

THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF HINDUISM *

In his paper entitled "The Misunderstanding of Hinduism"¹ Professor Santosh Chandra Sengupta defends Hinduism from its Western critics. Hinduism, according to Sengupta requires its defence from such objections as that it is "other-worldly or world and existence-negating, mystical and monistic etc."² He assumes without questioning that it would be a disqualification for Hinduism if it is other-worldly etc. disqualification of a kind where the very status of Hinduism as a religion is at stake. He assumes, again without questioning, that Christianity is this-worldly, existence-affirming, theistic etc. And his supreme assumption is that a religion, in the genuine sense of the term, is world and existence-affirming, theistic etc. Therefore, Christianity, according to Sengupta's definition of religion, fully qualifies to be called a religion. The only issue worth consideration is whether Hinduism is similar to Christianity.

The description of Hinduism in terms of existence-negation etc., i.e., its "Western description", in Sengupta's language, "is due to some of the Indian Scholars' one-sided approach to Hindu philosophy and religion. They select one of the systems of Hinduism for which they have a preference and interpret the whole of the Hindu thought in the light of that system. The system in this case is Advaita-Vedānta (pure monism) as expounded by Śaṅkara."³ While interpreting Hinduism sometimes the Indian scholars do not select any system of Hindu thought, not even Śaṅkara-Vedānta; they select some system foreign to the Hindu thought, and try to interpret the whole of Hindu thought in the light of that system. What would be the value of such interpretations? While referring to the study of Hinduism by Christian (Western) scholars Professor Geoffrey Parrinder says, "Clearly there are dangers in viewing other people's beliefs through the coloured spectacles of our own religion."⁴ What would be the situation if one comes to view one's own religion through the coloured spectacles of others?

To present the true as against the false picture of Hinduism, Sengupta considers three concepts: the concept of ultimate

reality, of *this* world and of liberation. Since the fundamental assumption of his paper is that Christianity is not unlike Hinduism, therefore, most of his paper is devoted to his crusade against Advaita-Vedānta. Perhaps Advaita-Vedānta seems to him the only Hindu system which is quite unlike Christianity. He begins his attack on Advaita by arguing that the Advaita conception of Ultimate Reality as *impersonal* and *indeterminate* does not have sufficient grounding in Vedas. As he says, "There is no denying that one or two hymns of Ṛgveda, which is one of the many Vedas, point to the impersonal and indeterminate nature of the Ultimate. But against these one or two hymns there are four other hymns that refer to the notion of the Ultimate as God or Viśva-Karmā, i.e., the maker and the Lord of the Universe".⁵ Let us not dispute Sengupta's statistical analysis of the hymns from Ṛgveda. But he forgets to quote any of the hymns to which he refers. Since Ṛgveda is an ocean of hymns, it is difficult on our part to guess the hymns to which he refers. Then how can we verify Sengupta's analysis and estimate of the hymns in question? Further, Sengupta does not produce any supporting argument for his view that the notion of God signifies the Ultimate Reality in Ṛgveda. In Ṛgveda so many different names have been used, such as, Prajāpati, Viśva-Karmā, Puruṣa and Time etc. Whether they are the names of the concrete God or the abstract Absolute is not obvious at the first glance. Again, though Ṛgveda is only one Veda, for Hindu philosophy and religion it is the most important scripture. All the other Vedas, Sām, Yajur and Atharva contain large portions of Ṛgveda. Therefore, the importance of Ṛgveda cannot be decreased simply by saying that it is one of the many.

While discussing the nature of Upanishadic concept of Ultimate Reality, Sengupta uses the same sort of argument which he uses in connection with the Vedas. As he says, "To come to Upanishads: There is no denying that there are negative passages here, passages that deny personality and qualities to the ultimate"... "However, against a few such passages there are numerous passages that refer to the Ultimate as a person having qualities."⁶ After his analysis of the two sorts of passages he comes to conclude, "The Upanishads consistently maintain that the world is the expression or the manifestation of the Abso-

lute or God, which means that the world is itself real, for the manifestation of the real cannot be unreal.”⁷ Do Upanishads consistently maintain any particular view? If they do, then how could there arise such diverse interpretations of their views? Again, Sengupta’s argument “the manifestation of the real cannot be unreal” fails to do any harm to the position of the Advaitin. Sengupta’s ‘cannot’ is a logical ‘cannot’. It is unlike saying ‘I cannot’ win a hundred miles race’. Suppose one refers to one’s dreams and says that they are the unreal manifestations though he himself, i.e., the person who is dreaming, is a real person. Sengupta’s view remains unrefuted, for he can easily maintain that dreams are real. Why should they not be real? The term ‘real’ is ambiguous, it refers to material objects, after-images, ideas and sensations etc. The reality of one object may be unlike the reality of another, yet all sorts of objects that are entertained by one’s mind are real in one sense or the other. No empirical situation, no empirical fact, can be brought against Sengupta’s position. But if empirical facts do not refute Sengupta, they also fail to support him. From the logical truism that the real cannot manifest what is unreal, nothing can be deduced about the nature or character of *this* world. This world may very well be unreal though it may be logically true that the real manifests only what is real. If this world is unreal then it would of course, be objectionable on the part of an Advaitin to say that it is the manifestation of the Real. The responsibility of creating this world, therefore, the Advaita-Vedānta puts on Māyā.

Sengupta further says on the above issue “The concept Māyā occurs in the Upanishadic literature. But Māyāvāda, i.e., the doctrine of the unreality of the world, is alien to Upanishads”.⁸ The manner in which Sengupta rejects Māyāvāda shows as if Īśvaravāda is fully developed in Upanishads. The sense in which Māyāvāda is alien to Upanishads Īśvaravāda is also alien to Upanishads. Upanishads themselves are not the philosophical or metaphysical systems; they are the sources of such systems. It is because no *one* particular system is developed in them that they could, as has already been pointed out, produce such a variety of systems.

His analysis of the Upanishadic verses leads Sengupta to find affinity between "theism as it is found in the Upanishads and in Christianity".⁹ Since Sengupta's analysis of the Upanishadic verses is the same as his analysis of the Vedic hymns (according to both Vedas and Upanishads God is ultimately real), Christian theism should also be like Vedic theism. But Sengupta discovers that the two "conceptions of God—the Upanishadic and Christian—differ in one essential respect in that the former stresses the metaphysical while the latter emphasises the moral qualities of God."¹⁰ If the Vedic or the Upanishadic God is provided with the moral qualities, Hinduism would be exactly like Christianity. The Bhagavad-Gītā bridges the gulf between Hinduism and Christianity for it "focuses on the moral attributes of God and recognizes devotion (Bhakti) as the principal mode of union with Him".¹¹ Bond between Hinduism and Christianity becomes perfect when we come to the school of Rāmānuja, i.e., Vaiṣṇavism or theistic Vedānta, for in this system there is "stress on the moral attributes of God, such as love".¹² The evolution of the theistic concept of God in Rāmānuja, according to Sengupta, is the result of the impact of Christianity upon Hinduism. This is proved by the fact that while discussing the nature of the moral attributes of God in the theistic Vedānta or Vaiṣṇavism, Sengupta closes his discussion by saying, "There are some historians of Indian philosophy who even speak of the influence of Christianity upon the schools referred to."¹³ Though Sengupta uses the word 'schools' (in plural), as a matter of fact he refers to only one school, for he talks of the theistic Vedānta and Vaiṣṇavism as if they are two different schools. In referring to the historians of Indian philosophy, in this context, he is not referring to any historian having authentic work. He is referring to the Western (Christian) historians of Indian Philosophy. Leaving a few exceptions, most of whom have either deliberately distorted the Indian philosophy or exhibit a lack of understanding of Indian philosophy. The fact that Sengupta has simply reported without contradicting the views of these historians shows that he is in agreement with their views. His agreement with the views of these historians is further proved by the fact that Sengupta refers to the historical position of Rāmānuja as 1000 A.D.—a sufficient gap after the death of Christ—

without at all referring to the historical position of Śāṅkara or any other Hindu thinker in the whole of his paper. A religious system which comes after Christ, one may be misled into thinking, has 'influence of Christianity. Consider a piece of wild guess produced by the American scholar Dr. Ruth Reyna. She says, "The saving grace of a personal God is characteristically Christian and may stem from Christian influence. Although this has not been established historically, Rāmānuja having come from the South of India where Christianity has established itself in the early centuries of the Christian era lends considerable support to the idea".¹⁴ Since Gītā has much currency in the West, and even the Western scholars place it in the third century B.C. I would like to quote just one verse from Gītā to exhibit that Hindus knew about the saving grace of God :

"Put your trust in Him and have no other thought; by His grace you will attain supreme peace and the everlasting abode." (17-62)

(Translation—C. Rajagopalachari)

Rāmānuja was not ignorant of Gītā. The Western scholars like Reyna and Sengupta force Hindu scholars to produce similar wild guesses. There is abundant historical evidence, the writings of the Greek and Roman historians like Ptolomy, Arrian, Strabo, Diodrus, Pliny and Plutarch, that the literate West was quite aware of the Wisdom of the East. The Buddhists established their missions in the Mediterranean regions (Palestine, Egypt and Syria) long before the birth of Christ. And the Hindu traders were not unknown to the people of these regions. No surprise if the Pre-Christian Mediterranean people already knew about the complexities of Hinduism, for Hinduism at that time was the main terget of Buddhism. The Christian religion to a Hindu scholar appears to be a simple combination of Bhuddhism and Hinduism. The missionary spirit of Buddhism coupled with the Bhakti religion of Hinduism can be combined to form a new religion. One may not be surprised to know the fact that the New Testament has something in common with the Bhagavad-Gītā. If one likes one can compare : Ch. VII-17 (B.G.) with John XIV-21 (N.T.); Ch. IX-18 (B.G.) with John IV-6 (N.T.); Ch. VI-30 (B.G.) with John VI-57 (N.T.); Ch. VI-29 (B.G.) with John XVII-23 (N.T.) and so on.

If Hinduism as reduced to Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇavism is connected with Christianity in such a way that the former is the result of the latter, then Sengupta's reference to Vedas, Upanishads and Gītā becomes futile. For these scriptures were written centuries before the birth of Christ. Sengupta says, "A Hindu is no less a Hindu in his openness or adaptation to what he finds, say, in Christianity and misses in his own religion."¹⁵ Had the traditional or orthodox Hinduism exhibited the sort of 'openness and adaptation' to which Sengupta refers, the Mediterranean religions would have failed to capture the land of Hindus. Failure to be absorbed in Hinduism, Buddha had to start his own independent religion. Not only Hinduism, even Buddhism and Jainism lack the Christian concept of *Crusade*. Islam adopted it in the form of *Jihad*. But Hinduism would prefer annihilation to the adaptation of such a barbaric concept. The most important question in the present context is to consider whether Hinduism *missed* the theistic concept or Bhakti tradition. Was Rāmānuja a product of the Bhakti tradition of India, or did he start this tradition? Śaṅkara who was the strongest critic of the Bhakti tradition admits in his works the antiquity of this tradition, afterwards, so much emphasised by Rāmānuja. Even a Western scholar like Schewetzer, who is so found of the terminology of world-affirmation and world-negation etc., the sort of terminology used by Sengupta, admits that "The Hindu Bhakti religion may be older than Buddhism, but is certainly of later date than Brahmanic mysticism, to whose influence, indeed it owes its rise. The beginning, then, of this higher development of popular religion may be referred to about 700 B.C."¹⁶ But if the Bhakti tradition already existed in Hinduism, there is no scope for the wild guesses.

Continuing his attack on Advaita Sengupta remarks, "The Advaita view of Ultimate Reality associated with Śaṅkara, is not a religious view at all, for it considers religion as a matter of ignorance (Avidya). This is evident from the view of the strong central distinction between the Absolute of philosophy (Brahman) and the God (Īśvara) of religion."¹⁷ Sengupta is right. There is a sense in which Śaṅkara's conception of Brahman is no more a Hindu conception than, say, Bradley's conception of the Absolute is a Christian conception. However, what Sengupta considers as an objection to Advaita, is simply a statement of its position.

The fact that God is not Ultimately real or that religion is the product of Avidya does not imply, as Sengupta thinks that it implies, that every body should stop worshipping God or should give up religion. Worship of God (Bhakti) is one of the paths which can produce knowledge of Brahman, and consequently liberate a man. Those who cannot follow the path of knowledge directly because of their limitations can take the path of Bhakti. What Advaita denies is simply that one should be liberated directly with the help of Bhakti without the intermediate state of the knowledge of Brahman. Advaita does not reject religion, it simply gives a secondary importance to it. Why should religion be given primary importance ?

Referring to the attitude of the Western scholars towards Bhagavad-Gītā Sengupta says, " We can say that Gītā is to the Hindus what the Bible is to the Christians and the Quran is to the Muslims. The Gita is the most popular Hindu scripture and it is unfortunate that many Western interpreters of Hinduism do not take much notice of it."¹⁸ There is a religion called Christianity, and it has one and only one scripture called the Bible. There is another religion called Islam, and it has one and only one scripture called the Quran. There is a third religion called Hinduism, therefore, by analogy with Christianity and Islam. It should also have one and only one scripture. Sengupta has discovered that scripture, it is Gītā. It is an interesting fact to know that Gītā is not a sacred canon of Hindus as Bible is the sacred canon of Christians and the Quran a sacred canon of Islam. The responsibility of raising the status of Gītā to the Bible of Hindus goes to the British. Since the sacred canon of Hindus, the Vedas, could not be touched by all Hindus, the Gītā started performing the function of the Bible of Hindus for taking oath in the courts of justice. Sengupta thinks that the Western scholars commit the error of omission by not taking into consideration the teaching of such a scripture as Gītā. It is the other way round. The Gītā is an extremely popular book in the West, perhaps next to the Bible. It is not the Indian but the Western (Christian) policy these days to interpret Hinduism in the light of the teachings of Gītā, particularly in terms of its path of devotion. Both R. C. Zehner and Geoffrey Parrinder, the leading contemporary British Christian theologians, have interpreted the teaching of Gītā in the light of its

path of devotion, rejecting the Advaitic interpretation. Western scholars cannot but appreciate Sengupta's own reduction of Hinduism to its Bhakti path and Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇavism.

Let us now consider Sengupta's Hindu view of the world, the world which we are presently occupying. As on the issue of the Ultimate Reality so also on the issue of *this* world Sengupta's only interest is to oppose Advaita view. Consider his remark, "Māyāvāda is alien to the scriptures—the Vedas, the Upanishads and the Gītā".¹⁹ We have already commented on such a remark. Concerning Gītā he goes on making even stronger remarks, "In the Gītā there is no reference to the unreality or the illusory character of the world".²⁰ There are several verses in Gītā which clearly maintain that the world is Māyā, i.e., illusion, in the sense in which the term Māyā signifies illusion. For Sengupta's satisfaction two verses are quoted below :

"This divine Māyā, operated by Me and founded on the play of qualities, is hard to overcome; but they who seek refuge in Me cross over this illusion." (VII-14); (translation—C. Rajgopalachari).

"I am concealed from view by this illusion of creative activity. This ignorant world does not know Me, who have neither birth nor ending." (VII-25); (Translation—C. Rajgopalachari).

Just as Gītā is the source for Rāmānuja's Īśvaravād, so also Gītā is the source for Śāṅkara's Māyāvāda. Since Gītā does not claim to say anything which has not already been said in the earlier scriptures, Upanishads and Vedas, it gives support to Śāṅkara's interpretation of Hinduism in terms of Māyāvāda.

Sengupta says, "It is no exaggeration to state that it is not the affirmation but the negation of Māyāvāda that is more characteristic of Hinduism".²¹ Does Sengupta mean to say that the number of Hindus who accept Māyāvāda is less than the number of Hindus who reject it? What is meant by the expression 'more characteristic'? Is Māyāvāda the characteristic of any other religion? Have the Christians, the Muslims or the Jews ever maintained that the world is Māyā? Then Māyāvāda is surely a very striking characteristic of Hinduism, a characteristic that distinguishes Hinduism from other religions. Sengupta says that

“it is erroneous to . . . interpret the whole of Hinduism in the light of one system or school”.²² He is revolting against the reductionistic tendencies in the interpretations of Hinduism. But Sengupta himself suffers from the reductionistic tendencies. He has reduced Hinduism to its theistic school. Again, all Hindu scriptures have been reduced to Bhagavad-Gītā. Throughout his paper Sengupta has expressed bias in favour of God, that he has gone to the extent of converting the existence of God into the defining characteristic of a religion. As he says, “Different religions are God or infinite-centred”.²³ The term infinite in this context is restricted to God, for Brahman is also infinite but Sengupta does not allow a religion to be Brahman-centred. The remark of Sengupta should not be taken as an empirical generalisation about religions. For only such religions as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are God-centred. Buddhism, Jainism and some systems of Hinduism are not God-centred. Sengupta has already excluded Śāṅkara-Vedānta, But he has failed even to mention in his paper that Hinduism includes Sāṃkhya, Mīmāṃsā and Cārvākas. With the exception of Vijñānabhikṣu, the concept of God is inconsistent with the Sāṃkhya doctrine. And unfortunately the God of Vijñānabhikṣu does not satisfy Sengupta’s prescribed qualifications, for Sengupta’s God does not allow the prior existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Again, for Sengupta nothing but God is ultimately real. But to accept the existence of God in this sense for a Mīmāṃsaka could be to accept some authority higher than Vedas. Only the Vedas are Ultimately Real. There is no necessity to tell about the notorious Hindu saints, Cārvākas. For all sorts of things Sengupta puts blame on Śāṅkara-Vedānta, which according to him, is only one system of Hinduism, as if all other systems have the same sort of views. The belief in God is not an essential feature of Indian religions.

The final issue of the paper, the Hindu concept of liberation, has become, in Sengupta’s hands a zoo of confusions. These confusions are the natural outcome of a conflict between Sengupta’s attempt to convert Hinduism to Christianity and on the part of Hinduism trying to break away from his grips. To understand Sengupta’s treatment of the Hindu concept of liberation, it is essential that we understand first the Christian concept of liberation. To be liberated for Christianity does not mean to be liberated from

moral actions. All this follows from the Christian doctrine of Resurrection. Since liberation from *this* world does not imply liberation from the bodily existence, so morality is also transferred to the Spiritual world with the transfer of bodies. The Christian concept of death is not strictly bodily-death, for a Resurrection person is required to arise with the same body which he had before he died. This is perhaps the reason why Christianity does not allow the bodies of its dead to get injured through fire or water. A liberated person is as distinct from God as is the person who is in bondage. God's spiritual world is unlike, but not wholly unlike, the world of persons who are in bondage. Since Advaita considers liberation as a state of being one with the Brahman, it appears to be wholly an UnChristian view.

Hinduism could be a religion of the same pattern as Christianity if somehow the concept of liberation is tagged with the concept of bodily existence. Therefore, Sengupta's attention is directed towards the Hindu concept of a liberated embodied person. As he says, "The way of liberation does not mark the cession of the way of action, for liberation in the world is possible. For liberated persons, living in the world means performing actions, for to live is to act. All that we can say is that with liberation there is a change of activity, to the extent that the moral life is the life of conflict and resistance for one who is in bondage, while it is natural and spontaneous for one who is emancipated".²⁴ In referring to liberated persons, in this context, Sengupta is referring to those persons who have been described in the Hindu tradition as *Jīvanamuktas*. But in referring to *Jīvanamuktas* in this context Sengupta is committing a grave mistake. Rāmānuja totally rejected the possibility of *Jīvanamukti*, i.e., the possibility of emancipation while one is living in this world. Death or destruction of the *material* body is a precondition for liberation. And the Non-Vaiṣṇava systems evolved the concept of *Jīvanamukta* to show the possibility of freedom from all sorts of actions without having one's bodily death. Does a liberated person, living in the world, act because he considers that some action is good or bad? To a liberated person no action is good or bad, for he has transcended the notions of goodness and badness. Janak is as indifferent to the beautiful woman sitting in his lap as his hand burning in the fire. By obtaining liberation one has lost the sense even of pleasure

and pain. It does not matter for a liberated person whether he sleeps on a comfortable cushion or on the thorny bed in the forest, for comforts and discomforts have no distinction for him. It is because of the fact that the liberated embodied persons transcend the moral and religious distinctions that we hear queer stories about their behaviour. The pure concept of a liberated person, however, does not allow a person to be embodied. Death of *this* body is essential for final liberation. Some Hindu systems (all shades of Vedāntins) believe that the final liberation consists in becoming one (merging) with the Absolute. Sengupta rejects this view, for this view goes against the Christian concept of liberation. According to him the "state of being one with God is not one of complete absorption into the divine or ultimate reality".²⁵ Granted that it is not complete absorption; does a liberated person continue to retain the same material body which he had before he died! All Hindu systems, those which accept as well as those which reject the merging of oneself into the Absolute, accept the destruction of the material body with which they have come to this *samsāra* as a precondition for final liberation. Even in Rāmānuja's Vaiṣṇavism *this* body being material (acit) has to be given up. Then, in what sense is the Hindu view of liberation similar to the Christian view?

In his attempt to show that liberation has a moral content Sengupta simply argues that it is obtained through moral action. Consider his remark, "In the Hindu view, liberation which has ethical content, is also ethically conditioned".²⁶ In support of his remark he says such things as, "Liberation is a matter of attainment through moral action".²⁷ "Hindu religious believers maintain that one principal way of obtaining emancipation is moral action".²⁸ None of these remarks shows that liberation (Mokṣa) has an ethical content, unless one confuses what is simply a means (moral action) with what is an end (Mokṣa).

In his attempt to show that the philanthropic ideal or the ideal of social service is not alien to Hinduism, Sengupta says, "We know of many religious leaders, the foremost among whom is Swami Vivekānand, who have through their extensive social reforms tried to show that the ideal of social service is not alien to Hindu religion".²⁹ Is this a defence? What about Pre-Vivekānanda Hinduism? Sengupta's defence of Hinduism

against the attack by the Western Christian scholars is a *mock* defence. In showing that Hinduism is a world and existence-affirming religion he gives the name of Rāmānuja. And then, immediately also accepts that Rāmānuja was the product of Christian influence. Is Sengupta defending Hinduism or arguing against its unique character? The question about the altruistic or philanthropic character of a religion is deep-rooted question. Can helping one's son or wife or any other member of one's family be regarded as a case of performing a philanthropic act? It is helping others, who are not related to oneself, that the question of philanthropic action arises. Can Christianity provide indiscriminate help to others? Do Christians have the same sort of attitude towards the heathen as they have to the persons of their own faith with whom a sort of kinship is established? So far the heathen is concerned, there is a simple principle-conversion or elimination. In Hinduism the question of philanthropic actions towards human beings plays a very minor role. The compassion for all living creatures includes the compassion for human beings.

In his attempt to produce a simplified version of Hinduism Sengupta suppresses its complications. Believe in the abstract Absolute or believe in the concrete God, you remain a Hindu. Believe in as many Gods as you like and do not believe in any God whatsoever, you remain a Hindu. There is not one but many scriptures of Hindus, but you remain a Hindu even if you consider all these scriptures as frauds introduced by the cunning Brahmins. For Hindus there are worlds other than *this* world, but you have not given up Hinduism if you reject the reality of even *this* world. For some Hindus one cannot be liberated if both mind and body are not dissolved. For others, only the body, is to be dissolved, mind has to be retained. And still others, the *material* body is to be given up and in its place the non-material body is to be acquired. But even if you reject the concept of liberation, you have not lost your faith in Hinduism. Hinduism is unlike, wholly unlike, Christianity. For the question of likeness and unlikeness is considered in its totality. One is not allowed to remain a Christian if one has lost his faith in the Bible or the God. But losing faith in the existence of God or one or all the scriptures is not losing faith in Hinduism. God is above the Bible, but for Hindus, Mīmāṃsaka's the Vedas are final, that nothing could be

above the Vedas, not even God. The knowledge that God exists depends on Vedas. A Christian cannot be liberated if he has lost faith in his religion, if he has become a heathen. But a Hindu would allow you liberation even if you are a Christian, what is required for you to be liberated is simply that you follow your own religion faithfully. These and several other complications about Hinduism would perhaps lead one to think that Hinduism is a repository of all truths, that it is a permutation and combination of all possible religious truths. Hindus have not to go outside their religious fold to learn any new religious truth. But this goes against Sengupta's conception of a religion. His conception of religion is such that no one particular religion or him could be the "repository of all truths".³⁰ Thus to show that Hinduism is not a repository of all truths, that it is as simple as any other religion, Sengupta has to reduce Hinduism only to those truths that are found in Christianity. What purpose does such a study as the study of Hinduism by Sengupta serve? Is the education of comparative religion, the education of a new religion, based on the common elements of all religions, the university professors being its priests and the universities its temples for prayer and worship?

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NOTES

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1. *Truth and Dialogue*, edited by John Hick, pp. 96-110.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 96-7.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 97.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

14. *Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, Tata, McGraw-Hill, 1971, p. 224
15. *Truth and Dialogue*, p. 109.
16. *Indian Thought and Its Development*, London, 1936, p. 181.
17. *Truth and Dialogue*, p. 100.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 109.