

THE COGNITIVE RELATION : WOULD A. C. EWING'S VIEW HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE NEO-LOGICIANS OF INDIA ?

What is the relation between a true judgment and the objective fact to which the judgment refers ? Apart from many possible relations between them 'one relation must be regarded as specifically cognitive'. It is only connected with a cognition. The achievement of the aim of a cognition invariably depends upon it.

"The relation of which I am thinking is the one which always subsists between a true judgment and the fact to which it refers and never between a false judgment and anything objective, the relation which constitutes the truth of a 'Judgment'. It has commonly been given the name, correspondence..."¹ The actual relation, in Ewing's opinion, is unique and irreducible. He also holds that "The relation subsists between my judging or, better, a certain characteristic of or element in this judging and that to which my judging refers."² In his opinion this relation is internal in the seventh and eighth senses of the expression 'Internal relation'. In the foot-note he has given the senses of an internal relation. (1) "An internal relation" means a relation the terms of which could not both have been what they are if the relation had not been present, and (2) "that it means a relation such that from a knowledge of one term and the relation in which it stands to the other term we could infer with logical necessity that the other term possesses a certain determinate or relatively determinate characteristic other than the characteristic of standing in the relation in question."³

Dr. Ewing clarifies his senses thus : "The terms are the judgment that S is P and the fact S-P. In any case of a true judgment we can always rightly say that the relation of 'correspondence' could not have been absent without either the judgment or the fact judged about being different. If I judged that S is P and S really is P, the relation of 'correspondence' must necessarily subsist between the two terms in question, and it could not be absent unless either I had judged differently or facts were different in regard to S and P.

This is obviously a case of logical entailment and not merely of casual entailment. My judgment being what it is and S being what it is, it follows *a priori* that my judgment corresponds to the fact S-P.

The relation is internal also in eighth sense, far from the fact that I judge 'S is P' and the fact that this judgment 'corresponds' to something it follows logically that S really is P, and from the fact that S is P and the fact that I have judged truly about (i.e. made a judgment corresponding to) the relation between S and P, it follows logically that I have judged 'S is P'.⁴

Before criticising the view I quote a sentence from the '*Philosophical Studies*' by G. E. Moore to throw some light upon the nature of cognitive relation. He remarks: "It is possible, I admit that my awareness of blue as well as being of blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation, the existence of which alone justifies as in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter."⁵ The cognitive relation holds only between consciousness and its object. Consciousness comprises within itself simple awareness, judgments of all kinds, true, erroneous and uncertain, and other forms of consciousness. The relation which subsists cannot be the unique cognitive relation. An act of consciousness reveals its corresponding object, being mutually related by this relation. Ewing admits that cognition is essentially 'extrospective'. A true judgment must be extrospective. Its essence lies in being aware of the fact to which it refers. But is the judgment in question introspective as well? 'No' will be his consistent answer since he believes that cognition is essentially extrospective. The relation of correspondence subsisting between a true judgment and its corresponding fact is not known when the fact is revealed. Similarly, an erroneous judgment also reveals its object when the absence of the relation of correspondence is not known. Ewing also admits that in the case of an error the relation of correspondence is definitely absent. An error refers to its object and reveals it. An uncertain judgment, having no relation of correspondence between itself and its object referred to, illumines its object. An error or an uncertain judgment has its relation to the object referred to. The cognitive relation is definitely distinct from that of correspondence.

I see a snake on the window of a room when I behold the window from a distance. I really mistake a garland for a snake. The snake is presented to my consciousness. I cannot deny that I see a snake. Is the snake—the object of my first observation related to my cognition? What is the exact relation here between cognition and its object? Does the relation of correspondence hold between them? I cannot say in the affirmative in face of the later contradiction that it is not a snake. All cases of wrong observation reveal an object. But the relation of correspondence does not obtain between cognition and its object. Similarly in cases of a large number of doubts the objects are directly presented to our consciousness. But in such cases two or more alternative predicates are asserted of the substantive but indefinitely. Let us take an example. I see from the one end of a straight and long street some object standing on the middle of the street. I see it closely and frame a perceptual judgement that this is a post or a man. The two alternative predicates 'a post' or 'a man' cannot be simultaneously predicated of the substantive 'this'. What is the cognitive relation in such cases? It cannot be the relation of correspondence. The true judgments should not exclusively enjoy the special privilege of having the relation of correspondence as the cognitive relation. Moreover, correspondence should be used as a standard to judge a judgment whether it is true or false. Direct cognitions of the three different types clearly indicate that the cognitive relation is other than that of correspondence.

Dr. Ewing may urge that the relation of correspondence is a cognitive relation which only subsists between a true judgment and the fact to which it refers. He also holds that this relation is unique and irreducible. I think, he arrives at a hasty conclusion in his eagerness for a compromise with the idealists since he tries to reach a kind of middle position between the contending parties. He shows that "the true character of knowing is a finding and discovering rather than a generating and producing." He combines the epistemological conclusion of Realism with that of Idealism, viz., the cognitive relation is internal in the above two senses—Idealist and Realist. He selects the relation of correspondence as the cognitive one to achieve his object with ease.

Does the relation of correspondence (accordance) subsist between a true judgment and the fact, referred to by it? In

judging a fact we cannot ascertain that our judging is true unless we know that the order of the relation of the contents of a judgment accords with that of the relation of the elements of the fact. A judgment cannot be true if the accordance with the fact in the described manner is not known. This point requires clarification. The judgment 'S is P' is about a fact 'S is really P'. If the terms, their relation, and the direction of relation accord with the constituents of the fact, their relation and the direction of the relation and their accordance is cognized, the judgment is known to be true. The accordance of a judgment with the fact referred to is indicative of the truth of the judgment but not constitutive of its truth.

The view of the critics of the idealistic school seems to me untenable. According to Ewing and the new realists knowing is merely finding and discovering. It has no form. According to the representative view consciousness is representative. It has a form. The very term 'accordance' reminds us of some remains of the representative view of consciousness. Consciousness is absolutely formless. The above view of the critics unwittingly ascribes some form to knowing. Dr. Ewing evades all these problems by saying that the cognitive relation is unique and irreducible. In order to evade the problems he invites a fresh trouble. When we introspect a judgment (S is P) we know that 'S is P'. It refers to the fact that 'S is really P'. If the relation between the judgment and the fact be that of accordance, the judgment is introspected as referring to the fact by relation of accordance. If the judgment is not introspected in the manner described, the judgment cannot refer to the fact. Every event of consciousness is united with its object only by means of the cognitive relation. If the relation of accordance is the cognitive relation, a true judgment with its relation to the object should be revealed when a judgment is introspected. In that case, the truth of a judgment becomes almost self-evident. If the truth of a judgment is known by mere introspection, a doubt about the truth of an introspected judgment could never arise in our mind. But the evidence of our experience controverts the logical conclusion of Ewing's suggestion. He anticipates the absurdity of his conclusion and keeps silence with regard to the cognitive relation subsisting between an error or a doubt and its object. The cognitive relation between an error or

a doubt and the object referred to is not that of correspondence (accordance). When any one of the two is introspected, the relation should also be grasped. An error or a doubt should be discovered as untrue. When I doubt that this is a post or a man I introspect a doubt. This introspection of a doubt is true. In all cases of introspection no error takes place. If a philosopher puts trust in truth of the hypothesis that reality is alternate the falsehood of a doubt cannot so easily be detected. If an error is easily known as an error, nobody in this world feels disappointed. Ewing's convenient silence on some relevant points is nothing but escapism. He has mystified the cognitive relation of correspondence (accordance). In spite of all his attempts he cannot save his well planned suggestion or hypothesis of the cognitive relation, as 'correspondence' to accommodate Idealism.

The suggestion that the cognitive relation be understood in terms of 'correspondence' as given by Ewing has not been followed up in the works on Epistemology in the West. But if we go through the works on Epistemology in Bengal, we come across the theses of G. Bhattacharya and Harirāma Tarkālamkāra which pay due attention to the topic of 'Cognitive Relation'. In the works of these logicians the nature of a cognitive relation has been determined after a thorough examination of the traditional hypothesis. The cognitive relation which subsists between a true judgment and the fact to which it refers has been mentioned. Also, the cognitive relation which subsists between an erroneous knowledge and the object which it refers to has also been stated. The cognitive relation of an uncertain knowledge has also been suggested thereby.

Let us start with the discussion : " Is the relation of cognition a necessary assumption " ? Before giving a reply to this question we take the truth of a few propositions for granted, viz.,

- (1) " the external objects are directly perceived " ;
- (2) " Knowing finds and discovers only " ;
- (3) " Consciousness is extrospective " ;
- (4) " Extrospective consciousness is introspected by introspective consciousness " ;
- (5) " An object cannot be an object of consciousness if the former is not related to the latter " ;

- (6) "The existence of consciousness which does not refer to an object cannot be logically proved", and
- (7) "When an event of extrospective consciousness is introspected it is introspected along with its object".

In works of Logic and Epistemology these propositions have been proved. We shall not re-examine these propositions in this paper. We assume them to be true.

We assume the existence of cognitive relation. We shall only discuss the nature of cognitive relation. The old Naiyāyikas and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, the propounder of the Navya Nyāya school hold that the cognitive relation is a distinct kind of *Svarūpa saṁbandha*. In English, it may be understood as a *sui generis* relation. *Sui generis* is a Latin word signifying unique. Radhakrishnan and others do not explain the relation of *Svarūpa*. They simply call it "Unique". This is not the meaning of the term "*Svarūpa saṁbandha*". S. N. Das Gupta explained it as one-term-relation. This explanation is better than the former but is not exhaustive. *Svarūpa-saṁbandha* is a distinct type of relation which is constituted by one of the relata or by both of them. The two facts which stand in relation to each other relate themselves. One of them may relate or both of them may do it. Śaṅkara and Bradley think that an external relation is a kind of third term. According to them an external relation should require another relation to connect itself with the terms and so on *ad infinitum*. Bertand Russell holds that relations which belong to a different logical type from terms cannot be open to the charge of *regressus ad infinitum*. A similar answer has been given by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-Vārttika* in his defence of Samavāya relation. The defence of Russell or Uddyotakara is not very effective since the latter admits the relation of Saṁyoga (contact) inheres in the substances which come in contact. According to Vaiśeṣikas Saṁyoga (conjunction) is a relation since it connects one term with another. Let us take an example. A club and a man are two independent terms. When he wields a club, it is conjoined to him. He is called the wielder of a club. These two terms are related. Therefore, conjunction is a relation. But conjunction is an attribute according to the Vaiśeṣikas. Conjunction cannot exist independently. It inheres in the two terms conjoined. Hence, all relations cannot be marked by a distinct type of relations. The admission of *Svarūpa Saṁ-*

bandha silences the worst critics of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. The charge of *regressus ad infinitum* becomes pointless. *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* gives final shelter to all other relations.

But, is *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* internal or external? According to McTaggart as relations fall within the nature of the related terms, they are internal. *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* is identical with either or both of the related terms. So it is internal. This interpretation of *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* is very shallow. *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* is neither a part nor the whole of either or both of the related terms. Let us clarify its meaning, citing an example. There is no table on the floor. The absence of a table is a negative fact. It is located upon the floor. The floor is characterized by the negative fact. An unrelated negative fact cannot characterize the floor in question. How are they united by a relation? Which is this relation? A negative fact can neither inhere in the floor nor come in contact with it *ex hypothesi*. The floor connects itself with the negative fact. But the whole of the floor is not connected with it for all times to come. A part of the floor at a particular time acts as a *relation*. There may be no table on another floor. That floor is also similarly characterized by the negative fact, that is the absence of a table. *Svarūpa Saṁbandhas* are different. No properties of the floor are predicable of the negative fact. The Jainas, of course, hold that a negative fact is included in the nature of the locus. But without establishing an all pervasive unity of Reality underlying all loci of a negative fact they cannot hold that a negative fact is a part of its locus. A negative fact and its locus, standing in relation to each other, maintain their distinct individualities intact.

Gadādhara in his *Viśayatā-vāda* subjects the notion of *Svarūpa Saṁbandha* to a severe criticism. If the cognitive relation is either of them then there is no decisive test in favour of either of them—means either of the relata. It is logical to hold that the cognitive relation should be both of them. A is related to B. A is called *pratiyogin* and B is called *anyogin*. In a figurative language the relation starts from A and proceeds towards B. When B is reached the relation rests there. Thus the locus of the relation is called ‘*anyogin*’ and that which is related is called ‘*pratiyogin*’. Thus these two relata are correlative terms.

We may call it *either of the correlative terms*. Such an assumption violates the law of parsimony. It is logically sounder to assume a distinct cognitive relation.

Let us now examine whether the assumption of *Svarūpa Sambandha* can serve the purpose of the cognitive relation? Let us examine the possible alternatives one by one. When a jar is known it becomes the object of knowledge. The jar is the locus of the cognitive relation. If the *jar is the cognitive relation*, the proposition that the jar is the locus of the cognitive relation cannot be explained. The cognitive relation is the jar itself. A jar cannot be its own locus. The defender of this view may argue that the surface constitutes the cognitive relation and that the entire jar is the locus of its surface. Such a defence does not hold good since the surface of a jar is an abstraction but in concrete reality such a line of demarcation cannot be drawn. The absurd conclusion that the jar is its own locus becomes inevitable.

Gadādhara reviews the assumption of his predecessors that the cognitive relation is *Svarūpa* relation. Let us take a concrete example viz., 'the knowledge of a jar'. Does the jar discharge the function of the relation in question? Or, does its knowledge act as the relation? The phrase 'the knowledge of a jar' is understood in the works on Epistemology in the sense that the jar is the object of knowledge. The word object implies the subject-object-relation. The word 'object' stands for the locus of the subject-object-relation. Now, if it is held that a jar is the object of knowledge and that the jar itself is the cognitive relation, the statement that a jar is the object of knowledge should mean that the object jar in order to be an object holds the relation jar as located upon it. Thus a jar would have become its own locus. The second alternative will be discussed in the next paragraph.

The second alternative is that the cognitive relation is the awareness of an object itself. This is the traditional view. The traditional logicians hold that this hypothesis only conforms to the law of parsimony and is superior to all other rival hypotheses. According to them all varieties of *svarūpa sambandha*, relating to awareness, are identical with awareness. This view is also not tenable. Now one is aware of a jar. The cognitive relation subsists between the awareness of a jar and a jar. The aware-

ness of a jar is also related to the present time (now) by a temporal relation. The cognitive relation is the awareness of a jar. So the present time is the locus of the cognitive relation. The line of demarcation between the temporal relation and the cognitive relation in the present context breaks down since both of them are identical with the awareness of a jar. The absurd conclusion which follows from the above proposition is that the present time is the awareness of a jar. The awareness of a jar is the object of the awareness of the awareness of a jar, that is, the awareness of a jar is the object of its introspective awareness which is caused by it. The awareness of a jar is one of the causal factors of the awareness of the absence of a jar. The awareness of the absence of a jar should have also revealed the awareness of a jar as its object, having been caused by the awareness of a jar. Similarly, other absurd conclusions, viz., 'the awareness of a jar is the object of the awareness of the absence of a jar', etc., become inevitable.

(a) Harirāma Tarkālaṃkāra in his *Viśayatā-vāda-vīci* raises a very important point that if the cognitive relation is constituted by the awareness of an object itself then in the relational knowledge, 'the floor is the container of a jar', all the cognitive relations which relate the floor, a jar etc., to that knowledge should be identical. When the above knowledge is introspected it assumes the form that I know this floor as containing a jar. But it should have been followed by another form that I know a jar as containing the floor since the cognitive relation is marked only the property relatedness. This is the first alternative discussed by Harirāma.⁶

The awareness of the objects mentioned constitutes the one and the same cognitive relation. These objects are related alike to the same consciousness. Thus, these objects share the same property of objectivity. In other words, a jar, the floor and the relation of the container and the contained are the object of awareness. The object is the predicate characterized by the only one property. This property has been expressed by relatedness. They remain the same object of the awareness in question since the characteristic feature of the predicate—the object is not affected. A predicate is called a *prakāra*. *Prakāratāvachhedaka* is characteristicness. Harirāma Tarkālaṃkāra discusses the view that the cognitive relation is constituted by the *relata*. If this view is

entertained, there are two main possibilities viz., (i) the cognitive relation is constituted by the awareness of an object, and (ii) the object itself constitutes the relation under consideration. He exposes the hollowness of these two possible alternatives. The third possibility that the relation in question is constituted by both the terms has been criticized already.

(b) The copulative knowledge that there are a jar and a piece of cloth should be reduced to a piece of erroneous knowledge since the characteristic feature of a jar should also characterize a piece of cloth as the cognitive relations being not specific the cognitive relation subsisting between awareness and the characterized and that subsisting between awareness and a characteristic become logically identical.

The copulative judgment that there are a jar and a piece of cloth should have been a false judgment. The judgment in consideration is the combination of the two judgments viz., (i) 'This is a jar' and 'This is a piece of cloth'. This is characterized by jariness and this is characterized by clothiness. In the example if jariness characterizes the piece of cloth and clothiness characterises the particular jar, even then the cognitive relation remains unaffected since an object in its relational character is not related to knowledge by a distinct relation. So far as the cognitive relation is concerned it is hard to distinguish a true judgment from a false one.

(c) Tarkālamkāra also points out that if the object of awareness constitutes the cognitive relation the distinction between a judgment and a copulative judgment referring to the same terms and relations is hard to maintain. Let us clarify the objection. In the judgment that the floor is in contact with a jar the cognitive relations are identical with those of the facts, the floor; the relation of conjunction and a jar. In the copulative judgment that there are the floor, the relation of conjunction and a jar the cognitive relations are also identical with the floor, the relation of conjunction and a jar. The terms and the cognitive relations in the above two judgments being the same the two judgments should be logically treated as identical.⁷

The judgment that there is a jar on the floor and the copulative judgment that there are a jar and the relation of conjun-

ction on the floor are hard to distinguish the first one from the second one so far as the cognitive relation is concerned. The terms of the two judgments are the same. The cognitive relation being constituted by the same terms is the same. These two judgments, having the same terms and the same cognitive relation, must be the same.

(d) In this connection, we may add another argument against the above hypothesis that if the cognitive relation is identical with the object of awareness then the true judgment that this is a cow should not be distinguished from the false judgment that this is a horse, since in both cases the cognitive relation is the same, being identical with the object. In the erroneous judgment a cow is mistaken for a horse. The object of the erroneous judgment is a cow which is mistaken for a horse. The object 'cow' is interpreted to be a horse. Therefore, the object of the erroneous judgment is a 'cow'. The cognitive relation is identical with a cow. In both cases the object and the cognitive relation being the same the two judgments should be indistinguishable.

Thus we come to the conclusion that the cognitive relation is neither awareness nor its object. Similarly, we may mention that both awareness and the object do not constitute the cognitive relation since the above objections cannot be answered thereby. The net result of this discussion is that cognitive relation is not a kind of *Svarūpa Sambandha*.

Gadādhara and Harirāma Tarkālaṁkāra emphatically assert that the cognitive relation is a distinct type of relation. This relation is external. It is also related to the terms by another relation. A charge of a *regressus ad infinitum* may be levelled against this relation which is taken as a third term. Gadādhara anticipates it and boldly meets it. He admits that a determinant must be assumed so that an object as related to its consciousness and its relation as a connecting link is well determined. The determinant in question is another relation. It is designated as *Nirūpyatva* (the relation which belongs to the characterized). An awareness is characterized by its object. The relation is a property of the characterized. So it bears the significant name 'Nirūpyatva' (characterizedness). According to the same logic an infinite series of relations must be admitted. This is the objection of Śaṅkara and Bradley against the notion of external relation.

Gadādhara, however, points out that a *regressus ad infinitum* does not vitiate the hypothesis of an external relation since such a *regressus* is rationally established. He means to say that a *regressus ad infinitum* in epistemology is to be avoided but not in ontology. At the time of knowing an object if an infinite series of relations is to be grasped as a condition of knowing it then the knowledge of the object will not be possible. But here the object requires the services of an infinite number of relations in order to be related to an awareness.⁸

The above two logicians hold that the converse of the subject-object-relation is also a distinct relation. The cognitive relation or the subject-object-relation is known in Indian Logic as *Viśayatā*. The relation starts from consciousness and proceeds towards the object. But the relation which starts from the object and proceeds towards consciousness is called *viśayitā*. Some Western logicians hold that the second one is the converse of the first one. But the above two logicians refute this suggestion with the remark that in the absence of a crucial proof it is illogical to believe in the primary character of the subject-object-relation. They conclude that the relation of *viśayitva* is also a distinct relation.

Gadādhara and Harirāma mean to say that no sound reason can be advanced to prove that the cognitive relation which proceeds from an awareness and moves towards an object is the basic relation since the logicians of the Bhatta school hold that the objectivity of an object is first grasped. In other words the cognitive relation proceeds from the object and moves towards its awareness. The object-subject-relation is the basic one. Moreover, the Western view is worthy of being considered from the ontological point of view. But from the logical or rather epistemological or grammatical points of view it is wiser to admit that *Viśayatva* and *Viśayitva* are two independent relations.

'An object is seen by me' and 'I see an object' are two distinct sentences though the subject and the object are the same. They are different because the relations are different. Let us cite another example from the literature of Law to convince our readers. The relation of debt holds between the creditor and the debtor. The relation of debt which proceeds from the latter and moves toward the former. The privileges which are

conferred upon the creditor are denied to the latter. These two relations are different i.e., the relation of debt and the converse of it are different. Legal transactions prove their difference.

Having established the hypothesis that the cognitive relation is a distinct relation the two neo-logicians (Gadādhara and Hari-rāma) discuss whether the cognitive relation is one or many. They hold that the cognitive relation is not one. If the cognitive relation is one, objections which have been raised against the *svarūpa sambandha* will remain unanswered. Let us take an example. The judgment that the floor is in contact with a jar and the copulative judgment that there are a jar, the floor and the relation of conjunction cannot be distinguished from each other. Therefore, the cognitive relations are many. Now, what is the principle that determines the difference between the cognitive relations. Has every event of consciousness a distinct cognitive relation of its own? Harirāma says "No". According to him the cognitive relations vary with the difference in the objects. If the objects of consciousness differ, the cognitive relations also become separate. Hari is aware of a jar. Rama is also aware of the same jar. These are two distinct events of awareness. But there is no proof to establish that the cognitive relation is not the same.

Harirāma divides the cognitive relation into two broad subdivisions, viz., (1) unrelated to other cognitive relations and (2) related to other such relations (*viṣayatva anirūpita* and *visayatva nirūpita*). The cognitive relation of the indeterminate perception does not proceed towards the qualified object. When an indeterminate perception of a jar takes place, jariness, a jar, etc., remaining mutually unrelated, are related to indeterminate perception by the cognitive relations.⁹ The cognitive relation of a perceptual judgment is a related one in which the cognitive relations form a well-connected structure of relations. In a relational knowledge an object is presented as being characterized. It is called a *viśeṣya*. Its cognitive relation is called *viśeṣyatā* (characterizedness). Some other object qualifies or characterizes it. It is called a characteristic (*prakāra*). Its cognitive relation is called *prakāratā* (characteristicness). A relation subsists between the *viśeṣya* and the *prakāra*. It is called *sāmsarga*. The cognitive relation of this *sāmsarga* is known as *sāmsargatā* (relation-ness).

All these relations remain so organized that the direction of relations is ascertained. *Prakāratā*, *viśeṣyatā* and *sāmsargatā* (cognitive relations) occupy their proper place in the organized structure of relations. Otherwise, the relational knowledge in the form 'the floor is in contact with a jar', and 'the hill is fiery' cannot be distinguished from another relational knowledge in the form 'the floor is fiery' and 'the hill is in contact with a jar' since the cognitive relations and objects of both events of relational knowledge are the same. Similarly, in case of copulative relational knowledge in the form that the floor is in contact with a jar and that the hill is in contact with a jar characterizes the cognitive relation of *prakāratā* is not one and the same though a jar characterizes both the floor and the hill. Also, in case of the copulative relational knowledge in the form that the floor is in contact with a jar and with a piece of cloth the cognitive relation of *viśeṣyatā* is not the same. If this suggestion is not accepted then a distinct type of cognitive relation has to be admitted since in case of non-copulative relational knowledge no characteristic characterizes two distinct objects which are characterized, a single object being characterized by two distinct characteristics. In these cases if two *prakāratās* and two *viśeṣyatās* are assumed then there is no need of postulating a distinct type of cognitive relation in cases of copulative relational knowledge.

Let us cite the two different types of perceptual judgments viz., "The floor has a piece of cloth" and (2) "The floor has a piece of cloth and a jar". The logical import of these two judgments is that the floor is in contact with a piece of cloth and that the floor is in contact with a piece of cloth and with a jar. Is the cognitive relation one and the same in these two judgments? The neo-logician Tarkālamkāra emphatically asserts that in these two judgments the cognitive relations must be two different ones. The logic behind this assertion is that the cognitive relations in the first judgment has been organized in a definite order as answers to the order of the objects of the first one. The floor is the subject, a piece of cloth is the predicate and the copula (the connecting link) is the relation of conjunction. Whereas in the second case, the floor is the subject, a piece of cloth and a jar are two independent predicates and thus these two predicates are connected independently with the floor by the two rela-

tions of conjunctions. The objects of the second judgment are organized in a different order though the subject is the same. Hence it is quite reasonable to hold that the cognitive relations are different in order to maintain the distinction of the above two judgments.

Harirāma discusses also other relevant points with regard to the cognitive relation. I shall not discuss them in this paper. The last point which I intend to discuss is that all the cognitive relations possess a common property known as *viṣayatā-tva* (cognitive relation-ness). If a critic takes an exception to this assumption, he must fail to explain the common character communicated by the statements, viz., 'a jar is an object of awareness', 'a cow is an object of awareness' and so on. All these statements indicate that all the 'cognitive relations' have a common form.

Now we shall come back to the original issue. In a true judgment the structure of the cognitive relations is in accordance with the related fact which includes many diverse elements and relations in itself. In cases of error the cognitive relations are present but their interrelation is not such as it appears to our consciousness owing to the presence of some defect or other. Therefore, the analysis of cognitive relation as put forward by Ewing does not seem tenable when seen in the light of the objections of the neo-logicians of India.

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NOTES

1. Ewing : Idealism. Chapter V. p. 204.
2. Ibid. p. 138.
3. Ibid. p. 138.
4. Ibid, p. 139.
5. G. E. Moore : Philosophical Studies, p. 20.
6. Harirāma Tarkālaṃkāra : Viṣayatā-vāda-vīci. Benaras Edition. p. 3.

7. *Vādavāridhi*, p. 258.

8. *Viṣayatā-vāda*, p. 12.

9. The *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika School has been interpreted by the neo-logicians in a different manner. It is not so much psychological as it is logical. It is not introspected since it is transcendental but it is a logical assumption. Every judgment that is a relational knowledge presupposes the awareness of the predicate, that is, the adjective as its invariable condition. In the perceptual judgment this is a jar imports that 'this', an unqualified particular, is related to the universal 'jar-ness' by a relation. The awareness of 'jar-ness' is invariably necessary for the origin of the judgment 'this is a jar'. The awareness of jar-ness must precede the perceptual judgment 'this is a jar'. Therefore, jar-ness must be presented in some form of primary perception. This primary perception has its contents such as 'this', a yonder particular, the relation of inherence and jar-ness as disjoint objects. In other words, the objects of an indeterminate perception remain mutually unrelated. We cannot say with certainty whether we are aware of objects as unrelated. But logic demands its invariable existence. So it is more logical than psychological.