

BRADLEY AND ŚĀṆKARA

I

The present seminar is an essay in comparative philosophy. I believe its aim is to evolve a perspective in philosophy within which a deeper reconciliation and a more fruitful synthesis of divergent truths can be had. There is an essential unity characterizing systems of human philosophy which is not disturbed or marred by the "strife of systems". This is why the surviving "isms" merely suggest, as Perry put it, the battle-cries of a war that has ended in a peace without victory; this is why there is a "meeting of extremes", and an endeavour to move "beyond idealism and realism". Every philosophical problem has a many-sided richness about it. The problems also run into one another, so much so that every philosophical concept turns out to be an abbreviation of system. Every approach to the problem is legitimate and there can be no question of substituting one approach by another. This explains how A.N. Whitehead's 'philosophy of organism' which, according to the author himself, while it is "based upon a recurrence to that phase of philosophic thought which began with Descartes and ended with Hume", is, in its final outcome, "a transformation of some main doctrine of Absolute Idealism onto a realistic basis", "an approximation to Bradley"¹. This also explains how this very philosophy, with its concept of 'Creativity' and of 'God' as its primordial, non-temporal accident, "seems to approximate to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European thought"². If Descartes, Locke, Hume, and Bradley can be rolled into one, there is sufficient justification for a seminar on comparative philosophy with "mutual self-discovery and self-illumination" as its watch word. "Let both grow together until the harvest".

In a way the key-problems of philosophy have always been the same. They are the problems of Reality, of Value and Meaning, and of Knowledge. But the problems always grow on a particular psychological soil which has an antecedent past and which determines the future 'go' of the philosophic quest. The formulation of the problem may receive a peculiar slant. It may for example appear as the problem of 'Meaningful Life' of 'Intelligible

World' or of the 'Criterion of Intelligibility'. As the problems run into one another, we cannot say something about one problem without, at the same time having said something about the other ones. As every philosophical concept is an abbreviation of system from whatever point of view we may take up the question of philosophic interpretation, from the standpoint of fundamental distinctions within being, such as mind, matter, life, spirit, from the point of view of philosophic categories or concepts, such as origin and destiny, cause and purpose, development and progress; or finally, from the point of view of ultimate values, in every case the unity of philosophic thought and of the categories scheme is visible.³ There can be no question of substituting one approach by another, and Kant's claim to have introduced a Copernican change in philosophy by insisting that objects must conform to knowledge and not knowledge to objects seems to be an exceedingly exaggerated claim.

II

I propose to bring together one western and one Indian view concerning the problem of 'Reality' in order to see whether and how far these perspectives enrich each other and help the emergence of a unified picture as the result of mutual self-discovery and self-illumination. I believe the doctrines of Indian philosophy have sufficient vitality to influence the current of modern philosophy in the west.

Some modern, newfangled, perspectives in philosophy dispen-
pence with the notion of "*ens realissimum*" because they find that there is an element of 'prejudice' in the varried and contrasting definitions of the real. We may identify the real with the actual, or with the non-existent or the subsistent, with the permanent or the changing, with that which is related or which is independent of relations; but we cannot do away with the concept. It is the very *a priori* of intelligible thought and intelligible discourse. What is it, then, *to be real*? And what is that in human experience *which answers to the notion of reality*? These two questions are crucial questions for philosophy.

In recent times we find singularly bold and strikingly original attempt being made by Bradley to reconstruct the notion of Reality⁴ which he offers as the essential message of Hegel.⁵ It is an idealistic view of Reality. The nerve of this Idealism is that "Reality is

spiritual”⁶. Outside of spirit there is not and there cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real.⁷ The question we have to put to ourselves is : What is it to be spiritual and in what sense can one thing be more spiritual than another according to Bradley ? What is the notion of “ spirit ” outside of which there cannot be any reality ? In what sense are ‘ Reality ’ and ‘ Spirit ’ synonymous ? Is the conception of ‘ Spirit ’ identical with the conception of ‘ Absolute Experience ’ as defined by Bradley ?

Pure Spirit, according to Bradley’s notion of it, is realized in the Absolute. It can never appear as such and with its full character in the scale of existence i.e. among the phenomena. It is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased.⁸ The Spirit is described by Bradley as “ absolute life ” and “ absolute experience ”. The concrete content of absolute life is ‘ experience ’ and nothing but sentient experience. Bradley identified existence with experience. By describing the Real as Absolute Experience he intends to bring out and emphasize the immediacy characterizing the supreme reality or Absolute Life and to show that the externality of the manifold is overcome in the Absolute. The main features of Absolute Life, to some extent, are within our own experience and they are drawn from it. We have a suggestion here of the unity of a whole embracing distinctions within itself. This we have in ‘ mere feeling or immediate presentation ’ which is the experience of felt unity. Bradley thus reaches the idea of a higher experience in which thought shall as it were, return to the immediacy of feeling. “ We can form the general idea of an absolute experience in which phenomenal distinctions are merged, a whole becomes immediate at a higher stage without losing any richness ”.⁹

In describing the Absolute as Absolute Experience, Bradley emphasizes the ‘ content ’ side of reality and neglects the ‘ that ’ aspect of experience which he identifies with reality. According to Bradley, in anything considered real we find two aspects, a ‘ that ’ and a ‘ what ’ an ‘ existence ’ and a ‘ content ’, and the two are inseparable. We cannot get the one without the other. That anything should be and should yet be nothing in particular is impossible. That a quality should not qualify and give a character to anything, is equally impossible. We can get neither the ‘ that

nor the 'what' by itself. They are distinguishable only and are not divisible. In isolation neither of them can be taken as real. Bradley speaks of "the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'".¹⁰ Judgement is essentially the reunion of two sides, 'what' and 'that' provisionally estranged.

In no judgement are the subject and predicate the same; but in every judgement the subject is more than the predicate and is a 'that' beyond a mere 'what'. In every judgment the subject is reality which goes beyond the predicate; but the subject is never mere reality, or bare existence without character. But the 'content' or 'what' aspects of experience gets the upper hand in Bradley and the Absolute comes to be treated as Absolute Experience. Reality must be one Experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Thought which provides the test of reality for Bradley—for only what satisfies the intellect is to be taken as either true or real—can be absorbed into a "fuller experience", in a superior form, namely "immediacy" which we find in feeling. I would become "experience entire"¹¹ and "be present as a higher intuition"¹² involving a complete transformation of thought which is also its consummation. To go on calling it 'thought' would, however, be indefensible even according to Bradley. The Absolute Experience, however, is, in the end, the sole perfect realization of Spirit.¹³ Pure Spirit is not realized except in the Absolute.

In reducing the concept of the Absolute Reality to that of the Absolute Experience and reconstructing it in terms of mere 'content' to the obvious exclusion of the 'that' aspect of the real Bradley has done violence to the very structure of reality. The main features of reality, of the Absolute, are down from our own experience which wears the two aspects of the 'that' and the 'what', an 'existence' and a 'content'. These two are inseparable. They are distinguishable only and are not divisible. The main features of Absolute Life *are* within our own experience and the genral idea of the Absolute has to be formulated in terms of this experience. Finite experience involves the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'. It has a 'subject' aspect and a 'content' aspect. It is in the works of Cunningham, centre-content. Bradley seems to indentify experience exclusively with 'content'; the real is 'experience' 'sentient experience' for him. He neglects the 'subject' aspect of experience and regards it as of diminishing significance in the pro-

cess of self-transcendence. 'Content' apart from a 'centre' or 'subject' of experience is an abstraction. The relation between the 'subject' and the 'content' is a crucial problem for any philosophy which takes up the problem of the real. The subject or centre is what the content makes it, and the content is as it is defined by the centre or the subject. If one is abstracted from the other we have to face the dilemma: either "sublation" of the individual or complete "self-sufficiency" i.e. existential distinctness of it.¹⁴ In Bradley's absolutism the individual has met the same fate. Self-transcendence for Bradley turns out to be sublation. For him the individual is quite unreal from the side of the Absolute, self-hood being a vanishing distinction. The finite self is "embraced and harmonized in the Absolute through its being suppressed as such". The finite as such disappears in the Absolute. 'Merged', 'blended', 'fused', 'absorbed', 'run together', 'dissolved', 'destroyed', 'lost'—these are some of the words used by Bradley to express the disappearance of the finite individual in the Absolute.

If we keep in mind both the aspects of experience, the content as well as the subject aspect, self-transcendence will mean not only the expansion of the content but also the enrichment of the centre and fullness of emergence. This will not be the perpetuation of "the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'" but the overcoming of it without neglecting these two aspects of human experience. The presentation of the Absolute only in terms of the 'what' or the 'content' aspect of experience, its presentation as Absolute Experience, as "experience entire", as "immediacy" or "higher intuition", neglecting its presentation as the 'that' as the 'subject', which is more than the what and is never mere reality, or bare existence without character, is not to overcome the dualism of the 'that' and the 'what'. The way to overcome it is to realize, on the basis of experience itself, that there is a point where "that" and "what", existence and content, fact and meaning, reality and value fuse in one. 'That' and 'what' are thought concepts and for thought they will remain distinct to the end. But their distinction cannot deter 'something' or an 'entity' being both, reality *and* value, existence *and* content, and realizing in its life the fusion of the two. The truly real can be its own meaning. Its existence can be its meaning and its meaning embodies in its existence. For thought there can be no more adequate way of

giving expression to the overcoming of the dualism of 'existence' and 'content' than by pointing out that self-transcendence in human experience is a double movement and human language can embody this by speaking of the (i) expansion of the content as well as (ii) the enrichment of the centre, both taking place *pari passu*. Śaṅkara described the Absolute, the Brahman, as Ātman, as the subject, and also as Liberation (Mokṣa, Muktyavasthā). The word Ātman brings out the 'subject' aspect of reality; the word Mokṣa brings out the 'content' aspect of it. While emphasizing both these aspects of experience to which thought cannot turn a deaf ear, Śaṅkara brings out the oneness of Brahman, Ātman and Mokṣa for experience. Brahman, the supremely Real, is "Bliss entire" for Śaṅkara, in Bradley's phrase "experience entire"¹⁵.

But for Śaṅkara it is the supreme reality also, the Ātman, the subject *par excellence*, for which there is nothing other (anātma-vastu), no non-self. Rather for him the whole universe is the Self. The Ātman is the supreme Bliss, the supreme 'that' and the supreme 'what'. Bliss and the Blissful are one at this point. "Bliss is not anything different from the Blissful Self".¹⁶ "When he thinks, 'This (universe) is myself who am all', that is his highest state". In Bradley's phrase "the Universe is substantially one with each of us, and actually as a whole feels and wills and knows itself within us"¹⁷ Bradley is voicing forth Śaṅkara's conviction that Brahman, having created all this universe, entered, for its own realization, all the bodies having life and having so entered, it realized its own real self directly thus: 'I Brahman, am all this'.¹⁸ But it is Bradley's failure to realize that the Spirit is to be realized not only as an absolute 'experience', but also as the absolute 'subject' or 'self' which has disfigured his idealistic enterprise and landed it in a bog from which the individual is not able to extricate itself and recover its authentic status as substantially one with the Universe. We are thus brought back to the point where philosophy is called upon to weave together in one system the human insight concerning the profound significance of human life, the realm of value and the order of the real. The spirit in man is to be the centre of this philosophic weaving, "for the man to whom his own life is a triviality is not likely to find a meaning in anything else". The idealistic reconstruction will centre around the notions of Reality, Value and Spirit in the context of a mean-

ingful human existence, for, as Pringle-Pattison pointed out, "every form of philosophical idealism appears to involve this conviction of the profound significance of human life, as capable of appropriating and realizing these values¹⁹". The Idealism of Bradley has to address itself to the problem of the recognition of the Spirit not only as absolute experience but also as the absolute subject, the Ātman, the Self. What Śaṅkara has said about the Self as having an authentic existence, as being *svārtha* and not *parārtha*, as being the very *a priori* of intelligible thought, and what, in recent times, K. C. Bhattacharya has reconstructed as transcendental spiritual psychology with the notion of the Subject as Freedom as central to it, has almost a finality about it. Brahman, for Śaṅkara is liberation itself (*muktyavasthā*)²⁰. It is at the same time the supreme cause of the universe²¹.

III

There is another doctrine of Śaṅkara which, if incorporated into western thought and assimilated therein, would yield a fruitful harvest. This is the doctrine of *Māyā* or illusion. It is in the context of authentic spiritual life that Śaṅkara developed his doctrine of *Māyā*. "The witness of the three states (of waking, dreaming and deep sleep) who ever remains the same, is not affected by the three variable states. This appearance of the supreme Self as involved in the three states is mere illusion, as in the case of the rope appearing as snake"²². Śaṅkara philosophised within the frame-work of a religious traditions which he inherited and strengthened. "This adds seriousness and urgency to his endeavours which seem to be lacking in the efforts of many pseudo-philosophers of today, who no doubt think quite freely, entirely on their own and in utter disregard of all traditions, but hardly to any serious purpose"²³. For the authentic spiritual life it is all one existence, one Spirit being forth. If there appears to be something other than it (*anyatvābhāsam*) it must be an illusory experience. Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā* is not a doctrine of rationalism or agnosticism, nor a "rigid exercise in logic". Incorporates an experienced truth. The *Ādvaita* realization and the doctrine of *Maya* are knit together in his philosophy which is "the record of a strong conviction", "involves the communication of a grave experience, and not

the mere frame-work of a theory". It is spiritual experience which bears the weight and provides the substance of the doctrine of Māyā or illusion.

Bradley does not know "why or how the Absolute divides itself into centres, or the way, in which, so divided, it still remains one. The relation of the many experiences to the single experience, and so to one another is, in the end, beyond us".²⁴ It is here that Śaṅkara's doctrine of Māyā and Upādhi is relevant and provides the clue to the understanding of the being and the nature of "appearances". Śaṅkara's dual vision of the Supreme as unconditioned (nirupādhika) and conditioned (sopādhika), Māyā being the necessary conditioning factor (upādhi), is a significant contribution to the solution of the problem of the togetherness of the Absolute and the world-appearance. The real, though beyond dynamis and stasis, becomes dynamic-cum-static in its role as Creator (Īśvara) through the association of Māyā which is neither wholly one with Brahman nor wholly other than it, and which is the creative power of the Supreme. The supreme figures as Mahāmāyā, the Māyāśābala Brahman, which is the synthesis of the dynamic and static—a synthesis expressed in Art by the image of Nataraja in that wonderful expression of movement and rest and in metaphysics in the revelation of a contradiction or ontological antinomy within itself which Śaṅkara calls anirvacanīyata or Māyā,²⁵ an antinomy which is eternally present and eternally resolved therein. This is because the Absolute of Śaṅkara is substance as well as subject, Brahman as well as Paramātman. The concept of Māyā, the cosmic energy of the Supreme, is a religious concept in the philosophy of Śaṅkara and cannot be rendered intelligible in dissociation from the concept of Īśvara. Śaṅkara in his poetic moods describes it as the consort of the Lord (parabrahma-maḥiṣī). Māyā is operative in two ways. In one aspect it brings about the "illusion of empirical existence" of the self; in another the "illusion of isolation" of the self.

The concept of 'Illusion' is both significant and intelligible. Illusion is never recognised as illusion so long as it is not sublated. So long as it remains unsublated it possesses stubborn reality. The empirical illusion is the very pattern of world-existence. The Absolute which divides itself into centres and which, so

divided, still wants to remain one, can do so only through the instrumentality of *Māyā*. Bradley's Absolutism whose Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number, must find a place for a doctrine like that *Māyā*. So should Hegel's Absolutism whose Absolute takes upon itself and makes its own the stupendous labour of world's history and in the process, which is at once eternal and in time, reconciles itself to the world and the world to itself. It is only through some such doctrine (*māyā*) that the Aristotelian idea 'that the Real will be without movement or change, not because it is not active, but because its activity is determined by itself', can be rendered intelligible. The meaningfulness of the concept of "illusion" in the context of the world-existence in relation to the Absolute Spirit and its richness have to be explored by philosophy both in the East and the West. The appearance of the Spirit, the Self, the Absolute, as undergoing a spatio-temporal existence which seems to be integrated to it, while in its own, original existence, it has an authentic, transcendental nature unsullied by time and temporal trappings—this is *māyā*, the great illusion. Śaṅkara likens it to the "appearance of the snake in the rope", to a "great sleep" in which the soul during its empirical existence, lies embedded, unaware of its true status.

Bradley was preoccupied with a "critical discussion of first principles"²⁶ and an endeavour "to get sound general view of Reality"²⁷ merely without making any attempt "to show how the world, physical and spiritual, realizes by various degrees the one absolute principle".²⁸ This "would involve a system of metaphysics" which he was "not undertaking to construct".²⁹ Being content with a sound general view of Reality only, he "was not able to deal systematically with the various forms of appearances. If I had done this, it would have become clear that, and how, each form is true as well as untrue".³⁰ Bradley does not, as Śaṅkara does, extract the element of truth and reality in the constitution of the 'self' or ('I' and is content to call it an 'appearance'. The absolute is present in, and, in a sense, it is alike in each of its special appearances".³¹ The Absolute is each appearance, and is all, but it is not any one as such. And it is not all equally.³² Śaṅkara's

analysis of the I or Self goes deeper and is more thorough in that (i) he extracts the element of reality in it and (ii) deciphers the element which is superimposed on it, and turns it into an "appearance", both together constituting the empirical self. The jīva, the empirical self, according to Śaṅkara, is not Brahman wholly, nor something other than it.³³ Bradley was prevented from grasping this "duality" in the nature of "appearance" (self and nature) which is enshrined in Śaṅkara's doctrine of 'anirvacaniyata' or 'māyā'. The reason, in the first place, is that he did not undertake a thorough analysis of the phenomenon of 'illusion' though at the very outset of the first chapter of his *Appearance and Reality* he recognizes that "The fact of illusion and error is in various ways forced early upon the mind; and the ideas by which we try to understand the universe, may be considered as attempts to set right our failure".³⁴ This recognition needs to be supplemented by what Śaṅkara has said in the opening pages of his *Commentary* on the *Brahmasūtra* about adhyāsa. In the second place, Bradley was prevented from having this insight into the nature of the self, because he failed to distinguish between two qualitatively different types of "appearances". The 'self' as appearance is not qualitatively of the same character as 'nature' or what Bradley calls "the sphere of dead mechanism". The world of nature is an "effected" realm, what Śaṅkara called "vikāra". The self is not an affected something. Nor is it what Śaṅkara called the *vivarta* of Reality. It is what Śaṅkara describes as the 'Ātman' and Bradley as 'Spirit'—Spirit which "is a unity of the manifold in which the externality of the manifold has utterly ceased".³⁵ According to Bradley "Nature is quite absorbed into Spirit, and at every stage of the process we find increase in reality".³⁶

As Bradley does not distinguish between the qualitative characters of the 'self' and of 'nature' as appearances of the Absolute and lays emphasis only on the 'content' aspect of "experience" to the total neglect of the 'subject' aspect of it he fails to distinguish between the diametrically opposed ways in which Nature and self can respectively be said to be absorbed in Spirit. They are both appearances of the Absolute. But as they are appearances in qualitatively quite different senses, they can be so absorbed differently and in unique ways. Bradley

does not distinguish between these ways. The Advaita of Śaṅkara does this. The silver in the shell-silver cognition is illusory, because it is sublated; similar is the fate of the illusory snake. The reality of the illusory silver is the conch-shell, that of the illusory snake is the rope. The reality of the world-appearance is Brahman (Śaṅkara) or the Absolute (Bradley). The appearance is 'absorbed' into the Reality, the Substratum. Of this Bradley would say that it is 'lost', 'destroyed'. This absorption is described by Sankara as sublation (bādhā). But the individual self is not sublated in Brahman. The great saying of Advaita '*tattvamasi*' does not teach sublation of the 'thou' in the 'that'. With the rise of knowledge the individual self is not sublated but is recognized as one with the universal Spirit. The mahāvākya, *tattvamasi*, does teach oneness and unity of the two, but not by way of sublation; only by way of recognition of the intrinsic Brahman-nature of the self. It is a case of 'sāmānādhikaraṇyam', but of 'aikya sāmānādhikaraṇyam' and not 'bādhya sāmānādhikaraṇyam'. Had it been the latter, the teaching, says Padmapāda, would not be of the form 'that thou art', but would be 'thou art not like 'silver is not'. There is need of a "fusion of the old" eastern and the new western knowledge" on this point also. It is Bradley's failure to distinguish between the various types of appearances, even when the Absolute is present, and in a sense, *is* each of its appearances, that has led him to the view that the finite is merged in the Absolute, blended, fused and dissolved therein, as Nature is quite absorbed into Spirit. The authentic spiritual status of the self has been the great theme of the Absolutism of Śaṅkara.

IV

There is a fundamental divergence in their approaches to the philosophical problem. For Śaṅkara the religious problem has always been the fundamental problem of philosophy. Both religion and philosophy have as their ultimate problem the relation of value to reality; and for Śaṅkara the form of thinking about God is the same as the form of thinking about ultimate reality. Brahman is *muktyavasthā*, liberation itself. It is also the *ens realissimum*, *janmādyasya yataḥ*. For Bradley, however, the religious consciousness is, like the moral, inher-

ntly self-contradictory. It offers thought no satisfactory resting-place. It has been 'the fate of religion to be dissolved into philosophy' in Bradley. There is much truth in W.M. Urban's accusation against Bradley that his *Appearance and Reality* had a share in bringing about this dissolution and in encouraging positivistic and humanistic views of religion.³⁷ Urban distinguishes between four forms through which Idealism in the West has passed.³⁸ Bradley is connected with the third form of Idealism which Urban calls Logical or Absolute Idealism. Adopting this classification we can say that Śaṅkara would belong to what Urban calls the last stand of Idealism, namely Axiological Idealism or the Idealism of Value for which the notion of intelligibility and value are inseparable. For Bradley the crucial option for philosophy is the option between 'thought' and 'being'. For Śaṅkara it would be the option between "the inseparability of being and value" and "the divorce of being and value". I like to think with Urban that in comparison with the option between thought and being, the option between the latter pair is much more fruitful and significant. Śaṅkara's formulation of the idealistic principle represents the true inwardness of the idealistic movement. In any case it serves to distinguish him from Bradley. The categories which Śaṅkara employs in the presentation of his world-view are value categories. The categories of causality which he makes use of in his endeavour to bind the world to the Supreme admits of several formulations which are complimentary and complete each other. Śaṅkara does not, like Bradley, reduce the fundamental categories of metaphysical thought to appearance. The enunciation of the category of causality in Śaṅkara has a religious ring about it, and the world, even when it is said to own an illusory character, does not give up its spiritual ring, *Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇa midam* that is infinite and this is infinite. The doctrine of illusion is an organ of Śaṅkara's spiritual philosophy.

The true ontological problem for us is not 'Reality and Appearance' as Bradley poses it, but the problem: How the one Reality exists as (i) Unconditioned or Absolute (*nirupādhika*) and as (ii) Conditioned (*sopādhika*) with the world of name-and form as its limiting-adjuncts (*upādhī*) as Sankara poses it. The problem is one of the dual vision of the

Supreme, the Supreme figuring (i) as the Absolute and (ii) as the Creative Spirit, the Mahāmāya, the Māyāśabala Brahman. Māyā operates in two ways, as bringing about the "illusion of isolation" and the "illusion of empirical existence". The meaningfulness and the fertility of the concept of "illusion" have to be explored by philosophy both in the East and the West, if they are to hold that illusion can be overcome. On the contrary view there can be no problem of "appearance and reality". Even if we hold with some (Alexander) that 'Reality is reality' and everything can be said to be real, we must note that this statement can be true and intelligible only with a proviso: 'provided we do not take it for what it is not'. But we do take things for what they are not. Does Bradley tell us that the 'illusion about' Reality is at any point overcome? At least Śāṅkara does tell us. This overcoming of the illusion has, for Śāṅkara, a sacredness about it and marks the point where the ideal and the actual fuse in one. It is liberated existence. We can have access to it only by "trenching on the mystical".

Some of us may have their own doubts about the utility or fruitfulness of a seminar on *Comparative Philosophy*. They may also labour under the illusion that a philosophical conference is like an examination hall and the philosophers the candidates taking the examination who have, in their own way, to answer the same questions set to them. We should awaken to the truth that there is a uniqueness in the formulation of the problem by a major thinker, even when the problem for the professional text-book writer is the same. The problem, say, of reality, of value of universal, of knowledge, etc. acquire a uniqueness as handled by a major thinker. Every genuine philosophical problem has a many sided richness about it, and the problems run into one another. The philosopher-sage of Harvard, A.N. Whitehead, said that "in human experience the philosophic question can receive no final answer. Human knowledge is a process of approximation. In the focus of experience there is comparative clarity. But the discrimination of this clarity leads into the penumbral background. The endeavour to make our utmost approximation to analysis of meaning is human philosophy".³⁹ This is the supreme reason for the

utmost toleration of variety of opinion. A clash is not a disaster; it is an opportunity. "Let both grow together until the harvest".

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NOTES

1. A. N. Whitehead : *Process and Reality* (1929), p. VII.
2. Ibid., P. 9.
3. W. M. Urban : *The Inteligible World*, P. 435.
4. *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 489.
5. Ibid., p. 489.
6. *Apperance and Reality* (1930), p. 489.
7. Ibid., p. 489.
8. Ibid., p. 441.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
10. Ibid., p. 148.
11. Ibid., p. 152.
12. Ibid., p. 152.
13. Ibid., p. 489.
14. G. Watts-Cunningham : *The Idealistic Argument*, etc. (1933), p. 523.
15. Ibid., p. 152.
16. Bṛhad. SB. IV. 3.33.
17. *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 243.
18. Aitareya. SB., II. 1.1; Brhad. SB., II 5.19.
19. *The Idea of God* (1920), p. 236.
20. SB. III. 4. 52.
21. *Brahma-sūtra*. I. 1.2, Janmādyasya yatah: ।
22. *Brahma-sūtra*. SB. II. 1.9
23. R. V. Das in *The Journal of the Indian Academy of Philosophy*, Vol. VI. (1967). Nos. 1 and 2, p. 20.
24. *Appearance and Reality* (1930), p. 467.
25. A. B. Dhruva : Presidential Address to the Third Indian Philosophical Congress (Madras).
26. *Appearance and Reality*, Preface, p. IX.
27. Ibid., p. 318.

28. Ibid., p. 318.
29. Ibid., p. 318.
30. Ibid., p. 496.
31. Ibid., p. 405.
32. Ibid., p. 431.
33. SB. II. 3.50, na sa eva sāṅṣāt nāpi vastvantaram ।
34. *Appearance and Reality*, p. 9.
35. Ibid., p. 441.
36. Ibid., p. 439.
37. *Humanity and Deity* (1951), p. 41.
38. *Beyond Realism and Idealism*.
39. *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 46 (1937), p. 178.