

REVIEWS

J. Krishnamurti : *The Awakening of intelligence*, (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1973, £3.20)

This attractively got up volume is a record of the talks and discussions held since 1967 in America, Europe and India, illustrated with photographs by Mark Edwards. The talks cover a wide range of subjects relevant to meaningful existence. The proper use of intelligence and thought without allowing the latter to eclipse saneness and objectivity is one of the key themes.

Out of the vast range of our mental faculties we function only from a small portion. But we often fail to realise this fragmentary nature and think that everything under the sun has been exhausted by the march of thought. But we should remark what J. Krishnamurti says about the total mind " Only Love makes the total mind sensitive. You can learn a technique and yet love but if you have technique and no love you are going to destroy the world ". In spite of its vast comprehensive influence over mankind throughout the centuries, thought has failed to solve any problem satisfactorily while functioning purely by itself. While organised thought is necessary for the efficient functioning of the world, thought in human-beings due to its narrow distorting factor creates images, prejudices and ultimately conflicts. Even as we utilise knowledge we must be able to see its limitations and go beyond it. If we always function within the field of knowledge we should always be prisoners either within narrow or extensive borders. Thought signifies past and future projected from the past. So being a slave to thought means being enslaved to time. The mind tries to go beyond time and to enter into the immeasurable and still have a firm grip on the world. It wants to function still with time and technology. Such a mind should be absolutely free of illusions. It is very easy to cheat oneself, to be caught on some vivid imagination and think to be living in a timeless world. This illusion-free state requires ' tremendous honesty '. The mind should be free of the distorting factor to be in this free state.

Thought in our minds constitutes space which is isolation. We withdraw into our little circle of family or nations caring little for else. We become callous to general suffering. Because of this

isolation we lack real communication with our neighbours or members of our own family. Thought cannot bring about the vast space in which there is complete utter silence. The space created by thought lacks the dimension of real space which is not of thought. If thought can be completely silent and function only when it is called upon, the very functioning will become sane and objective. Otherwise knowledge will become an end in itself. If thought becomes silent, in the space and silence, beauty and love spring. Not material beauty but the sense of beauty. The parallel functioning of thought, both the skillful aspect and the functioning aspect without coalescing, without any perversion, lopsidedness, nemesis or vagueness has been the goal of all serious religious men. Thought or knowledge being an accumulation is of the past. But when the mind is total, when it is constantly learning, there is intelligence. It is intelligence which is able to perceive divisions, distortions and perversions. Intelligence is the freedom from the division of thought. The silence coming out of the stillness of thought is this impersonal intelligence. The stillness is Harmony. The instantaneous perception of this sense of complete harmony of mind and heart and the body and the presence of silence is the function of intelligence.

The brain is conditioned throughout the centuries and responds instantly to any situation out of its stored memory in a predictable way. If there is an interval between challenge and response however brief there is scope for the brain to act in a new way. The part of brain with which we function is so superactive that we are unaware of other parts which may be functioning in another way. But the brain cannot be denied its past knowledge as then functioning would not be possible. If it realises that it cannot offer a new dimension and is still, then the other part of the brain 'the new brain' would start functioning. The brain should not force itself to be quiet. It is the realisation of the truth of inability that brings about quietness not the intention to be quiet. The new brain functions in quietness alone. While functioning with the old brains we cannot discover anything new. We would not know about love, freedom and death. We know only jealousy, envy and fear. At the moment of discovery of this limitation, there is a total reversion in a different direction. This totally different movement is freedom. The old brain can have no relation with the new which

cannot be part of the old. But the new dimensions, the unknown, love can have a relationship with the old. This new different dimension operates only with the aid of intelligence. The realisation of the limitations of the old is intelligence.

Over indulgence in any form destroys the body's own intelligence, its sensitivity. When there is an awareness of the body it becomes a sensitive beautiful instrument. Intelligence brings about order which is virtue, spontaneous virtue, not mechanical. Once we are aware of our humility, it is no longer humility.

Thought, intelligence both are two forms of energy. The three, thought, matter and intelligence have a common source. Thought instead of functioning within the organism eclipsed others because supreme and created this chaotic world. When intelligence understands this thought operates differently. Then thought is in harmony with intelligence. Normally human beings are unable to touch the source as they are consumed with thought and are wasting their energy. This energy when conserved helps us to come upon this insight. This awakening of the intelligence within the mind is then the answer to the numerous problems of our existence. The unconscious mind is subtler and quicker. It understands much more quickly than the conscious mind. The external consciousness is hard, clever and subtle. But real communication can be had if this is penetrated by someone with affection and total feeling. Thus communication is possible even when there is no external, verbal understanding, even when there is resistance from the outer mind. This is the only way, addressing the conscious mind, to impart to others the harmony one gets.

The book is very stimulating and completely absorbing. It lends a new dimension to the reader. The talks on various subjects cover the whole gamut of psychology. Serious perusal of the book by earnest intelligent readers will doubtless lead to vast changes in the world, if the perception of the facts is immediately translated into action without the intervention of thought and deliberation.

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Pandey, Sangam Lal : *Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy*.
(Darshan Peeth, Allahabad, 1974, Rs. 80/-).

In order that a good history of Indian Philosophy and a worthwhile history of Indian Philosophical Ideas may come to be written data of atleast three kinds needs to be made available. Firstly, we must have the important philosophical texts properly edited. Secondly, we must know, for certain, what has been said by which philosopher. Thirdly, we must also know, wherever possible, the chronological order in which various philosophers flourished. The book by Mr. Pandey "Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Philosophy" is a very prominent step with reference to the second and third kinds of data mentioned above, at least so far as Pre-Śaṅkara advaita philosophy is concerned. Through his painstaking research he has collected enormous material which would be of immense help to the historians both of Indian Philosophy and of Indian Philosophical Ideas. The contribution that the book makes in this direction is great.

Mr. Pandey starts with a claim "na amūlam likhyate kiñcit na avicāritam uccyate" (p. vi). But in the body of the book these commitments are sometimes superceded by certain other considerations. We shall single out two kinds of instances in each one of which the two commitments and claims are damaged.

We turn first to the claim "na amūlam likhyate kiñcit". What does Mr. Pandey mean by mūlam likhyate? It may mean either that what Mr. Pandey has written occurs in the texts that he has scrutinized or the one that is literally supported by them. On each count, however, Mr. Pandey belies his commitment. Firstly, if Mr. Pandey is serious about his claim that everything he says does occur in the texts he has scrutinised, then this is not so. Take such examples as (a) Śaṅkara doctrine of Vivarta (p. 97), (b) the contention that Auḍulomi's concept of the self is finally the same which is upheld by Śaṅkara (p. 122) and (c) Māyāvāda of Śaṅkara (p. 205). What we mean is that there is no direct textual evidence for any one of these in the bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara. If, on the contrary, Mr. Pandey is to contend that every argument he advances is atleast supported by the texts, then this too is unwarranted. While criticising the argument of

Pandit Gopinath Kaviraj that Śaṅkara read Sūtasamhitā eighteen times Mr. Pandey writes, that this is derogatory to the genius of Śaṅkara (p. 94). What is the criterion to decide what is derogatory to a genius? Reading a work by some authors repeatedly is certainly not derogatory to a genius. To have reverence for Śaṅkara is one thing and to say that every argument that is advanced by the author is supported by the text is quite another. Which text is it which supports this argument of Mr. Pandey? But someone may argue that this case should be left out. What Mr. Pandey means by his claim is that he would be prepared to stand by any argument that is supported by the text. Even this contention, however, Mr. Pandey does not always stand by. Mr. Pandey, in agreement with Prof. Hiriyanna, argues that "Brahmadatta put forward a theory which is known as the theory of the dissolution of the phenomenal world (Prapañcavilayavāda)" (p. 239). He also endorses Prof. Hiriyanna's argument that the doctrine of prapañcavilaya leads to the doctrine of Māyā (p. 240). This may be correct. But there is a textual support that Śaṅkara does criticise this doctrine, of course without naming Brahmadatta. (See his commentary on III.2.29 of the Brahmasūtras.) Now if prapañcavilaya leads to the doctrine of Māyā and if Śaṅkara criticises the former then does it not follow that Śaṅkara rejects Māyāvāda? Further, it is a fact that Śaṅkara even once does not use the expression 'Māyāvāda' in any one of his commentaries. Thus, although this contention is supported by texts, Mr. Pandey does not show even the slightest indication that he endorses it. Why? Either because he does not wish to come out from the clutches of traditionalism or because he reverentially considers that Śaṅkara's philosophical erudition would stand if and only if he is a Māyāvādin.

The second claim of Mr. Pandey "na avicārya (kiñcit) ucchyate" may mean either that that which is written alone is clearly thought about by him or that not only what is written but also its implications are clearly thought about by him. On each count, however, the arguments of Mr. Pandey belie his claim. Let us consider the first alternative. Consider now three expressions used by Mr. Pandey: (a) the ontological knowledge of Ātman (p. 377) (b) the world soul or Modal soul (Vikāra puruṣa) (p. 188) and (c) Argument from the existential theory of the

apriori (p. 432) which is also called ontological argument for the sake of brevity (p. 433). These expressions clearly show that Mr. Pandey has used these expressions not only without clear thinking but also without any thinking at all. Without lingering any longer on this point let us, however, move to the consideration of the second alternative. We shall select three instance to show that Mr. Pandey is not only unmindful of the significance of the contention that he puts forward but also of the implications thereof. (a) Writing about Gauḍapāda Mr. Pandey writes, "..... (Gauḍapāda) observes that his philosophical views are the settled conclusions of Vedānta" (p. 75). This may be the case. But what is it that decides that somebody's contention is a settled conclusion or not? Further, are settled conclusions of Vedānta also the settled conclusions of philosophy in general? It is this which Mr. Pandey, it seems, in the heart of hearts, wants to maintain and if so, this is certainly unwarranted. (b) Writing about Gauḍapāda again Mr. Pandey writes, "He (Gauḍapāda) identified philosophy with epistemology which is at the same time ontology. . ." (p. 247). Leaving aside the consideration of the problem whether Gauḍapāda did really maintain this, does it show any sign that Mr. Pandey has understood either what he has written or the implications of it? Can philosophy be identified with epistemology? If it is not possible to do so, why did Mr. Pandey not protest against it, granting that Gauḍapāda has inadvertently maintained this? Further, is it sensible to identify epistemology with ontology? Does Mr. Pandey understand the implications of such a project? Lastly, (c) writing by way of comparison of the dialectic of Gauḍapāda and that of Hegel Mr. Pandey has brought his knowledge of German to bear the weight of the argument he has advanced. Comparing the word 'Advaita' with the German word 'auf/heben' he writes, "This word (i.e. Advaita) reminds us of the German word auf/heben which represents the positive meaning of preservation and the negative meaning of annulment in the dialectic of Hegel" (p. 249). Although it is true that the German word auf/heben means to preserve or to abolish, it also means to lift up or to raise. The synthesis, that arises, arises not on the same level on which the so-called thesis and antithesis come to collide with each other but on a higher level. In Hegelian

dialectic the dialectical process is spiral and not linear, such that the same point is never touched again on the same level. Unless Gauḍapāda's dialectic (granting that Gauḍapāda has given one) is shown to embrace this point, so crucial to the Hegelian dialectic, it will be a gross injustice to Hegel with whose dialectic Mr. Pandey has compared Gauḍapāda's dialectic. But this is not all. Mr. Pandey further contends, "But by this comparison we do not suggest that Hegel's dialectic is the same as Gauḍapāda's although we believe that the latter's dialectic is genuine and the former's dialectic is the nearest approach to it." (p. 249). We merely rest satisfied with saying that Mr. Pandey, in his haste of writing reverentially about Gauḍapāda, has given us a good example of what he himself calls "Identity Mistake" in his book.

If one sets aside the tall claims that Mr. Pandey makes and tailors the coat of his arguments for what they are really worth, that is if one separates the grain from the chaff then one is likely to find immense material that can become the basis of further research. It is for this grain that Mr. Pandey's book is to be welcomed wholeheartedly.

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PHILOSOPHY NEWS :

Release of the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy

The Second of August 1975 marked a memorable event in the Indian History of Philosophy, when Shri Ali Yawar Jung, Governor of Maharashtra State released the Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. The M.E.P. is a major work of reference in three volumes running to 1801 pages and including about 1217 entries, contributed by 129 scholars from India and abroad. The completion of this unique project under the chief editorship of Prof. D. D. Vadekar therefore is a land mark in philosophical studies in India. The M. E. P. is intended to be a Book of Reference in Marathi on all the important Branches and Disciplines and Areas in Philosophy. It is organised around Five Central branches of Philosophy (1) Epistemology, (2) Logic, (3) Metaphysics, (4) Philosophy of Religion, and (5) Ethics. On all these central branches, the M.E.P. includes detailed analytical and critical articles. Besides there are briefer articles on subsidiary branches such as (1) Methodology, (2) Philosophy of Science, (3) Cosmology, (4) Philosophical Psychology, (5) Philosophy of History, (6) Axiology, (7) Social Philosophy, (8) Philosophy of Economics, (9) Political Philosophy, (10) Philosophy of Law, (11) Philosophy of Education, and (12) Philosophy of Art.

The M.E.P. has another organizational principle in terms of Prominent and other areas of Philosophical contributions; the two prominent areas being Indian and Euro-American. The subsidiary areas taken note of are (1) Egypto-Assyro-Babylonian, (2) Jewish-Hebrew, (3) Perso-Arabic, (4) Chinese, (5) Japanese (6) Russian, and (7) Latin-American.

Another special feature of the M. E. P. is inclusion of philosophical work done in the modern Indian languages. It also includes broad survey articles on 11 World Religions :— (1) Hinduism, (2) Buddhism, (3) Jainism, (4) Sikhism, (5) Taoism, (6) Confucianism, (7) Shintoism, (8) Judaism, (9) Christianity, (10) Zoroastrianism, and (11) Islam.