ANALYSIS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Considering the General nature of the topic proposed for discussion in this seminar, I do not feel sure if I would be justified in narrowing down the scope of the discussion by electing to make a few observations in this paper on ' Analysis '. The reason for my choice of this particular subject is that without some illustration it cannot be shown how modern western philosophising looks in the perspective of Indian philosophical speculations, and ' analysis' being the major trend in modern thought no better illustration could perhaps be chosen to expound my point of view on the subject. I may also refer to some other problems generally regarded as peculiar to Indian philosophy and therefore having no topical relevance today, to suggest the view that philosophical problems, whether Indian or western, never become outdated and lose significance.

The conveners of the Seminar have aptly pointed out, in their note, that in the philosophical fraternity of India there is prevalent the impression that the philosophical thought of the ancient Indian schools has very little to say that is relevant to the solution or even the proper understanding of problems hotly debated today. If this impression were correct and based on a first-hand intensive study of the schools, then the sooner we get rid of our concern with Indian Philosophy the better. But I am afraid, the modern Indain Philosopher's impression about the contemporary irrelevance of Indian schools of thinking is quite hasty and even distorted. He has no better access to these schools than through the histories of them which, to say the least, are no better than bird's-eye views of only the major doctrines expounded by some of them. Detailed first-hand studies of each of the schools or any of its major doctrines, like Scherbatsky's ' Buddhist Logic ' are rarely attempted these days. Perhaps the neglect and indifference reflected in the prevalent attitude towards Indian philosophy is inspired by the over-weeningly conceited view of most modern Indian thinkers that the philosophical thought of an unscientific age could not possibly have any relevance to the philosophical problems of an out-and-out scientific era. I for one do not see eye to eye with this oft-repeated plea;

science for all its advance, does not seem to me to have changed much the nature of philosophical problems. But instead of arguing this point in an abstract manner, I would discuss briefly two problems apparently far removed from matters of current philosophical interest, to vindicate my point that almost all Indian philosophy of the schools has topical relevance today.

The first is the problem of the eternity of the Vedas. In view of the fact that the Vedas are vast literary compositions characterised by all the qualities that go along with human authorship, it would seem quite perverse to debate the question with a philosophical air whether these works are human creations or not. Most of the modern oriental scholars have been confused by this debate and have therefore tried somehow to explain it away. But if we take into consideration the technical meaning of 'imperative statements' assigned to the word 'Vēda' by Mīmāṁsā, and further interpret the above question as inquiring whether imperatives having to do with moral commandments derive their authority from that of any human speakers of them or they are self-authoritative, the contemporary relevance of the above question becomes evident at once. It is evidently the familiar question of the 'categoricity of imperatives' discussed in Kantian ethics.

The second problem is, on the face of it, no less anachronistic than the first. In his commentary on the fourth aphorism of the Brahma-sutras, Śaṅkara joins issue with the Mimāṁsists on their theory that only statements laying down ritualistic injunctions can be admitted as significant (if they occur in the scriptures). The Upaniṣadic statements purporting to make simple reference to ultimate reality have therefore to be interpreted as suggesting the necessity of some kind of action, say that of prayer, etc., in regard to the ultimate reality. It is obvious that the controversy presented in this form is bound to strike a modern student of philosophy as futile and senseless. But a slight change of idiom would suddenly transform it into a burning issue of contemporary philosophy. Śaṅkara, as the advocate of a certain theory of meaning, is here attacking the Mīmāṁsists who advocate another theory—the Indian and more refined counterpart of the modern theory of sense-verification which like the latter, rules out as not nonsensical, but as having only a secondary sense (or Arthavāda) the Upaniṣadic statements purporting to make significant reference to the transcendental rea-

lity of Brahman. The sallies and countersallies that take place between the Mīmāṁsists and Śaṅkara on this issue remind one vividly of similar polemics occurrring between the positivists and their opponents in modern discussions. Again, if it were explained that Śaṅkara's elaborate explication of the meaning of the indeclinable ' Artha ' in his commentry on the first aphorism is not mere exegesis but is a serious and rational attempt to justify the possibility, significance and feasibility of the realisation of Brahman, the discussion is at once thrown into a new perspective and it then assumes an extraordinary topical importance.

I have chosen only stray examples to just illustrate my point that even ancient Indian thinking can be a help in solving the philosophical problems of this scientific era. I now propose to discuss in some detail, one particular topic of modern philosophy, namely analysis, in the perspective of the speculations of Indian schools on the subject. In a short paper like this I cannot hope to present more than a bare outline of the discussion conducted on this subject in Sanskrit treatises. Analysis is the major trend of modern philosophising and it has emerged as such by way of a violent reaction against the sweeping generalisations and syntheses of the Hegelians and the Neo-Hegelians. This reaction in its earlier phases voiced by Moore and Russell, at the turn of the century, took the almost extreme course of equating philosophy with logic itself which, for Russell was the analytical discipline par excellence. Moore was however sober-minded enough not to identify philosophy with analysis but even he practised nothing but analysis all through his life.

An exactly similar trend we find raising its head for the first time in the sphere of Indian thought in the form of Buddhism which has been given the significant name 'Vibhajjavāda ' in the Buddhist cannonical literature. It must have been against the unsystematised, intuitive and sweeping generalisations of the Upaniṣads and the Upaniṣadic thinkers that Buddhism had to raise a strong voice of protest and this it did upholding the thesis that analysis is the essence of philosophy and that the real is the indivisible, self-contained and unique moment itself. Even in the avowedly analytical philosophy of atomism propounded by Russell and the subtle philosophical analysis of precepts in terms of sense-data proposed by Moore, we fail to find the depth of philosophical

insight which could enable them to proclaim boldly that reality is the ultimate spatio-temporal and qualitative unit itself and not that entity whose ultimacy is relative to a particular type of analysis. Compared to the vacillating attitude of the early analysts like Russell, Moore, Broad and others towards the problems of reality, the Buddhistic approach to it seems to be thoroughly honest, bold and confident.

There is another remarkable thing about the Buddhist philosophy of analysis. Russell, Moore and other modern analysts borrowed ready-made the analytical point of view from the sciences. I have not come across any rigorous logical argument advanced by any of these thinkers to support the analytical thesis. But it is quite different with the Buddhists. They have first formulated in precise logical terms the commonsense criterion of reality which is to the effect that whatever is real must be effective in producing some perceptible result (Arthakriyākāritvaṁ Sattvam). Literally taken, this implies that no real entity can remain ineffective even for a moment and that two different results cannot issue from the same entity, for, if an entity is capable of procducing them either successively or simultaneously it should produce them all at once. It will not do to say against this that even a cause requires the help of auxiliary conditions to produce its own results. In that case it could be rejoined that a result which is not wholly dependent upon its so-called cause cannot reasonably be regarded as its effect and further that the auxiliaries being only the partial causes of the cumulative result, they and the main cause may, without difficulty, produce their separate results at the same time. By this line of argument, which is developed to its logical pefection, the Buddhists seek to deduce .the analytical doctrine from the common notion of reality itself. Whole treatises in Sanskrit have been devoted to logical hairsplitting on this issue but the modern founders of the analytical movement do not seem to be aware of the need of any rigorous argument in this regard.

Further, it can also be said to the credit of the Buddhists that they have successfully applied the analytical thesis to every sphere of reality not excluding eschatology. Moore got so inextricably stuck up in the morass of the sense-data metaphysics that all through his philosophical career he remained preoccupied with the problem of the relation of sense data to perceptual objects and so he could

not even turn to the epistemological problem as to how sense data can be sensed if they are fleeting entities. It was because of his lack of awareness of the epistemological problem that Moore could maintain the position in ethics that ethical properties are suigeneris and are intuitively apprehended, which is in flagrant contradiction with his metaphysical position. Russell, however, tried to construct a realist epistemology but even he remained blissfully unaware of the main epistemological difficulty that any sense-data metaphysics has to face, namely, that the momentary sense-data and their momentary cognitions can never be directly connected with each other. The early Buddhists' attempts to negotiate this hurdle without being precipitated into the idealistic position show how keen an eye they had for philosophical subtleties. In comparison, the modern analysts' performance in this sphere seems to be rather half-hearted and slipshod, not to say of their utter indifference to explain eschatological matters on analytical lines. The Buddhists have quite consistently with their metaphysics developed a system of transcendental ethics from which the very idea of soul is excluded.

Like the Buddhist, the Naiyāyika also expouses the analytical point of view but he cannot be said to have any definite ontological commitments with regard to the nature of reality. As the celebrated remark goes : 'Buddhyā Yadupannaṁ Tannyāyamatam' the Nyāya would regard that to be real or true whose existence is justifiable by reason. This does not exclude commonsense but cautions us against an indiscriminate reliance in and use of it. As Moore would put it, it is one thing to say that one knows a thing but quite a different and a very serious thing to say that one knows the analysis of what one says one knows. Nyāya makes it one of its main business to provide the analysis of all important commonsensical notions.

All analysis in philosophy must be conceptual whether the concepts analysed are pure or are embodied in linguistic forms or strctures. It is not actual entities or their attributes and properties which philosophy can legitimately claim to analyse, for these are in rerum natura either self-analysed or non-composite. In the former case the business of philosophy would be confined to merely revealing the analytical nature of things. If the latter alternative holds, philosophical analysis would entail the fallacy of metaphysi-

cal division. Concepts, however, are not identical with conmmon objects but they are also not pure fictions or even mere logical constructions as Russell would say. Again,they are also not mere projections of the transcendental Vāsanā or Vijñāna as the Yogācāra idealists have maintained. They are epistemic structures grounded upon ontological realities which our various modes of cognition help build up when they come in contact with objects. To illustrate, a book is before me on the table. The book, the table and their mutual relation of conjunction are all realities in the world of nature. Now, since I perceive the book on the table and not the table on the book, each of these entities must figure in a certain way even in my simple cognition of the book on the table. The book figures as lying above the table, so we may call this mode of figuring as Prakārata. The table, on the other hand, figures as standing below the book, so we call its mode of figuring as 'Viśeṣata'. Similarly the connection between these two figures only as a relation and not as a term; so we may call its mode of figuring as 'Saṁsargytā'. Corresponding to each of these modes of figuring there has to be admitted the emergence of a mode in the cognition itself so that the latter would be endowed with a 'Prakāritā' a 'Viśeṣyitā' and a 'Saṁsargita' respectively. If this is not admitted, then all differences of cognitions would fall on the side of objects and then the obvious difference between the perception of a book on the table and that of a table with the book under it cannot be easily explained.

So Nyāya has postulated a large number of conceptual entities like the above to fill the apparent gaps in our reason-pictures of commonplace facts. Nyāya is called 'Lakṣanaikacakṣuṣka' in Indian philosophy for it does not rest satisfied with commonsense accounts of things but tries to give a compact and fool-proof account of these, for which purpose exact definitions based upon a rigorous analysis of common notions have to be formulated. This task involves some major difficulties, two of which may be referred to here in order to show how Nyāya has very ingeniously resolved them. One difficulty is about the status of the conceptual entities vis-a-vis the real entities with which they are supposed to be epistemically related. If these are regarded as real, as the commonplace objects, it would not only be overpopulating the real world but their non-recognition for what they are by unphilosophical people would be an enigma. If on the other hand these entities are treated as mrere

logical constructs, as has been done by Russell, the necessity of their incorporation in the analytical account is left unexplained. Indian logicians hold different views on this matter but the majority of them are of the opinion that these entities are to be conceived as certain types of self relations '*svarūpa saṁbandha*' This is a tricky no tion of Nyāya which cannot be gone into here. It would suffice to say only this much about it that it is a way of conceiving a thing under a relational aspect . Adapting the terminology of modern logic, one can even say that a conceptual entity is the relational function of the entity whose structure is subjected to logical analysis.

Another difficulty which is likely to present itself in this account is one which every formal logician has to face at some stage or other in his analytical investigation of things. It is the difficulty of explaining the apparent discrepancy between the logical and the commonsensical descriptions of a thing. If the structure of an entity is as complex as the logician makes it out, why does it appear quite simple and homogeneous to the common man ? It is not a satisfactory relply to this to say that the common man cannot be expected to know the analytical structure of a thing; for if the thing is really as complex as the logician makes it out to be even the common man must know this complexity. Nyāya's solution of this difficulty is that all the complexity that is discovered by analysis falls on the side of the relation which is supposed to hold together the different parts of the analystical structure of a thing. This relation as relation is unanalysable and therefore the question of its analytical presentation along with the presentation of its relata cannot be raised. If the relation were to present itself as a term it would cease to be a relation. But for the purpose of logical analysis, relation must be treated as a term and therefore each of its component elements must present itself separately. Many other difficulties, which cannot be mentioned here, are sought to be overcome by adopting this device by the Naiyāyikas.

Even this sketchy accout of analysis as practised by Nyāya would, by comparison, bring home to a serious thinker the serious inadequacy that characterises almost all analyses of concepts propounded by modern analysts. This relates to the explication of the logical nexus of the various component elements into which a conceptual entity is analysed. To illustrate. The concept of negation of an entity may be analysed by a modern analyst into the two com-

ponents, the entity itself and its negation. But a good many things remain undisclosed in this simple analysis. The entity is involved in its negation as its counterpositive. The specific character of the entity would also be involved in the negation as the limitor of the counterpositiveness of the latter. The counterpositiveness again would have to be related to the negation as its converse. Only when all these things are explicitly stated complete analytical picture of the negation can be said to have emerged. As Johnson has very aptly pointed out in his Logic, analysis is not mere separation of a complex or whole into its parts; it is the complete explication of the mode under which the various component elements are determined so as to constitute the whole.

We have dwelt at great length on conceptual analysis; but what about the other forms of analysis like those of common usage and other usages which are the fashion in modern thought ? Does Nyāya or any other Indian school deal with this rype of analysis ? The reply to this question is partly affirmative and partly negative. Nyāya is quite definite on the point that philosophical problems are not reducible to those of mere semantics. Discussion of usages becomes relevant only when words are to be precisely fixed in their meanings. We have abundant discussion of usages in that part of Nyāya which has to do with semantics. For instance, the precise determination of the meaning of ego-centric particulars like 'I' 'That' etc. has taken up a lot of space in Nyāya works like Śaktivāda In *Vyutpativāda* and *Sabdśaktiprakāśikā* We have detailed discussion of the seman tics of prefixes, suffixes, cases, verbs and so on in which thinkers of different schools take different positions. But such discussions are never mixed up with the philosophical explication of concepts. However near to common experience and usage Nyāya may be, its attitude to it is more prescriptive than descriptive. It has rarely allowed mere established usage or comparison of different usages to decide philosophical problems. Even in the west, as recent writings show, the interest in usage analysis seems to be on the wane.

I may wind up this account with some remarks on the Vedāntic approach to 'analysis'. Vedānta and Buddhism are poles apart and yet as opposite extremes they seem to converge on certain points. The Buddhistic real is the analytical ultimate while the Vedāntic real is the synthetic (or universal) ultimate. But as ultimates

both defy the imposition of any character or extraneous mark upon them. They are therefore *svayaṁprakāśa* or *svalakṣaṇa*; that is to say, not dependent upon anything outside themselves to manifest their identity. Though they may be described as tolerating *Upādhi* and *vikalpa*, yet these are, to adopt a modern terminology, only the dependent existential (in the case of Vedānta) and logical functions of the ultimate realities (in the case of Buddhism). For Vedānta as opposed to Nyāya analysis is the distorter of reality. Hence even on the empirical plane, where Vedānta shows its readiness to go the whole hog with Nyāya in its account of the means of knowledge (*Prāmāṇa*) it yet makes the reservation that even knowledge derived through *Pramāṇa* is mediated through and through and is therefore indirect The essence of reality is self-revelation and it mustcome out even in empirical knowledge. Hence while agreeing with other schools in their descriptions of the processes leading to perception, the Vedānta parts company with them in maintaining that the object of perception emerges in total definance of the subjective and the objective conditions by which it is usually obscured. Thus, analysis for Vedānta is a negative condition of knowledge while for Nyāya it is its positive condition. But even Nyāya, for all its analyticity, does not regard analysis as the final goal of philosophy. The distinctive apprehension of truths (leading to self-realisation as in other schools) is the goal which analysis is supposed to lead us to. If analysis were the end of philosophising it could never be reached for no analysis of a concept can be claimed as the final one. Yet if an ad hoc analysis of a concept adequately reveals its structure, it may be accepted as satisfactory for the purpose in hand.

Department of Philosophy, **N. S. Dravid**
Nagpur University, Nagpur.