

PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHO ANALYSIS

Introduction :

In the present paper, I first of all attempt to provide a context for a philosophical consideration of psycho analysis in terms of Dilthey's distinction between explanation and understanding. I hope to show how psycho analysis claims to be an explanatory as well as an understanding psychology, in Dilthey's language. It is this feature that I shall call the dual focus or the double perspective of psycho analysis. In the middle part of the paper, I hope to show how the balance between explanation and understanding or between metapsychology and phenomenology in psycho analysis has been a precarious one and how, in philosophical discussions of psycho analysis, this double focus has often been lost sight of. Thus, in the discussions of psycho analysis by American philosophers of science, like Nagel¹, Hempel², Frank³ and others, the emphasis has been placed all along on psycho analytic theory, on the methods of psycho analytic explanation and validation, to the relative neglect of the dimension of phenomenological understanding which is the distinctive core of psycho analytic interpretation, whereas philosophers in Britain such as Wittgenstein⁴, Wisdom⁵ and Flew⁶ seem to have been more interested in the philosophical aspects of therapy and interpretation, rather than in the explanatory framework of the theory. Thus, the bifocality of psycho analysis has been neglected with the result that both the American and British philosophical discussions of psycho analysis have, by and large, tended towards a conservative outcome. This conservatization of Freud, or what may be called the Americanization of the Unconscious, seems to me to be the melancholy fruit of philosophy's encounter with psycho analysis. I shall attempt to document the process of conservatization which psycho analysis has undergone in the U.S.A. in two steps. First, I shall briefly analyse the contributions of Hartmann, Horney and Parsons as exemplifying this tendency towards conservatization in an increasingly unmistakable manner. What is perhaps no more than a latent tendency in Hartmann's ego psychology reaches its nadir in Parson's theory of socialization. At the second level of

conceptual analysis, I shall argue that the American philosophers' lack of interest in the problems of psycho analytic understanding and interpretation has had a latent function in stabilizing and entrenching this conservative drift. In the U.K. seemingly there has been the exact opposite kind of philosophical interest in psycho analysis. Linguistic philosophers like Wittgenstein and Wisdom seem to have been more interested in therapy rather than in meta-psychology. But I shall argue that it comes to more or less the same thing in the final wash. In the final outcome, philosophers both in the U.K. and U.S.A. seem to have tamed the radical thrust of psycho analysis, and I shall end with the suggestion that perhaps this is due to the deep seated conservatism of philosophy itself. Psycho analysis, as we know, can create a crisis of identity at the individual therapeutic level; the conventional image of the self soon breaks down, yielding place to disturbing latent possibilities. Similarly, the encounter with psycho analysis can be the occasion for a crisis of disciplinary identity as well. Philosophy's encounter with psycho analysis, it seems to me, is an illustration of precisely such a crisis.

The dual focus of Psycho Analysis :

For Freud as well as for Dilthey, psychology is the sub-structure of all social and cultural sciences and however much they might differ amongst themselves regarding the conception of psychology, they were further agreed that the current experimental scientific psychology was insufficient to serve as such a basis. Both of them felt the need for the radicalization of the nature and scope of psychological understanding and its methods. Dilthey believed that such a new psychology must begin with the facts of lived experience; its standpoint and starting point must be the facts of 'erlebnis'. For Freud also psychic reality is the basic principle of all attempts at psychological understanding. The principle of psychological reality states that a thing is real to a person insofar as an as he experiences it; this does not mean, of course, that we cannot go beyond the subject's mode of understanding, but it does hold that subject's modes of understanding and experience define the facts or 'the givens' for the psychologist to interpret and explain. The primacy of the principle of psychic reality is most clearly seen in action when Freud, early in his practice, found

that the tales of seduction and sexual assault reported by many of his patients were objectively without any basis in fact. But instead of dismissing their accounts, Freud accepted such phantasies as real and efficacious for themselves and thereby began his exploration of the inner world of phantasy and subjective wish. Indeed, throughout the course of his explorations of the inner world of his patients, Freud held this principle of subjective reality as constant. His later theory of the Super Ego as an internalized structure of the personality and his account of introjection as a mechanism of defence give theoretical expression to this point of view and in the later work of Freudian analysts like Melanie Klein and Fairbairn, the theory of internal objects becomes an important postulate of psychological understanding.

Just as in Dilthey so also in Freud, the principle of psychic reality entailed the conclusion that all mental events have a meaning or sense and that the task of psychological understanding is to grasp this subjective sense; hence, hermeneutics or interpretation is a vital part of psycho analysis and it has been applied at various levels of behaviour from forgettings, mistakes, slips of the tongue to dreams, psycho pathological symptoms, and behaviours. But in Dilthey, because of his opposition to any theoretical or scientific psychology, interpretation threatens to work loose from any theoretical basis and become a mysterious self-sufficient and self-validating activity, whereas in Freud, psychological understanding and interpretation is guided by and derives from a theoretical basis; psycho analytic hermeneutics is anchored in psycho analytic metapsychology. With this indeed, we reach the fundamental and decisive difference between Freud and Dilthey.

The subjective level of understanding is an essential component of psycho analysis for in therapy we have to deal, not with de-personalized structures and systems, but with more or less integrated living persons. It is their experiences and the frustrations and sufferings of their lives that set the tasks of treatment and it is in terms of such common human experiences that ultimately the validity of psycho analysis itself as a system of psychology would have to be judged. Thus, subjective theory defines the problems as well as settles the criteria for their successful solution. But psycho analysis has also the other dimension of process theory,

the topographic, the economic and the dynamic points of view of metapsychology. Subjective or personal theory is not to be equated with a non-conceptual, idiographic description and contrasted with metapsychology as abstract nomothetic description. Subjective theory is not perceptual; the unity and integrity of the personality is not given in immediate experience, as Dilthey was forced to recognise towards the end. The difference between the two levels is not therefore that one is perceptual and the other conceptual; neither is it merely a quantitative difference, as it were, between degrees of abstractness. Rather the difference lies in the types and orders of conceptualization involved. As Brierley⁷ points out, a description such as 'the self feels threatened' would properly belong to the level of personal theory, whereas a description of the instability of the ego would belong to the level of metapsychology. Thus, to talk of the insecurity of the ego or its weakness would be to mix up the two levels. The metapsychological description is not just a translation in structural terms of the statements made at the level of personal theory. Rather, it claims to be the description of the objective conditions of the mental organization of the person who makes the data language statement. Once this point is noted, it would be clear that the two levels are necessary for each other. The subjective level or personal theory is necessary, for the problems of psychological understanding are defined in its terms. What we have to understand is the meaning or psychic relevance which a person finds in his experience. But the level of metapsychology also is necessary as the basis on which our understanding is validated. The personal level sets up the criteria of identification, while the metapsychological level lays down the criteria of validation of our psychological studies. In terms of a current anthropological distinction, psycho analysis uses both the 'emic' and the 'etic' levels of conceptualization and it is precisely this duality of focus that enables it to be the radical psychology it is. Understood in this manner, Freud's metapsychology is no mere addendum to psycho analysis but an essential part of it. Its revolutionary elan lies precisely in this duality of levels or double perspective.

If the above thesis regarding the dual focus of psycho analysis is accepted, certain further implications of a general philosophical nature can be drawn. If the radicalism of psycho analysis lies in

its double perspective, it would seem that the neglect of any one of the two levels would inhibit this radical potential. In other words, a philosophical approach to psycho analysis oriented to its theoretical component exclusively or to its hermeneutic component alone would tend towards an over-all conservative position regarding the individual personality vis-a-vis the cultural system. Such one-sided approaches would inhibit the radical potential of the Freudian image of man and society. In order to test such a deduction, I shall briefly analyse some important philosophical discussions of psycho analysis which have taken place in the U.S.A. and U.K. in recent years.

Psycho Analysis and American Philosophy of Science :

As a kind of schematic simplification, it may be observed that while American philosophers of science like Nagel, Hempel, Frank etc. have been more interested in problems of psycho analytic metapsychology, linguistic philosophers in Britain have been more interested in the hermeneutic or subjective interpretational part of psycho analysis. Possibly, this difference in philosophical focus may be traced to the distinctive developments of psycho analysis in U.S.A. and U.K. respectively for it may be remembered that while Hartmann's metapsychological contributions are the most distinctive of American additions to psycho analysis, in Britain, Melanie Klein's theory of internal objects relations has introduced complex problems of interpretation and subjective understanding. It is natural therefore that philosophical interest in psycho analysis in the two countries should follow these distinct lines. But whatever may be the reason, the difference in philosophical approaches to psycho analysis is quite evident. Most of the American philosophers of science pay only cursory attention to the problems and complexities of psycho analytic hermeneutics. Even M. Scriven⁸ who has discussed the claims of therapy in a very detailed manner does not really raise the issue of subjective understanding as problematic; he is only concerned with the empirical validation of psycho analytic predictions. I want to suggest that this lack of concern with subjective personal theory has tended to conservative the implications of psycho analysis and I wish to argue for this thesis in two stages. First of all, I shall try to show the conservative implications of the important contributions made to psycho

analytic theory by Hartmann, Karen Horney and Talcott Parsons. I have chosen these three as they are representative of important inter-disciplinary modifications of psycho analysis which are so distinctive of the American phase. In the case of Hartmann, the encounter was between Freudian theory and general psychology; in the case of Horney the encounter was between psycho analysis and cultural anthropology and in the case of Parsons, it was a meeting between psycho analysis and sociology. In all these three cases, the over-all effect has been a conservatization of the Freudian image of man, and in the second stage I hope to show how the purely conceptual and philosophical analysis of psycho analytic theory has but reinforced this conservative drift.

Hartmann's important theoretical contribution to psycho analysis has been to emphasize its character as a general psychology applicable to the normal and the pathological alike and in the service of this enlargement of the scope of psycho analysis he, along with Kris and Lowenstein has developed what has been termed psycho analytic ego psychology. How to accord the ego a greater degree of autonomy than Freud had allowed for was the problem upon which Hartmann⁹ focussed his attention. Although Freud's¹⁰ conception of the structure and function of the ego had undergone repeated transformations and although in his later writings he attributed to the ego a larger degree of independence vis-a-vis the id, from the metaphychological point of view, the ego was 'nevertheless a derivative of the id. Against this, Hartmann assumed within the id, an embryonic ego autonomy. According to him perception, movement, and memory are not created by the drives but are autonomous ego functions. Even apart from this primary autonomy, the ego, in Hartmann's theory also enjoys a secondary autonomy in the sense that certain genetically drive determined functions may in the course of development come to serve ego interests. The second important modification is the thesis of a conflict-free sphere within the ego. On the question of ambivalence too, Hartmann adopted a compromise position between Freud and Ferenczi. For Freud, ambivalence was a defence against destructive impulses, while for Ferenczi it was a defence against a hostile environment. But for Hartmann, ambivalence was a compromise between libidinal and aggressive components. With this the defence mechanisms lose their

pathological character and become normal stages in the process by which the individual comes to terms with the environment. Another consequence of Hartmann's views on the question of ambivalence is that he postulates a neutralized aggression which is responsible for reality denials. With this follows the primacy of the reality principle over the pleasure principle and the goal of adaptation to reality. For our present purposes, we may merely remark how these modifications—the primordial nature of the ego, the neutralization of aggression and the primacy of the reality principle—already foreshadow the tendency towards conformism. This tendency is still further accentuated in the work of Karen Horney.

In Karen Horney,¹¹ we can catch a glimpse of the results of the encounter of psycho analysis with American cultural anthropology. As Marvin Harris¹² remarks, psycho analysis was not without its attractions for the anthropologist. It has been said of the anthropologist that he is a radical at home and a conservative abroad. Freud's critique of the sexual mores of civilised society and its family structure struck a responsive chord in the anthropologist's endogamous radicalism. But at the same time there were deep resistances also to the acceptance of psycho analysis. For one thing, Freudian theory was evolutionistic and deterministic and the American school, under the influence of Boas had just then carved out its own disciplinary identity in terms of a sustained critique of evolutionism and determinism. For another, in his '*Totem and Taboo*'¹³ and more strongly in his '*Civilization and its Discontents*'¹⁴ Freud had underlined the repressiveness of all cultures and the basic conflict between the individual and society. The seeds of radical protest were present in Freud's theory of the universality of the conflict between libido and external reality. So long as the repressiveness of culture is kept in the foreground, psychic health and normalcy could hardly be seen in terms of adjustment or adaptation to the norms and values of the society.

In this situation, the Freudian Unconscious was the irreducible, unassimilable residue and preserve of the innateness of human nature; it was the domain of individualism and the seed bed of social protest. Hence it was natural that the cultural anthropologists' first reaction to Freud should be a strong thrust away

from the Freudian doctrine of the universality of the libido, towards cultural relativism. Benedict as well as Mead turned their attention to the documentation of precisely this diversity and relativity of human character. The very concept of mental health was shown to be culturally conditioned. But on their part, some of the psychologists were more than willing to meet the anthropologists more than half the way.

Karen Horney¹⁵, for instance, insisted upon cultural relativity as much as the anthropologists. In her '*Neurotic Personality of Our Times*', Horney acts on the assumption that there is no such thing as the so-called psychology of the normal personality or a universally applicable psychology of human behaviour. She rejects the Freudian view of libido development as the criterion by which we can distinguish the normal from the neurotic, since in her view, the Freudian theory is applicable only to the civilization of central Europe at the turn of the century. In the light of the extra-ordinary diversity and variability of human behaviour within different cultures, Horney concludes that it is not possible to distinguish between sickness and health on the basis of individual schemata; such distinctions can be made only with reference to the principles laid by a given culture. In short, normalcy consists in being congruent with a given culture pattern.

Now, there is nothing in the idea of a culture pattern as such which inherently makes for conformism. It all depends on the use made of the concept. On the one hand, one could raise the question of the sickness of a whole society or culture as Erich Fromm¹⁶ does; or, on the other hand, one could argue that since normalcy is determined by cultural patterns, the question whether these patterns themselves are normal or pathogenic cannot even be raised, in which case conformism would be built into the very concept of a culture pattern. It all depends on whether one is prepared to attribute normativeness to the cultural pattern or not. Horney¹⁷ has no use for the Freudian Unconscious and although she does not abandon the term altogether, in her thinking, it stands for no more than learned habits and attitudes and feelings whose origin has been forgotten. Her unconscious seems to be no more than Freud's pre-conscious. And finally in her discussion of the basic forms of neurosis, in her last book '*Neurosis and Human*

Growth', we find that all of them are cast in the mold of relations with others. Horney distinguishes three neurotic modes, moving against people, moving away from people and moving with people. It is to be noted further that while describing moving with people, she remarks that there is a normal healthful aspect of this mode, she does not similarly describe healthful variants of the other two. In other words, there does not seem to be anything even potentially commendable about social protest (moving against people) or social withdrawal (moving away from people).

But it is with Parsons' great attempt at the integration of psycho analysis with sociological theory that we reach the high water mark of the conservatization of Freud. Talcott Parsons¹⁸ '*The Super Ego and the Theory of Social Systems*' and '*Social Structure and the Development of Personality*' have been justifiably regarded as the most important of the responses of American mainstream sociology to the challenge of Freud and in the outcome, we find that the challenge has not merely been met but well and truly digested. Incidentally, there is some irony in the fact that Parsons¹⁹ earlier work '*The Structure of Social Action*', which hardly took notice of Freud, is much more radical than '*The Social System*' which devotes considerable attention to Freud. Parsons²¹ himself was conscious of this neglect as he records in the preface to the 2nd edition of '*The Structure of Social Action*'. There is a further element of irony in the fact Parsons has been the first to emphasize the convergence between Freud and Durkheim. Parsons writes 'this convergence from two quite distinct and independent starting points deserves to be ranked as one of the truly fundamental landmarks of modern social science'. Remembering that in his '*Totem and Taboo*' and '*Civilization and its Discontents*' Freud had emphasized the antagonism between the individual and society and of the repressive nature of civilization, while Durkheim had emphasized the solidarity of the individual and the collective conscience, the claim of convergence between Freud and Durkheim is surprising. But it is not so very surprising that Parsons should make it, since, as he himself tells us, the most important change in his theoretical perspective from '*The Structure of Social Action*' to '*The Social System*' is a shift from an individualistic voluntaristic Weberian standpoint to a systemic, collectivistic Durkheimian standpoint.

Understood in this context, it is natural that Parsons should lay particular emphasis on the Freudian theory of the formation of the Super Ego, for the Super Ego is the internalization of the norms and values of the collectivity. But even here, we find Parsons hardly ever mentioning the archaic, the punitive and repressive nature of the super ego; he passes over in silence the phenomenon of super ego anxiety and neurotic guilt and emphasizes only the function of the super ego as a mediating mechanism between the individual and the cultural norms and values of the society. Parsons no doubt correctly underlines the objects-relations aspect of Freudian theory—the interaction between child and the mother is the basic element of analysis, but in Parsons' hands, this interaction is conceptualised in terms of role-playing. The child is said to learn to play a role vis-a-vis the role of the mother and at this point Parsons corrects the Freudian concept of identification in a theoretically far reaching manner. He holds that identification cannot mean the attempt to be like another person but only to play a specific status defined role against another specific status defined role. The logic of stratification and differentiation is thus introduced into the very structure of the most personal and intimate of human relationships—the mother-child relationship. But Parsons' assimilation of Freud goes far beyond this for he holds that not only the super ego but the ego as well as the id are the results of internalization. Society and culture inter-penetrate and constitute the personality at all levels. A common Neo-Freudian criticism of classical Freudian theory has been that it is primarily an id-psychology and not an ego-psychology, that it emphasizes motivational dynamics and not cognitive dynamics. But it seems to me that this criticism misses the essential aspect of Freudian ego-psychology. For Freud, the cognitive functions of the ego are the results of conflict; secondary processes are the precipitates of frustration. Hence, in the Freudian picture, the individual's cognitive relatedness to reality, social as well as environmental, cannot be free of a certain dialectic tension and conflict. But in the Neo-Freudian revisions of psychoanalytic theory, it is precisely this dimension of ego-reality conflict that is eclipsed. As we have seen, Hartmann places the cognitive orientation of the ego in a conflict free sphere and Parsons holds that the ego's cognitive as well as affectual structure is constituted by social

reality. The ego is as much a product of socialization as the super ego. No doubt, Parsons' emphasis upon language as structuring cognitive capacities is well placed, but in psycho analysis, language is characterized by ambivalence. Freud's elaborate comments upon the antithetic meaning of words, the theory of manifest and latent contents of symbolism were elaborated into an entire psycho analytic theory of language recently by Kallir²². In such a theory of language, we can distinguish between the semantics of the id and the semantics of the ego. But in Parsons, all this tension and the explosive potential of such semantic conflicts is lost and the ego merely becomes the residue and sedimentation of socialization. Not merely the ego, but even the id — that last stronghold and preserve of individuality — is surrendered for Parsons proceeds to extend the theory of internalization to the content as well as the structure of the unconscious. With this, he naturally finds little relevance in the concept of repression and internal conflict. Conflict, now in Parsons, is no longer a clash between antithetic systems but merely a lack of equilibrium between early socialization (id) and adult socialization (ego and super ego). One feels like saying that in Parsons, Hartmann's ego psychology takes its revenge on the id by obliterating the id in any fundamental sense, altogether, but with the tragic result that it itself disappears in the process and the social system steps into the psychic vacuum.

In the above, I have attempted to bring out the conservatization which Freudian theory has undergone in the U.S.A. It appears to me that this drift towards conformism is the result of an attempt to bring psycho analysis closer to sociology. Hartmann's ego psychology was the preparation for this convergence but this convergence has been further consolidated both in terms of therapeutic aims and theoretical modifications. The goal of adjustment and adaptation to the given cultural system has been more or less taken as unproblematic and in the hands of Horney especially, we see the far flung revisionary modifications which this clinical orientation entails. But on the level of theory also the attempt to socialize psycho analysis has had the same result. Here, Parsons' generalization of the process of internalization has been the chief mechanism of the assimilation of psycho analysis. But in itself the convergence between psycho analysis

and sociology need not have the effect of inhibiting the radical potential of analysis. This de-radicalization has been the effect of the assimilation of psycho analysis to one particular version of sociological theory, namely, the structural functionalism of Parsons. It is this sociological theory of the establishment that has been the chief factor in the de-radicalization of Freud and as recent critics of Parsonian functionalism like Gouldner have pointed out, functionalism is, in part, the ideology of the capitalist society in its post-industrial phase. Thus, in the final analysis, the de-radicalization of psycho analysis is a symbol of the victory of affluent but conservative America over frustrated but radical Europe.

But for our immediate purpose, the point to note is that recent philosophical discussions of psycho analysis in the United States take as their point of departure the structure of psycho analytic theory as it has finally shaped itself in the above manner. Philosophers of science like E. Nagel, C. G. Hempel, H. Feigl and P. Frank who have given a good deal of attention to psycho analytic theory have taken Hartmann's ego psychology as their object level. In this connection, it is interesting to note that S. Hook's symposium '*Psycho Analysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy*', which is perhaps the most extensive and authoritative compilation of American philosophers of science reaction to psycho analysis opens with a presentation of psycho analytic theory by Hartmann and this presentation serves as the paradigm for all subsequent comment and discussion. It is to be further noted that S. Koch's²³ ambitious multi-volumed effort '*Psychology : The Study of a Science*' presents psycho analysis in terms of Rappaport's²⁴ systematization of Freudian theory. The net effect of such presentations would be to re-inforce the Neo-Freudian revision as the only tenable version of Freudian theory. Coupled with this is another significant general feature of the American philosophical response to psycho analysis. None of the American philosophers of science seem to consider the Diltheyan context of explanation versus understanding as relevant at all in a philosophical consideration of psycho analysis. They seem to regard analysis as just an explanatory theory and have concentrated their attention upon the structure of psycho analytic concepts. They have

enquired after the definitions and theoretical status of psycho analytic terms, the possibility of operationalizing its constructs, the design of the experimental validation of its hypotheses and so on. No doubt, this is an important and necessary part of a philosophical analysis of Freudian theory, but such issues and problems are not distinctive of psycho analysis. They are the common problems of any scientific discipline and hence an exclusive concern with them amounts to the ignoring of whatever that may be distinctive of psycho analysis. Specifically, it appears to me that the most challenging of all issues posed by psycho analysis has to do with the complex dialectical relationship between metapsychological explanations and therapeutic interpretations. It is this psycho analytic hermeneutics, as it may be called, which is the distinctive feature of Freudian theory. But it is precisely this feature which is more or less ignored by most of the philosophers of science in the U.S.A. Even Scriven, who is the most concerned with therapy does not seem to regard psycho analytic insight and interpretation as in any way philosophically problematic. He regards interpretations all most exclusively in terms of predictions. The content and mode of such predictions, the dialectical nature of psycho analytic insight does not seem to interest him very much.

Herbert Marcuse²⁵ has remarked that the radical potential of psycho analysis consists in its theoretical or metapsychological level, but it seems to me that it lies not so much in its theoretical concepts considered by themselves as in their relation to therapeutic insight and understanding. It is this relationship between psycho analytic metapsychology and psycho analytic hermeneutics that is the vital link and as E. Fromm notes, this relationship is a dialectical one. Hence, when this aspect is ignored there tends to be a deradicalization of psycho analysis. In America, both the ego psychologists and the philosophers of science have been concerned with metapsychology and they have tended to regard psycho analytic understanding and interpretation as philosophically unproblematic. My hypothesis that this de-radicalization of psycho analysis is the un-intended result of the neglect of the dual focus of psycho analytic theory derives additional support when we turn to the philosophical discussions of psycho analysis by the linguistic philosophers of Britain.

Psycho Analysis and Linguistic Philosophy.

Linguistic philosophers like Wittgenstein²⁶, Wisdom²⁷ and Lazerowitz²⁸ have been more interested in psycho analytic understanding and interpretation. In fact, Wisdom has based his approach to philosophy on the model of psycho analytic interpretation and in general, the discussions of linguistic philosophers freely uses the rhetoric of therapy—they talk of puzzles, anxieties, compulsions, neurotic doubts, therapeutic release and the dissolution of philosophic problems. Compared with this intense interest in and sympathetic attitude to the level of subjective understanding, linguistic philosophers have been rather unconcerned with metapsychology. It is significant that only MacIntyre and Toulmin have shown any considerable interest in Freudian metapsychology and even here in the case of MacIntyre's²⁹ book '*The Unconscious*' there is more concern with the hermeneutic problems of unconscious intention purpose and meaning. As he himself remarks, his book is inspired by Geach's³⁰ '*Mental Acts*'. But I hope to show that inspite of this greater interest in the subjective level of psycho analytic interpretation, the net effect of British philosophical discussions has been much the same as in the U.S.A.; here again, we witness a de-radicalization of Freud.

II

In the American case, I have argued that the philosophical discussion of psycho analysis took place on a ground already prepared by Neo-Freudian ego psychology and I have suggested that it is the conservative and conformist character of these Neo-Freudian contributions which have shaped and structured the American philosophical response. But in the case of Britain, especially with reference to linguistic philosophers, the ground level conformism had been prepared for by philosophy itself. The inherent conservatism of Oxford linguistic philosophy has been frequently commented upon, by Russell, Gellner, Mundle³¹, Campbell and more recently by Katz³². The appeal to ordinary language functions in part as a conservative defence of the conceptual status quo and Strawson's³³ elevation of descriptive metaphysics over revisionary metaphysics has the same purpose. Just now I am not raising the question whether the acceptance

of ordinary language as a norm setting level is necessary for philosophy or not; that is altogether another and more complicated issue. What I am trying to suggest is that it is this turn to ordinary language, which is the distinctive elan of recent Oxford philosophy, which conservatizes the discussion of psycho analysis by linguistic philosophers.

The interest in psycho analytic semantics, the problems of understanding and interpretation posed by psycho analysis is the heritage of the developments of psycho analysis in Britain. The most distinctive of the British contributions, on the level of therapy has been the development of child analysis by A. Freud³⁴, Melanie Klein³⁵, Joan Riviere³⁶ and on the level of theory, the theory of internal objects by Klein, Fairbairn³⁷ and M. Balint³⁸. Recently, the work of R. D. Laing³⁹, in connection with schizophrenic disorders also focusses attention upon the level of comprehension of subjective meanings. Psycho analytic hermeneutics can be explosively radical, for on the one hand it involves the grasp and comprehension of subjective meaning and intention, and on the other, the very act of analytic interpretation sublates this subjective meaning. It is this dialectic inter-play between the two levels which is the distinctive feature of what may be called psycho analytic semantics. In itself, therefore, one would expect that a philosophic concern with this aspect of psycho analysis would be full of dialectical possibilities. But in the event, this has not come about for this concern with psycho analytic meanings has been tied to the paradigmatic role of ordinary language, with the result that psycho analytic insight has been treated as a paradox, itself a symptom of queerness to be dissolved by linguistic therapy. In Wisdom, there is this peculiar reversal of roles. In his essay '*Philosophy and Psycho Analysis*'⁴⁰ he treats philosophic problems about other minds, external objects and certainty as compulsive neurotic doubts, thereby suggesting deeper unconscious determinants of such conceptual worries, but in '*Philosophy, Metaphysics and Psycho Analysis*'⁴¹, psycho analytic talk of unconscious purposes motivations etc. are treated as paradoxes to be dissolved by linguistic analysis of how we in fact use the words 'to mean' 'to intend' etc. Old style philosophy is to be dissolved by psycho analysis, whose disturbing 'paradoxical' statements in turn are to be dissolved by

new style ordinary language philosophy. There is a huge irony here for M. Lazerowitz invests so much time and pre-occupation to the psycho analysis of philosophy, but Wisdom uses the techniques of ordinary language analysis to dissolve the paradoxes of psycho analysis. Into this vacuum created by the disappearance of both philosophical and psycho analytical interpretations, ordinary language steps in. Is this, in the final upshot, so very different from what has happened to psycho analysis at the hands of Parsons? In the one case, it was a certain theory of society which dominates the picture and in the other, a certain social institution, namely ordinary language, which does so.

Wisdom's suggestion that psycho analytic statements are illuminating paradoxes goes back to Wittgenstein, only in the case of Wittgenstein, the suggestion was much more subtly introduced. As Charles Hanly⁴² reports, Wittgenstein's attitude towards psycho analysis seems to have been ambivalent. On the one hand, he was favourably disposed towards psycho analytic interpretations, especially towards dream interpretations. Given his interest in language, this was to be expected. But on the other hand, he was anti-pathetic to psycho analytic theory, even going so far as to describe it as a myth. The usual British dichotomy of a favourable attitude towards psycho analytic phenomenology and a negative attitude towards psycho analytic theory is here evident. Wittgenstein was struck by Freud's idea that dreams have a meaning, but he immediately qualifies this approval by making two corrections, both designed to negate the idea of wish fulfilment. Wittgenstein first holds that the interpretation of the dream is part of the dream itself. If this is so, it makes nonsense of the attempt to uncover a sexual wish behind the dream. Here it appears that Wittgenstein does not distinguish between interpretation and secondary elaboration, which alone according to analysis, is part of the manifest content of the dream. Secondly, comparing dreams to languages, Wittgenstein suggests that there is no one thing common to all dreams just as there is no one thing common to all uses of language. Wittgenstein's suggestion that interpretation also is part of the content of the dream is designed to give expression to his idea that psycho analytic theory is itself something like a symptom. Wittgenstein held that psycho analytic theory is only a mode of representation;

it is merely a way of assembling particular cases, a case of seeing as. Wittgenstein seems to have had two purposes in so regarding analytic theory. On the one hand, if a theory were to be no more than a mode of representation, it functions merely as a metaphor or model and the question of its truth or falsity does not arise. As we have seen, Wisdom also exploits this suggestion and MacIntyre too regards the unconscious as such a schema of representation. Secondly, if analytic theory is a mode of representation, then it could be assimilated more easily to Wittgenstein's own conception of philosophy for, as is well known, in his later period, Wittgenstein described his work as a non-theoretical mode of illumination. Psycho analytic theory becomes just one more language game to be housed in the generous mansion of '*The Philosophical Investigations*'. But the difference and a vital one at that, between philosophy and psycho analysis would be this—while philosophy self-consciously reminds us of the multiple modes of representation and thereby delivers us from puzzlement and bewilderment, analysis, insofar as it misunderstands itself to be something more than a mode of representation, would function as a picture which holds us captive. It would, in itself, be a form of bewitchment and we may require the services of linguistic philosophy to be freed of this particular form of bewilderment. Here again the conservatization of psycho analysis becomes obvious. What threatens the 'pathology of normalcy' as Erich Fromm calls it, is banished as a form of bewilderment; what could upset the routines of ordinary language is abjured as a form of conceptual paradox.

In sum, therefore, we reach a negative and melancholy result—the encounter between philosophy and psycho analysis in America and Britain has resulted in a conservatization of psycho analysis. Partly this may be due to the inherent conservatism of philosophy itself, but partly this is also due to the ambiguity of psycho analysis. While psycho analysis recognises that the sickness of the individual is ultimately caused and sustained by the sickness of society, psycho analytic therapy aims at curing the individual so that he can continue to function as part of the sick society. Thus, theory preaches protest, while therapy counsels resignation. It is in this way perhaps that one could describe Freud as a reluctant radical. But the prospects of a radical psychology are not yet

completely extinguished—the work of Laing in Britain, Lacan in France, Fromm in the U.S.A. and Adorno and Habermas in Germany hold out promises of such a radical psychology. It is worth noting that all these recent attempts at the radicalization of psycho analysis have a Marxian dimension.

University of Madras,
Madras.

—R. Sundara Rajan

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