

METAPHYSICAL SYSTEMS*

Introduction

The greater part of contemporary philosophy when not anti-metaphysical is either unmetaphysical or metaphysical in a low-key and consequently metaphysical systems when not dismissed as curious examples of primitive philosophising are looked down upon. Not only that, Second-order philosophical questions receive more attention than first-order ones. This, in our judgment, is hardly satisfactory and is a symptom of the ill-health of contemporary philosophy. So we propose in this paper to say a few words in defence of metaphysical systems. Accordingly, we shall in the first place consider briefly the Kantian criticism of metaphysics and then shall try to build up a case for metaphysical systems. Our reason for starting with Kant is that his criticism of metaphysics was more informed and more full of insight than the contemporary criticisms are. Besides, the contemporary attitude to metaphysics is directly or indirectly related to the Kantian criticism in that either the contemporary philosophers do themselves link up their philosophy with that of Kant or writers on them do it. And it also is the case that they write more approvingly on Kant than they do on Hegel or Marx. Anyway, we shall, in this paper, try to make out a case for metaphysical systems, and so shall consider first the Kantian criticism of metaphysics emphasising his two contentions that in our judgment bring out the strength as well as the weakness of metaphysical systems. Then, we shall study their implications. And lastly, we shall argue that the Kantian treatment of metaphysics is also a request for doing metaphysics in systems or, to borrow a term from the ecologists for systemic thinking in metaphysics and that this is a request to which every serious thinker should respond favourably.

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(I) The Kantian Criticism of Metaphysics

Kant was of the opinion that while physics and mathematics existed as sciences, metaphysics existed as a natural disposition. The criterion that he used to decide if a certain discipline existed as a science was that if it was not just a vestibule of the sciences it should yield synthetic *a priori* judgments. And in his opinion while physics and mathematics yielded such judgments metaphysics did not. So he held that physics and mathematics existed as sciences, and that the intriguing philosophical question was how they were possible. And as metaphysics existed not as a science but as a natural disposition the intriguing philosophical question with regard to metaphysics was, how was it possible as a natural disposition and not as a science. And in his first critique he attempted to answer these questions. It is with his answer to the third question that we shall be concerned in this paper and it may be outlined as follows :—

An object to be known ought to conform to mind that intuit, understands and reasons. In other words, some subjective factors or elements not derived from experience are involved in knowledge. The said subjective factors at the level of intuition are space and time, the *a priori* forms of intuition or sensibility; and at the level of understanding they are the categories or the primitive concepts of the understanding. At the level of reason there are some subjective factors or ideas of reason, but it is not essential that objects to be known should conform to them. To put it differently, knowledge involves some subjective factors, and so we may say that if an object is known, it has conformed to some subjective factors. But we cannot convert it and say that if some factor is subjective, an object to be known conforms to it. That is, the subjective factor may be just subjective. It may not be objectively valid. Now, it is evident that an object without conforming to the *a priori* forms of intuition cannot be given. Thus space and time, though subjective, are given-ness determining factors. Besides, they are not applied to

what is not given; so, no demonstration or transcendental deduction is required to establish that they are objectively valid. But the categories of the understanding are not given-ness determining factors and they are also applied beyond the given; so, a transcendental deduction is required to establish that they are objectively valid. And such a deduction may be given or worked out. It is to the effect that though not given-ness determining factors, they constitute the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience as such. But the ideas of reason are not such subjective factors as condition given-ness or the possibility of experience of objects. A transcendental deduction to establish that they are objectively valid cannot be given. And the ideas of reason constitute the proper province of metaphysics, and as it is impossible to establish their objective validity, metaphysics is not possible as a science.

But it is possible as a natural disposition. For, such is the nature of our mind and such again is the importance of the metaphysical questions that we cannot help considering them. This helplessness on our part should not be thought of as pathological. For, a transcendental deduction of the ideas of reason to show that they are regulative, though not constitutive may be given, and with the help of them what we aim at is a secure foundation for the systematic unity of our experience – a unity indispensable to reason, advantageous to the understanding, and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.¹ Thus, the psychological idea of reason viz. the Ego considered as a thinking nature or soul does not directly relate to objects, but serves the purpose of connecting ‘all the phenomena, actions and feelings of the mind as if it were a simple substance.’² Treated as an as-if-object or an ideal object having a sort of ‘hyperbolic existence’ it helps us in systematising the different psychological laws, though we should on no account try to deduce the internal phenomena of mind from it. Similarly, the theological idea enables us ‘to regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an absolute but dependent and

sensuously-conditioned unity and at the same time as based upon a sole, supreme and all sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself.³ But then 'we ought not to deduce phenomena, order and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence but merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of causes and effects'.⁴

Again, when we grant the ideas an objective and hyperbolic existence 'we get involved in antinomies only in the case of the cosmological idea. Thus, when solely on the authority of speculative reason we admit them, we grant them only 'a comparative reality - that of a scheme of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition'⁵ and 'we cogitate something of the real nature of which we have not the least conception but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the whole system of phenomena analogous to that in which phenomena stand to each other'.⁶ So these ideas do not really extend our knowledge beyond the objects of possible experience, but they enable us to extend 'the empirical unity of experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the scheme of which is furnished by the idea which is therefore valid - not as a constitutive but as a regulative principle.'⁷

This represents briefly the Kantian criticism of metaphysics and in it two contentions demand that they should be carefully considered. They are (when stated in plain language) :

- (a) Metaphysics is not co-ordinate with the sciences;
- and (b) Metaphysics enables us to introduce into our experience a higher degree of unity than science or understanding could of itself do.

And in the two sections that follow immediately we shall make an attempt to see what they imply or what is their moral.

(II) The First Contention of Kant.

We have seen that the first contention of Kant is that metaphysics

is not co-ordinate with the sciences. We may also state it as : a metaphysical statement is unlike a scientific statement. Or as : we cannot do metaphysics as we do science. Such statements may be deemed truisms. But we cannot brush them aside as trivial. For, the pre-Kantians, if we are to trust Kant, were unaware of it and did metaphysics in a dogmatic way. And we think that in contemporary times the empiricists – whether the logical empiricists or the analysts who, as Charles Taylor has observed, have rediscovered and reemphasised certain aspects of classical British Empiricism,⁸ – either do not take notice of it or give it an interpretation that is hardly tenable and the consequence has been that a student of contemporary philosophy gets vexed with the frequent occurrence of expressions like ‘ meaningless ’, ‘ metaphysical muddle ’, ‘ linguistic confusion ’ etc. Not only that, the discussion of second order philosophical questions with which many an outstanding contemporary philosopher is almost exclusively occupied would not have otherwise acquired such immense proportions, and possibly the question of articulating our *Weltanschauung* would not have been treated with disdain or left to the hands of the religious and political fanatics. Anyway, an empiricist does not, as he cannot give a happy interpretation of the very reasonable Kantian contention.

Thus, the logical empiricists noticed as Kant did that a metaphysical statement is quite unlike a scientific statement. But then they did not think as Kant did that metaphysics is ‘ promotive of the interests of empirical cognition ’ and so dismissed metaphysical statements as meaningless. The philosophical movement known as empiricism ’ or ‘ logical positivism ’ is long dead but it is doubtful if its ghost does not simmer. The same observations are applicable to Russel’s attempt to apply the scientific method to philosophy. Anyway, the ghosts of these movements haunt our philosophising today. For we almost unquestionably accept the proposition that philosophical (metaphysical) statements are not factual, and though we cannot argue the point here, the correct attitude is that they are

not factual in the way scientific statements are. Kant was more careful in this respect, For, what he denied was that reason or the ideas of reason are directly applicable to sensibility. But as he noticed that 'the production of systematic unity in all empirical cognitions of the understanding is the proper occupation of reason'⁹ and also that 'although it is impossible to discover in *intuition* a scheme for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding there must be some *analogon* of the schema',¹⁰ so he held that reason was indirectly applicable to sensibility. To put it in plain language, it is not the case that a metaphysical statement has no roots in facts though it cannot be uprooted in the way a scientific statement may be. Thus we do not have alternative sciences though we do have alternative metaphysical systems. But the existence of alternative metaphysical systems cannot be accounted for in the way the alternative formal systems are. So, a metaphysical system is not 'advantageous to the sciences' in the way the formal systems are. But this does not argue that a metaphysical statement has no cognitive meaning. What it indicates is that we human beings who do metaphysics have varieties of experience, varieties of interests etc. and in selecting the crucial experience we differ as our primary interests differ. Besides, though there are many competing metaphysical systems we do not think that one person can wholeheartedly embrace more than one – and to embrace a metaphysical system is to embrace it wholeheartedly or not to embrace it at all, And this was also noticed by Kant when he spoke of moral actions and practical reason, in short of 'the destination of man'.

Be that as it may. The idea that philosophy does not study facts is deep rooted. And so the view that philosophy is linguistic analysis has come into existence almost inevitably. For if philosophy does not study facts it should study concepts, and concepts dissociated from words in which they are, so to say, embodied or incarnated cannot be studied. So it should study language, and and the

language should be ordinary language, and not an ideal language.¹¹ This way of conceiving philosophy has to face many questions like : what distinguishes philosophy from lexicography or an ordinary say, the Fowlerian way of treating usage How would philosophy transcend the particular language the uses in? which it studies and becomes universal? We would not take such questions into account, though we feel that linguistic philosophers cannot answer them satisfactorily. We are keen on making the point that the analysts try to model philosophy on natural science though their image-of science is simplistic and false. But before that let us make an observation almost edgewise and it is that though Russell expressed his displeasure at Wittgenstein's later philosophising and so at linguistic analysis as practised in Oxbridge, yet he was one of the precursors of this movement and in a sense the movement is the consistent outcome of the view that every factual question is in principle exclusively scientific—a view for which he tirelessly pleaded.

It does not require much effort to bring out that the analysts model their philosophy the natural sciences. When we read between the lines that Ryle wrote in his introduction to the *The Revolution in philosophy* we see that he and the analysts conceive of treating their subject in the way their colleagues in the science departments treat their subjects in laboratories and journals and conferences.¹² His reference to 'the professional practice of submitting problems and arguments to the expert criticism of fellow craftsman', 'growing concern with questions of philosophical technique' etc. are illumined when we take into account what the scientists do and create the impression that if we are to make our subject as prestigious as the sciences are we should do what the scientists do, even though philosophy may never bake any bread. And Austin on being asked to define the methodology of contemporary British philosophy in a conference held at Royaumont said this in so many words.¹³ What he said in the conference may be briefly outlined

in the following manner to make the points; 1) that we are not attributing to the analysts a view they do not hold; 2) that they have a false image of science; and 3) that they rely on the old Lockean view that the mind is a *tabula rasa* and so are empiricists of the most extreme kind and thus fail to do justice to the kind of distinction Kant drew between science and metaphysics.

The gist of Austin's observation is : we have to look for our subject in the less sceptic regions and so reach an agreement on the question ' what we should say when. ' On this question carefully considered we may reach an agreement and obtain a ' datum ' that would enable us to arrive at statements that would also be equally agreed to by all concerned. Obviously, we should see to it that our inventory is quite complete and at the same time sufficiently limited. This would do away with all bias in philosophy, and the scandal that in philosophy we quarrel never knowing how to settle the quarrel and occasionally not even knowing what we are quarrelling about would be wiped out. And though there are many reasons for adopting this method, the principal one is that this is what is exactly done in physical or natural sciences.¹⁴

From the above it would be evident that no argument is wanted to make the point that Austin seeks to model philosophy on physics and thinks that ' there is no other way to proceed. ' And this is not Austin's personal opinion, for Ryle and Ayer were also present in the conference. The second point we think, has been convincingly made by Mezeros who has shown that it is not true that scientists like Newton or Einstein had no concern with comprehensive schemes and also of the limited problems dealt with in sciences.¹⁵ It seems that Austin and the analysts on observing that in sciences the predecessors bequeath some solutions and also some problems to the successors think that in philosophy also we may do it. But this is a delusion. Every philosopher should start afresh. And the practice of linguistic philosophy since the second world war has not been successful in arriving at any agreed

solution that may be bequeathed to the successors some of whom let us hope, would survive to philosophise if— God forbid there be a third world war. And a perusal of their writings create the impression that they are making prescriptions about uses and not describing them. The requirements laid down by Austin only shows that this cannot but be the case. Thus, he says that the inventory should be complete or representative, and we feel helpless when we find that what one analyst holds to be representative another does not and naturally we think that all of them are interested in making prescriptions about use or in doing *a priori* linguistics. Besides it is not clear how the other requirement viz. that the inventory should be *sufficiently* limited is to be satisfied.

All this ought to be obvious to the linguists also. But then, it is not. This may be due to the fact that they consider uses not to find out the philosophical wisdom they contain but rather to present their views formed independently of consideration of uses through such a consideration. It may also be due to the fact that they are unwilling to take cognizance of the fact that just through a perusal of the uses one cannot arrive at any interesting philosophical proposition. Besides they are overpowered by the *tabula rasa* view of mind. This becomes transparent when we seek to understand the indifference of the British Philosophers to Marxism. Thus a Marxist believes in *praxis* and so holds that there are different ways of looking at the world. But an empiricist would treat it as unintelligible.¹⁶ He would say that we are passive in respect of the given and that we differ is due to the fact that we arrange the given — the same for all of us — differently, and this may be sorted out by discussion. So, whereas an empiricist may claim that there are 'hard data' or the same given for every man, a Marxist, or an idealist, or a philosopher who holds like Whitehead that even in perception interest plays an important part, cannot do. Now, Charles Taylor is of the view that an empiricist whatever may be the mode of his philosophising holds it more or less on the ground Locke

did.¹⁷ And when an empiricist thinks that our choice of ordinary language as a natural choice, he is not an exception. That is, a linguist does not deny that choice plays a role in the selection of the uses of the word to be studied. Indeed, Austin says that 'it is essential that the *choice* be representative enough'. So the linguist does not dismiss choice. But then he does not notice that every choice—the choice of ordinary language included—is preferential. And he does not notice it, as the mind, he, at least unconsciously, holds—such is the weight of the tradition in which he philosophises—is a *tabula rasa*.

So we may conclude this section of the paper with the observation that Kant made a valid distinction between science and metaphysics and that though the distinction is made also by the empiricists they cannot account for it and so fail to see that metaphysics may be 'promotive of empirical cognition'. Now, we may consider if the Kantian way of accounting for the distinction is satisfactory and so would consider his second contention.

(III) The Second Contention of Kant

The second contention of Kant, as we have observed before, is that metaphysics introduces more unity into our cognition than the sciences can do of themselves. So we may consider the nature of this unity. It is said that the unity is systematic unity. So we may say that metaphysics is of assistance to the sciences in that it enables them to be systematic. But then we should be careful. For we may be understood as having said that metaphysics constructs such formal systems or models as includes all legitimate scientific statements and excludes everything else. So to analyse the Kantian understanding of systematic unity we may borrow some ideas from Hegel, and see how they look when expressed from the Kantian point of view.

Thus, while concluding his treatment of Hegel's 'Logic' Acton observes :

The argument of Hegel's 'Logic' can be very briefly summarised. The least that can be said about anything is that it is. More is said about it when it is qualified numbered or measured : Still more is said about it when it is explained in terms of essences, grounds or causes. Most is said about it when it is placed in the context of life, purpose, will and value.¹⁸

The above Hegelian idea is substantially Kantian. To make this point we would briefly dwell on the Kantian treatment of the theological idea of reason. Kant had no doubt that if we are to do physics or mechanics in the Newtonian style, we should not introduce the concept of purpose or teleology in scientific explanation. Indeed, Kant was a thorough student of the physical sciences of his time, and also of its development from Galileo onwards. He was fully aware of the fact that the physical sciences became scientific by dismissing the question of final cause as spurious, or by abandoning the Aristotelian way of understanding cause. Nevertheless, he felt that an account of cause in terms of regularity—an account that received its classical structure in Hume—did hardly do any justice to the concept as involved in the very possibility of the physical sciences. But then he did not think that a scientific treatment of the physical universe—the universe that is explored by physics—would be rewarded by introducing the concept of final cause.

Notwithstanding that Kant held that 'the hypothesis of a supreme intelligence as the sole cause of the universe.... is always of the greatest service to reason'.¹⁹ And if we keep to the hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative, even error cannot be detrimental. For in this case error can have no serious consequence than that when we expected to discover a teleological connection (*nexus finalis*) only a mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a case we merely fail to find the additional unity we required but do not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in experience.²⁰ Thus, the systematic unity as

contemplated by Kant is to be achieved 'by the aid of a causality according to design in a supreme cause'.²¹

Again, Kant was also of the view that though in physics teleological explanation had no place in the bio-sciences it had. Accordingly, he distinguished between external teleology and immanent teleology and was careful to point out that the theistic argument from design was useless as the concept of teleology behind it was external teleology. Moreover, he also argued that as the bio-sciences could not proceed without presupposing immanent teleology, and as again it was unlikely that the universe was partly teleological and partly non-teleological the reasonable position was not that the inanimate nature was non-teleological but that 'to keep itself within limits, physics abstracts from the question whether ends in nature are intentional or unintentional for this would mean intruding into an alien territory'.²²

Possibly, we would not be digressing if we consider here how some contemporary thinkers estimate the role of teleology in scientific investigation. So, we may refer to a few observations made by Lucas, Waddington and Longuet-Higgins, the Gifford Lecturers 1972-73. Thus in the opinion of Lucas the official philosophy of science has standardised itself on the regularity paradigm, and this has given rise to a characteristic but distorted world view.²³ Accordingly, the loyalty of a biologist becomes divided. For, as a scientist he respects the physicists and cannot offer a straight-forward teleological explanation.²⁴ But then he also cannot deny the importance of a functional or teleological explanation as there are many good reasons for offering such an explanation. For in the first place, a functional explanation opens up the possibility for putting forward more basic regularity explanation. In the second place, such an explanation being in the form of a scheme enables him 'to gather together a whole lot of features and make them into one coherent and intelligible whole'.²⁵ And in the third place he uses it as he notices 'a certain homeostatic quality in the biologi-

cal world around him'.²⁹ So also Waddington is of the opinion that if we seek to understand the universe in terms of Newton's billiard ball physics we find it difficult to introduce the concept of purpose and when ignoring the difficulty we introduce it, we can do by inventing a purposeful creator who 'injects purpose' into a purposeless universe. But when we try to understand the universe we perceive and notice that our perceptive apparatus that involves our mental abilities has some self-stabilising properties that make it possible for us to recognise something when it comes to our experience for the second time, then we speak of the universe as having a structure – the structure being as we perceive it and come to hold that 'the components of the universe are not simple material bodies quite independent of ourselves but are the types of things we perceive with this apparatus which involves properties similar to purposes' and 'that the structure of the universe involves cosmic purpose' – though it is a matter of terminology or of taste, if we would like to go further and 'say that cosmic purpose involves some sort of a God'.²⁷ Longuet-Higgins expresses his agreement with the views of Waddington and adds that the distinction between the conventional theistic position and any other position even the atheistic one, is that while from the point of view of the former the universe has been created by somebody outside it from the point of view of the latter it contains within itself all the matters of significance to us. Besides he expresses his preference for the second view as it permits him to think of 'life growing outwards as it were until the universe was in such a tight intimate relationship with itself that you can think of the whole thing as a living organism'.²⁸

The views of Lucas, Waddington and Longuet-Higgins as given above do not differ substantially from that of Kant. And when Lucas in reply to Kenny who holds that while the statement that the universe is rational in the sense that it is intelligible to rational creatures like ourselves is non-controversial, the statement that the

universe is rational in the sense that there is an end or purpose in the universe is not, observes that as when talking about other people 'it is difficult to distinguish between the overt behaviour patterns from the mind behind them' so while talking about the world intelligible to rational creatures like us, it is difficult to distinguish the talked about from the talk which though not quite legitimate is yet 'almost a necessary conflation of terms', he in our judgement approximates Hegel.

Anyway, metaphysics seeks to introduce a rational and systematic unity in the sciences and so is not co-ordinate with them : this is the second contention of Kant in ultimate analysis.

(IV) Limitations of the Kantian Account

We have seen that in the opinion of Kant the ideas of reason which form the subject-matter of metaphysics enable the sciences to have systematic unity as contrasted with 'technical unity'. Now though this accounts for the distinction between science and metaphysics and also the relation between metaphysics and facts in a happier way than an empiricist account does, yet it has limitations of its own. The limitations are primarily due to Kant's views about the ideas of reason and so to the distinction that he draws between phenomenon and noumenon. Without disputing his principal contention that when in science we frame our explanations in terms of the ideas of reason and thus avoid the laborious and careful investigation of events we cease to do science and fail to understand how the universe surrounding us behaves, we should, insist that the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is hardly tenable. While we do natural science, we may not feel the need of treating the systematic unity of nature and thus the idea of a supreme intelligence as something more than a heuristic or regulative principle. But while we do social sciences or as Kant would say give serious consideration to the 'destination of man' and so to moral philosophy we cannot retain the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon.

The Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon has been challenged by philosophers with diverse persuasions, and we know that his immediate successors particularly Hegel made serious attempts so to show that the distinction was hollow, and that reactions to Hegel's views have been diverse. But the most prevalent reaction is that he abandoned the caution of Kant and formulated a kind of metaphysics that Kant would have labelled as dogmatic and that he had taken recourse to a kind of argument which cannot be outdone either in obscurity or in abstractness, and so metaphysical in abusive sense of the term. And this is an irony of fate. For Hegel was never tired of expressing his distrust for the abstract. However, we are not Hegelians nor are we interested in this paper to make out a case for Hegelianism. To be candid we should say that our acquaintance with Kant is poor and with Hegel poorer. Nevertheless we refer to Hegel in that we are of the impression—the impression has been created by Hegel-lovers and Hegel-haters²⁹ that Hegel had a great concern for the history of his times and for history as such. And we cannot do history or social sciences (that is, not only moral philosophy as Kant thought) if we retain the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon and do not in some sense introduce the concept of teleological determination.

Thus, as Plant³⁰ and others have shown, that as a consequence of industrial revolution new classes came into existence and this created a kind of disorder in the social structure of Germany. That is the unity of the social being was disturbed. It becomes fragmented and consequently the personal being of the individual living in the fragmented society also became fragmented. This fragmentation in the social as well as in the personal being of man was noticed by the poets and the philosophers alike and received in their writings powerful expressions that read as the cries of tormented souls. Thus Holderlin wrote :

I can think of no people as torn apart as the Germans....Craftsmen are to be seen but no human beings, masters and men but no

human beings; young people and old but no human beings. Is it not like a field of battle where hands and arms and other limbs lie scattered in pieces while the blood of life drains away into the soil? ³¹

Similarly, Schiller observed :

Eternally tied to a single fragment of the whole man himself develops into nothing but a fragment Everlastingly in his ears is the monotonous sound of the wheels which he operates. He never develops the harmony of his being and instead of stamping the imprint of his humanity upon nature he becomes no more than the imprint of his occupation and specialised knowledge. ³²

And in the opinion of some, in the writings of Kant 'man appeared as an inwardly shattered being – a profound bifurcation existed, Kant argued, between reason and passion, duty and inclination, the autonomous self and the heteronomous self, between the cognitive, conative and affective sides of man's nature'. ³³

There are reasons to believe that to Kant's successors it appeared that Kant sought to overcome the bifurcation by introducing another though broader bifurcation viz., that of phenomenon and noumenon. So they made strenuous attempts to overcome it; and Hegel sought to remedy this bifurcation or divisiveness not by idealising the old Greek culture as some have done, nor by taking recourse to religious feeling uncontaminated by reason nor also by denouncing industrial revolution but 'by following the path of reason and reconciliation'. He argued that a man felt alienated when he treated his own creations – the objectified mind – as independent objective realities curbing his autonomy and that to overcome it what was needed was an intellectual reorientation that would make it clear that the historical process was a rational process or an unfolding of reason such that the social, political and economic structures articulated or were embodiments of the rationally co-ordinated purposes of society and its members and in last analysis what resulted was the self-finding of the spirit. And Marx sought to rectify Hegel by

substituting the concepts of struggle and revolution – and thus by assigning to reason a creative role – for the Hegelian concepts of re-conciliation and co-ordination. Anyway, it is obvious that the Kantian way of distinguishing between science and metaphysics that entails a distinction between phenomenon and noumenon is unhappy as it goes against the intuitions on which the social sciences and social behaviour (including moral behaviour) rest.

(V) Conclusion

It is difficult to accept gracefully the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. But it is not less difficult, in the opinion of many, to accept monistic systems built in the style of Hegel or Marx. Similarly, the concept of reason or purpose introduced to interpret history or to give more unity to our experience may be thought to be one that does not lend itself to an intelligible analysis. And such a line of thinking becomes strengthened when the difference of opinion of the Hegelian scholars on the exact interpretation of necessity, or of the Marxist scholars on the nature and importance of 'praxis' is taken into account.³⁴ Besides one may think that the kind of unity that we seek to introduce into our experience may not be that of reason, but just of a system – a unique kind of unity resulting from the fact the metaphysical beliefs come in clusters. In other words, there are many metaphysical systems. And it is not possible to formulate a criterion for deciding which is genuine and which is not. Which metaphysical system would be acceptable to which individual or society of individuals depends on the individual or the society of individuals and the condition of acceptability is not logical, but that of growth – that is the individual or society of individuals grows out of and also through reflection, reasoning out, rationalization and even conversion into the metaphysical system. And it is almost obvious that no individual or society of individuals grows into the unity that science gives to experience, though it contributes a good deal.

For science is not concerned with the whole of experience or with all dimensions of it, and so though proud of science we are also the critics of it. The point is Kantian though the Kantian way of making it viz., by limiting science to the phenomenal world is not happy. It may be that Kant made the point in that way as the development of science in his days created a distorted image of man – an image that imperilled the existence of human beings as moral beings. And so instead of rejecting the Kantian point we should interpret it in the light of the development of science in our times, for the very existence of man is at stake today as a consequence of the vast development in science and technology – a development that is accompanied by the belief that science is value-neutral. And we should think seriously over the question if science that unsettles our sense of values is really so. Again, what is popularly known as ‘crisis in science’ is more or less a consequence of our worshipping science instead of understanding it. Thus it is a curious fact today that the scientists themselves are not sure about their own sciences. We have mentioned before the divided loyalty of the biologists. And Dingle informs us that the physicists because of their preoccupation with mathematics are not usually aware of the fact that a mathematical interpretation of experience does not amount to a physical interpretation of it and as a consequence of it a lot of physicists mistake the special theory of relativity of Lorentz for that of Einstein³⁵ that the expression ‘mass of an electron,’ does not mean exactly what the expression ‘mass of the lead balls of Cavendish’ means and so also the expressions ‘change,’ ‘position’ etc. do not mean in quantum physics what they do in ordinary physics precisely because electron ‘enters physics in a different way’.³⁶ The outcome of all this has resulted in confusions about our understanding of space, time, the universe we live in, freedom, responsibility etc. And it is a pity that many leaders of contemporary philosophy are indifferent to such questions lest they should be involved in some ‘metaphysical muddle’. True, the task is one of immense magnitude and Kant was perhaps right when he observed that a

philosopher existed nowhere. But then he also noticed that the ideal was in us.³⁷ And So we have Platos, and Kants Hegels and and Whiteheads and Marxes and others who may not be philosophers or rīṣiṣ. Possibly there has not been any rsi at any time. Never theless, they are approximations to the ideal of a philosopher or that there are and have been small and have been ṛṣikalps. And we may try to understand them in a creative, that is, non-scholastic way. Besides we have the poets, the historians and others with creative talents or concern in man's integration to help us.

Again, whether we know it or not, we are in possession of some kind of philosophy or metaphysics and why should we not subject it to reflective consideration. And if we do not, ideologies will be showered upon us by interested persons who are, even when most generously treated, usually charlatans. Be that as it may. Metaphysical systems are not outmoded. They have not outlived their utility. Possibly, sometimes in future which Ellul thinks³⁸ to be the year 2000 when ' what is needed will pass directly from the machine to the brain without going through consciousness ' technology may stay but neither science nor pceiry nor philosophy i. e. nothing creative or expressions of the creative man will be there. Till then, so long as we are what we are viz. creative and in perpetual quest of identity we should do metaphysical or systematic thinking as we have to.

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Notes

1. *Critique of Pure Reason* (2nd Ed. Micklejohn's Translation. Everyman's Library 1946) p- 393.
2. Ibid p. 388.
3. Ibid p. 389.
4. Ibid p. 389.

5. Ibid p. 389.
6. Ibid p. 390.
7. Ibid p. 390.
8. BAP (British Analytical Philosophy Ed. Williams B. and Montefiore A. Kegan Paul 1966) : Marxism and Empiricism p. 230.
9. CRP p. 385.
10. Ibid p. 385.
11. Warnock G. J : *English Philosophy Since 1900* (OUP 1958) pp. 161-2; Flew A. *Essays in Logic and Language* 2nd series (Blackwell, 1953) p. 9, White A. R. *The Philosophy of Mind* (1967) p. 11 etc.
12. *The Revolution in Philosophy* (Macmillan 1956), Introduction.
13. BAP. : The Possibility of a Dialogue : Mezaros I.
14. Ibid pp. 319-25.
15. Ibid pp. 324-5.
16. Ibid : Taylor p. 233.
17. Ibid p. 233. True, Taylor refers to the sense-data theories. But he also says that ' it is the cradle of a number of other views even when we have ceased to discuss the philosophical problems of perception in these terms '. And a linguist may deny that he is an empiricist in that he refuses to be labelled. But we do not think that we should estimate anyone in terms of his own opinion about himself. Besides we are not in a bad company when we say that the linguists are empiricists or cryptic-empiricists and we have good reasons for saying this. For, they in some form or other, make use of the VP (Verification Principle), and not infrequently do not distinguish the question from the question on the meaning of a word. Ayer in his inaugural address at the University of Oxford in 1960 observed that a pattern of the argument of the ordinary language philosophers ' rests on a theory of meaning which its advocates commonly fail to make explicit...the verification

principle on which the logical positivists relied in their elimination of metaphysics.' Hampshire in his review of *The Concept of Mind* (Mind 1950) observed that in some form VP formed a suppressed premise of Ryle's argument in most cases. Mundle in his '*A Critic of Linguistic Philosophy*' (OUP 1970) has observed that VP in some form—verification—by—me, verification—by—anyone, verification—by—others—is present in Wittgentien's treatment of language. Lewis in his paper on 'Mind and Body' (Journal of the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University 1976—77) has pointed out that the discussion on the relation of mind and body has assumed immense proportion in recent British Philosophy on account of the 'severely empiricist views' of the linguists. And we think—though we cannot argue the point here—that the choice of ordinary language is on the part of the linguists is comparable to Locke's choice of the unsophisticated plain man.

18. The article on Hegel in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Ed. Edwards P. Macmillan 1972) Vol. 3 p. 441.
19. CPR p. 398.
20. Ibid p. 397.
21. Ibid p. 397.
22. *Crittque of Judgment* (Bernard's Tr. : London 1931) p. 289.
23. The Development of Mind (Edinburgh University Press, 1973) p. 18.
24. Ibid p. 18.
25. Ibid p. 19.
26. Ibid p. 19.
27. Ibid p. 121.
28. Ibid p. 122. The following sentences of Gilson E. may also be quoted here :

The assumption that nothing can be rationally known unless it be scientifically known is far from an evident proposition ...

By accepting design or purposiveness, as a possible principle of explanation a scientist would introduce into his system of laws a ring wholly heterogenous with the rest of the chain. He would intertwine the metaphysical causes for the existence of organism with the physical cause he must assign to both their structure and functioning. Still worse he might feel tempted to mistake the existential causes of the living organisms for their efficient and physical causes... If the only intelligible way to explain the existence of organised bodies is to admit that there is design, purposiveness at the origin, then let us admit it, if not as scientists, at least as metaphysicians. And since the notion of design and of purpose are inseparable for us from the notion of thought, to posit the existence of a thought as cause of the purposiveness of organised bodies is to posit an end of all ends or an ultimate end, that is God.

(In *The Science of Meaning Life*; Ed. Davidson R. F. Holt, Rinehart, and Winton, 1962, pp. 283-7): Quoted by Plant R. M. in his *The I-Opener* (Prentice-Hall : 1976) p. 128.

29. Warnock G. J. op. cit pp. 142-3.
30. *Hegel* (Unwin University books 1973).
31. Quoted by Plant R. in his *Hegel* p. 19.
32. Quoted by Plant R. in his *Hegel* pp. 22-3.
33. Plant R : *Hegel* p. 20.
34. The great divide in contemporary critical Marxism is on the concept of *praxis*. Gajo Petrovic and some give emphasis on Marx's humanism and widen the concept of *praxis* and hold that the philosophy of Karl Marx is not only not identical with dialectical materialism but also incompatible with it.' But Mihalo Martovic and some others take Marxism as a positive science and like the logical positivists and analysts hold that 'only scientific knowledge is objective and reliable'

(cf. The two main streams of contemporary critical Marxism : Iring Fetscher in Karl Marx 1819–1968; Inter Nationes : Bad GodesBerg 1968 pp. 45–58).

35. *A Threefold Cord* (George Allen, 1961) pp. 61–69.
36. Ibid pp. 166–71.
37. CPR : p. 475.
38. Technological Society : Quoted by Platt R. M. in his *The I-Opener* p. 110 and elsewhere in the same book it is also observed by him that Ellul's book is one of the eight books that make ' the world of college generation. '