

SOME TECHNICALITIES IN *NAVYA-NYAYA*-EXPLAINED

The Naiyāyikas, *Prācīna* or *Navya*, alike, accept the concept of 'Viśayatā' as the ground of our knowledge of specific objects. The realistic attitude of the Naiyāyikas had been reflected once again in this concept. The later Naiyāyikas, however, were more concerned with the ontological status of it. The aim of the present paper is to discuss the nature and different types of *viśayatā* and to inquire into whether any linguistic element is necessarily involved in cognising a thing.

Naiyāyikas believe that cognition always refers to some object. That is to say cognition is always cognition of or about something like a pot, a cow, etc, and there is no such thing as pure or mere cognition otherwise called 'pure consciousness' which is no cognition of or about some object.¹ Not only this, according to them the referred object is always some real entity, the real, being that which, as we shall presently see, turns into the object of that cognition. Even an invalid cognition like the cognition of a snake in place of a rope refers to some entity existent in this world. The object of an invalid cognition is a complex entity.² The *viśeṣya* of this complex is not, however, actually so qualified by the qualifier which becomes the object of cognition there. There the qualification is through some cognition and not through the actual presentation of the reals.³ But that cognition must refer to that real on some other occasion. That is to say, the complex object that appears in invalid cognition may not have a counterpart as it is in the world of reals but each and every part of this complex is always some real. This is also true in cases of non-existent entities like sky-lotus or hare's horn.⁴

Epistemologically, however, Naiyāyikas do make a distinction between the real as such and the real as known or cognised. The real as such exists independent of any cognition but is only revealed through it. The real as known, and just so far as it is known., i. e. *qua known*, is the *viṣaya* or the *object* of cognition. As such it has relevance only in the context of a cognition. The *object* as the real--that--is--known thus stands necessarily related to cognition i.e., contains within itself a relation between it on the one hand, and the cognition of it on the other. In other words, whenever there is knowledge there is a real (*a padārtha*) that has come to be known: there has occurred an extrinsic relation between it and the knowledge of it. As the real that is known is nothing but the real as it is in itself, i. e., in its *svarūpa*, the relation in question actually holds between the real as such and the cognition of it. This relation as considered from the point of view of the real is called its objectivity (*viśayatā*). Considered at the same time from the point of view of the cognition, it is called subjectivity (*Viśayitā*) of that cognition. The relation in either--case, between the real and its cognition is not, however, 'a simple relation like any that obtains between any two reals.'⁵ The cognition that takes place is the cognition of that particular real but no other thing is necessarily of another thing. Yet, however, that cognition too, though of that thing, is revealed of course in another cognition as just a real and being so revealed it has become an object. Thus although every cognition has a subjective side it is at the same time objectively determined. According to the Naiyāyikas there is no clash between this objectivity and subjectivity of cognition.⁶ Objectivity belongs to the real as its *svarūpa* but this real itself is independent of the cognition that reveals it.⁷ Objectivity is an emergent property and belongs to the object when it is cognised. With the appearance of cognition it comes in to being and with the destruction of that cognition it is also destroyed.⁸ It is objectivity that can account for the cognition of specific objects.⁹

Objectivity resides in the object as the *svarūpa* of it.¹⁰ If another relation was required to relate it to the object then there would be an infinite regressus of relations. Be it noted that according to Gadādhara, this objectivity is not the distinctive character of cognition only, it also belongs to some mental events like desire, aversion, etc. But these mental events do not directly refer to objects. They refer to objects only being based on some cognitions which directly refer to those objects.¹¹ Before we desire a thing, we must know that thing as desirable (*iṣṭasādhana*). So the *viśayatā* of desire, aversion, etc., is borrowed from the cognition from which desire, etc., proceed. But is it proper to hold that even the mental events like joy, sorrow, pleasure, pain, etc. have some type of borrowed *viśayatā*? The answer to this question from the Nyāya standpoint although seems to be negative, it does not seem to be so definite. Prof. Mohanty in his 'Gaṅgeśa's Theory of Truth' (p. 26), has made no distinction between mental events like desire, aversion, etc. and joy, sorrow, etc., but has made a distinction between cognition on the one hand and all other mental events on the other. But Prof. Matilal has clearly made a distinction between mental events like desire, aversion, etc., and joy, sorrow, etc. and points out that the Naiyāyikas do not admit any type of *viśayatā* as belonging to the mental events of the latter type.¹² Whatever might be the case, the prevailing opinion among the Naiyāyikas is that *viśayatā* is intrinsic and distinctive property of *jñāna* alone. This view of the Naiyāyikas, however is in sharp contrast with the views of some modern Western thinkers like Brentano who hold that all mental phenomena refer to or are directed toward some object.

The Naiyāyikas of the later period were much worried about the ontological status of *viśayatā*. There is enough of difference among the Navya-Naiyāyikas themselves on this point. Gaṅgeśa, is of the opinion that *viśayatā* is a *svarūpa sambandha*.¹³ Jānkīnātha in his *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* while referring to the same

view,¹⁴ refers also to another view of a section of the Naiyāyikas, according to which *viśayatā* is no relation but a separate entity or category.¹⁵ Gadādhara is in favour of accepting the latter view.¹⁶ Gadādhara has pointed out various difficulties in accepting *viśayatā* either as a *svarūpa* of the object or as a *svarūpa* of the cognition or as a *svarūpa* of both the object and the cognition. So he thinks it to be better to accept *viśayatā* as a separate category. But all those who accept it as a separate category are not once again unanimous with regard to its numbers. Some think that the category of *viśayatā* is different with reference to the different modes of time and knowing.¹⁷ Some even think that there are as many categories of *viśayatā* as there are objects of knowledge.¹⁸ Others hold that so long as the objects are of similar nature, *viśayatā* as a category should be regarded as one. Generally, however, *viśayatā* is regarded as the self-linking relation or *svarūpa* of the object or of the knowledge contents themselves and not as an ordinary property of them.

II

The Naiyāyikas classified *viśayatā* into simple (*aviśiṣṭa*) and complex (*viśiṣṭa*). A complex *viśayatā*, also known as '*avacchedakatāviśayatā*' has several *viśayatās* together. The features *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* of a complex *viśayatā* may have some other characterising features subject to some further classification and so on.¹⁹

Ultimately, however, we get some simplest or bare *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* without being related in any way. In such cases we do have the simple *viśayatā* i.e., simple *viśeṣyatā* or simple *viśeṣanatā*. Whenever we have this simple *viśayatā* the resulting cognition is indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*). The simple or bare *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣana* being devoid of any further characterising feature can not be the object of determinate cognition. Just after the contact of the sense-organs with objects we do have this

simple cognition of bare *viśeṣya* or of bare *viśeṣaṇa*. If and when they are connected with each other, we do have determinate cognition (*savikalpka pratyakṣa*) in the next stage.²⁰ *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa* reveals "absolutely featureless entities not even characterised by *viśayatā* itself".²¹ Nor are the entities revealed in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* felt as objective. Simple *viśayatā* is a logical must for the factuality of any complex *viśayatā*.

The Naiyāyikas classified the complex *viśayatā* in to three elements, technically called, '*viśeṣyatā*', '*Prakāratā*' and '*samsargatā*'. *Viśeṣyatā* is qualifiedness the fact of being qualified and refers therefore, to that which is qualified i.e., the qualificandum. *Prakāratā* is the fact of the being a qualifier, i. e., qualierness and refers necessarily to this qualifier.²² *Samsargatā* is relational *viśayatā* and refers to the relational tie existing between the qualificandum and the qualifier.²³ For instance, in the cognition "The man with a stick", 'man' is expressed as the *viśeṣya*, 'stick' is expressed as the *prakāra* and their contactual relational tie is expressed as *samsarga*.

The concept of '*Prakāra*' is a very important concept in *Nyāya*-system. But unfortunately, the term '*prakāra*' has been used in so many different senses in different texts and even in the same text on different occasions. Viśvanātha, in his *Siddhānta-muktāvali*, has used the term in the sense of *viśeṣaṇa*.²⁴ *Viśeṣaṇa* is sometimes taken as the 'adjective' of English Grammar. But the concept of '*viśeṣaṇa*' as in *Nyāya*-system is wider than that, unless, of course, in English Grammar it is identified with anything that is used as adjective. Gaṅgeśa, however, classified *prakāra* into *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*.²⁵ *Viśeṣaṇa* is that *prakāra* which has the same substratum (*samānādhikaraṇam*) as the *viśeṣya* and differentiates that *viśeṣya* from all other things.²⁶ *Upalakṣaṇa* is that *prakāra* which has a different substratum from that of the *viśeṣya* but differentiates the *viśeṣya* from all other things.²⁷ In Sanskrit Grammar, two different words having the

same substratum stand in the same case—termination. For example, in the expression, 'niloghataḥ' both the words 'nilo' and 'ghataḥ' are in the nominative singular but in the expression 'Jatabhiḥ Tapasaḥ', the word 'Tapasaḥ' is in the nominative singular but the word 'Jatabhi', is in the instrumental plural. So 'nilo', is here a *viśeṣaṇa* but 'jatā' is an *Upalakṣaṇa*. We must not forget that this is only a retrospective justification of the cognitive situation already apprehended. We shall, however, go on, using the Sanskrit term '*prakāra*' to mean a mode of presentation which acts as the differentiator (*vyāvartaka*) of the *viśeṣya* only in context of a particular cognition. In *Nyāya*-system the term 'differentiator' (*vyāvartaka*) has a wider application and it covers the acts like particularising, qualifying, determining.


Be it clearly noted at the beginning that these *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *samsargatā* are objects entirely from the epistemic point of view and not peculiar properties over there, of any particular object. An object, for example, which is known as *prakāra* in relation to some *viśeṣya* may well be regarded as *viśeṣya* in relation to some other *prakāra*. In the instance cited above, although the 'stick' is expressed as *prakāra* with reference to the 'man', it is itself a *viśeṣya* in the context, say, of the universal 'stickness.' 'Stickness' was very much there as a content of the cognition 'The man with a stick' but it was not so explicitly expressed or mentioned there. Thus, according to the *Naiyāyikas* although no knowledge that is capable of linguistic expression can go without a qualifier, yet the qualifier may not be always explicitly expressed as one.²⁸ Thus it is only in further analysis that we get the following components of the cognition 'The man with a stick':

- (a) a *prakāratā* attached to the stickness,
- (b) a *viśeṣyatā* attached to the stick,
- (c) a *prakāratā* attached to the stick,
- (d) a *viśeṣyatā* attached to the man,

- (e) a *prakaratā* attached to the manness,
 (f) a *viśeṣyatā* attached to the man.

Although the *viśayatā* of the cognition—‘The man with a stick’ has the above six components, it is the ‘man’ that is the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) and the ‘stickness’, the chief qualifier (*mukhya-viśeṣaṇa*).²⁹ When an object is cognised as a *viśeṣya* only and does not appear as a *prakāra* of anything else in that cognitive situation, it is known as the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*). Similarly, when an object is cognised as a *prakāra* only and does not appear as *viśeṣya* of anything else it is known as chief qualifier (*mukhya-viśeṣaṇa*).³⁰

The different components of *viśayatā*, however, are not known in isolation. The different components constitute a unity by virtue of two sorts of epistemic relation known as ‘*nirūpakā-nirūpita*’ and ‘*avacchedaka-avacchinna*’. In a cognitive situation we know this unity as a whole. As Professor Mohanty observes, “Even for the Nyāya with all its analytical attitude the unity of knowledge is not entirely analysable into discrete components.”³¹ The unity of the cognition ‘the man with a stick’ may be represented diagrammatically as follows :



The total qualified cognition is determined (*nirūpita*) by the unity of the different components of objectivity (*nirūpaka*). Although it is generally held that the nature of the objectivity determines the specific nature of the cognition, in Nyāya episte-

mology one can equally hold that it is the cognition that is the determiner and the objectivity, the determined. The relation between the objectivity and the cognition is a reversible relation, and one can define a cognition through its objectivity and the objectivity through the corresponding cognition. The specific defining characteristic of objectivity is technically called 'avacchedaka'³² as it limits the specific nature of the objectivity, and the objectivity is technically called 'avacchinna' as it is limited by the defining characteristic. The defining characteristic may be either a quality (*dharmā*) or a relation (*sambandha*).³³ In case it is a quality, it may have a further limiting condition of some sort (*kiñcit sambandhāvachhinna*), but in case it is a relation it can not have any further limiting condition of any sort (*kiñcitsambandhānavachhinna*), for if relations are admitted to have further-relations that would again involve an infinite regress. The Naiyāyikas do not also admit any feature delimiting a generic attribute (*jāti*) and an unanalysable characteristic (*akhandopādhi*) to avoid similar vicious infinite regress.³⁴

III

At this point we have to keep in mind that the classification of *viśayatā*, into *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *sāmsargatā* is not exhaustive. There are also other types of *viśayatā* viz. *uddeśyatā*, *vidheyatā*, *dharmatā*, etc. Like *viśeṣyatā-prakāratā*, these *viśayatā-s* are also treated as pairs i.e., *uddeśyatā-vidheyatā* and *dharmatā-dharmatā*. As these latter pairs of *viśayatā* are very similar to the former, they are often confused with one another. So it is useful in this connection to point out the differences admitted by the Naiyāyikas between these different pairs of *viśayatā*.

Commonly, the concept of *viśeṣya-prakāra* is an epistemological one, the *dharmin-dharma* concept is a metaphysical one and the *uddeśya-vidheya* concept is a grammatical one. The Naiyāyikas, however, have applied these metaphysical and gram-

matical concepts at the epistemological level. But their distinctiveness had never been overlooked. According to the Naiyāyikas the *dharmin-dharma* concept or the *uddeśya-vidheya* concept does not necessarily coincide with the *viśeṣya-prakāra* concept. As Prof. Matilal observes : "But it is interesting to note that even at the epistemological level the *uddeśya-vidheya* distinction (i. e., subject-predicate distinction in the Sanskrit tradition) does not always coincide with the qualificund-qualifier distinction." ³⁵

The *viśeṣya* is cognised as possessing the *prakāra* and the *prakāra* is cognised as belonging to the *viśeṣya*. *Dharmitā* is the possessingness of a quality or a feature which is known as *dharma*. So apparently it seems that the *viśeṣyatā* and the *dharmitā* (correspondingly *dharmatā* and *prakāratā*) are identical. But this is not the case. They do not always mean the same thing. In the cognition "The fire is on the hill", 'the fire' is the *viśeṣya* as well as the *dharma* (not *dharmin*) whereas 'the hill' is the *dharmin* and the *prakāra*. *Dharmitā* is the real possessingness of feature (*dharma*) in the objective world whereas *viśeṣyatā* is the possessingness of some feature (*prakāra*) only in the context of a cognition. Although the *viśeṣya* is characterised by this feature in the context of cognition it may not actually possess it, as it is in the objective world as its *viśeṣaṇa*.³⁶ On the other hand, we can describe blueness as the *dharma* of the *dharmin* blue pot apart from the context of a cognition.

In general *prakāratā* is used as the determiner (*nirūpaka*) of the corresponding *viśayatā* existing in the *viśeṣya* of that particular cognition. So *viśeṣyatā* differs being connected with mutually different types of *prakāratā*.³⁷ But *prakāratā* is not always a fixed property of the object. As we have already seen, (vide note 22), the Naiyāyikas sub-divide *prakāratā* into *viśeṣaṇatā* and *upalakṣaṇatā*. The *prakāratā* in the form of *upalakṣaṇatā* is that character which differentiates an object from other objects even though that character is not permanently located in that object,

for example, an ascetic indicated by matted Locks (*iatābhīstāpasāh*) The matted locks of hair may not always exist on the head of an ascetic. Even when it exists, it may not continue so long as an ascetic lives. In other words, matted locks do not in any way constitute the asceticity of a man. So the *prakāratā* in the form of *upalakṣaṇatā* can not limit the specific nature of an objectivity i.e., it can not be an *avacchedaka* of the objects, it plays only as an indicator of the object in some context of knowledge. From this it is clear that the concept of *viśeṣya-prakāra* is not identical with the *dharmin-dharma* concept. The same can be said about the *Uddeśya-vidheya* concept.

Uddeśyatā refers to some object of affirmation and *vidheyatā* refers to the way in which it is affirmed. It is true that there are some instances where the *uddeśyatā* and *viśeṣyatā* belong to the same identical entity, for example in the items of the cognition 'The pot is blue'. But even then they can not be said to be identical. An object of affirmation (*uddeśya*) need not necessarily be a possessor of some feature (*viśeṣya*). There are so many instances where *vidheyas* can not go with *prakāras*.³⁸ For instance, when we infer the presence of fire on the hill, the epistemological predicate is 'fire' but the *prakāra* may be either 'fire' or 'hill' depending upon the type of the particular cognition. The particular cognition may be either of the forms : "The hill is fiery" (*parvato vahnimān*) or "(There is) fire on the hill" (*parvate vahniḥ*) depending upon the actual process of cognition. Even in the form of the cognition "The hill is fiery" (*parvato vahnimān*), there is another *prakāratā* besides fire, belonging to the hill i.e., 'hillness' (*parvatatva*). But this *prakāratā* i.e., hillness can in no way be said to be the object predicated.

Viśeṣyatā-prakāratā does not necessarily involve a linguistic pattern. Linguistic pattern³⁹ on the part of the speaker, aims to reflect the cognitive situation as it is originated beforehand. But it does not always succeed in doing so. As Prof. Matilal

writes : "consider the cognition whose verbal expression is 'dandi chatri' (The staff-bearer, the umbrella-bearer). Here the linguistic expression does not help us much to distinguish the qualificand from the qualifier. The structure of the epistemological situation involved is, perhaps, our chief guide in helping us distinguish the qualificand from the qualifier."⁴⁰ The epistemological situations here may be either of the forms 'the staff-bearer has an umbrella' or 'the umbrella-bearer has a staff' depending upon the way as the *viśeṣya* and *prakāra* had been apprehended.

In the light of the above discussion we can say that the Nyāya Logic (or epistemology) is mainly concerned with the things as cognised and not with reals or statements (of course, without disregarding at the same time ontology and grammar). According to the Naiyāyikas cognition is either non-relational or relational. In non-relational cognitive situation we do not apprehend anything as *viśeṣya* or as *prakāra* but apprehend a thing just as something. But in each and every piece of relational cognition we do apprehend a thing as a *viśeṣya-prakāra* complex. The *viśeṣya-prakāra* complex which we apprehend in such cases may be either as it is in the objective world (*tadvati tatprakāra*) or not. When it is, the piece of cognition becomes valid but when it is not, it becomes invalid. The things of the world may exist as related (as *dharma-dharmin* or in some other way) without being cognised but to be cognised as related they must appear either as a *viśeṣya* or as a *prakāra*. The same is true also in case of *uddeśya* and *vidheya*. To be cognised, a *uddeśya* and a *vidheya* must appear either as a *viśeṣya* or as a *prakāra*. *Uddeśya* and *vidheya* being talked about only in the context of a sentence either written or uttered, it is hardly possible for a *uddeśya* or a *vidheya* to be without being cognised. On the contrary it is quite possible for a cognition to be without at all being expressed as *uddeśya* or a *vidheya*. The cognition which is stated in language is necessarily relational since non-relational cognition can not be stated in language.

But the fact of stating in language is quite different from and foreign to that very cognitive event (except of course, the cognitive event itself is not due to any statement.) In any case, the possibility of a relational cognition without involving any linguistic element remains always open.

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NOTES

1. "Sarvam ca saviṣayād vijñānam bhavati."
 N. V. on sūtra 1-1-4
 "Buddheḥ svābhāvīkam caitanyamāstheyam".
 N. V. T. on sūtra 1-1-15
 "Sā (buddhiḥ) ca saviṣayikā".
Vādavāridhiḥ, viṣayatāvādaviḥciḥ, Gadādhara, p. 268. For the Naiyāyikas 'consciousness' and 'jñāna' are synonymous. According to them there is no cognition without object (*nirālamba pratīti*). The existence of the objective reals is not a mere postulation taken for granted, but it had been proved from the fact that the object is one of the causes of cognition.
2. According to the Naiyāyikas cognition that initiates or determines our activity can not be simple. Illusory consciousness determines our activity. Therefore, illusory consciousness is not simple. But this complex *viṣayatā* of illusory consciousness is different from the *viṣyatā* of a valid qualification cognition.
3. Although memory plays an important role in the production of illusory consciousness, according to the Naiyāyikas it is perceptual in character. A transcendental contact does condition such perception. The Naiyāyikas firmly hold that the qualified element (*viśeṣya*) of an illusory consciousness is never misapprehended but only the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is mitsaken.
4. The Naiyāyikas have recognised even greatness-smallness, nearness-fartherness and all numbers except 'one' i. e. the object of *apekṣā-buddhi* as reals. See also "The Indian Concept of Knowledge and Self"—Kalidas Bhattacharyya, O. H. Vol. II, 1954.
5. Ibid, Vol. I, 1955.
6. "The absolute faithfulness to realism of the Naiyāyikas has no clash with the epistemic character of the object."

— Ibid, Vol. II, 1954

7. To avoid the charge of 'psychologism' (private world) of a particular cognition ('cognition-particular' in the coinage of Prof. Matilal) Prof. Matilal makes a distinction between the 'epistemic attitude' and 'the objective content' of an event. He writes, "The epistemic attitude is what is private to each individual but the objective content may very well be a public property. It is difficult to specify the epistemic attitude in each case, but we can describe the epistemic attitude as an inclination to believe or disbelieve or even to doubt the objective content of the assertion, provided that a given cognition is of an assertive or qualitative type. What is important for the purpose of analysis in Nyāya is not the epistemic attitude but the objective content of a qualificative cognition-particular." *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K. Matilal, p. 12.
8. "Viśayatāyā jñānasamānakālinatayā" Pakṣatā, Jagadīśi, p. 16.
9. If no relation is admitted to hold between a specific object and its cognition then the cognition can not be said to be a cognition of a specific object. Although it is a common Nyāya doctrine that the different cognitions of a specific type are to be distinguished by their reference to different objects the cognition are also distinguished by virtue of their different *viśayatās*. As Prof. B. K. Matilal observes : "cognitions are to be identified, not when their objects are identical, but when the relational abstract contentness of one is identical with that of the other." — *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K., Matilal, p. 64.
10. The concept of '*Svarūpa Sambandha*' has some peculiarity. According to the Naiyāyikas this relation is not something having *independent* ontological status over and above the relata. Although it is exhausted in the relata it relates, yet it can not be identified with any one of them taken by itself.
11. "icchādīnām yācitamandananyāyena janakajñānaviśayatayaiva saviśayakatvamiti prācinamatābhīprāyenaiva vā..." — Anumiti, Gadādhara, p. 18
 "Evametanmata icchāvanāham..lāghavam". Harirama opines that desire (*icchā*) effort (*kṛti*), aversion (*dveṣa*) and *śamskāra* known as *bhāvanā*, which are much related to the object (*saviśayaka*) as knowledge itself, may officiate as the super-normal contact.
 Jñānalakṣaṇavicārahāsyam, p. 66
12. "Pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, though they are mental states, do not have any *viśayatā* at all. They proceed according to Nyāya, from some instance of *jñāna* or other nonphysical acts which have an objective reference, but they are themselves only the results of such non-physical acts. They are mere feelings without any self-transcendental reference." *The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K. Matilal, p. 8.
13. "jñānaviśayasvarūpātirikṭayā viśayatāyā bhāvāt."
 T. C. p. 816.
14. "Viśayatā ca viśayākārapratītiśakṣikaḥ svarūpasambhandhaviśeṣaḥ".
 N. S. M. p. 28.

15. "Padārthāntaramity ekadeśinah" — Ibid.
16. "Navyāstu viṣayatvam padārthāntarameva, na tu svarūpa-sambandha-
viśeṣaḥ."
Vādarīdhiḥ, viṣayatāvādaviciḥ, Gadādhara, p. 268
17. "dhībhedasya viṣayatābhedakatvāt."
vyāptipañcakarahasyam, Māthuri, p. 32
18. "viṣayatāyāḥ svāśrayaviṣayādibhedena bhinnatve' pi".
Anumiti Gadādhara, p. 83.
"viṣayatā ca viṣayabhedāt bhidyate.."
Vādarīdhiḥ, viṣayatāvādaviciḥ, Gadādhara, p. 272.
19. "Prakāratā ca dvidivhā niravachhinnā viśeṣaṅantarāvachhinnā ca".
Vādarīdhiḥ, viṣayatāvādaviciḥ, Gadādhara, p. 272.
"viśeṣyatvam, prakaratvam ca dvidivham
kiñcidharmāvachhinnaniravachhinnaviśeṣa".
Harirāma, p. 259
Ibid,
20. "Yatra viśiṣṭajñānasāmāgrināsti tatra nirvikalpakaḥ".—T. C. p. 882.
21. Bhattacharyya Kalidas — O. H. vol. II, 1954, p. 231.
Navya-Naiyāyikas do admit a distinct type of *viṣayatā* known as
'*turīyaviṣayatā*' to account for *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*.
22. "yattu bhāsamānavaiśiṣṭyapratyogitvam prakāratvam tādrśavaiśi-
ṣṭyānuoyogitvam ca viśeṣyatvam.." Vādarīdhiḥ, viṣayatāvādaviciḥ
Gadādhara, p. 271.
Gadadhara, however, does not accept these definitions.
23. "viśeṣyaviśeṣaṅtatvānyaviśiṣṭadhivīṣayatvam eva sambandhatvamiti
bhāvaḥ".
— Siddhāntalaksanajāgadisī, p. 256.
24. "yaḥ prakāraḥ sa eva viśeṣaṅnamityucyate".
— Siddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 187.
25. "Prakāraṣca dvidivhā viśeṣaṅopalakṣaṅabhedāt".
— T. C. p. 824.
26. "Sāmānadhikaraṅam vyāvartakaḥ viśeṣaṅam Ekavibhaktiyantapadavā-
cyatvam samānādhikaraṅatvam".
— Saptapadarthi, v. 193, p. 149.
27. "Vyadhikaraṅam sadvyavartakam upalakṣaṅam
Bhinnavibhaktiyantapadavācyatvam vaiyadhikaraṅyam".
— Ibid v. 194, p. 150.
"Tadāhurācāryyāḥ 'sadasadvā samānādhikaraṅam vyavacchedakaḥ
viśeṣaṅam vyadhikaraṅamupalakṣaṅam iti".
— T. C. p. 834.
28. See also *The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K. Matilal, p. 18.
Gangesa's Theory of Truth, J. N. Mohanty, p. 35.
29. "mukhyatvañca viśeṣyatvam prakāratānavacchinnatvam, prakāra-
tābhinnatvam vā."

- Vadavaridhih*, visayatavadavichih, Gadadhara, p. 284.
30. *Prakāratā* in the form of *upalaksanatā* can always be treated as a *viśeṣya* with reference to the universal residing in it. Perhaps that is why a *prakāra* cognised as only *prakāra* is known as *mukhya-viśeṣaṇa*. Prof. Ingalls (vide Materials for the study of Navya-Nyaya Logic, p. 43) and Prof. D. C. Guha (vide Navya-Nyaya System of Logic p. 195) on some other grounds preferred to use the term 'prakara' in the sense of *mukhyavisesana*.
 31. 'Naiyayikas often speak of a total distinct type of *visayatā* known as '*viśakṣana visayatā*' which is more than its components and refers to the total object at a time'. In the instance cited above 'man as possessing the stick' is that unity. Such *visayatā*, however, is absent in the case of error.
 32. The essence of the principle of '*avacchedaka*' is the avoidance of ambiguity and making the object most specific. '*Avacchedakatva*' becomes different according to the difference of the limiting property or the relation.
 33. "*avacchedakatvamapi dvividhaṁ sāvachhinnam niravaccinnam ca*" *Vadavaridhih-visayatavadavichih*,
—Sri Harirama Tarkalamkara, p. 260.
 34. "*jatyakhandapadhinam anullikhyamananam svarupato bhanopagamat*", Often quoted by Sanskrit Scholars.
 35. *The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K. Matilal, p. 14.
 36. "Even with its realistic bias Nyaya-vaishesika thus distinguish between purely factual entities corresponding to a cognition, on the one hand, and the object that is meant, on the other."
— "The Indian Concept of Knowledge and Self". Kalidas Bhattacharyya, O. H. Vol. II, 1954.
 37. "*viśeṣyā ca samūhālabane prakārabhedādbhidyate*". *Vadavaridhih*, visayatavadavichih, Gadadhara, p. 283.
 38. "*vidheyatvaṁ tu na prakāratāniyama Kvacid viśeṣya-vrttirapitu.*"
— *Pakṣatā Jagadisi*, p. 113.
 39. "As far as Navya-Nyaya is concerned, I do not think that the qualificand and the qualifier are grammatical categories, as the subject and predicate in some contexts at least, are thought to be in the West... In modern terminology, they might be called semantic or metalinguistic concepts."
— *The Navya-Nyaya Doctrine of Negation*, B. K. Matilal, p. 14.
 40. *Ibid*, p. 13.

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