BOOK REVIEWS

I. Edmond L. Erde : *Philosophy and Psycho-linguistics*, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, The Hague, 1973, pp 237.

The book under review is a welcome addition to the growing corpus of literature which have a unifying theme of bringing out the philosophical implications of recent linguistics. It makes a larger, generalised claim about the compatibility between science and philosophy, and a smaller, particularised claim about the compatibility between the linguistics of Chomsky and the Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. At the outset, the unity between them is achieved with a particular interpretation of *a priori*.

According to the author's interpretation, both Katz and Vendler have viewed *a priori* as containing the possibility of uniting science and philosophy. This it seems to be too generalised a view to evoke sympathy. Because, to a great extent it is true to say that they use scientific data obtained in linguistic studies to solving philosophical problems, it requires a methodological clarification as to whether their use of *a priori* seems to converge at all. Interpreting Katz as using two senses of the *a priori*, he says that certain scientific theorising about experience obliterates the distinction between science and philosophy. Not satisfied with their views, he proceeds to clarify his own view based on *a priori*. His thesis here is that *a priori* enters into both the activities of science and philosophy, and this stands without theoretical support. His drawing additional support from Kuhn and Hanson, not though entirely out of place, is not altogether satisfactory. However his parenthetical remark that Chomsky is doing good science and good philosophy may be taken seriously for further consideration.

There seems to be a confusion between innatism and *a priori* in his view. It arises on account of looking at innatism as a kind of *a priori* which does not seem to be true. Again he thinks what lends scientific credibility to innatism doctrine is the notion of *a priori* when it is elevated to the status of science. The same applies to the notion of grammar. Consequently, this is shown

to give the definition of linguistics as a twig in the philosophy of science. The relation between the general linguistic theory and the theory of a specific grammar is symbiotic.

His efforts to harmonise science and philosophy comes to near fruition when he takes up the issue of 'unifying' the opposing paradigms of mentalism (Chomsky) and behaviourism (B. F. Skinner, Bloomfield, A. W. and C. K. Staats, and M. D. Braine). Chomsky's commitment to mentalism however has not been explored fully though it seems to promise something of a parallel framework which Karl-Otto Apel gives for the analytical philosophy of language.

Further, he endorses Lee's opinion which holds that Chomsky's theory has all the characteristics of a scientific theory. He also accepts the criticisms made by Chomsky on the conceptual confusions of Skinner's *Verbal Behaviour*. In that he brings to the fore the principal force behind Chomsky's criticisms as relevant to the understanding of their respective commitments. After discussing the 'paradigmatic' and 'internal' differences, he goes on to claim that Chomsky's theory is so systematised as to include what has been dismissed by other linguists as 'mere commonsense'. Here he seems to express a point. The disciplinary considerations seem to be the most interesting part of the book.

Having said that innateness has an *a priori* status in the science of linguistics, now he proceeds to say what constitutes that science. Using science in the ordinary sense and the 'assent of the scientific community' are the two main features he mentions here. The latter, he says is the essential and final criterion of the correctness of science (155).

In his comparison between Descartes and Chomsky, he concentrates on the idea of infinity and tries to explain the idea behind the production of infinite sentences in Chomsky. Apart from this he mentions two other issues; one is about private language and the other is about the analytic-synthetic distinction. He claims that if Chomsky were right, his argument would support a private language hypothesis, which apparently goes against every grain of interpretation of Wittgenstein. This may also be understood as seeking support for the innatism doctrine. But this seems to be too hasty a conclusion to reach.

He worked out the compatibility between Chomsky and Wittgenstein in the following way. First he defends Wittgenstein both from the attacks of Chomsky as well as from the attacks of Katz, Fodor, and Chihara; positively, he tries to prove that both Chomsky and Wittgenstein as ' logical behaviourists ', the former is because of his ' use theory of language ' and the latter is because of the relation between a novel proposition and its underlying competence. He also points out the obvious similarities between Wittgenstein and Skinner.

Secondly, he avers that Wittgenstein is not an anti-mentalist as Chomsky has understood him. Besides he mentions three similarities, concluding that there is an implicit acceptance of nativism in Wittgenstein. He compares them again by enumerating five features of the phrase ' forms of life '. Here he seems to make a relevant point when he says something about ' agreements in forms of life '. He winds up his discussion by considering how philosophical questions attain the status of science.

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II. Martin P. Goldig : *Philosophy of Law*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1975. Pp. x+133 $7.95, $4.35 paper.

The author of *Philosophy of Law* is with the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York and the book, which is one of a Prentice-Hall *Philosophy Series*, is oriented toward the study of criminal law; it is a work dealing with legal philosophy rather than with the philosophy of law. The law as defined by Golding is law that covers offences against public order, decency and safety. But criminal law is surely only one aspect of the totality of law, occupying as it does a borderline position, although certainly an important one, which encroaches upon both private and public law and which trespasses upon case and statute law.

The place of ecclesiastical law is not elaborated, and there is no detailed account, for example, of the importance and development of *contract* in law nor of the origins of international law as we might find it given in painstaking detail in Sir Henry Maine's work on *Ancient Law*. If we think that authors such as Maine and Fredrich overemphasize the historical approach to law, Golding has traced the historical development of the various aspects of law hardly at all. The medieval classification of law into eternal, natural and human law is touched on only slightly; there is no mention of the sixteenth century political philosophers Hooker or Bodin, nor of Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist whom Maine held in such high regard.

The first chapter opens with a discussion of the nature of law and its problems; we might wish that the topic were not so narrowly met and given a wider interpretation. In any event, it is shown that not only does society require rules but that laws require a good society. From this the terms of reference for any legal system should follow naturally enough : first a society, second an agency to make the laws, followed by further agencies to enforce the laws and to settle disputes.

Compensating somewhat for the slender beginning made in the first chapter, the second chapter contains a treatment of some of the more important theories about law in general. Centering upon the two traditions of legal positivism and natural law, various

approaches are given in condensed version, and it is only by virtue of a clear and precise style that the author is able to cover so much so adequately. Legal positivism, by its very positivistic nature is able to offer little in the way of a genuine philosophy. By contrast, the natural law theory of St. Thomas Aquinas gives to law a moralistic and even a theological basis, bringing into play an entire system of metaphysics. Hans Kelsen's 'Basic Norm', taken by Golding to suggest a 'pure' theory of law, is criticized as involving circularity. There follows a discussion of H. L. A. Hart's interpretation of a legal system as one that rests on recognized rules, in turn based upon accepted practices. A section is given over to Lon L. Fuller and his advocacy of a legal morality as the condition for lawmaking in the tradition of natural law, a condition that we nevertheless do not expect to find written directly into positive law. The chapter ends with an account of Philip Selznick's emphasis on legal authority, exercised and given weight through a clarification of ends in the light of both tradition and reason. All in all we have what appears to be an acceptable summary of mostly current developments in law theory together with a brief evaluation of each and some well-integrated comparisons.

In discussing the limitations of law, it is well noted that in a modern free society a fine line must be drawn between legal compulsion and the individual's right of choice. In contemporary legal philosophy this whole area is seen to be one of keen concern. Where we acknowledge natural moral law we admit to certain moral rights at least in principle, but no government can legislate morality nor is legal punishment necessarily provided for moral wrongs. On the other hand, however, where immorality threatens to become a public menace, the question of private morality can give cause for concern, and if it is our aim to improve the quality of life rather than simply to endure life, wholesome moral living should be of consequence to all citizens.

There is a final chapter describing methods of settling disputes, such as adjudication and conciliation, but prior to this we have Golding's discussion on the pros and cons of punishment, which takes up fully thirty percent of *Philosophy of Law*. Punishment as a deterrent, it is said, is carried out and justified with the idea of effecting a balance, as it were, to protect society, or to protect the offender against himself or to justify the law to itself as law that is

enforceable. This may to some extent be true, but we might add that where measures that are preventive are not instituted, violence is done to the developable potential in human resources, and moral principles are dishonoured to the extent that there soon eventuates the need for remedial measures among the very populace that these principles were supposed to benefit. A look at the problem in perspective should show that punishment is a belated reaction to a largely preventible situation, and it might be pondered that most societies since early Greek times have given slight heed to Plato's stress upon the educative function of law.

There is much in *Philosophy of Law* that appears to center around what may be said to be current discussion in law theory. A great deal of the literature cited is of recent origin; of all the reference and source material listed, amounting to 142 titles, eighty percent of it is dated as recently as 1950 or later. It would have been instructive even to have drawn a comparison between the laws that are freely made and obeyed by man, and those laws of nature which operate among non-free agents; both kinds would seem to require a society to formulate the laws as well as one or more agencies to administer the laws. If the concept of law could be seen in a rather wider context than Golding has placed it, could it not be considered that, while law may be taken as society's declared vengeance upon what it deems to be wrongdoing, law may also be viewed as science's standard to which all its observational facts must conform. Philosophically speaking, law may be said to constitute reality's formal principle to cover the changes that go on in all existing worlds, possible as well as actual.

London, Ontario, Canada. **A. W. J. Harper**

III. Niharranjan Ray, *An Approach to Indian Art*, xii + 299 pp., biblio., index, Panjab University Publication Bureau, Chandigarh, 1974, Rs. 40/-.

A rather unassuming title, *An Approach to Indian Art* is indeed more than an approach. It is in fact an exciting journey into the Indian way of life through the ages, in which art has always prominently figured both as creature and creator of the Indian *elan*. Himself inspired by A. K. Coomaraswamy whom he pays fulsome tribute and whom the book is dedicated to, Professor Ray questions some of his basic assumptions about Indian Art. Coomaraswamy as well as Havell present in their scholarly works an idealised and intellectualised version of Indian art, an abstraction which does not do full justice to the profound inter-action of art and living. Indian art, the author lucidly demonstrates, is an integral part of the total way of life, and never enjoyed autonomous status. Despite some writers like Visvanatha and Rupa Gosvamin who " raised the study of art and art experience to the level of philosophical discipline ", Indian art never opted out of the vital work-a-day life of the people. Its impact was felt in the home, temple and market place no less in the court of the rulers. In contemporary society when art, like technology, has a tendency to withdraw in the name of freedom from its moral and social responsibilities, it is well to ponder on what the author has to say on this point. The traditional Indian view, he explains systematically, is that the whole art activity is, in the final analysis, a moral striving, an attempt at " cultivating the soil of life ". Art as such is an indissoluble part of the integral *yoga* of life.

The author devotes quite some space to the writers on Indian aesthetics, who have explained some fundamental principles of art experience, and whose rich contribution he quite acknowledges. However, he himself, I believe justifiably, makes a bold attempt to de-intellectualise Indian art, and to restore to the body and the senses, to begin with, their rightful place in the scheme of life. Thus he provides a corrective to the perspective of Indian life, which represents it as ascetic and life-denying. This may shock many idealists who thought they had successfully disposed of the body metaphysically from Indian thought.

As for art experience, the author refers to, among others, Bharata's *Natya Sastra*, which " introduces for the first time the concept of *rasa*...as the central and most significant theme in art experience ". Yet another vital element in art experience is *chhanda* i.e. rhythm and balance which like *rasa* is a common denominator of all aesthetic experiences. The consummation of art experience is reached when through concentration and distancing—physical and psychological—the dichotomy of the subject and object is obliterated giving a foretaste of the spiritual bliss.

Through profuse concrete illustrations from painting, plastic arts, architecture, music and the rest, the author gives us an intimate peep into the creative process : how from the variegated material and contents the artist, by virtue of his mind's eye and artistic skill, carves out an object of art pregnant with meaning. At some stage of the creative process, the author maintains, the artist is lost in the object and there is no subject-object duality. The experience of the artist at its best, even as of the perceiver is not in the form of the categories of thought but that of being. Even such a pronounced pragmatist as John Dewey concedes that no experience including, to be sure, the intellectual and the scientific, is complete unless it is topped off by aesthetic experience. Which, to my mind, implies something akin to the aforementioned experience of being. Arthur Koestler's *The Act of Creation* which is about the best book on the nature of the creative process I have come across, may be, I believe, considerably enriched if insights gleaned from the Indian art by Prof. Ray were suitably incorporated in it.

The youthfulness of Indian art, the author convincingly proves, is to be found in the ' dynamic naturalism " of the whole range and variety of its expression in line, colour, tone, volume and so on, which have the root in the senses and the sensuous and yet leap out to transcend them without any tension or conflict. As a further proof of this he maintains that " in traditional Indian art there is no portrayal of old age ". And all the gods and goddesses are depicted as young, not all too godly but quite overtly human too. The unity of the senses-sensuousness and the transcendental, of the divine and the human, of the subject and the object as portrayed in Indian art could not have been achieved without a long tradition of maturity in aesthetic experience and in

creative expression. The treatment of this quality of Indian art at the hand of the author history-wise, example-wise and concept-wise makes a highly insightful reading.

Nor is the unity to be missed in the relation of one art form with another. All the arts from painting to music are closely inter-linked, with common denominators. From the most abstract music to the most bodily and all-embracing architecture, there is the central unity of *elan*, purpose and meaning. To be sure, Indian art is integral. In this age of specialisation and fragmentation even in the area of art, the Indian concept of integral art both poses a vital question and offers a profound answer so well articulated in the book.

The book, so meticulously scholarly in detail and explanation, is, to my mind, much more than scholarly. It has all along the touch of the creative, for no one could have written this book on the force of pure scholarship alone, for as the reader will be able to sense, I hope, that the book has been written by one who himself has lived for the good part of his life the experiences and contemplated over them, made them a part of his own being and becoming before putting them across. This is evident from the way he explains the classic art objects in Indian history. He seems to live authentically the experience of the artist himself and equally authentically perceives the object with his mind's eye, all of which he seems to have rehearsed in his mind many times over. The result is a refreshingly original book on Indian art which is helpful not only to those interested in Indian art but also to those who are interested in Indian heritage in general and in aesthetics in particular. If I can trust my judgment, the book, I am sure, will join the classics in Indian art and heritage pretty soon in its career.

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IV. When A Great Tradition Modernizes—*Milten Singer* : Vikas Publishing House, Delhi, 1972. pp. 403.

Milton Singer's new major study '*When a Great Tradition Modernizes*' is, in many ways, a uniquely important work, for it consolidates almost two decades of research in an attempt to formulate a theory of cultural change. Singer's central problem is to illuminate the type of innovative adjustments to which India's 'Great Tradition'—Sanskritic Hinduism—is put in the life of an urban centre and how out of this process, there comes about a modernization of the tradition itself. One of the special features of Singer's study is that its context is not village India, but an urban city—Madras. Even at the most superficial level, his study clearly demonstrates that the sociological rural-urban contrast has little application to India, for he shows how within the context of an urban setting, the cultural elements of the Great Tradition operate and how the industrial elite uses this very tradition in its path to modernization.

But there is a more important theoretical implication in Singer's choice of setting. As he himself points out, in studying a complex civilization such as that of India, there is a great danger of an exclusive concentration upon a textual, culture—historical study. The work of Indologists, Culture Historians and Philosophers illustrate this textual approach to the study of Indian civilization. On the other hand, the usual approach of the social anthropologist has been purely contextual; he has tended to concentrate upon a tribe or village or a simple community as an isolate and study its form and functioning, ignoring the fact that the group he is studying is embedded in a larger context. Hence there has come about an opposition between the textual and contextual approaches to the study of civilization and Singer's choice of an urban centre is an attempt to integrate the two approaches, for his study is informed by Redfield's theory of the functions of a city with regard to its cultural tradition. As is well known, Redfield distinguishes between the orthogenetic and the heterogenetic functions of the city as well as between primary and secondary urbanisation.

According to Redfield there are basically two different roles that cities play in the process of cultural change—the 'orthogenetic' role of carrying forward and systematically elaborating long established local cultures and the 'heterogenetic' role of introducing or creating modes of thought and behaviour which go beyond local culture. In Redfield's theory, a city is seen as a locus in which cultural change takes place. Hence Singer's study of modernization whithin the context of an urban background like that of Madras is not merely a departure in terms of field study; it is also informed by a theory of cultural change. His book offers us an invaluable attempt at documenting as well as theoretically interpreting the process of modernization in India.

But the study of an alien culture and society poses certain methodological as well as theoretical problems. At the initial level itself, there arises the problem of ethnocentric bias and Singer carefully documents the distortions brought about by common western stereotypes about Indian society and culture. In his opening chapter, 'Passage to more than India', he traces the historical origin of two fundamental western images of India—the image of India as the White Man's Burden, and the more recent, but equally distorting complementary image of Indian spirituality. Little need be said about how such images and stereotypes prevent any real understanding of the country. But what is more interesting for us to note is the methodological safeguard usually taken against the harmful effects of such stereotypes. Ever since Malinowski, social anthropologists have realized that the best way to get rid of ethnocentrism in the study of an alien culture is to look at it in its own terms, from the natives' point of view. It is believed that however difficult it may turn about to be in practice, the adoption of such an insider orientation is the only effective and ultimate safeguard against ethnocentric bias.

No doubt, insofar as the task of social anthropology is to achieve an understanding of the meaning of social behaviour, an insider orientation becomes necessary but there is a subtle danger in such a perspective for the insider point of view is very often a justificatory perspective. The way the people see themselves and relate themselves to their action is also the way they justify or legitimise their behaviour and hence a reliance upon their

modes of perception and belief may subtly end up as a covert justification of what they do; in other words, there is a drist towards conservatism in such an orientation. But more seriously, at the level of interpretation also, an insider-perspective may have its own distorting effect. For instance, a piece of behaviour or social action may appear to be identical in terms of subjective meanings and purposes. Nonetheless, it may be an altogether different type of action when it is performed by different groups of social agents. For example, 'Sanskritization' means something altogether different when it is performed by an elite group than when it is performed by a rising jati. In the latter case, it functions as a tactic of mobility, while in the former it serves as defensive operation. However, in both the cases the same appeal to traditional norms and values is made. Hence an exclusively insider orientation is likely to miss or minimise the differences between the two forms of sanskritization'. Furthermore, from the point of view of a theory of cultural change, an insider approach has a serious limitation. In terms of the agents' own beliefs and intentions, any change or innovation is likely to be regarded as an adjustment or at the best an adaptation; the actors are not likely to look upon themselves as harbingers of fundamental structural change. An approach which relies heavily upon the actor's point of view is, therefore, likely to miss the note of fundamental change in social processes. In short, what I am suggesting is that the adoption of an insider perspective has its own dangers and secondly that for the purpose of a theory of social change these dangers become serious.

The understanding of an alien society requires not merely the careful perception of facts; it also involves interpretation in terms of a theory. It is a theory or conceptual scheme which can confer intelligibility upon the observations of social behaviour. And here again, there arises a peculiar dilemma-either one uses a theory of social systems developed in a different context or one tries to use an indigenous conceptual scheme. The first alternative has its own problematic aspects; it may for instance create dichotomies and contrasts that are inappropriate to the situation one is trying to understand. As Singer and others have emphasized, the radical opposition between tradition and modernity may well be an artificially generated problem. On the other hand if one were to use a

native conceptual scheme, there is the risk that one may be relying on an ideology rather than any viable theory at all. For example the fourfold varna scheme is more an ideology rather than a sociological theory. The problems posed at the theoretical level are especially serious for the attempt to study processes of change. As we still lack an adequate theory of social change, one's theoretical beliefs may stand in the way of one's study of social change and transformation.

Generally speaking, most of the American sociological and anthropological studies of India have more or less a functionalist frame of reference. Singer, of course, qualifies his commitment to functionalism in certain important ways which we shall shortly note, but just now I wish to emphasize the overall functionalism of his and most other approaches to the study of Indian society. It is a trite criticism of structural functionalism to say that it is static, that it ignores change etc. Certainly, such criticisms are theoretically naive for, as Francesca Cancian has recently argued, functional analysis can easily treat of change and indeed the charge of static bias is misapplied when we remember that functionalism as Parsons uses it, is specifically designed to explain processes. However the charge may be reformulated so as to have greater pertinence. In replying to the charge of static bias Parsons writes 'structure does not refer to any ontological stability but only to a relative stability—to sufficiently stable uniformities in the results of underlying processes so that their constancy within certain limits is a workable pragmatic assumption'. Parsons has conceded that the next step in analysis is the search for the dynamic elements in the social structure but it is precisely here that there occurs the crucial mistake of functionalism. The dynamically variable elements are related to the structure by means of the concept of function. In effect, this means that only those dynamic factors which serve to maintain the structure, only those elements of change and process within the system which have a functional significance for the system are singled out. This precludes the possibility of theoretically accounting for structural change. Hence the real criticism of functionalism is not that it is incapable of dealing with change but that it de-emphasizes the possibility of structural changes of the system itself, only allowing for changes within the system.

But as I said Singer's theoretical scheme introduces certain major modifications of structural functionalism. In discussing industrial leadership in Madras City, for instance, he observes 'By proceeding from observed concrete innovative behaviour and beliefs of particular individuals and groups to the more abstract levels of conceptualized 'systems' and 'structures', I hope to by-pass a number of dilemmas that have confronted Indian anthropology and social anthropology in general. Instead of trying to draw conclusions about individual behaviour and belief and empirical persistence and change from structural definitions and a priori assumptions, why not begin with the ways in which particular individuals and groups make use of their family, caste, religious affiliations and networks in particular fields of activity such as the city, and industry and consider what the facts imply about the congruence or incompatability of structural types ?' I consider this comment and methodological procedure highly important for it is in terms of working out from individual concrete behaviour that Singer is able to raise serious doubts about Weber's thesis that Hindu ritualism is an unsurmountable obstacle to industrialization and modernization. Singer shows how there is a subtle discrepancy in the concrete working out of Weber's argument. While dealing with the West, Weber takes account of the cultural creed of the Protestant ethic as well as the ways in which it was used and adapted by the rising entreprenurial groups, but while dealing with India, Singer points out how Weber largely neglects this contextualistic dimension and concentrates heavily upon the presumed ethos of the Hindu texts themselves. But Singer's own study focusses upon the adaptive behaviour of individuals and groups who make use of their religious tradition in their strategies of modernization. He thus avoids the usual sterility of much of the ideal-typical method. His procedure places the individual strategies much more in the foreground and hence one would expect his method to be more capable of generating a theory of change.

But although his method is much more 'individualistic' I find the absence of a psycho-dynamic dimension rather strange. Singer's method recalls the classic 'Culture and Personality' methods of Kardiner, Linton, and Dubois. As is well known, this approach seeks to interpret social behaviour as a response to

the frustrations and anxities created in the individual by what Kardiner calls the 'primary institutions'. The individual's cultural beliefs and ritual action is seen as a projection system which allows him to cope with the frustrations induced by the primary institutions. The essence of the approach is to interpret social behaviour in psycho-dynamic terms. While the application of such a psycho-dynamic analysis to a complex society may involve much more sophistication and refinement yet, in principle, I believe that such a psychological context is necessary, especially for a study such as that of Singer, which aims at the level of individual concrete behaviour and indeed there are a few places in his work where one misses the psycho-dynamic perspective. In his highly interesting account of the rise and popularity of bhajana cults especially of the Radha-Krishna bhajana in Madras City, Singer records two significant facts :

(1) that the bhajana movements are essentially the response of Smārta Brahmans. For instance, Singer notes that more than 55 per cent of the contributors and participants in these bhajanas are Smārta Brahmans living in Mylapore. As Singer himself notes, the popularity of such emotional displays among Smarta Brahmans who are in general followers of Advaita Vedanta is perplexing.

(2) Furthermore, in these emotion-charged bhajans, the male devotees identify themselves with love-lorn Gopis and although women are present at the meetings, they have no part to play; here again, the fact that Tamil Brahmans who generally are rather inhibited and repressed should identify themselves with Gopis and give vent to stylized erotic feelings, thoughts and sentiments is rather significant. But lacking a depth psychological analysis, Singer contents himself with merely the participants' own remark that in relation to the Lord all souls are feminine. But this does not even begin to explain the extreme passivity of the actual women present at these meetings. In such contexts, one needs a psychological perspective which would attempt to relate the ritual practices and beliefs to the psychic frustrations and ambivalences of the individuals concerned. Lacking such a psycho-dynamic theory, Singer's account appears over intellectualised and formal; for instance, he emphasizes the spread of the Radha-Krishna bhajans as a sign of innovative response. He looks upon the

cult as the means by which the Brahman community seeks to integrate itself against the rise of anti and non-Brahmins movements and more positively as a ritualized means of expressing equalitarian sentiments. While such conscious purposes may have a role to play in the final account, they cannot be regarded as the exclusive motivations for the simple reason that, as Singer himself notes, the euphoria induced by such bhajans is very short-lived; the feeling of fellowship hardly outlives the ritual itself. Furthermore, even within the bhajana itself the expression of such feelings takes the very artificial form of rolling on the floor and taking each other's dust. This suggests that there is a strong element of ritualization involved and I suggest that the exhibition of such tender feelings is more a ritualization of guilt feelings than a genuine upsurge of democratic sentiments. Living as they do in a sophisticated realistic context, exposed as they have been to a type of liberal education, is it too much to postulate that the Brahman participants would have begun to feel uneasy about their own exclusiveness and claims of ritual purity and that these rituals of tenderness and love therefore act as safety valves against such latent guilt feelings ? Max Gluckman has introduced the concept of ritualization of protest by which divisive and hostile feelings are ritualized and thereby contained. I suggest similarly that we may use the concept of ritualization of social guilt. Another indication of the overly formalistic nature of Singer's psychology is revealed in his discussion of industrial leadership in the city. In his critical examination of Weber's thesis, Singer reports that the Brahman industrial elite of the city expressed no sort of conflct between their traditional religious sentiments and their modern life-patterns. No doubt, Singer's critique of Weber is important and effective, but it is surprising that a conscious denial of conflict should be taken as conclusive proof of its absence, expecially in the light of some of Singer's own findings. For instance, he reports that the new industrial elite are staunch devotees of the Śankarācāryas of Kanchi and Sringeri and also records how these gurus have given them repeated re-assurance that they are true Hindus in spirit, even if not in daily ritual observance. Singer also explains how the new industrial elite compartmentalize their home and work-worlds so that they could preserve their dual identities. Singer regards such compartmentalization as an

innovative response, but the psychological overtones of living under double standards escape him. Here again the frustrations and ambivalences created by the cultural institutions, the projections and fantasies of such divided psyches need to be integrated into one's final picture of the modernization of a great tradition. At a more abstract theoretical level too, this neglect of the psychological context makes its presence felt. Following Redfield, Singer is concerned with the way in which an urban city functions as an adaptive center in which the cultural tradition is adjusted to the strains and stresses of modernization. Singer's study of the social and cultural organization of the bhajans cult as well as his study of the strategies adopted by the new industrial elite is an attempt to show how a great tradition gets modernized; this adaptive function of the city, Redfield calls the homogenetic function but besides this there is also the stressful, traumatic role of the city which is responsible for the rise of new patterns of behaviour—the heterogenetic function, as Redfield calls it. In Singer's study of modernization in Madras, only the first, the adaptive role, gets emphasized. Partly this may be due to the fact that Singer is concerned with a highly educated and accomplished group of Brahman leaders; on such individuals, the city is not likely to have a traumatic effect but if one were to consider for instance, a group of immigrant tribals in the city, one would be forced to deal more emphatically with the heterogenetic and conflict generating impact of the city.

The neglect of the psychological dimension makes its presence felt in various places and unfortunately makes his portratit of the modernizing process unrealistic. for above all, modernization is something that starts in the minds of men.

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NOTES

1. Milton Singer : When a Great Tradition Modernizes. p, 173.