CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE CAUSAL THEORIES OF THE BUDDHIST, HUME AND MILL : A COMPARATIVE STUDY

I

One of the corner-stones of the entire structure of Buddhist Philosophy is the emphatic denial of the concept of permanent substance. The *Upaniṣads* and the Brahmanical systems believed in permanent physical and spiritual substance immutable amidst their outer modifications. For several reasons Buddhist thinkers unanimously rejected such a concept of an enduring and immutable substance.

In the absence of the concepts of substances or things over and above qualities the whole superstructure of the concepts of 'agents' and 'production' seems to tumble down. It is my friend Manju who switches the fan on. It is the alarm-clock that wakes me up. If instead of these things there were only a collection of fleeting qualities, it would have been impossible to say that someone or something is an 'agent' who or which brings about certain changes.

But although the Buddhists deny 'agency', it must be remembered that causal explanations play a very vital role in their philosophy. Accordingly they had to devise a special theory of causation which would not need the concept of 'agent'. This theory is known as the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The formula which succinctly expresses this special theory of causation often takes the following form :

> "imasya satīdaṃ bhavati; imasyāsato idaṃ na bhavati, imasyotpādād idaṃ utpadyate; imasya nirodhād imaṃ niruddhati". (*Mahāvastu*, II, 285)

This may be rendered into English as : If this is present that comes to be; if this absent, that does not come to be. From the arising of this that arises; on the cessation of this that ceases. This formula expresses the idea of 'constant conjunction'. If

fire should be the sole cause of heat, then if fire is there heat will always be conjoined with it; if fire is absent, no heat will follow.

This analysis of the notion of causation seems to be a natural consequence of denying 'agents'. If you deny that there are any switches the turning of which to the 'on' position *produces* light in the room, and also that there is anyone to turn the switch to the 'on' position, we should have to analyse the causal situation involved here in terms of the 'constant conjunction' of certain events such as the being of the switches (described with the help of qualities that appropriately describe switches) in the 'on' position with certain others such as the illumination of the room (described also with the help of relevant qualities). Although concepts like agent, production and efficacy have been implicitly denied in all schools of Buddhism, nowhere have they been so explicitly and emphatically denied as in the causal analysis of *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla*. We would, in the present paper, examine the special causal theory propounded by these two Buddhist philosophers.

Now the above discussion of causation does also, at once, bring to our mind the Humean analysis of causation. Hume proposed to eliminate the idea of causal efficacy or power from the conception of causation altogether, maintaining essentially that causes and effects are merely changes that we find 'constantly conjoined'. We should not, according to Hume, explain changes in terms of causes having the power to *produce* them.

It would, therefore, be not out of place to compare, in this paper, Hume's theory of causation with the causal theory enunciated by *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla*.

A very illuminating account of the theory of causation enunciated by *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* can be found in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and its commentary, *Pañjikā*. Their theory of causation is a consequence of their doctrine of 'universal momentariness'. If things or persons are (in the ultimate analysis) series of momentary existence (i.e. '*dharmas*') how can they have any time to produce anything? Hence they claim that there is nothing called 'production' in reality. There is

neither any agent nor any causal efficacy. An event only *arises* depending on certain other conditions (*pratītya-samutpāda*).

In the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā Kamalaśīla* tries, basing his arguments on those of *Śāntarakṣita*, to establish the validity of their theory by considering first some objections. These objections arise from the consideration of the momentary nature of causes advocated by them. Since the future event is not yet in existence and the past event is defunct and hence bereft of causal efficacy, neither the future event nor the past event can be supposed to bring about the present event. The present event also, being momentary, is absolutely destroyed in the next moment. Hence it will no longer remain in existence in order to exert its causal influence on the effect which invariably *succeeds* the cause. It might be argued by the Buddhist philosophers that there is no need for the cause's exerting any influence on the effect; the mere antecedence of the cause is sufficient to establish a causal situation. But the opponent urges that the Buddhist philosophers would be led to an absurd position if they argued in this way. If mere precedence were a sufficient criterion for establishing causal relationship, they would be forced to call the colour, for example, which exists in an earthen pitcher, before it is destroyed by burning, the cause of the smell which one gets as a result of burning of the pitcher. (TSP, pp. 168-169).

Let us now examine the answers that *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* gave to these objections.

To the first objection that the Buddhist position implies the absurdity of the effect's coming into existence from a defunct cause, they give the following reply. In their view the effect comes out of the cause while the latter is still in existence. In the words used by *Śāntarakṣita*, "what happens is that the effect comes into existence at the *second* moment through its *dependence* upon the cause which has come into existence at the *first* moment and has not yet become destroyed. So that when the effect comes into existence, it does so from the cause while it is still undestroyed at the first moment" (TSP, p. 175).

Śāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* argue that it is even necessary that the effect comes into being through its dependence upon a *preceding* cause that has ceased to exist at the time the effect appears. Otherwise, in their opinion, we shall have an absurd theory that the effect comes into being at the same time as the cause. *Simultaneous beginning* of the cause and the effect is impossible in their opinion, because if the effect is already existing, what will the cause bring about? (TSP, p. 175, "niṣpanne kārye tasya akiñcitkārivāt", "Satyām api cānuvṛttau na tadānīṃ tasya kāraṇatvam").

The force of the above argument undoubtedly rests upon the significance of the word 'dependence'. Yet, unfortunately, it is not very easy to grasp what the authors mean by this word. Nevertheless, I shall try to state what appears to me to be the sense in which the authors used it.

There are some obvious cases of physical dependence. For example, a building is said to 'depend' on the foundation. Here the word 'depend' is used in the sence of being 'supported' by. But in all cases of physical support, the object supported and that which supports it, both exist at the same time. Such cases of dependence will obviously not help the authors advocating the temporal precedence of the cause. The word 'dependence' is used in another sense as well. This sense is demonstrated by statements such as 'the success of the CPI in the next election depends on their having a good party machine'. Here the word 'depend' is used in the sense of being 'caused by', which sense will not help the authors either.

The sense of 'dependence' which *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla did* probably have in mind is perhaps the following : What is popularly known as the cause of X, is nothing but a *set* of conditions or events that precede the appearance of X. The appearance of X, the conditioned, *depends* on this set. We shall have to get rid of our imagery of the cause as a substantial thing equipped with a separate quality called 'productive power'. Since the preceding set of conditions is no such substantial thing, it does not have to co-exist with X and exercise its productive power, which is somehow appended to it, on X.

Śāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* accuse the advocates of the theory of simultaneous beginning of the cause and the effect of anthropomorphism. They say that there is no need to suppose, as the advocates of the theory of simultaneous causation would have it, that the cause grabs hold of the effect like a pair of tongs and then 'works' on it. Nor does the effect come into being like a sweetheart caught up in the tight embraces of her lover.

Not only do the Buddhist philosophers argue that the cause need not and cannot co-exist with its effect, they also say that they do not see any necessity why the cause must exert its influence on the effect. In fact, there is no casual operation, distinct from the cause anywhere in this universe. We can speak of the 'agent' and the 'patient' in a metaphorical way only. These words do not stand for any objective reality. ("yāvatā nirvyāpāraṃ evedaṃ viśvam, na hi paramārthataḥ kaścitkartā vāsty, anyatra dharmasankarād iti samudayārthaḥ." TSP, p. 176).

But if there is nothing called 'casual efficacy' how will the Buddhist philosopher then explain such colloquial expressions as 'the fire produces the smoke' ? *Kamalaśīla* replies that sentences such as 'the cause produces the effect' are only metaphorical expressions of propositions such as, 'the effect arises depending on the cause'. ("janayatīty upalakṣaṇaṃ. tattadāśrityotpadyata ityapi vijñeyam". TSP. p. 176). In fact the word 'depend' only significes, in this context, that 'the effect always arises immediately after the cause'. And what is meant by the word "the cause acts on the effect' is nothing but 'the cause is always conjoined with the appearance of the effect'. ("idaṃ eva hi kāryasya kāraṇe'pekṣā yat tadanantara bhāvitvam, kāraṇasyāpi karye'yam eva vyāpāro yat kāryodayakāle sadā sannhitatvam." TSP, p. 177). In fact, the hypothesis of a functioning of the cause in addition to its existence itself is an unwarranted assumption. ("sattaiva vyāpāraśabdavācyāstu". TSP, p. 177).

Śāntarakṣita and *Kamalaśīla* have ruthlessly criticised this concept of causal efficacy which, according to them, has neither

the sanction of logic nor that of experience. They bring out a series of objections against this concept.

What is the factual evidence on which this hypothesis of a causal factor distinct from a cause, is based? Surely, this mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy' is not amenable to sense-perception. "adṛṣṭaśakter hetutve kalpyamānepy neṣyate kiṃ anyasyāpi hetutvam"? (if you assume the causal character of the (entity called) 'efficacy', when this 'efficacy' is not amenable to perception, then why do you not assume the same of something else also? (TSP, p. 178).

Whenever we discover that an object comes into existence if and only if another is present we call the latter the cause of the former. If this is the case, why should we attribute the causal character to a mysterious entity called 'causal efficacy'? Why not attribute the causal character to the cause itself? (TSP, p. 177).

We should note the remarkable similarity of these argumets with that of Hume. Hume grants that, at least according to common notions, the concepts of *power, force, energy or necessary connection,* etc. are fundamental to the concept of cause. Yet he restores that "There are no ideals, which occur in metaphysics, more obscure and uncertain, then those of power, force, energy or necessary connection." (Enquiry, p. 63).

According to his special method of clarifying obscure ideas by referring to the "impression or original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied", Hume urges his readers to examine the impression from which the idea of power is derived (Enquiry, p. 63). But, Hume declares that "when we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection" (Enquiry, p. 63).

In order to appreciate the full value of Hume's arguments against 'power', 'force', 'necessary connection' it seems worthwhile to look back at a very old theory strongly believed by many philosophers. According to this theory things behaved

in the way they did because of their possessing a certain property called 'productive power'. This 'productive power' was supposed to be hidden from our view. Now although this notion of 'hidden power' had already been the target of philosophical criticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (e.g. by Newton, Locke etc.), yet it remained a favourite notion of those philosophers who endeavoured to seek a kind of certain knowledge of the future. For in order to know that a certain medicine will cure, we need only to ascertain that it possesses the hidden power of curing us. If we could somehow visualise this occult power we could be sure that the medicine would cure us and hence could predict the future with as much certainty as we know the present state of affairs.

Hume makes several points against such a theory of occult powers. The first point that Hume makes is that we never have any experience of such a thing as power in the things around us : "We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy". Now, it is not very clear from his writing what Hume is exactly pointing out here ! Probably what he means is that we do not see anything over and above the objects related by causal relationship and particular states of them. We see only salt and water and the dissolution of salt but nothing else which could be expressed by saying that *water 'made' the salt to dissolve* (the sense conveyed by most transitive verbs).

Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that such powers do exist in causes, it would be a thoroughly useless concept, in our causal enquiries. Even ordinary men constantly use such terms as 'cause' and 'effect' in their daily lives. Yet they do not have to penetrate into the essence of 'cause' (Treatise, p. 86) in order to find out some such secret 'power'. They do not need to go to a scientist to determine whether this plant is dying because of the attack of insects. It is by experience only that they infer that this plant is going to die as it has been attacked by insects. They remember that every case of insect-attack on plants in the past has been followed by the subsequent death of these plants. "Without any further cere-

mony" they call the insect-attacks 'causes' and the subsequent dying of plants 'effects' and 'infer' the dying from a new case of insect-attack that they come across.

Besides, the notion of 'secret' power leads to some sort of conceptual absurdity. If we do not ever come across any such power in the world around us how can we form any concept of power at all ? The word 'power' would not have any meaning at all. "We do not understand our own meaning in talking so." (Treatise, p. 168).

But it may be urged that although external objects do not serve as mines from which such metals as 'power' may be extracted, yet the mind might well serve as such a mine. After all, we are every day confronted with the 'force' that our 'will' is exerting.

Hume disposes of arguments like this in the following way. Firstly, both the command of the will over body and thought are extremely 'mysterious'. How does the most refined thought actuate the greatest matter ? Whether any such mastery of the will over the idea is a reality or not, Hume says, he cannot conceive at all *how* the will commands the ideas.

The influence of the will, both over the organs and over thoughts, is limited. We cannot move certain organs of our body like the liver and the heart by our will. We are masters of our thoughts and sentiments at certain moments, and at other time we are not. It is only by experiments and observations that we know the limits of the will. But were we conscious of a 'power' or 'secret' 'connection' which binds them together and renders them inseparable (Enquiry, p. 66), we would have known the limits apriori.

As regards the theory of the "universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being", Hume comments, "are we not equally ignorant of the manner or force by which..... even the supreme mind operates, either on itself or on body ?" (Enquiry, p. 72).

It could be argued that the resistance which we sometimes feel external objects to put forward against us and the conse-

quent exertion of our force or power in conquering that resistance give rise to the idea of force. Hume answers that, we attribute power to a vast number of objects where we cannot even imagine the subsistence of any resistance or exertion.

Let us, after this brief discussion of the Humean criticism of the concept of causal efficacy, come back to the further criticisms. *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* brought against the notion of an occult 'causal power'.

Does this efficacy, they ask, produce the effect through the medium of another efficacy or not ? If it does, then the causal character should be imputed to that other efficacy. And this latter efficacy will also, in that case, depend on another efficacy to bring about the effect. The same argument would apply to the third efficacy, and hence we shall be faced with a vicious infinite regress. If, on the other hand, we hold that this efficacy produces the effect by its mere 'existence' then, by the same logic, it may also be argued that the *cause itself* produces the effect by its mere *existence*. And the hypothesis of an additional efficacy will be entirely futile (TSP, p. 178).

Anyway, the authors reject the utility of the concept of causal efficacy and say that, 'the only basis for the relation of cause and effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any efficacious action ("ānantaryaka-mātraṃ eva kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-vyavasthā-nibandham, na vyāpāra," TSP, p. 180).

As regards the objection that if mere sequence is considered to be the sole criterion of causation any arbitrary sequence would have to be regarded as a causal sequence *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla* gave the following reply : We do not say that mere immediate sequence is the basis of cause-effect relationship. Rather, what we do say is that one thing is to be regarded as the cause of another when the latter is *always* found to appear in immediate sequence to the former. Moreover, one thing is regarded as the cause of another when the latter is found to appear in immediate sequence to former *only*.' ("na hi vayaṃ ānantaryamātraṃ kārya - kāraṇa - bhāvādhigati - nibandhanaṃ brūmaḥ. kiṃ tarhi ? Yanniyataṃ tathā hi yasyaivānantaraṃ

yat bhavati tat tasya kāraṇaṃ iṣyate. TSP, p. 180). Thus although smoke is, in some cases, seen to follow the presence of certain animals such as cows, horses etc., yet it is not caused by these animals, because it is *not always* found to follow the appearance of those animals. Sometimes these animals may be present, yet there may not be any smoke in the vicinity. Moreover, smoke does not appear *only* in the presence of those animals, it appears even when these animals are absent. We shall have the occasion to discuss this point in more detail in the next section.

II

In the first section we have seen that Hume analysed causal relations as relations of uniform sequence between events. But Hume took a simple view of what it is that is found to recur in causal sequences. He often wrote as if it were pairs of single events which are related by way of unvarying sequences. Mill rightly insists that, "It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent that this unvarying sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce..... the consequent." (SL, Vol. I, p. 378). Thus what causal generalisations inform us of is that an occurrence of a given kind regularly follows when a complex *set* of conditions is satisfied. Each of the members of this complex set, from which we usually select one as *the cause*, is required to complete the set. This complex set consists not only of positive conditions, but also of certain negative conditions (i.e. absence of any preventing or counteracting causes). Hence a cause is "the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative together ..... which being realised the consequent invariably follows." (SL. Vol. I. p. 383).

But if causal relations are equivalent to those of unvarying sequence between phenomena, are we to suppose in that case, that any case of unvarying sequence would qualify as a case of causal connection? Are we to suppose that night is the cause of day, and day the cause of night? Now, Mill pointed out

that certain additional conditions need to be fulfilled if day is to follow night always. (These additional conditions are factors like the existence of the sun above the horizon, there being no opaque medium in a straight line between the sun and that part of the earth where we are situated). Night will thus not be followed by day under all circumstances or invariably.

If a case is to be, on the other hand, a case of causation, then, Mill argues, the consequent will have to follow the antecedent under all circumstances. And this is possible only if the consequent follows the antecedent unconditionally. Hence a cause is the concurrence of antecedents on which the effect is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent.

We have already seen some Buddhist philosophers had also argued that every case of causation is essentially a case of constant conjunction. Now, if we consider the philosophical treatises of *Sarvāstivāda* school which preceded the school of Buddhist logicians like *Śāntarakṣita* and *Kamalaśīla,* we shall see that they did not consider causation simply to consist in a connection between pairs of single events. They too had visualised the complexity of the causal situation and conceived of such a situation as consisting of a connection between a *set* of antecedent conditions and the consequent following it. (A similar spirit is noticeable in the proposition often quoted in the *Pramāṇavārtika* : "na kiṁcit ekam ekasmāt, sāmagryāḥ sarva saṃbhavaḥ").

Their awareness of the complexity of a causal situation becomes evident if we undertake a study of the four '*pratyayas*' and six '*hetus*' enumerated by *Sarvāstivāda* texts like the *Abhidharmakośa.* The scope of the present paper prevents us from undertaking an elaborate study of each and every '*hetu*' and '*pratyaya*' mentioned in this work. But it will be sufficient for our purpose to give a *very brief* introduction to the '*hetus*' and '*pratyayas*' and comment at length on one or two of them.

The '*pratyayas*' refer, as far as I understand, to only those factors that are *indirectly* responsible for the emergence of something else. In the technical terminology of western philosophy

these factors are known as 'conditions'. All the three '*pratyayas*', the (i) '*ālaṃbana-pratyaya*', (ii) '*samānāntara-pratyaya*' and (iii) '*adhipati-pratyaya*', which could be translated as (i) 'object condition', (ii) 'immediately antecedent condition' and (iii) 'dominating condition', explain how certain conditions can be indirectly responsible for the coming into existence of certain objects and events. The 'immediately antecedent conditions' refer to those antecedent mental events which are immediately followed by other similar events. They are the antecedent mental conditions which explain the uninterrupted flowing of a particular stream of thought. Just as the preceding sounds of a single tune that is being played do not produce, but are only indirectly responsible for (i.e. they influence the player to play the next ones) the sounds following them at subsequent moments, so the 'immediately antecedent condition' is only indirectly responsible for the subsequent happenings of similar mental events.[2]

An 'object condition', which is described as that which *helps* a cognition to arise (in the way analogous to that in which a stick helps an old man to stand up to his feet), is a sensation interpreted by applying concepts to it. Accordingly, visibles, audibles, smells etc. are the 'object conditions' respectively, of processes like the visual, auditory, and olfactory perceptions. One ought to remember that an object is only one of the factors responsible for the origination of a particular cognition. The other factors responsible for knowledge are, the existence of sense-organs and, as the Buddhists themselves tell us, the 'correlation' ('*sannipātaḥ*') of sense-organs and their corresponding objects. Hence an 'object condition' cannot, by itself, be said to be directly responsible for the emergence of anything.

A 'dominating condition' is described to be that condition which, although it does not positively help the arising of another phenomenon, nevertheless does not stand in the way of its coming into existence. This non-interference is comparable to the way a sovereign[3] ('*adhipati*') although he may not do anything constructive to make his subjects happy, may nevertheless be the *indirect* cause of their happiness by not oppressing them.

The 'general cause' (*'kāraṇa-hetu'*), which we shall discuss later, is said to be the same as this 'dominating condition'. The 'dominating condition' is thus only a 'permissive' condition, and consequently is not directly responsible for the emergence of anything.

As contrasted with the *'pratyayas'* or conditions, the *'hetus'* or causes represent factors that are *directly* responsible for the arising of other events or objects. One should not, however, interpret the words 'being directly responsible' as meaning 'producing'. Instead of explaining every case where one thing is said to be directly responsible for the origination of another, as a case of production, the *Sarvāstivādins* try to explain even what is known as 'production' as : involuntary reaction of a sort under certain conditions, or appearance of certain events in a particular way depending on certain specific circumstances.

The *Sarvāstivādins* analysed the *'hetu-pratyaya'* into five different *'hetus* : (i) *'sahabhū-hetu'*, (ii) *'sabhāga-hetu'*, (iii) *'samprayuktaka-hetu'*, (iv) *'sarvatraga-hetu'* and (v) *'vipāka-hetu'*. We may translate these respectively as (i) 'interdependent cause', (ii) 'homogeneous cause', (iii) 'closely associated cause', (iv) 'all pervading cause' and (v) 'retribution cause'. I do not want the readers to be bogged down by the details of the hair-splitting analysis which the 'Buddhist scholastics' have presented in their categorisation of the different sorts of causes. I would rather like them to be acquainted with the main ideas underlying the five-fold classification.

The category of *'sahabhū-hetu'* comprises all those objects and events which mutually cause one another and which are interdependent. The category of *'sabhāga-hetu'* is brought in to explain what is commonly known as 'homogeneous production' as well as the apparent continuity of a particular object. In this way, although the 'five constituents of a person' (*'pañca skandhas'*) are momentary and, as a result, are destroyed in the next moment to that in which they are born, similar *'dharmas'* arise immediately and take their place and give us the feeling that they constitute a continuity. The *'samprayuktaka-*

hetu' is supposed to represent an intense form of co-operation between '*dharmas*'[4]. As contrasted with the co-operation between '*dharmas*' exhibited by this cause, the next two causes are paradigm cases of unilateral causation. The '*sarvatraga-hetu*' comprises the passions ('*anuśayas*') which later give rise to all sorts of demeritorious consciousness. Both the demeritorious ('*akuśala*') and those of the meritorious ('*kuśala*') '*dharmas*' which proceed from craving lead to certain painful or pleasurable consequences. Such meritorious and demeritorious '*dharmas*' are then said to act as '*vipāka-hetus*'.

Now we come to the discussion of the '*kāraṇa-hetu*' which can be translated as 'general cause'. For some technical reasons the *Sarvāstivādins* have included this cause not under '*hetu-pratyaya*', but under '*adhipati-pratyaya*. We shall have to make a detailed study of this category of cause for reasons which will be apparent to us as we proceed.

The 'general cause' is described to be that factor which does not constitute an obstacle to the arising of '*dharmas*' that are 'capable of being born' (i.e. which have all the positive conditions of their coming into existence fulfilled). In this sense all the conditions that are present at the moment when an effect comes into existence, but do not obstruct the effect's appearance, are the 'general cause' of the effect. This description naturally brings to our mind the concept of the negative condition.

The case of a 'general cause' is comparable to that of a king, who, although powerful enough to oppress his subjects, refrains from doing so.

The '*dharmas*' then, that are capable of constituting obstacles, may possibly be designated 'general causes'. But what about those that are incapable of being obstacles ? The *Sarvāstivādins* maintain that even such '*dharmas*' are 'general causes' of other '*dharmas*'. The reader may naturally stagger at such an apparently unintelligible statement. But what is implied is probably something like the following :

We would readily grant that the appearance of a thing is, besides being directly caused by certain things, also indirectly conditioned by certain other factors. But we usually think that *only a limited number* of conditions are directly and indirectly responsible for an effect. The *Sarvāstivādins* try to show that it is not possible to restrict ourselves in this way in our investigation of the conditions. It is true that a particular effect comes into being through its dependence upon a particular set of conditions (both direct and indirect conditions). But there is a causal background from which this set of conditions itself arises. This background itself is, in its turn, dependent on another causal background. All these factors are, according to the *Sarvāstivādins*, indirectly responsible for the emergence of the effect. If they did not exist and constitute, so to speak, a 'general background' in which the effect in question appears, the effect could not have secured its existence. In fact these philosophers wanted to show that if we conducted our search for the conditions to its farthest limit, then we would find that nothing short of the conditions of the whole universe at a particular time is in a way responsible for the appearance of the effect.

Our examination of certain aspects of the Buddhist causal theories has, as it has proceeded so far, revealed to us some general points of resemblance between the position of the Buddhists and that of British empiricists like Mill. But the same question which we have asked in the case of Mill's exposition of causation can be repeated in the context of this Buddhist theory of causation as well. How can the Buddhist logicians avoid the necessity of designating every case of constant conjunction as a case of causation? Buddhist logicians like *Kamalaśīla* have shown that the presence of cattle in the cow-shed cannot be said to cause the smoke in that area. The reason is, smoke may be present *in some cases at least*, even when no cattle are around (see Section I). Whereas nothing can be the cause of smoke if smoke could be present *even in some cases* in its absence. In other words, the Buddhist logicians are trying to say that smoke can be caused by something only if the former (in addition to being constantly con-

joined) is necessarily connected with the latter. That this is what the Buddhists imply, is evident from the following consideration :

The statement, 'No case of X is possible without Y' really means, 'X is necessarily connected with Y'. If no case of being a bachelor is possible without its being a case of a male, then being a bachelor is necessarily connected with being a male. Thus one can conclude that if *no case* of smoke is possible without a case of fire, then smoke is necessarily connected with fire.

Mill had argued that only that phenomenon is a cause which besides being immediately antecedent to the effect, is also an *unconditional* antecedent to the latter. But how does one determine whether an antecedent is unconditional or not ? Surely we do so only by repeated observation of the phenomena. Thus we arrive at the 'further quality' which, Mill says, an antecedent must possess if it is to deserve the title of a cause, through our experience of the unvarying succession of several phenomena. How can he then be said to have improved upon the position of those empiricists according to whom causation can be fully explained without residue in terms of constant conjunction ?

The Buddhist logicians would, however, say that the 'further quality' which a case of causation must possess is that of 'necessary connection', and they do not arrive at this concept through observation of several instances of succession. That everything is necessarily connected with the effect it produces follows from the very definition of something as real. A real entity or *'paramārtha sat'* must be able to give rise to an effect, it must be *'artha kriyā kāri'* (See *Nyāya-bindu,* verses 14-15, and commentary on them. See also *TSP,* Vol. I. p. 140 : 'akāraṇaṃ bhavatāṃ dvidhā – nityam asat ca'). An imaginary fire, whether we imagine it to be in the vicinity or at a distance from us, fails to make any impact on us. That is because it is an unreal entity. A real fire, on the other hand, is bound to make a difference to our sensation by its vicinity or remoteness from us. That a cause must be necessarily connected with its

effects, does, therefore, follow from the very definition of something as real.

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NOTES

1. *Pramūṇavārtika,* ch. II, verse 536.
2. If a contrary mental state were to arise, then the continuity of a particular thought, consisting of similar mental events, would break.
3. 'Sovereign condition' would perhaps be a better translation of the word *'adhipatipratyaya'*, which is *usually* translated as 'dominating condition'. The usual translation is rather misleading, since it suggests the idea of an overwhelming influence.
4. The protection which a group of merchants travelling together in a caravan give each other from the dangers of the road, is comparable to the way the various *'sahabhū-hetus'* help each other. The merchants are more united when they have the same food and drink, and do exactly the same work. This is comparable, according to the *Sarvāstivādins,* to the unity which an act of consciousness (*'citta'*) and its concomitant mental phenomena or *'caittikas'* (viz. conception, feeling, volition etc.) have when they have the same 'point d'appui' (*'samāśraya'*), same object and the same time of origination. Such an intense co-operation between an act of consciousness and its concomitant mental phenomena is an example of the causal functioning of the *'samprayuktaka-hetu'*.

ABBREVIATIONS

AK : *Abhidharmakośa,* Ed. Louis de la Valle's Poussin, 6 Vols. Louvain, 1923-31.

Enquiry : *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* David Hume, Selby-Bigge's edition, Oxford, 1894.

SL : *A system of Logic,* Vol. I, 1872, London.

TS : *Tattva-Saṅgraha* : with Pañjikā, Ed. E. Krishnamacharya, 2 Vols, Baroda, 1926.