish to make peace by saying that you and I could not be one another at the same time. But why not? If self or Ātman-Brahman is regarded as infinitely and simultaneously many-centred, and advaita interpreted communicatively requires that we so regard Ātman-Brahman, then you and I are simultaneously one another because one. There is here on one view action without desire because although my action is interpretable as expressing a complex desire of mind, it is also capable of being regarded merely as an expression of meaning, a universal possibility and structure of cognition and volition. There is also quite decisively a surrender of power to you, my audience. And there is the seeing of selfhood as one in you and me and all else. Is this not the heart of the Bhagavadgītā? Thus when we say something as opposed to nothing we invoke the Gītā! All is sacred in communication, the saying everything which is mauna or stillness and the saying of quite ordinary things also. The teaching of the Gītā is not any specific thing that I say in saying something to you as opposed to nothing, it is rather what is involved in my saying anything at all to you, in the general structure and style of all communicative behaviour. The greatest message is truly the medium itself. For the medium is communication and communication is either saying everything as in saying advaita, or it is the manifestation of the total surrender of agency and egoity which is bhakti.

(4)

Śrī Ramaṇa Maḥarṣi insisted again and again that no one had to become a jñānī, that all are already and eternally jñānīs. Why then is it necessary for one like Śrī Ramaṇa to speak to others, to teach others, and why is it necessary for others to listen to one like Him and to receive the truth from Him? One classical answer, a powerful answer if also a much misunderstood answer, is that our seeking of jñāna or the imparting of jñāna by a teacher to us are both illusion, not reality, because when we realise that we are Ātman-Brahman we will realise that we were always so and that we never needed to seek or receive jñāna. But for those who are unable easily to see the truth of this, it should be possible to point out that the heart of even mundane communicative seeking

and receiving, and also of course the heart of receiving in *mauna*, is also *advaita*, because the heart of human communication witnesses to *advaita*, to the eternity of our *jñānī*hood.

Oneness is not exclusive of play, the play of world appearance or the play of human life in intricate communication and co-operation. The intensity of the play, its darker and more traumatic acts and scenes, often camouflage the underlying oneness of which the world and human life are a play or a display; but without the oneness the play or display would be unintelligible and not only unbearable, rather it would be unbearable because essentially unintelligible. Two cannot play, they can only fight and destroy one another in gross or subtle ways. One alone can in play appear to be two and play the great game and unfold all the drama of recovery of self-knowledge.

(5)

Does the world or nature entirely only impinge upon us ? And in so far as it does not overwhelm us with its causal power, is this failure to be attributed to some power of causal resistance in us ? Are we to suppose that finite man has the causal power to resist the impinging causality of the infinite world ? This would be an extreme fantasy, just as the view of a world benignly waking us to a perception of it as the prince awakens the sleeping beauty would be fantasy. The world is a passionate lover, a quiet as well as an insistent speaker, a disarmingly open as well as a deeply camouflaged partner in a play of hide and seek. But it is in play with us, quite simply because the only conceivable alternative to play would be our instant destruction. Kant's dictum that all our knowledge arises from experience but is not derived from it bears a communicative interpretation. The world as experienced disavows pure causal efficiency by only occasioning thought and belief but not coercing it. The transformation of thought and belief—after their occasioning by experience—into insight and knowledge is the process of our more or less distorted reading and rendering of the message which the world communicates to us in its fundamental act of disavowing pure causal efficacy, in its act of pressing upon us but not overwhelming us with its power. In being there the world is vibrantly dynamic, a *sthitaprajña muni*, or an instructing sage. In being there in this dynamic mode the world says a hundred million different things as opposed to saying

nothing, depending, analogously to the case of human communication, on the specific style and structure of disavowal of causal efficacy which is our manifold experience of it; but abidingly it says also, a priori, that it is one with us in a way which becomes progressively clearer with the advance of insight and theory and imagination, with the advance of metaphysics and science and art. The world speaks to us, advaita its secret communication.

Postscript : What you confess to me in confidence, swearing me to secrecy, is logically strictly a private language, not because no one else can understand the secret words, but because they are unsharable unlimitedly with others without their ceasing to be secret words. Advaita is logically the most private word, impossible to communicate to *others*, there being no others. Rhetoric must not race beyond realisation.

(6)

Apparent others, aspects of the world in their apparent otherness to myself, may occasion a stirring of myself to self-consciousness but are not the mysterious operation of bestirring which has to remain my own, which has to be nothing but the rhythm of alertness of self-consciousness itself, if we are talking about a subject's being stirred to self-consciousness unabsentmindedly in the sense of being moved to take a hold of himself/herself existentially reflexively. And yet apparent others do in communication, and in the vocative act which is at the heart of communication, stir me to self-consciousness by putting me in mind of the reflexive thoughts "I" and "me". It would follow, then, that they can be none other than myself, witnessing to the many-centredness of self-consciousness, not to a plurality of selfhood. Communication is the many-centredness of self-consciousness, self-consciousness is not the internalisation of communication. Speaking and listening are the *spanda* of Śiva, Ātmabodha, illumined self-consciousness : Hermeneutics of Being.

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NOTES

1. This article was read as a paper at a Seminar at Jadavpur University in January, 1983.
2. By 'advaita' in this paper I mean the non-duality of ultimate reality in all the coherent range of senses indicated in Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas and elsewhere at the heights of Indian metaphysical insightfulness all the way down from antiquity to the witness of Ramaṇa Maharṣi and the innovativeness of Sri Aurobindo in our own times.
3. *How to Do Things With Words*, J. L. Austin, (O.U.P.), Oxford 1962.
4. Not a causal consequence of the noises, but the temporal realisation of the noise-sequence itself, our *uttering* of language.
5. In uttering the words "I promise" in an appropriate context I perform the illocutionary act of promising, according to Austin. But what do I *say* in so doing? Within the frame work of Austin's theory of performative utterance one would have to say in answer to this question *either* that I say nothing, I *do* something, i.e. promise something, which most implausibly condemns a sophisticated linguistic act to semantic vauity, anartha; *or* that the only saying involved here is the locutionary act of saying, uttering, the words "I promise", which is an equally implausible reduction of a highly evolved cognitive and communicative action to automatism. Surely in addition to being the committing institutionally binding performative action which it is, my act of uttering the words "I promise" is a massive *saying* of something, equal to the complete analysis of what promising is, filled out with the details of my specific promise. That analysis is what I inexplicitly say in doing the action describable as uttering certain words or as binding myself in a certain way.
6. Two important clarificatory applications of the notion of saying something in doing something are: (a) Ethical judgment, invitation, commendation, etc., may be regarded as implying that certain actions and attitudes, or certain classes of action and attitude and other categories of thing, are such that *in* doing or cultivating them or seeking them we *say*

something which is necessary metaphysical non-trivial truth. To say that something is a virtue or a moral obligation, e.g., is to imply that *in* cultivating or doing it we say that we are not separatively other than what appear to be others, other beings, i.e. to affirm necessary metaphysical non-trivial advaitin truth. Ethics becomes cognitive again. (b) All free action impliedly affirms its permittedness, no man being under a law of freedom apart from mankind. This truth illumines the theory of truth. A declarative utterance is an iteration of indicative words and, as such an action, impliedly affirms its permittedness, i.e. the reiterability of the indicative words in question. Thus when in affirmation of the truth of a declarative utterance we say "You can say that again", we only articulate the implied permission of the utterance itself. Language invites endorsement.