

## CAN 'KNOWLEDGE' BE DEFINED ? A SKEPTICAL APPROACH

In the present article I attempt a survey of certain objections urged by the Absolute Skeptic as to the possibility of knowledge. The word 'Knowledge' is ambiguous and has been applied to mean different things. Of these senses one important and well-known sense is : Knowledge is true and sure awareness. According to this usage, it would be improper to speak of any 'Knowledge' as *false*. To avoid confusion, it is necessary to use the word in one specified sense in one specific context, and in the present discussion I propose to employ the word 'Knowledge' in the sense just mentioned to mean 'true and sure awareness'.

Now there is an attitude of thinking in which there is a reluctance to admit 'Knowledge' in the sense of true and sure awareness. This attitude is usually known as that of a 'Skeptic'. 'Skepticism' questions the possibility either of knowledge in general or of any one or other of its accepted varieties.

Skeptical thinking has existed ever since the dawn of philosophy. The Skepticism prevailing since the early age to the modern days may be divided under two broad types. There are some Skeptics who do not cast doubt on *all* the ways of knowing accepted by ordinary people but only on one or more of them. This type of Skepticism may be described as 'moderate Skepticism'. Again, there are others who do not admit the cogency of any cognitive method at all and who challenge even the validity of sense-perception. The variety of 'Skepticism' in this extreme form is usually known as 'Absolute Skepticism'. A moderate Skeptic, like Cārvāka or Mach, admits atleast the possible veracity of sense-awareness, where as an Absolute Skeptic questions the certainty even of sense-perception and thus, according to him, nothing can be relied upon. It has been held by him that like inference and testimony, perception is also incompetent to lead to truth. Such an extreme skeptical theory has been elaborated in the Buddhist School of 'Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda' the chief exponents of which are Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. It has also been formulated in detail in the Tattvopaplavasīmha of Jayarāṣi. It has also been reported in different Nyāya aphorisms of Gautama in which the Skeptical Views of a nihilist and a relativist

have been examined. It is interesting to note that the Pyrrhonic View which has been reported in detail and emphasised by Sextus Empiricus in also extreme 'Skepticism'; the validity of every mode of cognition has been challenged there. Nothing is reliable to an Absolute Skeptic and he cannot trust even his own senses. The philosophy of Wittgenstein in his latest phase also contains traces of such 'Absolute Skepticism'.

The question about knowledge in general breaks up into (i) the problem as to whether it is possible to have a correct definition of 'knowledge'; (ii) whether it is possible to establish actually of knowledge. The first problem has been discussed by Jayarāśi in *Tattvopaplavasīmha* and by Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā* with a detailed criticism of different definitions of knowledge in general. The second problem has been considered by Nāgārjuna in his *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* and by some other Absolute Sceptics as reported in Gautama's 'Nyāya-Sūtra' and commentaries thereon. It is to be noted that the present essay is concerned exclusively with the skeptical objections in regard to *some* definitions of knowledge and with special reference to some of the objections urged by Jayarāśi. Objections concerning some other definitions of knowledge in general as found in Jayarāśi and Śrīharṣa are not considered here for the sake of brevity.

[ It is to be remarked that the present article is not an historical one. It is an analytical study of some of the genuine difficulties found by Jayarāśi, the Indian Absolute Skeptic and an attempt to assess the logical value of those difficulties. ]

Now, what exactly is meant by a 'true cognition'? In other words, what is it that constitutes the truth of a knowledge, or, under what conditions is a unit of cognition regarded as true? Commonsense thinking tries to answer this question in different ways and here are some of the alternatives which have been suggested by different thinkers in answer to the question just mentioned :—

- A. Knowledge is that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.
- B. Knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success : that is to say, it is a cognition leading to pragmatic success.

- C. Knowledge is that cognition which corresponds with fact.
- D. Knowledge is that cognition which is uncontradicted by other cognitions.

According to an Absolute Skeptic, each and every definition of knowledge is found, on examination, to be defective and unacceptable. It is not possible, therefore, on his view, to define the truth of a true cognition; and since what cannot be defined cannot be established as ' real ', a so-called ' true ' cognition and a mistaken one are to be regarded as sharing the same status.

We take up here the skeptical objections against the first two of these definitions.

**A. Knowledge as that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.<sup>1</sup>**

There are different types of cognition, viz., perception, inference, testimony etc. Now every cognition is not regarded as a correct one; some cognitions are found to be wrong also. To take the case of perception. A number of conditions, like the sense-organ, sense-stimulation, the object to be perceived, attention and some other factors like light etc. are necessary for perceiving an object. But it is observed sometimes that even with the presence of all these required conditions we have the phenomenon of wrong perception. A distant forest, for example, looks like a black sheet. A person is not able at that time to perceive and distinguish the different trees with their leaves and branches. Distance is here the factor which prevents that person from seeing the trees of the forest in their true nature. Again, sometimes, a patient suffering from jaundice sees all things as pale yellow. The mind is, also, found in many cases to control a perceptual awareness. For example, when a man eagerly waits for the arrival of his friend, he may hear a sound similar to the knocking at the door though actually there is none. These are some instances of wrong perception and in each of the above cases, in addition to the conditions of cognition, a vitiating factor is found to operate. The vitiating factors are of three types, viz., environmental, physiological and psychological.

It is seen that the veridical character or truth of a perceptual state depends largely upon the nature of its conditioning factors. And this is to be admitted in the cases of other cognitive states as

well. A true cognition or knowledge has accordingly been defined by some thinkers as that cognition which is not conditioned by any vitiating factor.

According, to an Absolute Sceptic, like Jayarāṣi, however, this definition cannot be justified. For, to determine the truth of a cognition in this way it is necessary at first to know its conditioning factors as non-vitiated or faultless. But one can hardly know that *all* the conditioning factors of a so-called true cognition are not vitiated. According to the common-sense notion, a thing is to be known either by perception, or, by inference, or, by testimony. Now the skeptic urges that it is not possible to know by any of these 'means of knowledge' that the conditions of a cognition are really devoid of any vitiator, environmental, physiological and psychological. The skeptical attitude will be more evident if, in this context, the arguments urged by Jayarāṣi are taken for consideration.

According to Jayarāṣi, it is not possible to know by perception that the conditioning factors of a cognition are faultless or non-vitiated<sup>2</sup>. Consider the perception of a tree. This perception is conditioned by a number of factors viz., the eye, the tree itself, the sensory stimulation, light etc. Now, the Skeptic asks; how is it possible to know that the sense-organ itself, is without any defect. One cannot surely perceive one's own eye in its non-vitiated condition.

It might be urged, that one can perceive one's own eyes through a mirror. But this cannot solve the problem. For it is a fact that the retina and the nervefibres of the occipital region are responsible for a state of visual perception. But, surely, a person cannot perceive his own retina or the occipital region in his brain. And if the retina etc. are invisible, it goes without saying that their defects, if any, would be equally invisible. The sensory stimulation causing the perception itself is also imperceptible by nature. Thus it must be concerned that the faultless character of the physiological factors of knowledge cannot be known by perception.

It is to be noted, further, that on assertion like 'the faultless character of a perceptual cognition is known by perception' involves a petitio.

It is to be added, further, urges Jayarāṣi, that our sense-organ is sometimes found to deceive us. Therefore, one cannot assure

oneself that an awareness based on sense-evidence must be always of a veridical character. In other words, as the validity of a knowledge by testimony depends on the validity of the statements of other persons, so the validity of a perceptual cognition depends on the infallibility of the sense-organ concerned.<sup>3</sup> In the former, the cognition turns out to be false if the statements are found to be false; and in the latter, the cognition turns out to be false if the relevant sense-organ is found to be defective. Therefore, the doubt that a perception may be invalid cannot be ignored. It is to be concluded, therefore, that the faultless character of the conditioning factors for a cognition cannot be known by perception.

Again, a sound ground or probans is always demanded by a valid inference. But it has been held by Jayarāṣi that no such ground can be pointed out on the strength of which one can infer the absence of any fault in the conditioning factors for a cognitive state, and that it is not possible, therefore, to know by inference that the conditioning factors are not vitiated.<sup>4</sup>

If it is said that the truth of a cognition itself may be taken as the ground or probans (from which one can infer the faultless character of its conditioning factors), then it would clearly involve the fallacy of *petitio*. For, then, the inference would be of the following form: 'the conditioning factors of a cognition are not vitiated because the cognition is true'. But it is to be emphasised that the question regarding the faultless character of the conditioning factors for a cognition arises only for the reason that the truth of the cognition is not self-evident. How can the cognition itself be regarded, then, as the ground? It would, obviously, be a case of *petitio*.

Now, as the faultless character of the conditions of a perception cannot be proved by perception or inference, it is impossible to say that it can be known by testimony. For knowledge by testimony ultimately depends on perception. Therefore, the Skeptic Jayarāṣi emphasises that the faultless character of the conditions of a cognition cannot be proved by perception, inference or testimony.

It is to be observed, however, that the difficulties urged by the Skeptic concerning the perception of the non-vitiating character of the conditions of a cognition need not worry the non-skeptic

thinker for the simple reason that the latter does not claim that perception is at all competent to reveal the non-vitiators. What he claims is that inference is not incompetent to do that work. It is to be noted that Jayarāṣi's claim about the incompetence of inference in this reference cannot also be maintained. The reason is that the possible argument mentioned by him as establishing the thesis of the non-skeptic is not actually put forward by the latter. The non-skeptic would not deny that the argument suggested by Jayarāṣi is vitiated by a petitio. That does not mean, however, that there is no other argument in support of his position. As a matter of fact, he would emphasise that the probans for his inference is 'pragmatic success'. The inference acceptable to him would then be of the following form; 'the conditions of a cognition do not involve any vitiating factor because the cognition leads to pragmatic success'. It is held by him that the correct method to find out whether a cognition is true is to see whether it leads to a successful volition or not. Perception of water by a thirsty person is regarded as correct or not-hallucinatory if he can reach that water. In other words, the success of his effort to achieve the object cognised is a proof that his cognition is true or veridical.

It is to be noted here that this inference mentioned above embodying the test of truth has been also taken by some thinkers as a definition of true cognition. Knowledge has been defined by them in terms of pragmatic success. In other words, knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success.

#### **B. Knowledge defined as that cognition which leads to volitional success.<sup>6</sup>**

It is often seen that after cognising an object a person either wants to obtain or to avoid that thing. And his desire of attainment or avoidance causes in him a sort of volition or exercise of the will (like going towards the thing or fleeing away from that). If this volition is followed by the attainment or avoidance of the object, then the volition is termed successful and the cognition leading ultimately to this volition is regarded as true.

It might be objected, however, that there are some cases where a false perception is also followed by the success of a relevant volition. The case of getting a gem after a false perception of such a gem may be taken as an example. To elucidate. It may

be supposed that a gem hidden in a dark room casts its radiance on a portion of the floor. A man perceives that radiant portion of the floor, and taking it to be a gem he has a desire to get it; then the desire is followed by the requisite volition and effort. Then, in course of his effort to get the gem he happens to come upon an actual gem lying at an adjacent place. In this case, a false cognition of a radiant surface (of the floor) as a gem ultimately leads to the attainment of an actual gem. Hence, in this case, the man's volition following from his false perception may be claimed to be successful. It would be a mistake to hold, therefore, that the success of a volition following from a cognition always proves the truth of that cognition.

This objection seems to be quite plausible and is based on the assumption that the volition, in the case under reference, is really successful. This assumption, however, requires a close examination.

It is to be explained first, under that circumstances a cognition is regarded as leading to a 'successful volition' and, as a consequence, that cognition is claimed to be veridical. The case of obtaining a gem after perceiving the gem may here be considered. 'Perception of the gem' is followed by the 'desire for the gem' and then by the 'will to get it'; and, then, if the requisite means are utilised, there follows the 'attainment of the gem! Here the stages of the sequence are : cognition, desire, will and attainment. Now each of these stages has not merely some object but also the self-same object. That is to say, on the present case the objects of the four stages of the sequence are identical entities. It is only when we have such an identity, that we can properly speak of a cognition *leading* to or *causing* a volitional success. To deny this identity would be to deny a direct or indirect causal relation between the first stage, viz., the cognition of an object and the final stage, viz., the attainment of that object. It is to be emphasised, however, that in the case where a gem is obtained after perceiving a radiant surface near the gem, this required identity is absent, and, as a consequence, the relation of 'leading to' between the cognition and the volitional success cannot be claimed to be established. Why such a relation is absent in the case under reference requires to be explained. It is a matter of common knowledge that mental states, like cognition,

desire and volition have always a reference to some object, Now this object, it is to be noted, is not anything simple or unanalysable but is always a complex of two aspects, viz. 'the characterised' and 'the characteriser'. The former means 'that which is characterised' and the latter 'that by which something is characterised'. To explain. When a man perceives a gem, the *object* of his perception is a complex of two aspects, viz. a 'something' and the 'Peculiar features of a gem'. Again, when that person desires to have that gem, the *object* of his desire is also a complex of the self-same aspects, viz., 'something' and the 'peculiar features of a gem'. Similarly, when again that person exercises his will to get that gem, the object of his will has the same two aspects without any difference what-so-ever. And the object, that is to say, the gem which is ultimately secured by him is a complex exactly of the two aspects present in the cognition, the desire and the will. And the volition, concerned, is regarded as 'successful' owing to this identity of the aspects of the complex entity, viz., the gem. And because of this identity of the object, a causal relation expressed by the phrase 'leading to' is legitimately claimed to exist between the starting perception of the gem and the attainment of that gem. So much for the analysis of a valid cognition. Let us now analyse the other case, viz., the attainment of a gem following a false perception of something other than the gem, viz., some radiance. When a man perceives some 'radiance' (of a gem near-by), the object of his perception is a complex of two aspects, viz., a 'something' and the 'peculiar features of radiance'. But since mistaking it to be the gem itself he desires to have it, the 'characteriser' of the object of his desire becomes quite different from that of the actual object of his perception<sup>8</sup>. Now the 'characteriser' of the object of his desire is the 'peculiar features of a gem', while the 'characteriser' of the object of his perception consists of the 'peculiar features of the radiance (that is actually seen)'. When, again, the man puts forth his will to obtain the gem, the 'characteriser' of the object of his will is the same as that of the object of his desire. Lastly, the thing attained by him is also a complex exactly of the two aspects, viz. a 'something' and the 'peculiar feature of a gem'. Now since, in the case under reference, the 'characteriser' of the object perceived is actually something other than that of the object of the desire and the volition, the former cannot be regarded as



identical with the objects involved in the next three stages, viz. the desire, the will and the attainment. And consequently, a casual relation expressed by the phrase 'leading to' cannot be admitted to obtain between the starting cognition of the radiance of the gem and the attainment of the gem. There is, therefore, no good ground, in this case, for regarding the volition as successful. The attainment of a gem following the perception of some radiance is nothing but a coincidence. It is thus seen that the objection that a false perception sometimes leads to a successful volition cannot be maintained. For it is based on the assumption that the volition is really a successful one. But it has just been shown that this assumption is unwarranted. There is no difficulty, therefore, in defining a true or veridical cognition as that which leads to a volitional success, or in other words, pragmatic success.

A question; How to prove the falsity of this perception under reference? So far it has been discussed whether a successful volition can follow from a false perception or not and the discussion above is based on an assumption that the perception concerned is a false one. But is there really an ground for assuming this perception in question to be false and not something veridical? If knowledge is defined in terms of volitional success, then this 'perception of some radiance (as a gem)' also amounts to 'knowledge', since it is followed by the actual attainment of a gem. In other words, the 'radiance' is perceived as a gem by a person and following it an actual gem also has been obtained by that person. There appears to be no difficulty then to admit that this perception amounts to knowledge; or, in other words, it is a true cognition (since it satisfies the definition of 'knowledge').

This, however, cannot be granted, The perception in question is not admitted to be true for the reason that it does not tally with any reality. To explain. A thing is always cognised as occupying a certain place. Nothing in this world is known as existing nowhere. To cognise a thing is to find it at some place. If an object is not found to exist at the place where it has been perceived, then the perception cannot be said to correspond with fact. It is true indeed that, in the case mentioned above, some 'radiance' at some place is perceived as a gem and, ultimately, a gem is obtained near that place. But, as a matter of fact, that gem is not obtained at *the same place* where the

'radiance' is perceived. This perception, then, surely, cannot be described as tallying with a real thing. There is not the real object 'gem' which is to correspond with the perception of 'gem' (in place of 'radiance'). This perception of some 'radiance' as a gem is to be regarded, therefore, as something non-veridical or false.

Thus correspondence with reality may be considered as one of the characteristics of a true cognition. It is to be noted here that this correspondence with reality finds so much importance to a group of thinkers that knowledge has been defined by them as 'that which corresponds with fact'.

Let us now return to the discussion regarding the definition viz., 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success'. This definition may, however, be immediately challenged by the absolute skeptic. He may urge that it involves a regressus ad infinitum. To explain.

It may be asked by the skeptic whether this definitional statement is analytic or synthetic? In other words, it may be asked whether the predicate of this statement, viz., 'that cognition which leads to volitional success' is a part of the subject of the statement viz., 'knowledge'. The answer, surely, is not in the affirmative. It is obvious that it is not part of the meaning of the term 'knowledge' that it is 'something which leads to volitional success'. The statement cannot thus be regarded as analytic. It is, then, to be regarded as synthetic. That is to say, that a true cognition is one which leads to volitional success is to be established by some evidence other than the mere analysis of the subject-term. This statement viz., 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success' is then, to be established by means of some inference. That inference, in its turn, will require another inference for its validation. But this validating inference, in its turn, will require still another validating inference and so on ad infinitum. The skeptic emphasises that the definition of a true cognition as one that leads to volitional success thus involves a vicious regress.

Now it is to be observed that there is no quarrel with the skeptic as to whether the definitional statement in question is synthetic in its character. But as Vācaspati-miśra points out, the truth of this synthetic statement is self-evident.<sup>9</sup> Volitional

success is such an impressive thing that one does not, as a matter of fact, require any other inference to prove the truth of the definition, that, 'knowledge is that cognition which leads to volitional success'. The skeptic may, however, demur to this claim of self-evidence and demand a ground in justification of the synthetical statement mentioned above. The justification to be offered by the opponent would apparently involve a vicious infinite regress. It will be shown, however, that such a regress cannot be pronounced to be vicious. This will be discussed presently in connection with the examination of the objection (i), viz., that 'the successful volition cannot be known', relating to this definition in question.

Thus it is seen that there need not be any difficulty in defining knowledge as 'that cognition which leads to volitional success'.

The definition, however, has been attacked by Jyarāṣi, in his *Tattvopaplavasīmha*, from three sides. The objections urged by him are, (i) a volitional success cannot be known; (ii) the exact nature of the object of a successful volition cannot be described; (iii) the truth of a so-called true cognition cannot be proved even if it is followed by a subsequent volitional success.

To elucidate :

Obj. (i) *A volitional success cannot be known* : Let it be granted that a cognition called 'C1' is true or veridical because it is followed by a successful volition. Now the skeptic asks, is this volitional success known or unknown?<sup>10</sup> And it has been urged by him that none of these two alternatives can be sustained. Let us take up the second alternative first. It is to be noted that the case under discussion is an inference. Now it is obvious that in an inference, the probans has got to be known if the probandum is to be correctly asserted. If a person is unable to know whether a volition following 'C1' is successful, then it is not possible for him to assert that the cognition in question, viz., 'C1' is true. Thus the second alternative, that the volitional success is something unknown cannot be accepted. The volitional success is to be regarded, therefore, so something known. But there appears to be a difficulty of infinite regress and it is as follows. The cognition of the volitional success following 'C1' may be called 'C2'. Now this 'C2'

as a cognition, is either true or false. To admit that it is true is to admit that it also leads to a volitional success since a true cognition has been defined in terms of volitional success. This fresh volitional success may be called 'V1' and, again, the same question, 'is this 'V1' known' arises and a third cognition, i.e., 'C3' is to be postulated as before and so on an infinitum. To avoid this infinite regress, 'C2' may be regarded as false; but then the object of this 'C2', that is, the volitional success following from 'C1' is to be regarded as something unreal or non-existent, and thus the first cognition viz., 'C1' also turns out to be false or non-veridical. For it is seen that to prove the truth of 'C1' it is necessary to prove the relevant volition as successful. In short, one is to admit either that a volitional success is not known and thus to conclude that the truth of the relevant cognition cannot be established or to admit that a volitional success *is known* and thus to invite an infinite regress. But none of these two alternatives, is, acceptable to the skeptic and, therefore, according to him, the truth of a cognition cannot be defined in terms of volitional success.

This objection, however, seems to be unwarranted. For, this we are to accept vacaspati's position mentioned before, the cognition regarding the success of a volition following an awareness does not require to be tested any further.

But even admitting that such a question actually does not arise, a skeptic may urge that there is always a possibility of asking such a question. For, it is not impossible for a person to challenge the truth of the cognition of a volitional success following an awareness. And if the cognition thus challenged is found to be false or non-veridical, then its object viz., the volitional success itself fails to be the ground or probans of the basic awareness. And if, again, the cognition of a volitional success is admitted to be true or veridical, then, as it has been pointed out by the skeptic, an infinite series of successful volitions and their cognitions is to be admitted.

With reference to this objection, it might be observed, however, that there is no good ground to regard a regress of this sort as actually anything vicious. For if it were the case that owing to this infinite regress the truth of the basic cognition viz., 'C1' could not be established, then the regress would be regarded as

vicious. But the case here is otherwise. The truth of 'C1' has been established by the first volitional success and the other members of the infinite series of 'C2' 'C3' and 'V1' 'V2' etc., come as answers to the subsequent queries advanced by the skeptic.

A fresh objection might be urged now on behalf of the skeptic, that the same ground or probans, i.e. 'volitional success' has been employed in each case of this infinite series in question to establish the truth of 'C2', 'C3', etc., and, this to him, is inadmissible. To explain, 'C1' is true because it is followed by a volitional success. Again, 'C2' (that is, the cognition regarding this volitional success) is true because it is also followed by another volitional success and so on ad infinitum. The skeptic feels that it involves a petitio. For it is a case where the truth of 'C1' is sought to be proved by 'volitional success' and the truth of 'C2' (that is, the cognition of volitional success) is claimed to be proved by 'volitional success' itself.

But it is to be observed that this is not really a case of petitio in the proper sense of the term. It is true indeed that the self-same phrase 'volitional success' has been employed in each case as a probans or ground to establish the truth of each cognitive unit. But though the self-same phrase has been employed in all the cases, what is meant by that phrase differs from case to case. The nature of a particular 'volitional success' just like the nature of a cognition, differs in each case. In other words, the 'volitional success' termed 'V1' (by which the truth of 'C1' is established) is different from 'V2' and 'V2' is, again, different from 'V3' and so on. There is, therefore, no good reason to regard the case under discussion as involving a petitio.

It is well-known that an infinite regress is regarded as vicious only when it vitiates or serves to repudiate the truth or reality of the starting point of the series involved in the regress. But where it is not so, particularly, in a case where it is the outcome of recurrent queries, the infinite regress cannot be adjudged to be anything vicious. In the present case, the regress is a result of the skeptical queries. One cannot, then conclude from it that the volitional success following from a cognition cannot be known at all and hence the definition, viz., 'a true cognition is that which

leads to a volitional success is unacceptable. It is to be emphasised further that a question about infinite regress can possibly be brought forward by the skeptic only by a previous acceptance of this definition and not by its denial. Thus the skeptical objection is, as a matter of fact, self-stultifying.

Obj. (ii) *The exact nature of the object of a successful volition cannot be described :*

It has been held by Jayarāṣi that it is not possible to describe the nature of that object with reference to which a volition is described as successful. A thirsty man perceives water of a stream and, taking the requisite means, he is ultimately able to drink water from that stream. His perception of water, in this case, is admitted to be veridical. Here the object of his perception is 'water' and the element of the object of his subsequent volition (which is admitted to be successful) is also 'water'. Now, the skeptic asks, what exactly is the nature of this 'water' which is the object of this successful volition under reference? Surely, it has a sort of identity with the object cognised; otherwise the volition would not be regarded as successful. Now it has been urged by Jayarāṣi that two plausible alternatives may be suggested regarding the nature of the object of this successful volition. The object of volition has either numerical identity with the object of the relevant cognition or it has qualitative identity with the latter.

It may be said that the 'water' attained in numerically identical with the 'water' cognised.<sup>12</sup> It is the ordinary view and there appears to be no difficulty in admitting this. It has been objected, however, by Jayarāṣi that this view cannot be accepted. For an object cognised is not obtained immediately after its cognition. A man perceives an object and desires to have it; then he puts forth his will, and taking the requisite means he is able to obtain that object ultimately. And, as a matter of fact, there is a time-interval between the perception and the final attainment of an object. The object cognised may suffer a change or alteration during the interval between the perception and the volition. As for example, the object perceived in this case, viz., 'water' may be disturbed by some outer force, say, by some animal. And, it would then be quite plausible to hold that the man is not able to drink the same 'water' which was

previously perceived by him. Owing to this disturbance in the 'water' caused by some outer force the 'water' obtained is something different from the 'water' cognised. In this case, a numerical identity cannot be admitted therefore, between the object of cognition and that of the apparently successful volition. And thus the volition cannot be called really 'successful' and hence the perception of water cannot be called true or veridical.

It might be urged, however, that this difficulty, as pointed out by the skeptic, can be overcome by giving a more precise description of a case in which a cognition is taken as true or veridical. When it is said that the object of a cognition is numerically identical with the object of the relevant successful volition, the phrase 'numerical identity' is to be taken to mean-identity of spatio-temporal position. If there is an identity of the spatio-temporal position as between the two objects, viz., the object cognised and the object obtained, then alone should the volition be regarded as really successful and the relevant cognition as veridical.<sup>13</sup> And, if the object obtained is not found to exist exactly at the same place where the object was perceived to exist then the volition cannot be admitted to be successful. The result is the same if there is a difference between the time-position of the object of perception and that of the object of the volition. Thus if it be the case that the *spatial position* of the 'water' obtained differs from that of the 'water' cognised, then the perceived object *cannot, surely, be admitted* to be what is obtained. In other words, the volition then would not be successful, and accordingly, the perception of 'water' could not be regarded as true or veridical.

The skeptic urges, however, that this clarification does not succeed in overcoming the difficulty mentioned by him. It fails in the case of a veridical cognition of an object which is about to perish, or, again, of any celestial body, like the 'moon'.<sup>14</sup> To elucidate. A man perceives a snake which is on the point of dying. He desires to avoid it and by an exercise of his will he flees away from that snake. Now if it is admitted that a volition is 'successful' if there is an identity of spatio-temporal position between the object of a cognition and that of the ensuing volition, then the volition of this person as far as the snake is concerned is *not* successful. For the snake is *dead* when his

volition is accomplished. And, surely, there cannot be an identity of temporal position between a thing when it lives and when it perishes. Similarly, in the case of a celestial body, like the 'moon'. It is well-known that the 'moon' undergoes a perpetual change of positions. And in case a person has a subsequent volition relating to the moon, the object of the volition cannot evidently have the same spatial position as that of the perception of the moon. In the case then of a perception of the 'moon' followed by a volition, it is impossible to have an identity of the spatial position between the object of the perception and the object of the volition concerned.

It may be urged, however, that though the cognised object and the object of volition cannot be numerically identical, they may nevertheless be regarded as qualitatively identical. In other words, the object of the successful volition and the object of the cognition belong to the same kind. According to this alternative, a perception is to be regarded as veridical if the volition in question leads to the attainment of an object of the same kind as the perceptual one. But, as the skeptic points out, a cognition in such a case is not, as a matter of fact, regarded as veridical. When after perceiving 'A' and with a desire to obtain it a person finds 'B' (which is an object of the same kind as 'A' but not 'A' itself) instead of 'A', then the volition in question is not actually accepted as successful.<sup>15</sup> To take the case of the perception of a ball. A person perceives a ball and desires to obtain it. But if, in fact, he succeeds in having not that ball but another ball of the same kind, then he is surely not justified in claiming that he *has* secured that observed ball. In other words, even though his perception of one ball is followed by his obtaining another ball of the same kind, he cannot, surely, regard his volition as successful. This alternative, is, therefore, seen to be unacceptable like the former one.

The upshot of all this discussion, according to the skeptic Jayarāśi, is that the exact nature of the object of a so-called successful volition cannot be described. And, therefore, it is not possible to define a true cognition as 'that which leads to volitional success'.

It may be observed, however, that there is no quarrel with the Absolute skeptic regarding the qualitative identity mentioned



above. It is not indeed claimed by the non-skeptic that the object in a successful volition is qualitatively identical with the object cognised. What is claimed by him is that the two things are *numerically identical*. The skeptical objection above regarding this alternative is now being examined.

The skeptic assumes in his objection that any change of the parts of an object causes a change in the nature of the whole object. Keeping this in mind he argues that the 'water' perceived is something different from the 'water' obtained when the former is disturbed by some outer force. The non-skeptic may not have any disagreement with the skeptic on this point. He would also admit that the volition regarding an object cognised cannot be called really successful if the object undergoes any change during the interval between the cognition and the volition. And if that be the case, then it is not logically possible to regard the relevant cognition as a true one; for the required identity of the object cognised and the object obtained is not found in a case like this. But the skeptic seems to assume further that every object cognised does undergo some change before the emergence of the relevant volition. This assumption is, however, quite unwarranted. There are many things in the world, like a 'table', a 'book', a 'jar' etc. which may be treated as exceptions to this skeptical view. Let us take for example, the true perception of a book. A person perceives a book on the table and he desires to have it. Then putting forth the required will he ultimately succeeds in having that book. There is no reason to assume here, the non-skeptic says, that any part of the book cognised has necessarily undergone some change within the time-gap between the perception and the final attainment of it; and to doubt the numerical identity between the object cognised and the object obtained is here quite uncalled for. It is, surely, a case of successful volition and the cognition in question, is veridical.

But it may be argued on behalf of the skeptic that the time-position of the two objects in question, surely, undergoes some change, for time is commonly accepted as an ever-changing entity. And since every object exists in time, the nature of every object is to be admitted as changing in accordance with the change

of time. The 'book' of the example mentioned above is cognised at the instant 'T1' and the 'book' is obtained at another temporal instant, say 'T4'. According to the skeptic, the 'book' existing at 'T1' is not identical with the 'book' existing at 'T4'. The nature of the 'book' is changed with the change of its time-position. And thus it is not possible for any person to obtain the object which was cognised by him.

But it is to be observed here that the skeptic, in his argument, assumes that the nature of an entity necessarily changes with the change of time. There is, however, no good ground for thinking so. It is indeed true that every object exists in time; but one cannot infer from this that time is constitutive of the existence or reality of an object. When it is said that a thing exists in time, it is, surely, not claimed that the thing is the time in which it exists. The two, viz., the thing and its time-position are not thus identical. Any change in the latter does not, therefore, automatically mean a change in the former. To claim any such thing would be quite dogmatic. To sustain the claim it would be necessary to advance cogent grounds. But no ground can be advanced here excepting merely re-iterating the claim.

Again, time is admitted to be an ever-changing entity. Therefore, to admit the view that the nature of an object changes with the change of time is to admit that an object is also of an ever-changing nature. Now the most important objection to be urged against this theory of momentariness is that it makes recognition unintelligible. If the nature of a 'book' or a 'table' for example, changes at every moment, then how can one recognise it as that 'book' or that 'table'? But, it is a matter of fact, that a person is actually able to recognise an object as 'this object is what I knew before'. It cannot be held, therefore, that a thing undergoes change at every temporal instant. It is to be added further that if, for the sake of argument, the theory of momentariness is accepted, then the skeptic argument itself cannot be maintained. The skeptical argument is either a real phenomenon or it is not. If, on the one hand, it is regarded as something unreal, then it fails to serve the purpose for which it has been offered. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as something real then just like other real things the argument itself would change with

the change of time. And thus the skeptic's argument would not have a constant or unchanging nature and would, accordingly, lose its cogency.

Obj. (iii) *The 'truth' of a so-called true cognition cannot be proved even if it is followed by a subsequent volitional success :*

Jayarāṣi emphasises that the definition of a true cognition as 'that which leads to a successful volition' cannot be sustained even after granting that the object cognised is numerically identical with the object of the relevant successful volition. According to him, the non-sceptic's argument is able at best to prove that a volitional success regarding an object cognised is possible. But the truth of a perception cannot be established even by the fact of the successful attainment of the object which is perceived. It has been urged, for example, by Jayarāṣi that a cognition cannot be taken as true even if it is followed by the success of a relevant volition. It is commonly thought that the 'truth' or 'veridical character' of a cognition is known by the subsequent successful volition concerning the object of that cognition. Now it has been pointed out by the skeptic that the knowledge that a cognition is true is either a case of inference or of perception. On the first alternative, volitional success is a ground which establishes the truth of a cognition. And, on the second alternative, volitional success is a ground which established the truth of cognition, and on the second alternative, volitional success is perceived to exist in true cognition.<sup>16</sup> But in Jayarāṣi's opinion, none of these alternatives can be admitted. To elucidate.

Generally the 'truth' of a cognition appears to be known by inference. It is an inference like the following : "a cognition is true because it leads to volitional success". It has been urged, however, by the skeptic that the truth of a cognitive unit, e.g., a state of perception cannot be inferred from the ensuing volitional success and the reason given by Jayarāṣi is that it is not possible to be aware of the relation between a volitional success and the 'truth' in question.<sup>17</sup> To explain. It is well-known that for every inference a uniform relation between the relevant ground or probans and the probandum requires to be established. Now the apprehension of the concomitance of the ground and the probandum in a particular instance is necessary to establish this uniform relation. In the present case, the ground

is 'volitional success' and the probandum is 'truth'. To assert a uniform relation between 'truth' and 'volitional success', then, requires a direct apprehension of the relation of concomitance between 'volitional success' and 'truth' in at least one particular case of cognition. But it is not possible, according to the skeptic, to perceive such a concomitance between the ground and the probandum concerned in any instance at all. The probandum of this inference, viz., 'truth' (of a cognitive state) can never, according to Jayarāṣi, be an object of perception or immediate apprehension. It has been held by him, therefore, that since one of the two terms of the relation of concomitance, viz., 'truth' cannot be an object of direct apprehension, it is not possible to apprehend directly the relation of concomitance even in one case. And that being the position, it is not possible to establish a uniform relation between 'volitional success' and 'truth'.

And if again, it be granted that it is possible to perceive in a particular instance the relation of concomitance between the ground, 'volitional success' and the probandum, 'truth' then, also, the inference under discussion cannot possibly be sustained. For to admit the direct apprehension of the concomitance in a particular instance is to admit the direct apprehension of 'truth' in that instance of cognition. But Jayarāṣi urges that if the veridical character or 'truth' of a cognition is admitted to be apprehended directly, then it would be quite needless and a sheer wastage of time to infer its existence in a state of cognition from 'volitional success'.<sup>18</sup>

The upshot then is that the inference in question cannot be sustained because it is not possible to establish a uniform relation between the ground 'volitional success' and the probandum 'truth'. The truth of a so-called true cognition or knowledge then cannot be regarded as known by inference. The inference under discussion is either impossible or needless. So much for the first alternative.

Let us now pass on to the second one, viz., that 'volitional success is *perceived* to exist in a true cognition'. It might be urged that when the 'volitional success' is perceived as existing in a unit of cognition, that cognition is to be regarded as a true one. But Jayarāṣi points out that this alternative also cannot

be accepted. The reason for this non-acceptance appears to be as follows. A unit of cognition is admitted, on the Nyāya view which is here sought to be repudiated by the skeptic), to last for two temporal instants only and it is bound to disappear at the third instant. Now the perception of an object may be followed by a desire in regard to that object, which in its turn may be followed by an act of will. And a volitional success can take place only after an exercise of that will. Thus it is seen that there is a time-gap of at least three instants between the cognition and volitional success. The 'volitional success' in question can thus occur only after the cognition concerned disappeared. But then it is difficult to see how a 'volitional success' can be perceived to exist in a unit of cognition which cannot exist at the time of perception.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, this alternative also falls to the ground.

The difficulties pointed out by Jayarāsi have been discussed so far. It may be observed, however, that the non-skeptic has no hesitation to accept the skeptic's position that 'volitional success cannot be *perceived* to exist in a true cognition'. But he does not admit the skeptic's position that the truth of a particular cognition cannot be inferred from 'volitional success'. The skeptical objections in this latter connection are now being examined.

The perceive in one instance the concomitance of a probans and a probandum, it is necessary indeed to perceive the existence of the probandum in that instance. For example, when in the kitchen the concomitance of 'smoke' and 'fire' is perceived, the 'fire' is also perceived there. Similarly, it is not possible to admit the perception of the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' (of a cognition) unless 'truth' itself is apprehended directly at least in one instance. Now the perception of this concomitance under reference has been denied by the Absolute Skeptic on the assumption that 'truth' is not perceived in any instance of cognition. There is, however, no good ground for accepting this assumption as a true one. For it is a matter of fact that there are some instances of cognition which are directly apprehended as true. In other words, the truth of these cognitive states are self-evident. To take, for example, a true cognition like 'the cognition of cow is different from that of

horse'. No second factor is required here to prove that this cognitive state is true. The 'truth' of this knowledge is an object of direct apprehension by the mind. Other instances can be multiplied *ad libitum*. And if 'truth' can be *perceived* in some instances of cognition, then there should be no difficulty about the claim that the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' may, for all that we know, be the object of perception. And, accordingly, it is not impossible to establish a uniform relation between the probans, 'volitional success' and the probandum, 'truth'. The skeptical claim that the truth of a cognition cannot be inferred from the ensuing 'volitional success' cannot be sustained.

It is to be noted, further, that the objection urged by the skeptic that it is not possible to perceive the concomitance of 'volitional success' and 'truth' in an instance of cognition is also without any good ground. In the skeptic's judgment, there should be no need for the inference at all if 'truth' becomes an object of direct apprehension in the case where the concomitance under discussion is perceived. But the skeptic may be reminded here that it is a very common fact that an object of perception may also sometimes be an object of inference. To take the case of the inference of fire in the hill from smoke. Fire is admitted to be an object of perception and it is perceived to exist in the kitchen, for example. But when fire exists unseen in the hill, one is to infer its existence from the 'smoke'. And this inference is not regarded by anybody as needless. Similarly, though the truth of a cognition is an object of direct apprehension in a particular instance, there is no logical bar to its being an object of inference in other cases.

But it might be urged on behalf of the skeptic that the non-skeptic's claim that the 'truth' of a cognitive state is sometimes apprehended directly by the mind is found, on analysis, to be quite unintelligible. For the state of internal perception under reference cannot be admitted to take place at any temporal instant. To explain.

It has been said before that, on the Nyāya view, a cognition persists generally for two temporal instants. Emerging at 'T1'

a cognitive unit like the perception of X, or in short 'PX' continues to exist for a second instant, 'T2' and disappears at 'T3'. This 'PX' is an instance of veridical cognition, and, it may be claimed that 'truth' of the cognition called 'PX' is apprehended directly in internal perception. This internal perception of the truth of 'PX' may be called 'CPX'. Now the skeptic asks, at which instant does exactly this 'CPX' emerge? The emergence of 'CPX', or the internal perception of the truth of 'PX' requires an 'operative relation', say 'R' between the mind and 'PX'. For the perception of an object is always conditioned by an 'operative relation' (sannikarṣa) between the object to be perceived and the sense-organ concerned. The perception of a jar, for example, is conditioned by an 'operative relation' between the 'eye' and the 'jar'. Similarly in the case of internal perception. The perception of an internal state, like 'desire' of 'cognition' requires an 'operative relation' between the mind and the relevant state. The emergence of 'CPX' or, in other words, the internal perception of the 'truth' of 'PX' requires, therefore, an 'operative relation', say 'R' between the mind and 'PX'. For the perception of the 'truth' of a cognition implies the perception of the cognition itself. Now the skeptic might point out that it is not possible to have this 'R' at the instant called 'T1'. For to have 'R', (that is, an 'operative relation' between the mind and 'PX') the latter must exist before the occurrence of 'R'; since without the presence of the objects to be related the relation itself cannot take place at all. Therefore, if 'R' would occur at 'T1', then it would have to occur before the emergence of 'PX'. But this is patently absurd. For 'T1' is the very instant at which 'PX' itself comes into being. And thus the emergence of 'CPX' cannot be explained. Accordingly, the 'truth' of 'PX' cannot be admitted to be known in internal perception or the direct apprehension by the mind.

It might be urged, however, that the two events, viz., the emergence of 'PX' and the emergence of 'R' may take place at once at 'T1'. In other words, 'PX' becomes an object of direct apprehension when it is in the process of its emergence. But this may be regarded by the skeptic as altogether unwarranted and for the following reason. It is not possible to have a relation with a thing which is only in the process of its emergence.

For a thing which is in the process of emergence cannot be regarded as an existing entity for existing entity means only an accomplished entity. It is a fact that to have a relation with an object, the object has first to be in existence, that is to say, it must be something accomplished. But, in this case, with the accomplishment of the object in question, viz., 'PX' the temporal instant called 'T1' continues into the subsequent instant which may be called 'T2'. How can it be held, therefore, that the emergence of 'PX' and 'R' can occur at once at the same unitary instant called 'T1'?

It is to be noted here that even if the skeptic waives the difficulty regarding the emergence of 'R' at 'T1', the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' can by no means be conceded either by the skeptic or by the non-skeptic. For the concession would imply the co-emergence of a cause and an effect, which is palpably absurd. Here 'R', or the 'operative relation' between mind and 'PX' is admitted to be a condition of the emergence of 'CPX' or the internal perception of 'PX'. Now if 'CPX', as the effect, were taken to emerge at 'T1' along with 'R' as the cause, then it would amount to saying that a cause and its effect can emerge at the same time. This, however, is not intelligible.

It is to be emphasised, again, from the skeptical stand point that the difficulty cannot be overcome by assuming that 'CPX' emerges at 'T2' or at any subsequent temporal instant. To elucidate. To admit that 'CPX' emerges at 'T2' is to admit that a person perceives 'X' at the instant 'T1' and he mentally apprehends that perception of 'X' to be true at the instant which immediately follows, i.e. at 'T2'. But this, in the skeptical judgement, is quite inadmissible. According to the skeptic, 'CPX' cannot be admitted to emerge at 'T2' and the reason is that 'CPX' is an effect of 'R' (that is, the 'operative relation' between mind and the object 'PX') and it has just been shown that 'R' cannot take place at 'T1'. It must exist prior to 'CPX' or the direct perception of 'PX'. 'R' might, then, be taken to come into being at 'T2'. Now if 'R' occurs at the instant called 'T2', then it is clear that 'CPX' cannot emerge at 'T2'. The co-emergence of 'R' and 'CPX' cannot be



granted; for it would imply, as before, the co-emergence of a cause and its effect and with it a number of insoluble difficulties regarding the casual principle.

Now since the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' or 'T2' cannot be accounted for, then it would have to be admitted to emerge at the instant subsequent to 'T2', viz., at 'T3'. It would follow, then, that 'PX' or the perception of 'Z' occurs at 'T1' and 'CPX' or the mental perception of 'PX' takes place at 'T3'. And thus it would be possible to admit that the 'truth' of the cognitive state called 'PX' can be apprehended directly at 'T3'.

But that, again, can hardly be accepted. For 'PX' (that is, the perception of X) endures, according to the Nyāya tenet, only for two instants and is bound to disappear at 'T3'.<sup>20</sup> Now it is well-known that a thing that is perceived has got to be contemporaneous with the state of perception. In this case, however, 'PX', according to the Nyāya position, does not persist at 'T3'. The skeptic is thus forced to conclude that it is never possible to apprehend directly the truth of a cognitive state, since the state itself can never be an object of direct apprehension.

With reference to the above skeptical difficulties it is to be observed, that the non-skeptic should have no hesitation to concede the skeptical claim that the emergence of 'CPX' at 'T1' would violate the principle that a cause and its effect cannot *emerge* at the same time. But he fails to understand why there should be any difficulty about the emergence of 'CPX' at the next temporal instant, viz., at 'T2'. It appears to be assumed by the skeptic that 'R' as a condition for the emergence of 'CPX' cannot emerge at 'T1'. This assumption, however, is neither self-evident nor something that can be demonstrated. What after all is the ground of this assumption under reference? The ground seems to be that though 'PX' which is one of the terms of the 'operative relation R' emerges at 'T1', it is not a fully accomplished entity at 'T1', and that there cannot be any relation between terms one of which is only in the process of emergence. Now this ground, far from being self-evident, appears to be highly questionable. What exactly is the distinction between the 'process of emerging' and 'emergence'? The pro-

cess as well as the accomplished state are, surely, effects depending on certain causal conditions. They can be distinguished only if the conditions are different. But it is difficult to see the difference in the case of any effectuation whatsoever. To take the case of an effect, like a jar. It has, if the skeptic's distinction is to be granted, two aspects, viz., 'jar as emerging' and the same 'jar as on accomplished entity'. Now can the causal conditions, in this case, be differentiated into the conditions for the two aspects, viz., 'process of emerging' and the 'product as accomplished'? None, whatsoever. The same conditions that determine the process, determine the product as well.

Further, to distinguish between the process and the product would imply the acceptance of some discontinuity between 'T1' and 'T2' due to the intervention of a series of instants between them. But 'T1' and 'T2' are supposed to be *contiguous*. This involves a patent self-contradiction.

It is seen thus that the acceptance of an aspect of an effect describable as a 'process' distinguished from the effect as a 'product' or something accomplished involves a self-contradiction. To escape from this, one will have to say that there is no distinction but a verbal one between the two aspects of an effect, viz., the process and the product. In other words, the time-position of the two aspects is exactly the same. That being the case, there should be no harm in admitting the emergence of an operative relation 'R' between mind and 'PX', at 'T1' along with the emergence of 'PX'. The skeptical objection, then, does not appear to have any legs to stand upon. Accordingly, the skeptic should feel no difficulty in admitting the emergence of 'R' at 'T1' and that of 'CPX' or the internal perception of 'PX' at 'T2'. Therefore, there seems to be no logical bar to the possibility of direct apprehension of the truth of a cognitive state as has been previously suggested by the non-skeptic. The upshot of the above discussion is that there is no difficulty in admitting that knowledge or true cognition can be defined in terms of volitional success.

## NOTES

1. 'Yatra ca duṣṭam karaṇam yatra ca mithyā iti pratyayah sa eva aśamicinaḥ pratyayah"—Śabara on "Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra", 1.1.5.
2. "Sa eva Kāraṇānām adustata kena avagamyate? Na pratyakṣena; Nayanakuśaladeh atīndriyatvāt"—Jararāsi: 'Tattvopallavasimha': p. 2.
3. "Kim ca indriyāṇām guṇa-doṣāśrayatve tadutthe vijñāne doṣāśaikā na ativartate pūrvyāparotpādita-śabdavijñānavat", *Ibid.*
4. "Na api anumāna; lingāntarā- navagateḥ". *Ibid.*
5. "Nanu idam eva jñānam lingam taduttham tasya viśiṣṭatām gamayati; yadi evam itaretarasrayatvam durūttaram āpanīpadyate" *Ibid.*
6. "Pramāṇataḥ arthapratīpattau pravṛttisāmarthyāt arthavat pramāṇam"—Vātsyāyana's introduction to 'Nyāya-Sūtra', 1.1.1.
7. "Maṇipradīpaprabhayoḥ maṇibuddhyābhīdhāvataḥ Mithyājñānaviśeṣe'pi Viśeṣarthakriyām prati"—Dharmakīrti: 'Pramāṇavārtika'.
8. Vide Tarkavāgīśa in Nyāya-darśana: Vol. 1; 2nd edition, p. 4. (foot-note).
9. "Anumānasya tu pravṛttisāmarthya-lingajanamanah anyasya vā nirasta-samasta-vyabhicāraśankasya svataḥ eva prāmāṇyam anyamevyabhicāringa-samutthāt"—Vācaspati: 'Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatika': p. 12, CSS.
10. "Tat kim avagatam anavagatam vā? Yadi na avagatam tad 'asti' iti katham vesi? atha vagatam; tadavagatesḥ avyabhicāritā katham avagamyate iti pūrvoktam arusartavyam"—Jayarāsi: "Tattvaplava-Simha": page 3.
11. "Udakaprāptyā pūrvotpannodakavijñānasya avyabhicāritā vyava sthāpyate; kim tat pratibhātodakaprāptyā, āhosavit tajjātyodakaprāptyā...". *Ibid.*
12. Tat yadi pratibhātodakaprāptyā, tat ayuktam; pratibhātodakasya avasthānam na upadyate, jhaṣa-mahiṣa-parivartanābhīghātopajātā" vavayakriyānyāyena pratyastamayāsambhāvāt". *Ibid.*
13. "Atha taddeśakālasaṃlagnaṃ udakaṃ na prāpayati tena tat avyabhicāri iti cet". *Ibid.*
14. "Yat na prāpayati tat vyabhicāri tarhi mumuṣupadārthotpāditaṃ jñānam candrārkagrahanakṣatratārakādi-saṃvedanaṃ ca vyabhicāri prāpnoti". *Ibid.*
15. "Atha tajjātyodakaprāptyā, evam tarhi asati udakajñāne' pi jāte kvacit toyam āśādayanti pumāmsaḥ tat api avitatham syāt". *Ibid.*
16. "Kimca, pravṛttisāmarthyena avyabhicāritā pūrvoditajñānasya jñāpyate.—kim lingābhūtena, āho adhyakṣātmakena". *Ibid.* p. 9.

17. "Tat yadi lingabhūtena; tat ayuktam; tena sākaṁ sambandhānavagateḥ". *Ibid.*

18. "Avagatau vā alarṁ pravṛttisāmarthyena". *Ibid.*

19. "Atha adhyakṣātmakena; tat ayuktam; pūrvoditapratyastamitana sākaṁ sannikarṣā'bhāvāt". *Ibid.*

20. The reference to the Nyāya tenet, it is to be noted, is due to the fact that this discussion is an offshoot of the controversy between the skeptic Jayarāśi and the Nyāya thinkers regarding the direct apprehension of the truth of a cognitive state.