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SCEPTICISM, IDENTITY AND INTERRUPTED EXISTENCE*

(Consideration of Some Model Universes)

While discussing the problem of reidentification¹ Professor Strawson uses what is described as a 'Transcendental Argument' against the sceptic. The argument in question refers to the presupposition of a *single* (as opposed to *multiple*) space-time system of particulars. According to Strawson, doubting the possibility of particular-identity, i.e., the possibility that this or that particular has continued existence, presupposes the existence of a single space-time system of particulars. But such a system of particulars is impossible if the possibility of particular-identity is denied. Thus, Strawson's argument against the sceptic is more attractive than the 'Common Sense' argument of Moore. For Moore's argument is only a dogmatic assertion of the common sense view, whereas Strawson is supposed to have discovered some sort of internal incoherence in the sceptic's doubt.

I attempt to show in this article that Strawson's argument fails to refute the sceptic, whether the sceptic in question is a solipsist or one who accepts a view similar to that of Hume.² By accepting the *continued* existence of oneself, a solipsist satisfies the condition of there being a single space-time system of particulars. An if the concept of 'identity' is different from the concept of 'continuity', as I have attempted to show in this article, then the sceptic, who has a Hume-like frame of mind, could also accept the existence of there being a single space-time system of particulars without being led to accept that the particulars of such a system continue to exist without being observed. In the course of this discussion I refer to after-images and hallucinatory objects. But my purpose in referring to these objects is different from that of a phenomenalist like Ayer. For a pheno-

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menalist refers to these objects in order to introduce, what he describes in his language as sense-data. But it is in connection with the distinction between the concept of 'identity' and the concept of 'continuity' that I bring these objects into this discussion. For these objects are very good examples of the sorts of objects to which identity could be ascribed without ascribing continuity. Before taking up the main issues, I would like to explain what Strawson means by there being a *single* space-time system, and how such a system could be distinguished from other sorts of systems.

Strawson describes his single space-time system in terms of *particulars*, filling the space-time structure, and the relation of *identity* holding between *some* of these particulars. His system can clearly be distinguished from what may be described as multiple space-time systems. Consider the following model which exhibits the nature of multiple space-time systems.³

Model I :

(A) $\begin{matrix} s- \\ t- \end{matrix} o, p, q, \dots$

(B) $\begin{matrix} s- \\ t- \end{matrix} x, y, z, \dots$

A and B are two different systems of particulars; *o, p, q* and *x, y, z* are the particulars in question. The arrangement of symbols $s-/t-$ stands for the spatio-temporal frame of a system. If the particular *o* of the system A does not have any spatial relation with the particulars *x, y* and *z*, either being at the *same* place as any of them or being at a *different* place from any of them, and does not either temporally precede or succeed or is a contemporary of any of them, then *o* does not have any spatio-temporal connection with the particulars of the system B. If this is also true of *p* and *q* that they can have spatio-temporal relationships with one another but not with a particular of the system B, then the system A is wholly independent of the system B. There is no sense in which A and B could be considered as parts of one and the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. If such systems of particulars as A and B are possible, they would exemplify what it is for there to be multiple space-time systems of particulars. Whether any philosopher has ever accepted the

existence of such independent, parallel, space-time systems of particulars is to be seen later.

Now, imagine that some particulars of the system A are numerically identical with some particulars of the system B; then these systems could not be considered as those sorts of systems which are independent of one another. It is impossible for a particular of one system to be the same as a particular of another if these systems are independent of one another, if they are not parts of one and the same system of particulars. So it is the relation of identity, numerical identity, between particulars that converts two different systems of particulars into a single system of particulars. Consider the following model :—

Model 2 :

$$(A) \begin{matrix} s-1 \\ t-1 \end{matrix} o, p, q, \dots$$

$$(B) \begin{matrix} s-2 \\ t-2 \end{matrix} o, m, z, \dots$$

$$(C) \begin{matrix} s-3 \\ t-3 \end{matrix} o, p, z, \dots$$

The differences between this model and the earlier one are that space and time have been distinguished into $s-1$, $s-2$, $s-3$ and $t-1$, $t-2$, $t-3$. And some particulars are common to these different systems. If we consider q , we fail to connect the system A with the system B and C, for q is found only in A. Similarly, m is restricted to B. But if we consider o we find that it is common to all of them, and shows that the three systems of particulars in question are not independent of one another, that they belong to one and the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. Does it imply that at least one particular must be common to all those systems of particulars which are parts of one and the same system of particulars? There is no such implication. If we do not consider the presence of o in these systems (which is the only particular common to all of them), even then they are connected with one another. Since p is common to A and C, and z is common to B and C, therefore, A, B, and C are not independent of one another.

The denial of *continued* existence to particulars, according to Strawson, is the denial of the ascription of *identity* to them, and

sequently, it is the denial of there being a single space-time em of particulars. For if continued existence is granted to a particular it could possibly exist in two different spatio-temporal systems, could be *identified* in one of them and *reidentified* in other. Consider the second model. The particular p in that del is identified in the system A and reidentified in the system

But if p is deprived of its continued existence, i.e., its existence beyond the system A, then it cannot be the same p that is again identified (reidentified) in the system C. What is being identified in the system C is a different p . But if it is not the same which occurs in the spatio-temporal system A and C, then so

as p is concerned these systems are independent of one another. If A and B are to be considered as sub-systems of the whole system, then according to Strawson, we must accept "the identity of at least some items in one sub-system with some items in the other".⁴ And our ascription of identity to these items, Strawson presupposes, depends on our ascription of continuity to them. But why does Strawson insist on *some* items rather than

of the or only *one* of them? Why should there be more than *continuant*? There seems to be no other reason than that

pluralistic ontology does not require that all particulars should have continued existence, a few of them will serve the purpose. It does not demand that all particulars should have continued existence for so much. For nothing in *this* universe is everlasting. And

all things have the fortune of existing for a sufficiently long time to be found in new company; only a few things have this privilege. But is Strawson concerned with *only* what happens in *this* world? Is his interest restricted to the *conceptual* features of *this* world? As a philosopher, Strawson is required to give

conceptual analysis of particulars with reference to their space-time character. And his analysis should be applicable to any world of particulars which satisfied the requirement of being a

single space-time world of particulars. The question which Strawson is posing about the requirement for there to be a single spatio-temporal system of particulars is a conceptual question, and therefore, demands only what is *essentially* required for such a system. There could not be such a system as the system in question unless this and this is present. And there could be such a system even if this and this is missing. For example,

Strawson should accept that there could be a single space-time system of particulars inspite of the fact that nothing in that universe is everlasting. Again, Strawson should accept that there could not be such a system if the universe is constituted out of fleeting things like sense-data, for there would be nothing in that universe which could function as a continuant, could be identified in one sub-system and reidentified in the other. A phenomenalist may have his own grounds for disagreeing with Strawson on this issue. But the phenomenalist's conceptions of space and time, and items occupying space and time, are different.

Consider the following model depicting the phenomenalic picture of a universe :

Model 3 :

$$(A) \begin{matrix} s-1 \\ t-1 \end{matrix} o, p, q \dots$$

$$(B) \begin{matrix} s-2 \\ t-2 \end{matrix} e, f, g \dots$$

$$(C) \begin{matrix} s-3 \\ t-3 \end{matrix} x, y, z \dots$$

This model is a slight variation on the first model. Though no sense-data or a complex of sense-data can recur, sense-data can have the relation of *succession*, one set occurring after the other. Thus, space and time can be sliced into s-1, s-2, s-3 and t-1, t-2, t-3, for the system C succeeds the system B, and the system B succeeds the system A. These systems are certainly not independent of one another as are the systems of the model 1. But our difficulty with Strawson's argument is not the same as that of a phenomenalist. Our question is : is it essential for there being a single space-time system of particulars that *continuity* should be ascribed to more than one particular ? If we consider the second model we can easily discover that one particular is sufficient to connect the two different sub-systems. Though two particulars *o* and *p* are common to the sub-systems A and C, this does not imply that both of them are essential for a connection between these sub-systems. Either of them will do. But to accept that only one particular will do the job of connecting the two sub-systems is to accept that the solipsistic

picture of a universe could be the picture of a universe exhibiting a single space-time system of particulars.

Consider the following model depicting the solipsistic picture of a universe :

Model 4 :

(A) ${}_{t-1}^{s-1} o, p, q \dots$

(B) ${}_{t-2}^{s-2} o, x, y \dots$

(C) ${}_{t-3}^{s-3} o, m, n \dots$

This model is closer to the second model than the first or the third. Suppose a solipsist maintains, as perhaps he does maintain, that the only particular that is continuous in different space-time sub-systems is *oneself*, and all other particulars are fleeting. He ascribes a persisting existence to himself and a transitory existence to other objects. This is possible by applying sense-datum analysis to all other objects except oneself. He may be condemned on various counts. But how could he be condemned for denying the existence of such a system which may be described as a *single* spatio-temporal system of particulars? He is certainly not saying that no particular is common to two different sub-systems, he is simply saying that only one such particular is common. The objects other than oneself are transitory on the ground that their existence is restricted to the existence of one's observational stretches. But the fact that these objects are transitory does not imply that a person himself does not have a persisting existence.

However, a difficulty remains to be solved. The consideration of oneself as a persisting being presupposes the conception of a wider system of objects, a system in which a person has to put himself on a par with other objects. For it is in relation to objects *other* than oneself that one's own persisting existence has been considered. But how could a solipsist be prohibited from having such a conception? The difficulty arises only if he considers himself to be a bodiless spirit or a transcendental subject. For a transcendental subject could not be placed in *this* world, the world in which noises, smells and visual scenes

occur. But why should a solipsist take up such an extreme position? Why should he consider himself to be a transcendental subject? 'If one is not a bodiless spirit or a transcendental subject, then it is not absurd to maintain that one occupies a position in the same visual scenes, same observational stretches, in which a chair or a table occupies its position. But why should this *body*, the body which I call as *mine*, be allowed to persist rather than the one occupying a position in the remote corner of my observational stretch? The answer is simple. This body, the body which is mine, has a unique position in the system of bodies. I am aware of it without observing it; and hence its existence is not tied to the existence of any observational stretches in which it occurs. I have not brought my body into existence by observing it, by having a visual glimpse of it, for I was already aware of its existence before I started observing it. Therefore, no inconsistency arises in refusing to apply the sense-datum analysis to one's own body, but continuing to apply such an analysis to things other than one's body. The fact that certain considerations lead me to put myself on a par with such objects as shoes and sealing-wax, does not mean that I have to assimilate myself to these objects. I am aware of my shoe because it pinches me, but I am aware of my body without its pinching me.

The consideration of oneself as the only continuant shows that the solipsistic conception of spatio-temporal reality is extremely restricted. His seclusion is supposed to be unlike the seclusion of Robinson Crusoe. For a solipsist cannot even hope or wish to be ever joined by a Man Friday. Crusoe not only identifies the spatio-temporal items of his world, but sometimes he also reidentifies them, i.e., ascribes identity to them. Every evening he returns to the *same* cave, recaptures the same visual scenes. But a solipsist has no use for the concept of identity for the items of his experience. There is no doubt that the world of a solipsist lacks the richness and variety of Crusoe's world. But it is not so poor as to prohibit the solipsist from ascribing identity to some of the items of his experience. The fact that the visual, tactual and auditory items, out of which a solipsist constructs his universe, are not physical, simply implies that these items cannot have physical continuity, that these items cannot produce a physical continuant. But their failure to have physical

continuity cannot prohibit a solipsist from ascribing identity to them. Such a prohibition is possible only by equating the concept of identity with the concept of physical continuity. I shall take up the issue of ascribing identity to visual and auditory items while discussing Strawson's treatment of sounds.

Let us now consider Strawson's crucial argument, the argument which is meant to dispose of the sceptic having a Hume-like frame of mind, one who refuses to grant continued existence to items of observation, and hence, is supposed to have refused to ascribe identity to them. According to Strawson, if we are never willing to ascribe identity to items of observation then, "We should as it were have the idea of a new, different, spatial system for each new continuous stretch of observation.. Each new system would be wholly independent of another.. There would be no question of *doubt* about the identity of an item in one system with an item in another. For such a doubt makes sense only if the two systems are not independent, if they are parts, in some way related, of a single system which includes them both."⁵ Are the systems of the model 3 wholly independent of each other? Though no particular is common to them, i.e., identity or continued existence has not been ascribed to any of them yet it cannot be said that the systems of this model are independent of one another. Had they been independent, then the particulars of one system should not have even the spatio-temporal relation of *succession* to the particulars of the other systems. But the fact that they have such a relation shows that the systems in question do not carry their own spatio-temporal frames, that they belong to the same spatio-temporal system of particulars.⁶ It is only the systems of the first model which are wholly independent of one another. But to deny the ascription of identity to particulars is not to subscribe to the first model. This implies that the issue of identity should not be confused with the issue whether a given system of particulars *depends* on the other system.

It may, however, be argued that the term 'dependence' has more than one sense. It is only in one of its various senses that two different systems of particulars may depend on one another when they have some particulars in common. In this sense of dependence even the systems of the model 3 do not depend on one another. This sense of dependence is exhibited only by the

systems of the model 2, for it is only in this model that the systems happen to have some particulars in common. (Let us forget the difficulties introduced by the model 4.) Strawson is not careful when he thinks that "each new system would be *wholly* independent of another" if the systems in question do not have some particulars in common. Granted that the systems of the model 3 fail to depend on one another, in this limited sense of dependence, how could they be prohibited from being "parts, in some way related, of a single system which includes them both"? They would be prohibited through a stroke of definition. If two different systems of particulars do not have any particulars in common, then it is a defining character of these systems that they are in no way related to one another, that there is no sense in which they could be considered as parts of one and the same system of particulars. So it is only the systems of the model 2 which satisfy Strawson's requirement. Would the sceptic, having a Hume-like frame of mind, accept the existence of a spatio-temporal system of particulars represented by the model 2? According to Strawson he would not. For if continued existence of a particular is a *fiction*, as Hume clearly maintained, then it becomes impossible for one and the same particular to occur in two different sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. The sceptic is clearly contemplating, according to Strawson, "the sketch of an alternative scheme", a scheme in which each spatio-temporal system of particulars is independent of another.⁷ But his doubt about the identity of a particular makes sense, according to Strawson, only if he accepts the existence of a *single* spatio-temporal system of particulars, a system which has its own sub-systems, in which particulars migrate from one sub-system to the other. But this implies that the sceptic "pretends to accept a conceptual scheme but at the same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment".⁸ The condition in question is the condition of continued existence, i.e., the condition of migration of *some* particulars from one sub-system to the other. In the absence of migratory particulars the sub-systems would claim independence from one another, they would claim self-sufficiency.

To elucidate Strawson's argument against the sceptic, let us take up the model 2. The different systems of particulars in that

model may be represented as the different stretches of observation, and the particulars as the items of these stretches. If one *doubts* that the item p in the observational stretch C is the same as the item p in the observational stretch A, it follows, if Strawson is right, that A and C are sub-systems of the *same* spatio-temporal system of particulars. But how does this follow? This follows from the logic of the verb 'to doubt'. To doubt that p in C is the same as p in A is not the same thing as to accept that p in C cannot possibly be the same as p in A. It is to accept a neutral position with respect to p . May be p in C is different from p in A. May be it is the same. (A philosophical sceptic is unsure of the alternative, and one may find a loophole in the sceptic's state of uncertainty). But if one accepts that p in C could possibly be the same as p in A, one has accepted that A and C are sub-systems of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. For if A and C are not such sub-systems, then it is impossible for p in C to be the same as p in A. Further, it is also shown that p in A is *continuous* with p in B. In the absence of continuity, Strawson assumes, identity is impossible. One may feel Strawson is right, that philosophical doubt about particular-identity which suggests the existence of independent spatio-temporal systems of particulars (model 1 or Model 3) is possible only within a single spatio-temporal system of particulars (Model 2), therefore, such a doubt is self-defeating.

However, there is a way out for the sceptic against the difficulties posed by Strawson, or a way out to pose a counter difficulty to Strawson's view. Consider the case of a murderer. After committing the murder, he is trying to escape detection. He turns his back to ascertain whether anybody is following him. And to his surprise he observes a policeman following him, a policeman somewhat like Macbeth's dagger, one who is the result of the murderer's guilty conscience. The murderer doubles his pace, and before taking a dive into the side lane he turns his back to ascertain the situation. He is shocked. The policeman is there, chasing him, the same policeman with his bulky figure and a cap on his shoulders. After diving into the lane the murderer hides himself and waits for the policeman. Though the policeman appears after sometime, the murderer is surprised. This cannot be the same policeman. This seems to be different

from the one whom he observed earlier on two different occasions. This one is quite thin. But perhaps he is wrong. He may be the same policeman. Since he has removed his coat and cap so he looks thin.

Let us consider the implications of this story.⁹ When the murderer came to observe the policeman the third time, he *doubts* that he is observing the same policeman whom he observed earlier on two different occasions. So we have the case of a policeman, though a hallucinatory one, who occurs in the first observational stretch, recurs in the second, and who is being doubted in the third observational stretch.¹⁰ Suppose that the item *p* in the second model stands for the policeman. We can very well imagine a further system *F* in that model in which the policeman occurs but his identity is doubted. Does doubting the identity of *p* in *F* with the identity of *p* in *C* and *A* presuppose the possibility that the same *p* occurs in the systems, *A*, *C*, and *F*? If it does, then numerically the same hallucinatory particular could possibly occur in different systems of particulars.¹¹ If it does not, then doubting the identity of *p* in *F*, so far as *p* is concerned, fails to presuppose that *A*, *C* and *F* belong to the same system of particulars.

A solution of the above difficulty on Strawsonian lines would be something like this. Doubting the identity of *p* does not presuppose the possibility that the same *p* occurs in the systems *A*, *C* and *F*, but *does* presuppose the possibility that some particulars other than *p* are the same in these systems. Unless some particulars which occur in *F* also occur in *A* and *C* these systems could not be the *sub-systems* of the same spatio-temporal system of particulars. And unless they are such sub-systems, it makes no sense to doubt the identity of a particular in one of them with a particular in another. (The same argument repeated). But the difficulty remains. For the condition of recurrence, i.e., the occurrence of one and the same particular in different systems of particulars, is satisfied even by hallucinatory objects. The only item which is common to two different observational stretches of the murderer, in the example cited above, is the policeman. The elements of the observational stretches of the murderer exhibit the pattern of the Model 2, which is the model of a single spatio-temporal system of particulars. But if the presupposition of a

single spatio-temporal system of particulars is satisfied even by hallucinatory objects then one cannot argue against the sceptic by referring to this presupposition.

An objection may be raised against the consideration that one and the same hallucinatory object may occur in two different observations. The condition for the recurrence of an object is its continued existence, its existence as unobserved no less than as observed. A material object can recur because it is defined in terms of its continued existence. But the concept of a hallucinatory object is obtained by denying continued existence to it. In this respect hallucinatory objects are like after-images. Neither a hallucinatory object nor an after-image can exist without being observed, and none of them is open to public scrutiny.¹² But if hallucinatory objects do not continue to exist, how could they be supposed to recur? How could one say that one sees the same hallucinatory object? If a hallucination has recurred, it is not the case that one and the same hallucinatory *object* has recurred. There are two different objects. The hallucinatory object observed on one occasion is different from the hallucinatory object observed on another occasion, though they may have close resemblance, so close that one may be confused with the other. The same analysis holds good for the after-images which on occasions one may have in one's observational stretches. This conclusion is the result of the failure on the part of a philosopher to distinguish the concept of identity from the concept of continuity, to distinguish the question whether an object observed on one occasion is *numerically* the same as an object observed on another occasion, from the question, whether an object observed on one occasion is spatio-temporally *continuous* with an object observed on another occasion. It is impossible for one and the same thing to exist in a discontinuous fashion, for the concept of identity is the same as the concept of continuity. But are they the same concepts? If they are, then the *ash* in my ashtray is identical with the *tobacco-seeds*. For, the ash in question is continuous with the tobacco in my cigarette, and this tobacco is continuous with tobacco-plants, and tobacco-plants are continuous with tobacco seeds.¹⁶

Consider how after-images occur in a discontinuous fashion. Suppose one obtains a grey after-image of some object when the

background is white. Suppose one paints the wall of his room in such a fashion that two different white patches have a grey patch in between them. Now one gazes at the object in question. And when one moves one's eyes to have the after-image in question, one succeeds in having it when one's eyes are directed towards the white patch. But when one further moves one's eyes to the adjoining grey patch the after-image disappears, and comes back again when one's eyes come to take rest at the second white patch. If an after-image exists only when you see it, then it certainly does not exist when your eyes are directed towards the grey patch. Yet it is one and the same after-image that exists in two different places at two times. To demonstrate the spatio-temporally interrupted existence of an after-image it is not necessary to consider such manipulated situations. Consider the case of an after-image seen with open eyes. Now close your eyes. You see the after-image again. But when you were closing your eyes, there is a time, though extremely short lived, when you do not see the after-image in question. It takes some time for the after-image to emerge in your visual experience, when your eyes are closed. And during this time the after-image exists neither in the visual space (of open eyes) in which chairs, tables and other such objects exist, nor in the visual space (of closed eyes) in which only ' stars ', coloured splodges and after-images exist. Since an after-image exists only when you see it, the after-image in question does not exist when you were closing your eyes. Yet the after-image seen with closed eyes is the same as the after-image seen with open eyes. This implies that an after-image exists in a discontinuous fashion. One and the same after-image exists at different times without existing in the interval between these times. Similarly, it exists in different places without existing in the intermediate places. The interruption in the existence of an after-image is not contrary to its identity, and hence, it does not require even the *fiction* of its continued existence. The same analysis holds good for the identity of hallucinatory objects. In order to migrate from one spacio-temporal sub-system to the other, a material object must *move*, it must pass through the intermediate positions. But an after-image or a hallucinatory object can migrate from one sub-system to the other without passing through the intermediate positions.

The usual argument that a hallucinatory object or an after-image cannot recur is that there are no interruptions, holes and gaps, in one's *experience* of such an object. Consider Price's remark, "The after-image follows me wherever I go. Which-ever way I look I still see it. The same thing happens in hallucination."¹⁴ Thus, continuity in one's experience of an after-image or a hallucinatory object is never broken. But so far as material objects are concerned, our experience of them, according to Price, "is frequently interrupted, full of holes and gaps".¹⁵ The continuity of visual experience is "soon brought to an end by a blink if nothing else."¹⁶ Is it a logical truth about an after-image or a hallucinatory object that continuity in its experience is never broken? The example of the grey after-image mentioned above clearly shows that there can be gaps and holes in one's experience of an after-image. The after-image follows me wherever I go, but with interruptions. And why cannot a blink introduce interruption in one's experience of a hallucinatory object? When I open my eyes I find the same hallucinatory object facing me which I saw before I closed my eyes out of fear. And if a blink is allowed to introduce interruption in my experience of a hallucinatory object, what would check me if I consider interruptions of longer duration? Why cannot a hallucinatory object play hide and seek with me? It cannot do so on account of the fact that philosophers have not given proper attention to it, or giving proper attention to it goes against their metaphysical constructions.

It may be awkward but true that Strawson's metaphysics cannot afford to have the presupposition which ties the concept of identity with that of spatio-temporal continuity. For Strawson believes, as a consequence of the question of ontological priority, that *disembodied* Mary is the same person, numerically the same person, who once lived in Oxford. The fact that the concept of a disembodied person is a logically derivative concept, does not mean that the concept of numerical identity is also a concept which has two different senses, a primitive and a derivative sense. Mary of Oxford is spatio-temporally continuous with Mary who once came to visit Edinburgh. But Mary of Oxford is not, and cannot be, spatio-temporally continuous with Mary who is now a disembodied being. What is the *distance* between *this* world and

the world of the disembodied beings? How much *time* does one take in reaching the world of the disembodied beings? These are senseless questions. Yet Mary of Oxford is numerically the same as disembodied Mary, and Mary who once visited Edinburgh. Are there two different senses of numerical identity? A *primary* sense in which Mary of Oxford is numerically identical with Mary who once visited Edinburgh. And a *derivative* sense in which Mary of Oxford is numerically identical with Mary who is a disembodied being. One could have the derivative concept of a person. But could one also have the derivative concept of numerical identity? Perhaps one could have such a concept if one succeeds in confusing the concept of numerical identity with the concept of spatio-temporal continuity. Since one ascribes numerical identity to spatio-temporally continuous objects, therefore it is only in the derivative sense of numerical identity that one can ascribe numerical identity to those objects which lack spatio-temporal continuity. But what this argument establishes is not that there are two different senses of numerical identity, a primitive and a derivative sense, but simply that the concept of numerical identity is different from, independent of, the concept of spatio-temporal continuity. The question whether an object is numerically the same as another is different from the question whether an object is spatio-temporally continuous with another. The fact that an object is not spatio-temporally continuous with another cannot be a reason for prohibiting us from ascribing numerical identity to it. The confusion of identity with spatio-temporal continuity is a prevalent feature of the present philosophical thought. This confusion has led philosophers to produce strange theories, the theories which they could hardly digest without this confusion. For example, this confusion has recently led Professor John Hick to introduce a temporal connection between *this* world and the Resurrection world. Since Resurrection Mary is numerically identical with Mary of Oxford, therefore, Resurrection Mary must be *continuous* with Mary of Oxford. But to be continuous, Mary of Oxford must occupy *successive* spatio-temporal positions between her present position in the Resurrection world and her earlier position in Oxford. But the idea of successive *spatial* positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world is nonsensical. For the Resurrection world (Hick's sense) is not spatially connected

with *this* world. The Resurrection world is not at such and such a distance from Oxford; the spatial position in the Resurrection world and the spatial position in this world are not positions in the *same* space. But Mary of Oxford could not be identical with Resurrection Mary if she is not continuous with her. If spatial continuity is impossible then temporal continuity has at least to be retained. Thus Hick has been led to consider the possibility of there "being singular time and plural spaces",¹⁷ to make it possible for Mary to occupy successive temporal positions without her occupying successive spatial positions. But could there be successive temporal positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world? Could a temporal position in Oxford and a temporal position in the Resurrection world be positions in the same time? How many seconds, hours or days has Mary of Oxford taken in reaching the Resurrection world? Could she have taken less time than the time she took in reaching the Resurrection world? May be if one dies in Oxford rather than New York, one takes more time in reaching the Resurrection world. If all these questions and conclusions are senseless than it is senseless to talk of the successive temporal positions between Oxford and the Resurrection world. Mary of Oxford does not, and cannot, occupy any *successive* spatio-temporal positions in reaching her position in the Resurrection world, But her failure to occupy such positions merely implies that she is not spatio-temporally continuous with Mary of the Resurrection world. It does not imply that she is not numerically identical with Mary of the Resurrection world. The fact that the Resurrection world is not spatio-temporally continuous with *this* world does not imply that a person of the Resurrection world could not be numerically identical with a person of this world. A philosopher can, if he wishes, scrutinise or reassemble the item of religious faith, but in doing so he is required first to remove those confusions which are inherent in his own conceptual apparatus. The difficulties connected with Hick's conception of the Resurrection world or Strawson's conception of a world of disembodied beings are not *religious* difficulties, they are purely *philosophical* difficulties. A *Christian* does not have these difficulties, for they are the outcome of an attempt on the part of a philosopher to *reconstruct* the picture of our everyday world.

A discussion of Hume's view may throw some light on our issue of identity. For Hume made an attempt to ascribe identity to an object (image) irrespective of the fact that there is interruption in its appearance. As he says, "The very image, which is present to the senses, is with us the real body; and 'tis to these interrupted images that we ascribe a perfect identity."¹⁸ What he means is that an image existing at one time has perfect identity with an image existing at another time, though no such image exists in the interval between these times. The interruption in the existence of an image should not prohibit us from ascribing identity to it. The only question is about the *ground* of such an ascription. For there is a sense in which the image existing at one time is different from the image existing at another time. If they are not apparently different images then there would have been no question of seeing whether they are the same images. Hume considers "resemblance" as the ground for the ascription of identity. As he says, "The smooth passage of imagination along the ideas of resembling impressions makes us ascribe to them perfect identity."¹⁹ But Hume starts doubting his original view of identity. Not because 'resemblance' is different from 'identity' (for 'resemblance' is only a *ground* of the ascription of 'identity') but because of *interruption* in the existence of an image. As he further said on this issue, "The interruption of appearance seems contrary to the identity."²⁰ There is no doubt that interruption in the existence of an image *does* seem contrary to its identity, but is it really contrary to its identity? For if there is a genuine contradiction between the identity of an image and its interrupted existence, then this contradiction cannot be resolved simply by the *fiction* of a continued existence, it requires a *real* continued existence. But the fact that Hume considered continued existence simply a fiction shows that there is no genuine contradiction between the identity of an image and its interrupted existence, that the contradiction is only apparent. How could there be a contradiction between the presence of identity and the absence of continuity? Such a contradiction is possible only if the concept of identity is the same as that of continuity. But saying that *a* is identical with *b* certainly does not mean that *a* is continuous with *b*. The particular *a* may or may not be continuous with *b*.

Hume's difficulties on the issue of identity are rooted in his faulty analysis of the powers of Imagination. At times, when Hume was under the influence of 'vulgar' consciousness, he was led to think that the *identity* of an image presupposed its *continued* existence, and the later in its own turn presupposed the *independent* or *distinct* existence of the image in question. He allots all the three concepts to the Faculty of Imagination. And once this allotment is made, all these concepts stand or fall together. Hume had no desire to retain the concepts of *continued* and *independent* existence, therefore, ultimately he was led to deny even the concept of identity. As he said, "'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our resembling perceptions are numerically the same; and it is this illusion which leads us into the opinion, that these perceptions are uninterrupted, are still existent, even when they are not present to the senses."²¹ The concept of identity has been taken as a gross illusion because it has led Hume to the opinion of continued existence. The question is whether Hume is right in considering identity as an illusion because he considers continued existence as an illusion? Is it impossible to retain identity without retaining continued existence? Hume surely did not consider *resemblance* as an illusion. He did not allot the concept of resemblance to the Faculty of Imagination. For we do not merely *imagine* that an image resembles another, we as a matter of fact find it so resembling. But if the ground or basis for ascribing identity is resemblance, then why should Hume trouble himself about the fact of continued existence? His troubles can be traced to his half-hearted scepticism, his half-hearted acceptance of the philosophical against the 'vulgar' views. He makes an attempt to revolt against the vulgar, but succeeds in only conforming to his standards. To quote a remark of Professor Walsh on Hume's analysis of Imagination, "The Humean imagination, in fact appears under two flags, rebel and conformist. Since one of Hume's pleasures is to tease the respectable, the rebel flag is waved a good deal.... But the imagination turns out on examination to be the supporter of the *status quo* after all: for all the shortcomings of 'philosophers' it is on their side in the end."²² An examination of Hume's view would disappoint the sceptic.

The above attempt to distinguish the concept of identity from that of continuity, however, remains objectionable. For Strawson

is struggling with the problem whether a material object could recur, whether we could observe the same material object twice. No argument has been provided for showing that we succeed in observing the same material object twice, the examples of the grey after-image and the hallucinatory policeman are meant for showing that we succeed in observing the same non-material objects twice. The objects which should fail in being observed twice have succeeded in being observed twice, and the objects which should succeed in being observed twice have failed in being observed twice. This is a surprising conclusion. But this objection is based on a wrong understanding of the above analysis. The examples of the grey after-image and hallucinatory policeman were meant for showing that Strawson's attempt to establish a connection between two different observational stretches, in the sense in which he requires such a connection, with the help of the weapon of *doubt* does not succeed. For no incoherence arises if one doubts the identity of a particular existing in one observational stretch with a particular existing in another, without believing that these observational stretches have any material object in common. For what is presupposed by such a doubt is simply that some particulars which occur in one observational stretch must also occur in another. Unless such recurring particulars are possible the sceptic's *doubt* is senseless. But the condition of recurrence, as has been pointed out, is satisfied even by after-images and hallucinatory objects. But if doubting the identity of an item occurring in one observational stretch with an item occurring in another does not bind one to accept that these observational stretches have any *material* object in common, then these observational stretches fail to be connected in the sense in which Strawson requires them to be connected. For a connection between two different observational stretches, in Strawson's sense of this connection, is possible only by introducing *material* objects. In case the observational stretches are not "long enough or comprehensive enough", then according to Strawson, "most of the common concepts of material things that we have would not exist".²³ As a consequence, he concludes, these observational stretches would be independent of each other, for the condition of their connection, i.e., the presence of material objects, does not exist. The question is, whether Strawson has succeeded in demonstrating the existence of such a connection, i.e.,

the existence of a material world, which he has attempted to do. Has he succeeded in showing incoherence in the sceptic's doubt? For a sceptic could very well accept Strawson's view that there is something which is common to two different observational stretches of a person without accepting that what one observes is a material thing, a thing which continues to exist when one is not observing it.

A difficulty, however, remains to be solved. Granted that an after-image or a hallucinatory object could recur, how do I consider that it has recurred, i.e., what conditions or criteria lead me to say that I am seeing the same after-image or the same hallucinatory objects? For, according to Strawson's a condition of our having a single spatio-temporal system of particulars is "that there should be satisfiable and commonly satisfied criteria for the identity of at least some items in one sub-system with some items in the other."²⁴ This implies that the position of the sceptic remains weak if he has failed to discover criteria for the kind of objects he supposes he happens to observe. It is possible that one may fail to discover what is technically called a 'criterion' of identity, for the reason that the concept of identity may not be a sort of concept which has any fixed condition of its ascription. Since the condition or ground for the ascription of identity may differ from case to case, therefore, there may not be any condition or ground which may succeed in performing the role of a criterion of identity. Even in such a situation, however, it is possible to point out that condition which generally, though not always, occurs when identity is ascribed to an object. According to Price the identity of an after-image depends on certain physiological conditions (strain on eyes, dazzle effects etc.). And the identity of a hallucinatory object depends on certain psychological conditions (expectations or wishes or fears). But Price is interested in discovering those conditions which are involved when we are considering the *continued* existence of these objects. As he says, "after-images, could continue in existence when unsensed, provided that the requisite physiological processes continued too."²⁵ He makes a similar statement about hallucinatory objects that they "could continue in existence when unsensed, provided that the requisite psychological processes continued."²⁶ But if the sceptic is unwilling to grant unsensed existence to any sort of images, how could he grant such an existence

to those images which are described as after-images and hallucinatory images. The sceptic's question is not what conditions are causally responsible for my observation of an image-or for its continued unobserved existence, but what conditions lead me to *say*, to *believe*, that I am seeing the same image which I saw before I had an interruption in my experience. Surely the condition of resemblance is a good claimant for the title. I ascribe identity to an image occurring on one occasion with an image occurring on another generally on the ground that these images resemble. This view obviously does not mean that all those images which resemble *must* be identical, but simply that those which are identical happen to resemble. And it is because they happen to resemble that resemblance could help one in ascribing identity. The sceptic does not equate the concept of resemblance with the concept of identity; they are different concepts. But the fact that they are different concepts cannot prohibit one from ascribing identity on the ground of resemblance. Suppose the image *a* occurs. Immediately after interruption in my experience, the image *b* occurs. I am persuaded to say that *b* is numerically the same as *a*, if *b* resembles *a*. In the absence of resemblance I would be prohibited from saying that these images are numerically the same. Hume failed to retain this view because of the fact that he confused the concept of identity with that of spatio-temporal continuity. Saying *b* is the same as *a*, for Hume meant the same thing as saying that *b* is *continuous* with *a*. Since continuity is an illusion, so identity is an illusion. Strawson has reversed the argument, since identity is not an illusion, therefore, continuity is also not an illusion. Except for his reservation on the identity of disembodied persons, in which case identity is allowed to be consistent with spatio-temporal discontinuity, Strawson's view of identity, in spirit, is the same as that of Hume. Neither for Hume nor for Strawson, is it possible to ascribe identity without ascribing continuity, that there cannot be one and the same object which may exist in a discontinuous fashion. There is no necessity of repeating the arguments against this view.

Strawson's attempt to prohibit the sceptic from dispensing with the existence of a material world has introduced certain confusions about identity which require further clarification.

Strawson does not deny the existence of after-images and hallucinatory objects. But in his ontology, they would exist simply as *derivative* particulars, depending on the existence of persons and material objects which are *primary* particulars. Strawson's argument is not *causal*, but metaphysical. To say about a particular that it is derivative means to say that its identity depends on the identity of some other *kind* of particular. Similarly, to say about a particular that it is primary, means to say that its identity does not depend on the identity of any other *kind* of particular. Thus, the idea of there being a derivative particular and the idea of there being a particular which exhibits identity-dependence are connected ideas. It is because of the fact that after-images and hallucinatory objects exhibit identity-dependence that they are simply derivative particulars. This implies that the sceptic could not ascribe identity to the sorts of objects he uses in constructing his universe without his having a prior conception of a material world, a world of primary particulars. For one's success in ascribing identity to derivative particulars depends on one's success in ascribing identity to primary particulars. The force of this argument depends on the confused concept of 'identity dependence'. What does it mean to say that the identity of a derivative particular depends on the identity of a primary particular? Does it mean to say that there are two different senses of identity, a primary and a derivative sense? A sense of identity in which I ascribe identity to Mary seen in Edinburgh with Mary seen in Oxford. And another sense of identity in which the murderer ascribes identity to his hallucinatory policeman or I ascribe identity to the grey after-image when it appears after an interruption. How does the murderer ascribe identity to his hallucinatory policeman? The hallucinatory policeman whom he is seeing now resembles the hallucinatory policeman whom he saw earlier. Similarly identity has been ascribed to the grey after-image because it resembles the grey after-image seen earlier. Does it mean to say that the ascription of identity to certain objects on the ground of their resemblance is an ascription of identity to them in a derivative sense? But it is on the ground of resemblance that I ascribe identity to Mary. Mary, whom I am seeing now, resembles Mary, whom I saw in Oxford. And this resemblance has led me to think that I am seeing the same person. Does it mean to say that I

ascribe identity to Mary in a derivative sense of identity? But how could it be a *derivative* sense, if Mary happens to be a primary particular? Of course, the ascription of identity to certain objects on the ground of resemblance, or on any ground what so ever, does not guarantee the truth of my identity-judgments. At times these judgments are false. But in order to ascribe identity to objects, I have not to wait for the *truth* of my identity-judgments. For the *expression* of an identity judgment does not *precede* the ascription of identity. It is because I do ascribe identity to an object that I could also be mistaken about my ascription.

However, accepting the possibility of ascribing identity to an object without accepting that it has a spatio-temporally continued existence, leads to a difficulty which the sceptic must solve. How could the sceptic discover that he has committed a mistake in his ascription of identity if the objects of his observation are deprived of their unobserved existence? Suppose I ascribe identity to Mary seen in Edinburgh with Mary whom I saw in Oxford. Subsequently, if I obtain evidence that Mary of Edinburgh is not spatio-temporally continuous with Mary of Oxford, I would be led to revise my judgment, I would be led to accept that I have committed a mistake in my ascription of identity. But no such evidence is possible if Mary is not a spatio-temporally continuous being, if the existence of Mary is restricted to the existence of my observational stretches. Then, how would I discover that I have committed a mistake in my ascription of identity to Mary? The question depends on whether one could have conditions in which one would be led to revise one's identity judgment when one deals with objects which lack continued existence. Surely there exist such conditions. Suppose I ascribe identity to Mary on the ground of her resemblance. But subsequently I discover that I did not get the characteristic smell of her perfume. So I could not have seen Mary, I am surely wrong in thinking that I saw Mary. Since one could have hallucinatory smells, sounds and tastes etc., it is possible to co-ordinate the hallucinatory visual scenes with the hallucinatory smells, sounds and tastes etc. When I saw Mary the first time, i.e., identified her, she had a characteristic hair-style, a characteristic dress etc., and I got a characteristic smell of her perfume. But when I saw her again i.e., reidentified her, I failed to get the smell of her perfume. So I have surely misidentified her.

The sceptic is prohibited from committing perceptual mistakes, or from making a distinction between *qualitative* and *numerical* identity, because of the fact that he has been treated by his opponents as a curious sort of creature. Some have treated him as a being who has a visual sense without having other senses, others take him to be a purely auditory being. Those who are quarrelling with a sceptic, are they quarrelling with a monster who is deprived of all other senses except one ?

Strawson attacks the issue of 'solipsistic consciousness' by considering a purely auditory world, i.e., a world in which only sounds, and nothing but sounds, exist, i.e., a world in which a being with only the auditory sense exists. And this monster, the auditory monster, has been asked by Strawson to make a distinction between qualitative and numerical identity. Could such a being say that he is now hearing the same, numerically the same, sound which he heard on an earlier occasion.²⁷ After an analysis of the limitations of such a being, Strawson concludes that no sense "could be given to the idea of identifying a *particular* sound as the same again after an interval during which it is not heard."²⁸ For the simple reason that "we cannot turn to the particular-identity of the non-auditory setting of the sounds...for, by hypothesis, sounds have no setting but other sounds."²⁹ Now, compare this auditory world with our familiar world, the world in which drummers and drums exist, in which people with all their senses exist, in which people smell flowers, hear sounds, taste their food and sometimes have visual glimpses of things. In such a universe it is quite possible to ascribe identity to sounds, to make a numerical and qualitative distinction between sounds. For the ascription of identity to sounds depends on there being the concept of an 'unheard sound', of a sound which continues to exist when I am not hearing it. A drummer is beating his drum, I observe him doing so, but from time to time the sound of his drum is *drowned out* by other sounds. So in the interval when I am not hearing the sound of his drum, the sound continues to exist, for the drum continues to be beaten. And if the sound continues to exist, then it is quite possible for me to hear the same sound, to reidentify it, to ascribe numerical identity to it.³⁰ Thus, Strawson has succeeded in proving many points, out of which two points must

attract the attention of the sceptic. First, the concept of resemblance fails to function as a condition for ascribing identity to sounds. The sounds in the sound-universe resemble one another, yet the auditory being fails to ascribe identity to them. Second, the ascription of identity to sounds depends on there being material bodies. It is impossible to ascribe identity to sounds in the universe which is contemplated by a sceptic, i.e., the universe which lacks the existence of material bodies. The sound-particulars cannot be treated as basic particulars.

The first point should not worry us long. The condition of resemblance could be rejected only if some other condition is accepted. Granted that the condition of resemblance does not work in ascribing identity to sounds in the universe of sounds. But Strawson has not provided any alternative condition to resemblance. For he has attempted to show that there are *no* conditions for the ascription of identity to sounds, that the concept of identity has no use in such a universe. So no *special* discredit can be given to resemblance for its failure to work as a condition for ascribing identity. The only question of interest is the question: Why does the auditory being fail to ascribe identity to his sounds? He fails because of the fact that his universe lacks the richness and variety required for the ascription of identity.

In describing the structural features of his universe, a sceptic relies much heavily on such cases as the cases of after-images and hallucinatory objects, for they are very good examples of the sort of objects which occur only so long as they are observed, and to which identity could be ascribed without accepting their physical existence. But his reliance on these cases exposes him to Ryle's charge, that a sceptic dissolves the distinction between 'real coins' and 'false coins' by denying the existence of real coins. If there were no real objects, i.e., objects which continue to exist without being observed, then all the objects that exist are as good as hallucinatory objects. But the sceptic is certainly not dissolving the distinction between 'real coins' and 'false coins'. In questioning the existence of material objects, a sceptic is simply asking people to be careful about the use of their coins. If too many false coins come into currency, it is the real coins that will lose their value. The sceptic is not denying the concept of a material object, he is simply saying

that such a concept is a derivative concept (a fiction, a false coin, a dodge) depending on the primitive concept of an observed object (a fact, a real coin, a real move). It is the frequency of recurrence of an observed object that leads us to form the concept of a material object, an object which is allowed to exist even if we are not observing it. But if there were no observed objects, or the recurrences of observed objects, there would not have come into currency the concept of a material object. Fictions can survive only in a world in which facts also occur. It is because I hear a sound, and hear again a sound resembling the earlier sound, that leads me to say that I am hearing the *same* sound. If the latter sound has not resembled the earlier sound, there would have been no question of my saying that I am hearing the same sound. Once I have the concept of the *same* sound, I could also have, if my metaphysical sense pleases me, the concept of an unheard sound, the concept of such a sound which continues to exist without my hearing it, which exists in the period of interruption in my hearing of it. In Hume's language, the ascription of identity to images "leads me to the opinion of continued existence". If I never heard sounds, and never ascribed identity to some of them, I could never have come to believe in the existence of unheard sounds. If I smelled no smells, and never ascribed identity to some of them, I could never have come to believe in the existence of unsmelt smells. Similarly, my having the concept of unobserved visual scenes depends on my having the concept of identity for the observed visual scenes. The concept of 'continued existence' of an object, i.e., of its unobserved existence, is a parasitical concept, parasitical upon the concept of identity. And being parasitical in its nature the survival of continuity is limited, it fails to survive in all the conditions in which the concept of identity survives.

In saying that the *continued* existence of a material world is only a fiction, the sceptic is attempting to remove certain confusions prevalent in our logical geography of concepts. The most prevalent confusion is the equation of the concept of identity with the concept of continuity. The second, no less prevalent confusion, is that which converts continuity into a primitive concept and allows identity to have only a parasitic existence. The later confusion sometimes lands a philosopher into the acceptance of strange views about the identity of objects. He wishes to ascribe identity

to an object, but his metaphysical sense fails to provide continuity to it, and hence his conclusions on the subject become vague. One has just to see the variety of senses in which the term 'continuity' has been used by philosophers. Some of the most popular senses of 'continuity' are : *physical, non-physical, hypothetical and fictional* etc. In their attempt to retain continuity as a necessary condition or presupposition of identity, philosophers do not mind in talking about 'continuity' which has the same sense as 'discontinuity'. Thus, continuity has been ascribed to a drum, the sound of a drum, an after-image, a hallucinatory object, a toothache and so on. Nothing remains discontinuous, for the concept of continuity includes in its very meaning even the concept of discontinuity. The source of all these views is the same—the equation of identity with continuity. A sceptic attempts to reject such equations. Thus, the question whether the sceptic has succeeded in his mission depends on the question whether he has succeeded in clarifying confusions, conceptual confusions, in an attempt on the part on a philosopher to depict a picture of the world in which he is living.

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NOTES

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1. *Individuals*, p. 35

2. It is a matter of dispute whether Hume was a solipsist, for a solipsist must accept the persistent existence of oneself. And so far as the issue of 'identity' is concerned, Hume's views are dubious. Hume describes himself as a moderate sceptic, because he has a tendency to support the sceptic, and also a tendency to oppose him.

3. Perhaps there is more than one sense of a single space-time system of particulars. For Strawson says many things about such a system, that such a system is *unique, comprehensive, primitive, unified*, and so on. But I am concerned with only that sense of such a system to which Strawson refers while showing incoherence in the sceptic's doubt about identity. In this sense, a single space-time system can clearly be distinguished from multiple space-time systems.

4. *Individuals*, p. 35

5. *Op. cit.* p. 35

6. If the succeeding system of particulars is *spatially* independent of the preceding system, then it would also be *temporally* independent of it. For the *new* stretch of observation does not occur at the same time as the *old* one. The fact that Strawson describes the systems in question as *spatial* may mislead one into thinking that he is troubled *only* about the spatial character of these systems? Is he troubled *only* about their spatial character? Why does not he feel any trouble about their temporal character? Does he mean to say that the systems in question would be temporally dependent and spatially independent of one another?

7. *Op. cit.* p. 36

8. *Op. cit.* p. 35

9. This story cannot be ruled out on *a priori* grounds. For Strawson attempts to show incoherence in the sceptic's doubt by considering an observational situation. And this story clearly describes a possible observational situation.

10. There is a popular argument that in having a hallucination one does not *observe* anything. The murderer can be said to have observed the electric pole, the cat coming out of the window of a house etc. (for they are real), but not the policeman. This argument is not grounded in the legitimate analysis of the observational situation. For the policeman is the constituent of the same observational stretches which has the electric pole, the cat and the house etc., as its other constituents. If the murderer is allowed to have observed the electric pole, the cat and the house etc., he cannot be said not to have observed the policeman. The murderer has not *imagined* or *dreamt* of a policeman. The fact that the subsequent evidence might lead the murderer to discover that he was wrong about his observation of the policeman, that there existed no such policeman, does not imply that the murderer did not observe the policeman. If he did not observe a policeman then his observation could not be wrong.

11. Such a possibility is not absurd. Though the hallucinatory objects do not exist without being observed, they can very well recur. The prohibition applicable to material objects is not applicable to hallucinatory objects. No material object can recur if it did not exist when unobserved. But a hallucinatory object is not a material object, hence it is free from this sort of binding. The question of recurrence should not be confused with the question of unobserved existence. It is quite wrong to suppose that nothing but material objects could recur, because it is only material objects which exist without being observed.

12. The consideration of these objects cannot be ruled out on the ground that they are not open to public scrutiny. For Strawson, in this context, is concerned with the contents of two different observational stretches of the same person. So the argument that a hallucinatory object or an after-image cannot occur in two different observations of two different persons has no tendency to show that it cannot occur in two different observations of the same person.

13. A sense-datum philosopher also shares the view of those who deny recurrence to after-images and hallucinatory objects. Though he accepts that in having a hallucination or an after-image one does not observe a material thing. What one observes is something which is non-material, a sense-datum. However, no sense-datum can recur, hence no hallucinatory object or an after-image can recur. But is it one and the same dagger or different daggers that followed Macbeth's path? The fact that the dagger in question was hallucinatory is no reason why the number of daggers be increased, with a new dagger being provided for each new observational stretch. The number can be increased only by confusing the concept of identity with the concept of continuity. If an object appears in a discontinuous fashion then it is not one and the same object but different objects which appear after some intervals. But what justification is there for equating the concept of identity with the concept of continuity? Even a sense-datum philosopher has failed to liberate himself from the Aristotelian prejudice of his opponents, the prejudice which leads to the dissolution of identity into continuity.

14. H. H. Price, *Hume's Theory Of The External World*, Oxford, 1940; p. 110

15. Ibid. p. 21

16. Ibid. p. 21

17. "Resurrection Persons And Bodies", *Mind*, July 1973, p. 412

18. *Treatise*, Edited by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, p. 205

19. Ibid. p. 205

20. Ibid. p. 205

21. Ibid. p. 207

22. W. H. Walsh, "Hume's Concept Of Truth", *The Royal Institute Of Philosophy Lectures*, Volume Five, 1970-71, Published by The Macmillan Press, 1972; p. 116.

23. *Individuals*. p. 35
24. *Ibid.* p. 35
25. *Hume's Theory Of The External World*, p. 114
26. *Ibid.* pp. 114-115
27. One of the chief functions of Strawson's construction of a 'sound-universe' is to construct a quarrel against the sceptic. This becomes evident when one examines his remarks on the 'solipsistic consciousness' on pages 72-73 of the *Individuals*. The very attempt to show that identity could not be ascribed to sounds without there being material bodies is an attempt to prohibit the sceptic from constructing his universe of non-material bodies. His conclusions about sounds are supposed to hold for all other derivative particulars.
28. *Ibid.* p. 70
30. See pages 71-72 of the *Individuals*. I must thank Dr. Davie for drawing my attention to these pages.