THE PROBLEM OF RELATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

If a student of Indian Philosophy makes a comparative study of the arguments and counter-arguments relating to relation advanced by Indian and Western thinkers he is sure to be struck by a deplorable lack of precision in the use of terms broadly synonymous with the word ' relation ' betrayed even by eminent philosophers like Bradley and his modern critic Russell. To single out only one such instance, Bradley, while attempting a critique of relation refers in the course of his rebuttal to relations and relational adjectives in identical terms. Russell, so well-known for his strict usage of philosophical terms, commits no nonchalantly the same mistake when he treats 'human' both as an adjective and as a relation. The only honorable exception to this unphilosophical practice is Johnson, who has tried to distinguish relations from relational adjectives. As a matter of fact, many more distinctions need to be drawn in this connection, which no western thinker has attempted to draw and which most Indian thinkers simply take for granted. This need not be looked upon as more linguistic hair-splitting, for only a profound knowledge of Indian philosophical doctrines would reveal as to how much diversity of views hinges upon the careful drawing of distinctions in this field. For example, the difference between the Vaiśeṣika and the Mīmāṁsaka accounts of 'Upamāna ' is directly grounded in the denial made by both that correlation is not just one relation or that the component relations in correlation could not be taken indifferently either as ' aRb ' or ' bRa '.

The most important distinctions therefore that have to be first formulated are those that relate to the terms ' relation ', ' attribute ', ' property ', ' relational property ', ' adjective ' and ' predicates '. Here we elucidate rather than define these terms, starting from the simplest one. An attribute is a special kind of property of a substance, one that may be called ' essential ' to the latter in a relative sense of the word. It is called ' guṇa ' in the Indian terminology to demarcate it from ' dharma ' or to use its western equivalent ' property ', which does not connote ' essentiality ', whatever else it may connote. There are guṇas of different types, some classed as general and some as essential but guṇas as a class may be re-

garded as more essential to ' dravyas ' or substances than ' dharmas '. Thus ' parimāṇa ' or measure is listed among common qualities possessed by all substances and yet as a quality it is supposed to be relatively more essential to a substance like stick than its causality in the production of the pot, which is only a property. A measureless stick is inconceivable but not so a stick which is ineffectual in producing a pot. Again, a property may be more stable than a quality without ever being essential to its locus.

A relational property differs from the general one in being relatively more accidental than the general property, just as this is more accidental than the common qualities. ' Being wealthy ' is a relational property of a man and as such is more accidental than the property of cleverness or punctuality that he may possess. The Sanskrit word for the former is Upādhi (उपाधि) and the Nyāya speaks of two kinds of them, namely the ' Sakhaṇḍopādhis ' or the analysable relational properties and the ' Akhaṇḍopādhis ' or the unanalysable relational properties. ' Potness-ness ' or ghaṭatwatva' explicated as ' inherentness in relation to the pot alone ' illustrates the former kind and ' spaceness ' or ' ākāṣatva ' in Sanksrit illustrates the upādhi of the latter kind.

A relation is quite different from both an adjective and a predicate. An adjective is just a part of a predicate with which sometimes even a perceptive logician like Johnson confuses it. In ' This flower is blue ', blueness is the adjective—not in the strictly grammatical sense—while ' being blue ' or, in other words, ' being the locus of blue colour ' is the whole predicate. A relation on the other hand is that which is involved in the predication or characterisation by an adjective of a substantive. As such, the relation is of the nature of a tie which cannot be indicated but is simply shown by the logical form of the sentence. This is precisely what Wittgenstein[1] refers to quite confusedly as the ' sense ' or ' representing relation ' of a sentence, which, he says, is only shown forth and not described. The Indian neo-logician Gadādhar makes the point very clear in the very first forthright remark of his masterpiece on ' Theory of Meaning ' known as ' Vyutpattivāda ', that it is syntax which reveals, or more precisely, suggests the relation of word meanings among themselves.

Failure to realise this peculiarity of relations appearing in logical predications has given rise to the ascriptive, class-inclusive

and identity views about the nature of predication and the Hegelians, capitalising on the impreciseness and irrelevancy of these to the actually intended meaning of a sentence, argue that a statement as a whole is a predication or judgemental determination of reality as a whole which is its real logical subject.

With these preliminary clarifications completed we may proceed to tackle the problem of relations from the reverse end, that is, from the side of the school which has gone to the furtherest extreme in demolishing the concept of relation, viz., Buddhism. The ultimate reals for this school are the spatio-temporally and qualitatively discrete and therefore, absolutely self-defined entities. These enter only into different configurations called " Skandhas ' with each other without ever coming into mutual contact. Compactness, homogeneity, wholeness and similar empirically-attested features of the real are only subjective impositions upon what is objectively only a congeries of absolutely unrelated particles of reality. The Buddhists have arrived at such a view by pressing the analytical point of view—which is called ' Vibhajjavāda ' in early Buddhist literature—to its logical extreme. Regarded from this point of view a thing is only a complicated network of partial effects or causal efficiencies differing in subtle degree from each other. The logical disintegration of the empirically real has to be carried to the stage at which all distinguishable causal efficiencies are analysed out of the complex structure of the real effect entity. This process therefore naturally gives rise to the notion of several different types of cause called variously as ' adhipati pratyaya ', ' samānāntara pratyaya ', ' ālambana pratyaya ' and so on, and acting successively or simultaneously to produce the final effect which is therefore of the nature of either the final causal efficiency or a conglomeration of all the partial causal efficiencies. Thus being led to espouse multiple causality to explicate fully the analytical point of view, Buddhism has quite naturally come to assign the central place to the doctrine of causality or ' pratītya samutpāda ' as it is called in Sanskrit. In all its successive phases of development this doctrine remains a characteristic feature of this school.

The relevance of this consideration of Buddhist notion of reality in the context of the discussion of the concept of relation in this school may perhaps be called into question. ' Causality ',

it may be argued, 'is itself one of the most important relations and so, to advocate a multiplicity of causes is only to indirectly admit relations.' To this it may be replied that causality is both admitted and not admitted by the Buddhists. In its usual sense, transmissive causality or the determination of the effect occurrence by the causal occurrence, is categorically denied by Buddhism. But the invariable sequential relation of causal units representing so many partial efficiencies is quite acceptable to this school. Here it should be noted that only the exigency of language and regard for colloquial usage have made us use the word 'relationship' in the above sentence where merely the word 'sequence' would have sufficed. But even this word is not as appopriate as we would wish it to be. The idea sought to be conveyed by it is, however, quite definite. Between the cause and the effect there is absolutely no relation, unless bare temporal succession itself were treated as a kind of relation. The simple reason for this is that neither the so-called effect is, as shown above, the real effect in its own right nor is the so-called cause a causal entity apart from the efficiency it is supposed to be possessed of. Invariability of the temporal sequence of cause and effect is, however, another matter. We shall say something on it after disposing of some other important points raised by critics in this connection.

The critic might argue : 'let causality be explained away as a relation, but what of so many other empirically testified relations like co-existence, inherence etc. ?' These cannot be ruled out or analysed out. The Buddhists' reply to this is that the real is not a static but a dynamic entity, 'a unit of energy' called 'Saṁskāra' whose existence is exhausted in a momentary flash. Only static entities can co-exist or be statically related one with another. But between bare flashes of energy there cannot obtain any relation which itself would be of static nature. Only causality could be supposed to link one energy unit with another, for the concepts of activity and determination and these are associated only with causality. This entails the consequence that co-existence, inherence, and other non-causal relations are to be looked upon as so many different types of causality which in its turn has already been reduced to bare sequence. This fact is a further explanation of the pivotal importance that the doctrine of 'pratītyasamutpāda' or of causality enjoys in Buddhism.

Another serious point that the critics may raise against the above view may also be examined here. It is to the effect that the material, the non-material and the efficient causes cannot operate without acting upon one another and this interaction of them is inexplicable without admitting relations. To illustrate, clay, the material cause of the pot, has to be placed in a lump on the wheel before it is fashioned in the form of the pot. Further, the material cause enters into the very structure of its product. Thus mutual relationship of the different causes of an effect cannot be ruled out. This objection is met by the Buddhists by denying all diversity of causes and maintaining only one type of cause, namely, the efficient one. This alone is a self-contained and non-involved type of cause. Others are mutually involved. The Vaiśeṣikas uphold the notion of the mutually-involved causes. Even the efficient cause does, in their view, involve the other causes, for in the majority of cases this cause is of the nature of activity or 'vyāpāra' as it is termed in Sanskrit and activity has mostly the material cause itself as its locus, or it is directed towards the latter to bring about the conjuction of parts to produce the whole. For Buddhism, on the other hand, all causes are efficient, efficiency is their very essence, the effect is only the last of the series of efficiencies occurring in uninterrupted succession and there are as many terms in this series as there are distinguishable efficiencies or aspects in the so-called effect.

One more point needs to be explained in this account. Reference has already been made above to the character of invariance exhibited by the causal sequence. 'Can this be explained without bringing in the notion of relation?' it may be asked. Invariance involves the idea of determination. The causal series cannot be invariable without each of its terms determining the term coming immediately after it.

In this objection invariance and causal determination call for separate consideration. If the character of invariance is subjected to analysis it is discovered that only that sequence of terms is invested with this character between which no term outside the sequence can occur. For instance, if a_1, a_2, a_3.... etc., form an invariable sequence of terms then no term like b_2, b_3, b_4.... etc., can occur between any two of these terms. If such an interposition can take place at any stage in the sequence it would fail to be invariable.

In another way also a sequence may fall short of attaining invariance. Suppose the sequence is a finite one and so comes to a stop at the *n*th term a_n. Since this is the last term in the series and the term following it belongs to another series (say the series b_1, b_2, b_3,.... etc.,) the first sequence cannot be invariable. Now in neither of these two ways is the Buddhist required to surrender invariability. He regards the so-called stable entity or effect as no other than an uniterrupted series of apparently similar momentary entities symbolisable as above. In any one series symbolised by a_1, a_2, a_5, a_4,.... no terms outside the series can intervene. If such intervention took place there would be an abrupt interruption in the cognition of the thing represented by the symbolism. Of course, a break in the continuity of the cognition of a thing would certainly take place after a short or long while so that the sudden change in the series a_1, a_2, a_3,....a_n after the *n*th term cannot be avoided. This difficulty is explained on the assumption that as a matter of fact a_1, a_2, a_3,....a_n and b_1, b_2, b_3,.... as also the innumerable sequences coming thereafter till liberation puts a complete stop to their incessant progression, form only one single series which in the spiritual terminology of Buddhism is the spiritual career of an individual. Breaks appearing at intervals in this beginningless and infinite series are nothing but so many stages determined by the selectivity of attention. That is why in retrospect things and events of the past which were felt as bizarre and unaccountable at the time of their occurrence, do fall in their proper place and are realised as quite natural.

As to causal determination, three alternative interpretations of this concept can be advanced, none of which, it would be seen, calls for the admission of relation : (1) The causal series, one may say, is self-determined. That is to say any term is what it is and comes into and goes out of being when it does, only because of its own peculiar nature. If this sounds queer, why should the opposite statement that every term in the causal series is determined in every respect by the term preceding it soundless queer ? In the Buddhist view, self-determination is the real kind of determination. Other determination is almost a contradiction in terms. However, one may take recourse to a different interpretation. (2) It is the well known one attempted by Hume

according to which there is no determination in strict sense in *rerum natura*. All determination issues from the mind, the fountain-head of all subjective (even logical and empirical) constructions. Cause and effect are mere subjective fictions, the real is merely an uniterrupted succession of events, interesting or otherwise. Even this view does not call for the acceptance of relations. (3) One more way of understanding determination—which does not find mention anywhere—may also be suggested. It amounts to saying that none of the causes determines itself or its effect but that this sequential picture as an account of the universe as a whole does itself determine the philosophical scheme that the Buddhist advocates. In other words, it may be said that the universe itself considered as the sum-total of its components (regarded as discrete momentary units) and called under this aspect as Buddha's 'dharmakāya' (or 'धर्मधातु') is determined by the sequential character of all existence. What precise logical meaning should be given to this peculiar kind of determination, is difficult to say. But that the acceptance of such a determination does not entail the acceptance of relation is quite obvious and so this point need not be pursued any further.

The account so far given of the Buddhist's stubborn attempt to exclude relations at any cost from his philosophical scheme may make one wonder as to how Bergson, starting from a view almost similar to that of the Buddist—that the real is the '*elan*' (or Saṁskāra) did yet arrive at the conclusion that this movement is absolutely continuous, devoid of interruptions and fully retentive of the past. While continuity is of the nature of 'vikalpa' or subjective construction for Buddhism, it is the very essence of the '*elan vital*' for Bergson. How could such a reverse conclusion be derived from the same premises needs some explanation. This, however, is not far to seek. The Buddhist's real is not only a '*saṁskāra*', but is also a '*dharma*' or a 'quantum' to use a word from modern physics. The real is, despite its 'energy' character static, that is to say, a self-contained entity. Bergson's '*elan*' is just the opposite of this in its nature. It is all '*saṁskāra*' and no '*dharma*' and so it is comulative progression from the past towards the future. The Buddhist view as contrasted with this is a static view about reality which is dynamic in essence. Bergson upholds a dynamic view about reality that is dynamic in essence.

Just as Buddhism is vehemently anti-relationistic, the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is vehemently pro-relationistic. But the inspiration behind these obstinate attitudes are quite different in character from each other. Buddhism constructs a general criterion of reality—the celebrated 'efficiency' or 'Kāritva'—on the basis of certain experiences and deduces its implications—the momentariness and utter discreteness of all reals—to discard stability, relation etc., from the world of reals. Thus the procedure adopted by Buddhism is more or less arbitrary.[2] The Vaiśeṣikas, on the contrary, base their conception of reality on the solid ground of common experience which involves relations of all kinds in almost every occurrence of itself. However, mere experiential testimony is not deemed adequate to establish the reality of relations in this school, firstly because in most experiences their contents do not become articulate enough to be identified for what they are and secondly, relations are by their very nature involved in their terms so that unless they are extricated or distinguished from the latter, they cannot be recognised as such at all.

Before considering the Vaiśeṣika view in detail we have to make one essential clarification. Unlike Buddhism this philosophy maintains that the determinant of the causal relation that one thing may bear to another is its own generic nature. That is to say, a thing is both itself and the cause of another, only due to its own nature. In the opposite view causality is extrinsic to the nature of a thing. Thus the "stickness" of the stick is for the Vaiśeṣika determinative of both the stick's own nature and its causal nature, if causality may thus be described. By this assumption, which directly follows from the 'distinctive' view of reality advocated in this school, puzzles like, 'how can a thing be regarded as a cause before it has produced its effect ?' and 'how can it continue to be so regarded after the production of the effect ?' are easily solved.

No realist school can do without the admission of relations although how many different types of relations are to be admitted, is a question that different realist schools have answered differently. There are realisms and realisms but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is distinguished from all other varieties of it by the fact that by developing the concept of relations to its logical perfection, this school has given birth to a fullfledged formal system

of logic. Even Mimāṁsā is a realist system but it cared precious little for relations, retaining only one type of it, namely identity, thus unwittingly imposing restrictions upon its development in the direction of formal logic. The main function of logic as Indian logicians understand it is conceptual (or symbolic) analysis[3] (and synthesis).[4] The constituents of this analysis cannot be other than logical entities which a realist philosophy cannot accommodate except under the category of relation. Nyāya has coined the blanket term ' svarūpa ' to encompass all logical entities to be met with in the conceptual analyses it formulates.

To come back from this digression to the question of how to prove the reality of relations, we find that the groundedness of one thing in another, ' वैशिष्ट्य or विशिष्टबुद्धि ' as it is called in Sanskrit, is declared to be the primary basis and justification of relations. In other commonly admitted cases of relatedness like that of father and son, it cannot be indisputably maintained that there subsists a relation between them which alone accounts for the properties of fatherhood and sonhood. Even without this relationship, father and son may quite logically be supposed to be invested with the relatively permanent properties of fatherhood and sonhood. Perhaps it is mainly because a real relation (as such) does not stand at the basis of this (relational) property that so often estrangement takes place between them ! But since, even in such cases there does obtain a relation somewhere at some time, the concept of relation needs to be explained so that all kinds of complex unities formed by relations could also be easily provided for. The Vaiśeṣika classification of relations as ' वृत्तिनियामक ' and ' वृत्त्यनियामक ' or ' determinants of groundedness ' and ' non-determinants of groundedness ' is intended to meet this objective.

The dichotomy of relations as external and internal so popular in Western thought is rather otiose in the view of the Indian philosopher. If a relation were really external to its terms in the sense that it retained an independent epistemic status in determinate cognitions, it would cease to be a relation, which, whatever it may be in itself, must somehow be involved in its terms. On the other hand, if a relation were wholly internal to its terms it would be but an adjective common to them both and as such could not function as relation. In whatever sense the pair of

terms 'internal' and 'external' is interpreted, it is very difficult to give any sense to them. All that this means is that the relation of two terms is only epistemically involved in them but not ontologically. Thus although constituting its terms into a relational unity, the relation between them does not thereby forfeit its *relational* character.

Probably, *four types* of relational unities may be said to occur in common experience and logical discourse and for each of these a specific type of relation has to be postulated. First, there are cases in which relation itself is a kind of unity to which the terms are subordinated. Next there are those cases where relation is almost co-ordinate with its terms. Then we have cases in which one of the terms predominates or acts as some kind of unity and the remaining term and the relation are both subordinated to it. Lastly, we come across cases in which both the terms predominate and the relation is subordinate to them. These diverse unities may broadly be characterised as logical unity, situational unity, factual unity and propositional unity respectively. The first of these, the logical unity is exemplified in what is called in Indian logical terminology the 'pariṣkāra' or precise conceptual analysis of a logical entity (like say the 'invalidity of cognition') which is formulated in a generalised or conceptual form. Thus all the analysens or the constituent terms of the analysis are put into the structure of relation and the analysendum is represented as a relational unity of any two arbitrarily chosen terms whose logical function is merely to act as pegs on which the complex relational thread is hung. Obviously in such logically constructed relational unities it is the relation which is the predominant factor or unity in which the terms are held together. Examples of this type of unity are not easily to be discovered in common experience.

The Vaiśeṣika example of the second 'situational' type of unity is the fact of one thing being in contact with another, say the pot placed on the table. The contact between the pot and the table is regarded as a relation (also a quality) which constitutes its terms into what is called above a situational unity which may be disrupted without doing the least harm to either of its terms. But contact being also one of the twenty-four qualities admitted by the Vaiśeṣikas, it can also be regarded—within the

situational unity itself—as adjectival to the terms. Why contact is classed as a quality is a pertinent question to be asked here but we cannot give more than a cryptic reply to it which is to the effect that every substance must at all times be in contact with some thing or other and so contact needs to be taken account of in the classification of attributes of substances.

Contact is, therefore, to be reckoned as co-ordinate with the terms it unites. It may be noted here that contact as an attribute of its terms may also constitute two unities subordinate to the original situational unity. In these, contact will be in the place of one of the terms of the unities although this character of it will not be epistemically conspicuous within the situational unity. The subordination of the latter role of contact to its former role is brought out by Indian logicians by characterising the term character of contact as determined by its relational character.

Very often contact is advanced as an example of the external relation for the simple reason that the unity constituted by it is—as characterised above—of a loose nature. But this is not quite correct. In the above example it may be noted that the contact relation is not quite external either to the table or the pot, as it is usually taken to be. If that were the case, the fact of the ' table being on the pot ' would be identical with the other fact instanced above. A more appropriate example of external relation is the contact of two eternal substances like space and time none of which is dependent upon the other. Only in such a case can it be maintained that the contact is purely external to its terms although even such a contact cannot be denied the function of uniting the terms.

The third type of unity called factual is that which is evidenced by facts like substances endowed with attributes or characterised by their generic character. It is called factual because the constituent terms of the unity are as a matter of fact welded together into a factual whole by the relation of inherence or what is called ' *samavāya* ' in Sanskrit. Unlike contact ' inherence ' does not stand on equal footing with its terms; rather one of the terms and the inherence stand in subordination to the locus that is the independent ' inheree'. A distinction therefore, is drawn between the two

terms of this relation by characterising them as dependent and independent inherees by the Vaiśeṣikas. This relation is usually regarded as the realist prototype of the internal relation advocated by idealists. Certainly inherence does bind its terms more closely to each other than contact in the sense that one of the terms would not quite remain what it is apart from its relation to the other term. Thus an attribute apart from a substantive locus is as inconceivable as a substance without its generic character. But this dependence is, as mentioned above, only unilateral. A substance not only can but has to remain devoid of its attributes at least in the moment of its origination and a generic character apart from the substance it inheres in has to exist by itself in the state of annihilation (प्रलय) at least. Thus even in the absence of the dependent term, the independent term along with a relation can continue to exist. This peculiarity of the relationship of the two terms to each other is perhaps the ground of the relation being regarded as internal. It is internal and yet a relation as it ' couples its terms apart ', to use a phrase of Bradley. But it should be clearly borne in mind that there ' internal ' should not be taken to mean ' adjectival to one or both of its terms, ' as is evidently the idealists ' meaning of this word. In this sense only contact, an instance of a quality, can be regarded as internal to its terms. Samavāya is internal in the sense that the unity constituted by it is a factual one and also a unilateral one.

The fourth type of unity is propositional which is manifested by negative facts or statements like ' there is no pot on the ground '. That it is unlike the other three kinds of unity is quite obvious. There cannot obtain the relation of contact between negation and its locus, for contact is an attribute and so it inheres only in substances. Also, contact is produced by its terms being brought together but negation is not an entity which can be moved from one place and taken to another to be conjoined with a new locus. Inherence also cannot connect negation with its locus for the two are not as closely knit together as any two inherences are. A logical relation also cannot subsist between the two, as both the entities are *empirically* real. Further, the unity that negation and its locus constitute is not as immediately evident to senses as other types of unities are. Without

the knowledge of the locus and the counter-positive as also the desire to discover the counter-positive, negation, although present in the locus cannot be observed. This is the reason why this unity is characterised as propositional. It may be recalled in this connection that Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta postulate the *pramāṇa* (or means of cognition) called '*anupalabdhi*' (or non-cognition) precisely to account for the indirect character of the cognition of negation. But the Vaiśeṣika treat non-cognition of the counterpositive merely as an instrument in the perception of negation. This idea is involved in the above characterisation of negational unity. Moreover, the relation underlying this unity is called in Sanskrit '*svarūpa*' or self-relation for various reasons, only one of which may be expounded here for lack of space.

In other schools negation is viewed either as an aspect of its locus or as the object other than or opposed to that which is negated. For such views the question of the nature of the relation of negation does not arise. But for the Vaiśeṣika negation is a real entity but a concession is made to the above views by treating negation under the aspects both of a term and a relation. Just as a relation is involved in its terms so, a relation negation may also be regarded as involved in its locus. The unity constituted by the self-relationing of negation is, therefore, such that this relation is wholly absorbed within its terms.

Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta repudiate all these relations and maintain instead the one relation of partial identity—over and above contact—between any two closely related entities. For these systems difference and identity are only relative terms. Nothing is either absolutely different or identical with another thing. Dependence of one thing upon another is more a ground of their being treated as identical, though partially, than as different. Thus substance alone is real in its own right and all other so-called categories of reality are merely so many aspects of it. Naturally in such a philosophy no relation other than identity would have any place at all.

Vedānta has urged the well-known regress argument against the concept of relation. The crux of this argument is the supposed incapacity of a relation to form a nuity separately with each one of its terms before constituting the terms into a unity. For example, contact cannot relate any terms, as it has to be related separately

to each of the terms by the relation of '*samavāya*'. But this relation also has to relate itself to the terms by means of another relation, namely, '*svarūpa*' and thus the regress arises. One cannot avoid the regress by stopping at any relation arbitrarily.

This oft-repeated argument is based on a presupposition which no critique of relations has tried to state clearly. The Vedāntins feel that a category of existence like contact or inherence cannot play the role of relation. It can only be a term, so '*samavāya*' and '*saṁyoga*' being of the nature of terms would always be needing other relations to relate them to their terms. But this presupposition is not acceptable to Vaiśeṣikas.

But in fairness to Vedānta it must be admitted that the Vaiśeṣika does not have an easy conscience over this matter. '*Samavāya*', no doubt, is precisely the kind of relation that fills the bill for the kind of realism that the Vaiśeṣika espouses; it relates the terms, sustains their unity, disallows their separation, is involved in them without being absorbed in either, is not adjectival to them and yet is self-related to them. Is it alright to ascribe all these necessary properties of a relation to a hypothetical entity and then to call it '*Samavāya*'? But can there be such an entity in *rerum natura*? I dont think the Vaiśeṣika can give a satisfactory answer to this question.

Department of Philosophy, **N. S. Dravid**
Nagpur University, Nagpur.

NOTES

1. Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. 'Review of Tractatus' by Ramsay. p. 11.

2. The implications of the concept of efficiency for the doctrines of momentariness and discreteness are worked out in detail in all important Buddhist treatises. They are too subtle and detailed to be elucidated here.

3. This is called 'Pariṣkāra' in Indian Logic.

4. This is termed 'Anugama' in Indian logical terminology.