

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE BUDDHA- HUME " CONNECTION "

Attempts to discuss parallels between David Hume's Philosophy and Gautama Buddha's philosophy have become very popular for scholars in the East and in the West. Although it might seem far-fetched to some philosophers, there do exist certain similarities between Buddhism and certain aspects of Hume's philosophy. In this study I propose to discuss : (1) The parallels between Hume's philosophy and Buddhist philosophy, (2) the question of whether or not Buddha influenced Hume; and (3) the contrasts between Buddha and Hume. My discussion will evaluate the thesis of Nolan Pliny Jacobson,¹ who holds that Hume was influenced by Buddha insofar as Buddhist philosophy was carried to the West by way of Chinese cultural traditions. and Edward Conze², who sees no real parallel between the two. It is my intention to show that the Buddhist conception of the self is more intricate than the Humean conception, and that this is due to the viewpoints on perception adopted by each of these men. I am going to restrict my remarks on Buddhist philosophy to Buddha as he is interpreted in the Theravāda tradition.³

My discussion will begin with the specific points on which a comparative study can be made. First of all, there is the issue of atheism. Hume's reflections about the nature of the universe and its relation to God are mainly contained in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. The speakers Philo and Cleanthes give a number of arguments and expose many difficulties which philosophers of religion must try to solve. Hume's attitude about the existence and nature of God can be given in Philo's words :

If the whole history of Natural Theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, *That cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence* : If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular explication : If it afford no inference that affects human life, or can be the source of any action or forbearance : And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no farther than to

the human intelligence, and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of mind : If this really be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the arguments, on which it is established, exceed the objections, which lie against it.⁴

Here Hume asserts that causes or order in the universe bear a remote analogy to human intelligence. The impression we get is that Hume believes that the existence of God is assured by reason of the amount of order discoverable in the universe, but due to insufficient evidence no conclusion about his nature and attributes can be drawn.

In a similar manner Buddhists also argue that the nature of God is beyond human understanding, and cannot be grasped by the finite intellect. Whenever Buddha was asked questions concerning the nature and existence of God, he refused to answer them. However, his atheism was not based on either scepticism or agnosticism, but on rational critical analysis that speculations about the existence of God are useless and a mere waste of time. All the arguments given to prove the existence of God are inadequate. In theism it is believed that there is a God who is almighty, omnipotent, and all-pervasive. Different religions of the world, like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and so on, believe in the concept of God. But according to Buddha, we do not have any direct way of knowing such a God and so discussions about him are unprofitable.

Second, there is the issue of the existence of substance. Buddhists deny the existence of any permanent substance. According to them world is in state of flux (*anicca*). Things are changing from moment to moment. Everything—perception, feelings, objects, etc.—is in a state of flux and belief in substance is nothing but the figment of imagination. Similarly, Hume also denies the existence of substance. He accepts the empirical theory of the origin of knowledge and holds that we only know our impressions. Accordingly, we have no right to assert the reality of substance. Thus, Hume rejected the existence of substance, as do Buddhists, although clearly for different reasons.

A third point of comparison is that of the existence of self. Since all knowledge for Hume consists of perceptions, he rejects the idea of a

self, because we do not have any impression of it. Hume remarks that some philosophers are of the opinion that they are conscious of self as something which is permanent and constant throughout our lives. But from what impression could such an idea be derived? If there be such an idea which gives rise to the idea of self, it must remain unchanged and therefore we do not have any such idea. He says :

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. An were all my perceptions removed by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated nor do I conceive what is further requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If anyone upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself, tho I am certain there is no such principle in me.

But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.⁵

From this, he concludes that :

The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, re-pass, glide away and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no *simplicity* in it at one time, nor *identity* in different; whatever natural propension we have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind, nor have we the most distant notion of the place, where these scenes are repre-

sented, or of the materials, of which it is composed.⁶

In a similar fashion Buddhists also argue that there is no such thing as the soul or the self in the sense of a permanent entity (*anattā*). As Lakshmi Narasu puts it, according to the Buddhists :

That which is called the Ego, which says 'I am', is merely an aggregate of *skandhas*, a complex of sections, ideas, thoughts, emotions and volitions. It is not an eternal immutable entity behind these. The word 'I' remains the same, but its significance continually changes. It originates in the child with the development of self-consciousness (*svasamvedanam*), and denotes first a boy, then a youth, after that a man and finally a dotard. There is an identity in a certain sense only. As the Blessed One says in the *Kūṭadanta Sūtra*, the sameness is constituted by continuity; just as we speak of the identity of a river or a fountain, though the water is continually changing, or of the identity between the flame of a lamp at one moment and that at another moment, although different particles of the wick and oil are consumed in succession, and the flame itself might have been put out for some time in the interim.⁷

Self, for Buddhists, is made of five *Khandas* (Sanskrit : *Skandhas*) which are impermanent and so cannot give rise to a permanent entity called self. Thus, the notion of a self as permanent entity is nothing but an illusion. So, for Buddhists as well as for Hume there is no thinker, but only thought, no perceiver but only perception.

Thus far we have seen the similarities between the views of Hume and Buddha on substance, self, and God. There are very important differences between the two thinkers, and it seems that the differences override the similarities. Before these differences are discussed, however, it seems appropriate to consider to what degree, if any, Hume was influenced by Buddha. Are the parallels between the two "real"? Different philosophers have taken different positions on this issue.

Edward Conze, in his article, "Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," maintains that any parallels between Hume and Buddhist Philosophy are superficial. "Spurious parallels", he holds, are those parallels which "often originate from a wish to find affinities with philosophers recognized and admired by the exponents

of current philosophy, and intend to make Buddhist thinkers interesting and respectable by current western standards."⁸ He agrees that there is a parallel between Hume's and Buddha's concept of the self, since both reject the notion of a permanent self. But as they have different purposes, the parallel is "merely deceptive."⁹ As he says: "A negative proposition derives its true meaning from what it is directed against, and its message entirely depends, therefore, on its context. In different contexts two identical negative statements may, therefore, have nothing in common,"¹⁰ because negative statements which are merely destructive of another point of view derive their meaning in connection with what they are negating. Humean and Buddhist philosophy lead in opposite directions. Hume "reduced selfhood to the level of the subpersonal," and the Buddhist doctrine of *anattā* - invites us to search for the super-personal."¹¹ And since these two philosophies have different goals and purposes, he claims that the parallels which we find in the two are deceptive.

Nolan Pliny Jacobson, in his article, "The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy," on the other hand, maintains that Hume's ideas to a large extent were borrowed from Buddha *via* China. His thesis is that in the areas of ethics, education and political thought, Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was much more influenced by Oriental ideas than by its own historical thought. He suggests that Montesquieu and Voltaire in France, Leibnitz and Wolff in Germany, and Shaftesbury and Anthony Ashley Cooper in England, all were influenced by Oriental thought to a significant degree. Jacobson proceeds to show that Pierre Bayle was not only a vehicle of Oriental thought, but also a major influence on Hume's thoughts and ideas.

Jacobson holds that Hume's central ideas, particularly his treatment of causality, God, substance, and self, were shaped by Bayle. Starting with the paradoxes of Zeno, Bayle attacks all sorts of ancient and modern forms of atomism. He attempts to show that all knowledge which carries us beyond the empirical world is contrary to reason, the doctrine which is central in Hume. According to Jacobson, Hume read Bayle when he was writing the *Treatise*. Bayle was very much impressed by the "tolerance of the Chinese emperor for Jesuit missions."¹² There was a craze for Chinese art culture in European markets at that time. Jacobson writes that :

Efforts to seek out the sources of Hume's major ideas must soon come to acknowledge the wide range of influences, both western and Oriental in origin, to which Hume was part deliberately, part unconsciously subjected. Ideas propounded by 'the yellow-garbed monks of yore' climbed the Himalayas, and were linked with an unexpected destiny by being synthesized and sharpened in a thousand years of Chinese philosophic discourse, whence they travelled the Old Silk Road and ocean trade routes to make a major contribution to the struggle of Western man to wriggle free from the fading philosophic tapestry of the Ancient world.¹³

Therefore he concludes that Hume had to be influenced by Oriental thought.

Oriental influences were so much a part of the intellectual climate in which Hume moved that neither he nor anyone of comparable prominence in the debate of the time could have formulated his thoughts apart from these influences. Asia played a dominant role in the thinking which had the longest future to play in the secularization of modern life; it played a prominent role in the shaping of Hume's thought, particularly in his working over of the notions of causality, substance, the role of reason in religion, and the enduring, ever-identical self.¹⁴

To sum up: we have, on the one hand, the view of Conze who maintains that there is no real parallel between Humean and Buddhist philosophy, and on the other hand, we have Jacobson's view that Hume was greatly influenced by Buddha.¹⁵

Conze's thesis that there is no real parallel between Humean and Buddhist philosophy is one-sided. Alex Wayman, criticizing Conze's article, points out that "I set no limit on the valid comparisons that can be and ought to be made,"¹⁶ a statement with which I agree. He explains Conze's thesis thus: "What Conze means is that if two persons seem to agree on item X, and seem to disagree on items $Y_1, Y_2, \dots Y_n$ - it follows that they do not agree on X; for if two persons seem to disagree on several things, they do not agree on anything,"¹⁷ a conclusion which must be regarded as absurd.

There is bias in Conze's article. His view that there is no real parallel between the two seems to be based on the thesis that there

is a very little hope for interchange between East and West in philosophy. As a matter of fact, he is convinced that the time has come to abandon the quest for parallels between thinking in the East and in the West.¹⁸ The fact that Hume's and Buddha's philosophies lead in opposite directions does not make the parallels "spurious," as Conze claims. It appears that Conze forgot that there is an affirmative aspect of every negation, and so in spite of the differences the parallels between the two cannot be denied. Simply because two parties happen to develop their central idea in obviously different directions, this, in itself, need not imply the central idea is, *ipso facto* dissimilar. In fact there might well be genuine similarity in the idea selected as points of departure for philosophic inquiry. For example, two parties might entertain a similar view that the Industrial Revolution was a key factor in the improvement of agriculture. While there is a genuine similarity regarding a certain statement of affairs, the parties might proceed to explain the specific effects of this revolution quite differently. One party might come to the conclusion that since this revolution rendered production possible on a much larger scale than ever before, hence it served as a betterment of our way of life; the other might conclude that it introduced nothing but a machine oriented, capitalistic social system in which the sense of human value is lost. The point I am trying to make is that Hume and Buddha have a real similarity so far as their conceptions of self are concerned, although they have different purposes, and reach different conclusions. Stated differently, both regard the self as a bundle of perceptions. There is a similarity here, and it would be erroneous to conclude that the differences make the similarity superficial.

Jacobson's position, on the other hand, also seems to be far-fetched. If one puts his position into logical form, we get the following premises and conclusion :

Bayle was influenced by Oriental thought.

Hume was influenced by Bayle.

Therefore, Hume was influenced by Oriental thought,

While Jacobson's logic appears sound on the surface, his use of "influence" is perhaps questionable. Clearly there are cases in

which one can be said to be "influenced" by another and yet the specific area of influence be, at least, ambiguous. Consider a primary case of influence that of the parent-child relationship. Certainly a great deal of the child's attitude and knowledge comes from his parents. Yet it is doubtful that anyone could *specify* that it was the parents' influence that caused the child to do such-and-such in any given situation, *unless* the observer had first-hand knowledge of *that particular* situation from talking with the parent or the child. Obviously, this first hand experience is lacking in the case of knowing about Bayle's influence on Hume. Jacobson's thesis has speculative weight, but it is lacking in historical and intellectual weight. Hume never mentioned Buddha in his writings and so there is no direct evidence that Hume was influenced by Buddha. Jacobson builds his case solely on "circumstantial evidence," and in order to strengthen his thesis, he maintains that sometimes circumstantial evidence is more "compelling" than direct evidence. And he observes that "Carter's early European typography may be mentioned, in which the case for Asian models for early European playing cards and religious drawing is said to rest on such strong circumstantial evidence as to be accepted with a reasonable degree of certainty."¹⁹ He also mentions that philosophers of Hume's time did not document their sources and states that "powerful support to the case for Oriental influence is provided in the fact that Hume and intellectuals of his time felt themselves under no obligation whatsoever to document the source of their ideas, and the evidence for this is boundless."²⁰ Then Jacobson continues by saying that Bayle was a major influence on Hume, although Hume mentions him by name only once in the *Treatise* (I. iv. 5. 243n), and only once in the *Enquiries* (I. 12. 155n). He quotes Norman Kemp Smith and Richard Popkin on this point, and he concludes, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, that Hume was influenced by Buddha.

Although Jacobson makes his case on the basis of circumstantial evidence, and gives examples where circumstantial evidence proves to be "compelling," he has failed to describe the examples of contrary evidence which would appear to outnumber the evidence he employed. The fact that circumstantial evidence is strong in a particular case does not prove that it is strong in all the cases. The force of circumstantial evidence is hardly a cogent basis to put forth

for an argument or thesis. While there may be some point in his suggestion, as we cannot totally disregard cultural influences and psychological factors, we cannot, on the basis of these alone, conclude that Hume was influenced by Buddha. In other words, that sort of alleged influence is by itself not convincing. However, this is not to say that Jacobson's thesis ought to be regarded as *necessarily* wrong; rather, the most that can be said is that the manner in which he argues the case fails to demonstrate certainty.

Thus we can safely conclude that, due to the lack of evidence, we cannot say to what degree Hume was influenced by Buddha or if he was at all influenced by him. In view of the fact that the attitudes and goals of Buddhism are so different from Hume's, Jacobson's thesis that Hume borrowed his ideas from the Buddha seems to be improbable.

I do not intend to suggest that there are only similarities between the two philosophies. There are major differences between the two and I agree with Jacobson that "differences certainly outweigh the similarities." ²¹

Having dealt with the similarities, we will proceed to look at the major differences between Humean and Buddhist philosophy.

The chief aim of Buddha was to free people from sorrows and delusions of life. Life in this world is full of suffering (*dukkha*). All human beings who are involved in this cycle of birth and death should try to attain salvation from it. Birth, death, decay are painful. Even the pleasures are painful because they are always accompanied by the fear that we may lose them. Therefore, all human beings in this world need to be saved from suffering and released from suffering which can be possible only through *nirvāṇa* or attainment of Buddhahood. Buddha did not stop by telling about life as *dukkha*, but in the second Noble Truth pointed out the cause of *dukkha* and in the third and fourth showed that there can be a cessation of the *dukkha* and the way by which one reaches the cessation of *dukkha*. *Dukkha* depends on some conditions, and if those conditions cease, *dukkha* ceases also. Thus, cessation of suffering is possible and attainable in this life, if certain conditions are fulfilled. Buddha followed the path which leads to the extinction of misery and affirmed that others can also follow it, if they want to attain a state free from

misery, that is, *nibbāna* (Sanskrit : *nirvāṇa*). Thus, Buddha as a teacher and physician diagnosed the disease but did not stop with the diagnosis; he went further and also provided the cure.

Hume, on the other hand, was not bothered by the suffering in the world, and we do not find in him any concept comparable to the Buddhist concept of *nibbāna*. He was not trying to save human beings from the suffering of this world. Hume's aim was to analyze different ways of knowing and to discover the principles which would meet the most critical examination.²² Hume wrote that he hoped he could contribute something to the advancement of knowledge by expounding on some particular which could give a new turn to the speculation of philosophers, as well as pointing out to them "more distinctly those subjects, where alone they can expect assurance and conviction. Human Nature is the only science of man."²³

Even with their similarity about the conception of self, their different purposes are obvious. Since Hume rejects all concepts which are not based on sensory experience, he necessarily rejects the view of self as substance : "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself I always stumble on some particular perception or the other.... I never can catch myself at any time without a perception and can observe anything but the perception."²⁴ This observation raises some very important problems. The question immediately is : If we can only observe perceptions, how can we know about the "observer," the "self"? Hume cannot say that these perceptions inhere in some substantial subject as the qualities do because he rejects the notion of substance. He raises the question : From what impression is the idea of substance derived? Since we do not have any impression of the idea of substance, there is no such thing as substance. No one has ever perceived the underlying substance or substratum, and so it does not exist.

If perceptions do not inhere in any substratum, it might be said that the factor which integrates the particular perception in the self is some kind of relation. But Hume rejects both the relation of identity and of cause and effect as necessary connection. Identity is one of the seven relations mentioned by Hume. He holds that the relation of identity involves a paradox. To say that two things are identical is to say that they are two, but identical. Identity refers

to two things but a pair is different, and not identical. As he puts it :

The view of any one object is not sufficient to convey the idea of identity. For in that proposition, *an object is the same with itself*, if the idea expressed by the word, *object*, were no ways, distinguished from that meant by *itself*; we really shoul'd mean nothing... One single object conveys the idea unity, not that of identity.

On the other hand, a multiplicity of objects can never convey this idea, however resembling they may be suppos'd The mind always pronounces the one not to be the other, and considers them as forming two, three, or any determinate number of objects, whose existences are entirely distinct and independent.²⁵

This, then, means that he maintains that we "feign an identity" between our present impressions and remembered ideas. There is no such relation as identity which belongs to different perceptions and unites them together. In a similar manner, he also rejects the view that there is necessary connection between cause and effect. Although we observe that one event follows the other, we never observe any necessary connection between cause and effect. It is a custom-born habit of the human mind to read necessary connection into constantly conjoined events. Causality as a necessary connection is only a fiction of mind which does not exist. In the world of external objects around us we are unable even in a single instance to find a "power or necessary connection, any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that one does actually in fact follow the other."²⁶ Therefore, the only conclusion to be inferred is that the self is just a collection of different perceptions, "which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement ... They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind."²⁷

Buddhism holds that everything is impermanent (*anicca*). There is nothing in experience which is impermanent but change. Unchanging substance exists only in thought and not in reality. *Anicca* or impermanence is a cyclic process. The law of change passes through the phases of birth, growth, decay, and death. And as everything is impermanent there is no such thing as a self which is permanent and endures through the changes. The very search for self is wrong, and

all false doctrines and notions arise out of this misconception. The belief in a permanent self causes attachment to it, and that, in turn, brings craving for pleasure. Buddha maintains that self is composed of five *Khandhas* which are impermanent, and therefore cannot give rise to a permanent entity called "self." Search for permanence in this impermanent world is the cause of our sorrow. And as self is nothing but a flow of these impermanent *Khandhas*, there is all the more reason that we should try to avoid it.

Due to the fact that Buddha and Hume have different purposes, their philosophies lead to different conclusions. Accepting *nibbāna* as the final aim, Buddha taught the doctrine of the *Middle Way* and held that extreme asceticism, and self-mortification are only another source of suffering. The ideal in Theravāda Buddhism is the *Ārhat* ('worthy' or 'holy'). *Ārhat* is the true disciple of Buddha and attains the highest stage for and by himself. On the other hand, Hume looks upon man as a social being. He maintains that sympathy is a propensity of human nature, and with the help of this quality we share pains and pleasures of other human beings. Sympathy is the faculty of our approbation and disapprobation of virtues and vices. He states that : "Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently it is that principle, which takes us so far out of ourselves, as to give us the same pleasure of uneasiness in the character of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss." ²⁸

Man is a social being and as he is in possession of the principle of sympathy he breaks off from egoism. Hume compares the minds of men to mirrors not only in that they reflect the emotions of one another "but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated, and may decay away by insensible degrees...One of the most considerable of these passions is that of love or esteem in others, which therefore proceeds from sympathy." Thus, social consciousness precedes "I" consciousness. So, sympathy in Hume means fellow-feeling. Although both Hume and Buddha regard the self as unreal, Hume describes man as a social being, which he regards as a natural element of human nature; Buddha offers us *nibbāna* which is not a social experience in any sense, but a very individual salvation.

Although Hume's conception of the self resembles Buddha's con-

ception of the self, the latter's conception goes further than the former's by explaining the continuity of seemingly separate perceptions. Buddha in essence has a way of avoiding Hume's dilemma in this case. He maintains that self is nothing but a stream of consciousness (*dhammas*). These *dhammas* are arranged in an intellectual hierarchy starting from the sensual states of consciousness and progressing to the ultimate goal which is *nibbāna*. These *dhammas* in themselves are not static but are regarded as "events" or "processes". Each *dhammas* rises from the preceding perception, develops and then passes its links to the succeeding perception. Every phase of perception has within itself the potentialities of its predecessor. So, *dhammas* are not only parts of the process but the process at the same time. With the help of the above analysis, the Buddhists explain continuity in the conception of the self as a stream of consciousness. Hume's self, on the other hand, stands out "loose and separate," without any connection between parts of the selves. Hume simply could not find a way to ground the notion of self. "But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head." ²⁹ And then he explains in the next paragraph: "In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. *that all our distinct perceptions are distinct, existences and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences.*" ³⁰ He concluded: "For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding. I pretend not, however, to pronounce it absolutely insuperable." ³¹ And here the matter rests.

This discussion will close with the observation that Hume wrote what he merely "thought". More encompassing, however, is the contribution of Buddha. Buddha not only "thought" what he preached, but also he had a "belief" in *nibbāna*. He not only conveyed belief in *nibbāna* but also he displayed in feeling and action the meaning of that consummate religious perspective. Hume wrote about the theory of knowledge; Buddha talked about a way of life. Hume's empiricism implies the task of conforming to the standards of knowledge; Buddha clarified the ethical dimension of one's way of life. The similarities which we find between the two are really

remarkable and the contrasts which we see between the two make the similarities all the more remarkable.

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NOTES

1. Nolan Pliny Jacobson, " The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* XIX (Jan. 1969), pp. 17-37.
2. Edward Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* XIII (Jul. 1963), pp. 114-115.
3. Theravāda Buddhism emphasizes the teachings and thoughts of the historical Buddha. The account of Buddhism we are concerned with in this study is based on the original teachings of Buddha. Buddha wrote no books, and all his instructions were oral instructions. Whatever knowledge we possess about Buddha depends on *Tripitakas* or the " Three Baskets " which comprise Buddha's views as recorded by his intimate disciples. There is no doubt that the *Tripitakas* are the earliest and most authentic accounts of Buddha's teaching which are available now, and they are the Canon of the Theravāda Buddhist.
4. Hume, *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* in *Hume on Religion*, ed. Richard Wollheim (Cleveland and New York : The World Publishing Company, 1954) pp. 203-04. In the *Dialogues*, Hume does not appear in his own views, and there is a great deal of controversy regarding the question, which of the two views is his own. It is difficult to say whether he wished to be identified exclusively with Philo or Cleanthes. But as their views are opposed to each other, it seems that we can associate Philo's views with Hume, because Philo is a sceptic.
5. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited with an analytical

index by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford : at the Clarendon Press, 1888) p 252.

6. Ibid; p. 253
7. L. Narasu. *The Essence of Buddhism*, (Bombay : Thacker and Co., Ltd., 1948), p. 218.
8. Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy, " p. 105.
9. *Ibid.* p. 106.
10. *Ibid.* p. 113.
11. *Ibid.* p. 111.
12. Nolan Pliny Jacobson " The possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's philosophy," p. 35.
13. *Ibid.* p. 36.
14. *Ibid.* pp. 36-37.
15. Jacobson maintains that when Hume came to France to write the *Treatise*, Europe had been under the influence of Oriental culture for three centuries. He states : " China by this time had become a repository for all major ideas of the entire Continent of Asia, and far too much coalescence of Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese philosophy had occurred over the centuries to permit any dissociation for our purposes here between the influence of Chinese thought, on the one hand, and the influence of Buddhist and-other Indian ideas, on the other. " *Ibid.* p. 28.
16. Alex Wayman, " Conze on Buddhism and European Parallels." *Philosophy East and West* XIII (Jan. 1964) p. 361.
17. *Ibid.* pp. 361-62.
18. Conze, " Spurious Parallels to Buddhist Philosophy," p. 105.
19. Jacobson, " The Possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy, " p. 27.
20. *Ibid.* p. 27.
21. Jacobson, " The possibility of Oriental Influence in Hume's Philosophy," p. 23.
22. Hume, *Treatise*, p. 272.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 252.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 200.
26. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. C. W. Hendel (New York : The Library of Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1955), p. 74.
27. Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 252-53.
28. Hume, *Treatise* p. 579.
29. Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 635-36.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 633.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 636.