

Sociology in Independent India I 2

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THE faith of this essay is simple. In Indian universities Sociology should be the fundamental subject in all the courses of social studies in the Arts Faculties; and the Science, Law, Medical, Technological and Commerce Faculties would do well to arrange lectures on the principles of Sociology and the social origins, processes and implications of their respective disciplines for their students in order that they may resist the disintegration of knowledge brought about by specialization and reach a whole view of life. It is also firmly believed that those who are at the helm of India's affairs must needs cultivate the sociological approach. Further, for the important and immediate task of reconstructing Indian culture through intelligent adaptation to and assimilation of the new forces in the light of a re-interpreted past, Sociology is the most useful study. No other study contributes so much to the active consciousness of kind, which is the declared purpose of India's progress. Each article of this faith is grounded on experience and prompted by reason and the sense of history in the making. The writer hopes and trusts that the new venture will keep the writer's faith in Sociology alive against odds and spread it where it is most needed.

The odds are heavy indeed. Seats of higher learning do not yet recognise the fundamental nature of Sociology; seats of political power do not seem to appreciate its importance for legislation and administration, which more in India than elsewhere, are predominantly social and must needs be based on sociological principles derived from Indian data; and big economic interests, with a few honourable exceptions, are still not cognisant of the elementary fact that even production for profit is a socio-economic problem. At present, the course in Civics at the pre-university stage is a hodge-podge of politics, economics and administration with little or no emphasis on Sociology. Only four universities in India teach Sociology with any seriousness in the under and post-graduate classes. In two, it is an independent subject with a full course of eight papers at the post-graduate level alone; in one, it is, for all practical

purposes, separate, making Sociology compulsory for Economics and optional for Politics students; and the fourth has just introduced it. Two other universities permit students to offer Sociology for their B. A. examination as one paper out of many, while three universities have opened diploma courses in Social Work and Welfare in which Principles of Sociology form one paper. Social Economics is usually called Applied Economics or Public Economics and comes under Economics. Neither is Philosophy of History nor Social History taught anywhere separately, though Social Psychology and Social Philosophy are usually included in either the Philosophy or the Psychology course. To this writer's knowledge, a course in Culture and Civilisation is given only in two universities, and in none in the social aspects of science and technology, medicine and law. Only three universities have a respectable number of students in the Sociology classes.

The reasons for this academic neglect and apathy are not far to seek. Till recently, Sociology was looked down upon by the Faculties. Though it was not called a whore among the sciences, it was certainly on the lowest rung of the ladder of academic parity. The attitude of the pure economists and the pure historians, not to mention the other purists in the Science Faculty, towards Sociology still remains one of old women, who had been widowed early, towards the young un-married. Reasons of Science, for example, quantification, mathematical treatment, experiments, are invoked against Sociology. Much of this suspicion is the traditional prejudice of the British universities of which Indian scholars have drunk; a large part of it is justifiable; because any loose thinking has been called Sociology, any subject that does not lend itself to rigorous thinking has been pushed into the arms of Sociology, and plenty of gas is being exuded and enough of slag secreted by the factories of bookmaking and doctoral dissertations in Sociology to offend those who believe that obstinate rigour is the first commandment of intellectual life. In view of all this and much more the "reasons of science" are rational. Yet this prudishness mainly arises from an elemental fear of the new—a hundred years' old science is still new in India; and it runs counter to the healthy tendency towards a synthesis of the social sciences now on the rise in the best thinking circles of the world as an effective remedy of the exaggerations of specialisms. Sociology is the only hope of a sensible co-ordination of the sciences that are becoming compartmentalised and schizophrenic in consequence. Indian universities have no case for repeating the mistakes committed by purveyors of knowledge in the past.

The Government, be it of the Centre or the State, is still oblivious of the existence of Sociology. Many pieces of legislation have been enacted, and some are on the anvil, which are intrinsically social. They not only impinge on society, they affect it; they are even meant to change it. Those who know how bills are framed will bear the writer out in his statement that sociologists are never consulted in their making at any stage. The office puts up a draft; the draft is sometimes submitted to a committee of legislators who are mostly indifferent to or ignorant of sociological principles; sometimes non-official opinion is solicited, only to be ignored; then the amended draft is driven back to the relevant secretariat whose officers are untrained in Sociology and Economics; then it is sent to the legislative and judicial departments for proper drafting and the study of legal implications; finally it is placed before the Cabinet. If it is accepted, then it is put before the Legislature to be pushed through by docile men. At no stage is a bill that affects the lives of millions now and many more to come, contaminated by the knowledge of Sociology. But many social traditions are being broken by the laws and no nucleus of healthy conventions is being planted. Bills and acts affecting industrial relations, the Hindu Code Bill, Zamindari Abolition Acts, to mention the prominent ones only, have been framed and passed without reference to Sociology. The Planning Commission's draft-outline deals with many reputed social problems from the non-sociological angle. The population problem has been mentioned, but it has been treated cavalierly. Family planning has been advertised, but no sociology of the changing structure and function of Indian family life is to be noticed in the well-intentioned attempts to stem the flow of babies. All that has happened in this line is the hurried tour of an American expert on birth-control in the Indian cities. The safe period technique, whatever be its physiological merits, is unrelated to Sociology in general, and to the Sociology of Indian life in particular. Perhaps the dissociation of a social bill from Sociology is complete in the Hindu Code Bill, which was drafted by a committee of jurists that took the evidence of jurists and certain organisations, and to which the Prime Minister is committed. None associated with it can be described as a sociologist. And the result is that the new Hindu Code is likely to create a number of problems against which the India and the State Governments are unprepared. To mention only two of them; so long as the standard of living does not rise high and rise sharply, the rise in the age at marriage, which will ensue, is more likely to increase the number of babies per marriage than not, thus defeating the purpose of family planning; and the new property rights of women

are also more likely to concentrate property in fewer hands than before, thus nullifying the distributive basis of social welfare. It does not mean that the Hindu Code Bill is unnecessary; on the contrary, it is an urgent need. The point is that there is an insufficient analysis of the need and an almost total indifference to the social consequences of the satisfaction of the need by legislation. Knowledge of sociology could avoid both. It may be argued that sociologists are not available and also that they, if any, could advise the committee directly, by submitting memoranda, or the various organisations whose opinion was solicited, by preparing memoranda for them. The argument is partly true and partly false. There are too few Sociologists in this country. But the point is that Sociology, not being recognised by the Government and not being popular with the public, cannot be expected to throw light where it is needed. The unfortunate part of it in India today is that unless the Government recognises a science it is not popular, and unless a science is popular, scientists are not produced in any number sufficient to influence the Government and the public. Why the Government and the public are apathetic will be discussed at a later stage.

Certain favourable indications, however, are noticeable. The Union Public Service Commission has allowed candidates to offer Sociology and Anthropology in the all-India competitive examinations. More than anything else this will confer a status on Sociology. Among Indian youth prospects for service mostly determine their selection of subjects for study. Formerly it was due to the British policy of creating clerks; now the exigencies of a Welfare State will operate to produce administrators. Nobody knows if the creative interests of young minds will ever be stimulated by the pressure of the social problems and directed spontaneously towards the study of Sociology. That would be an ideal situation, failing which a guarantee of the right of employment by the Constitution, which is not there, would be the next best. Even if we exclude the ideal situations, we cannot but admit the existence of a psychological lacuna which will stand in the way of producing great social thinkers. Be that as it may, one has to remain content with small mercies. Only, these can be made a little larger if the State Public Service Commission also permit the candidates for the provincial examinations to offer Sociology. The second indication is similarly half-encouraging. Certain enlightened employers have endowed schools of Social Work and social philosophy. A few State Governments have followed suit. Their policy is intermittent assistance. In one State the

scheme failed after three years when the Social Service cadets did not get jobs which they thought the state had promised them. In reality, the State had said that a training in the social services would be an additional qualification. Another instance of failure can be quoted. One State wanted the employers to employ the products of a well-known, unofficial labour service and training centre in their factories as Welfare Officers. Such appointment was and is necessary under the relevant Act., The candidates who were not confined to that institution were selected but the employers refused to appoint them, and the Government could not force them to do so. In a sense, this case is different and peculiar. But the tepid attitude of the economic powers that be towards the need of Sociology even in the matter of industrial relations is unmistakable. In one institution financed by the endowment of the most enlightened employing family of India, empirical studies of sectional social problems are being made and young men and women are trained in social service. They are in some demand. Another institution endowed by a rich employer has been started in Northern India. It has not yet produced tangible results to stir the public or the Government's attention in the way of giving its students jobs and utilising their services otherwise. Without minimising the importance of such voluntary agencies for the study of social problems and of the quality of work done by them it has to be said that the spirit working behind much of their effort is reminiscent of the British evangelicalism of the Victorian age though the terms and technique are often borrowed from similar organisations in the U.S.A. and the U. K. There is little harm in borrowings and imitations so long as the wider and the more basic cultural, that is psychological, philosophical, historical and dynamic aspects of the Indian social processes are studied in the context of more comprehensive social forces. Unfortunately, that is not being done to the writer's knowledge. Thus, for example, if beggary is studied in detail, the connection between the religious factors and the economic base is not; if Hindu-Muslim, or caste tension becomes a research project, the undertow of economic conflict remains hidden; if children's maladjustments are analysed, the structure and function of the class to which the parents belong are left untouched; if family-studies are planned the cultural environment of the class is taken for granted. Intensive study always requires delimitation, which in its turn, gives rise to a particular technique. If the technique is adopted, the constituency of research limits itself to the field out of which the technique emerged. But the field of investigation of an Indian research project may be different. In fact, it is often so. Thus it is that the research studies so painstakingly carried out in these institutions

look so foreign and unreal in the name of being scientific. They cannot be expected to enthuse many, most of whom lead such lives as do not need confirmation of the obvious by statistics and scientific observation and technical treatment.

Nor can such treatment of social problems excite young men and women about Sociology beyond the point of benevolence and philanthropy as a profession, which certain provisions in the Constitution, and a number of Acts, if they are implemented, are likely to extend. It is probable that the particular type of Sociology taught in these institutions is not meant to do anything more. Yet more is to be attempted by independent India whose social traditions have enabled Indians to live in a particular manner but are now found to be wilting under new types of social forces. If the ruling type of Sociology is unfit to solve the conflict of cultures, if it ignores the social realities of historical existence and of the collective desire to live better, then another type of Sociology is needed. One need not be ashamed of that being an older type. After all, India represents a certain historical phase in social development, and the technique that suits it need not be that of people who have come out of the community level to become an industrial society. Perhaps, that type is not so old as it is thought. May be, it will have to be Marxist, of which again free men in a free country need not be afraid. That freedom when it is grounded by knowledge of India's social realities will cure Marxist sociology of its usual dogmatic blindness and simplifications. In any case, the smallness of the number of such institutions cannot place Sociology in the scheme of intellectual disciplines provided for any considerable number of young persons.

There remain a handful of scholars in the universities who have been carrying on with their work in the midst of indifference, contempt and opposition. Fortunately, they have been influenced by the classic Sociologists of Europe and America, and by two of the encyclopaedic minds of India in this century, Dr. B. N. Seal and Dr. Patrick Geddes. So the synoptic vision and the understanding of the social reality in the form of organising principles and in terms of regional peculiarities are not altogether missing. Recently, some fine anthropologists are making their contributions to Sociology. Yet the total number is so small that it cannot explain all that needs explanation. In addition, a number of voluntary social service organisations are operating in the rural and urban areas. The work of the older ones, although associated with reformist movements in religion, are not confined to the religious and

sectarian grooves. These movements were essentially social and humanistic. Similarly, the newer ones, though impelled by Gandhi's ideas and example, are seldom political, because these were also social and humanistic. The records of both types of Social Service in certain spheres and areas are excellent. Their experience is very valuable. Yet the integral, secular and dynamic approach that can come from training in Sociology seems to be lacking. Humanistic ardour backed by Indian traditions of private philanthropy and monarchical service cannot replace the study of social processes and social changes. Nor can moral dedication do it. On the whole, these voluntary agencies contribute to the changing status of Sociology.

But how long can the young volunteers remain 'missionaries'? How much can the students and the scholars do? Whatever distinguished politician guests may say at the annual convocations, or at meetings where the young have to be pleased and placated, the Indian youth of today have no voice in shaping the destiny of their country or even their own, and the Indian universities have not yet begun to exercise influence over either the government or the people. Voluntary agencies of social work are too silent to attract government attention; and their work is too sectional to attract public notice. The constructive programme of Gandhiji is languishing with his death. Political work leaves no time to the Congress party to attend to the Sarvodaya programme. So it goes beyond the question of the universities being unable to produce a fair number of genuine experts or the government's unwillingness to trust men of knowledge outside the party in power; it is really a matter that goes to the very character of India's national movement. That character, in short, has been political, that is non-social, non-cultural and non-economic. Whatever consequences are noticeable seem to have followed on their own. Unless that character is completely changed, social forces will not emerge; and if they do not emerge, Sociology will remain an academic pursuit. In other words, Sociology as a subject can be popular and influential only in a certain social context, namely, that of comprehensive and persistent social change in a tempo faster than the previous. To put it in another language, Sociology begins when the Community ends and the Society emerges; and that is what is happening in India. Thus it becomes the duty of the Indian Sociologist to harp on the fact that the old context of community is no more and a new context of society is being formed. The first part is critical and the second is analytical and constructive. One remark is needed here. Criticism of

the national movement is solely on the ground that the study of errors and contradictions is essential for the knowledge of essential conditions for truth.

The only ideology that had grown in India under the British rule was nationalism. It was certainly a borrowed idea, but it flourished well in the soil, because the soil had been prepared by the racial arrogance of the British, the fear of a new exploitative type of civilisation and that of a novel type of culture with a different, if not contrary, sense of values. In the second stage, the real nature of the British rule was dimly perceived by the nationalists, only a few of whom attended to the economic side of the matter, but the majority were satisfied with the mystique of the nation. They turned to the glorification of India's past and discovered there not only what the West was clumsily doing now but a superior type of wisdom, which was dubbed as India's genius and which the West would do well to cultivate. Some Western scholars obliged them heartily. One of the consequences of this mystical scholarship was the defence of the caste system which was held to be the bony structure of India's social organisation. A number of English officials had written about it, some sympathetically, others in a hostile spirit. Their main work was ethnological. These two trends, the sociological and ethnological, could develop into an Indian school of sociology, like the Indian school of patriotic history, but they did not. The British treatment of ethnology was considered to be un-understanding and unsympathetic. It was considered to be more in the nature of subtle political exposure of a subject race than of scholarly exposition. On the other hand, gaps in history and historical knowledge were too patent to be ignored; but as the caste system still prevailed in magistral continuity, it was not necessary to know its mechanism. Either it had to be praised, and it was done handsomely, or it had to be ignored, which those who aped foreign customs did, at least publicly. Others, not so historically minded, thought, however, that it had to be broken. This task was undertaken by the social reformers. Unfortunately, the reformers were severely handicapped by their attitude, which was considered to be hostile to the Indian mystique. They loved the nation no less, but they loved the people more. They loved them, however, as Puritanic Victorian fathers loved their errant children, that is, as objects of reform and subjects of their reforming zeal. The British administration also suddenly lost interest in social reform; and the reformers were cut off from the social roots and declared to be non-Hindu, anti-religious, anti-nationalists, which certainly they were not. So the chance

of social studies was again missed in the conflict between the attempt to attain self-respect and the struggle for social freedom. The conflict was resolved in the political preoccupation. It was now a movement on a large scale, though apart from the superficial political consciousness that the British rule was satanic, the masses who formed the community were not materially affected. They had to wait for the consequences of the war and the new leadership to form a society. The increased cost of living and certain external factors awakened the middle class, and also the industrial labourers who began to start trade unions and organise strikes. Though the new forces were economic in the main, they were hitched to the political wagon. Once again the opportunity of studying the socio-economic motives of a movement was not seized. Instead, the movement became yet more ethical when the peasant risings occurred after the Great Depression. The leader himself had an integral view, which he called the constructive programme, later on, the Sarvodaya. He emphasized the need of looking after the oppressed and the depressed classes. He had a kind of economic programme that would make those who were otherwise deprived and dispossessed, independent on a small scale. He was against the centralisation of the industrial system and favoured the decentralised rural order on a higher level of self-sufficiency. He enquired into the defects of the system of education and suggested certain changes. He wanted the Hindus and the Muslims to come closer. In short, he had a sociology to offer. But here, as elsewhere and everywhere, forces released overcame the wishes of their generator, and ultimately destroyed him who was also their conductor. It required a highly developed sense of historical reason to utilise the forces and canalise them in the proper direction. The political pre-occupation of the last phase of Indian nationalism stood in the way of appraising the social changes that were taking place below the surface of the national struggle. For one, it was held that such appraisal would come after political freedom; for another, the rise of the submerged classes and their role were not understood either on account of fear or sheer ignorance of or indifference to the material base of a national struggle. Evidences of fear of the new class and the idealistic aversion to economic factors can be easily adduced. This is the basic social reason of the disregard of Sociology by Indians, and its neglect by the Indian universities. Now that the subterranean forces are shaking the surface and the Indian communities have been transformed into the Indian society, Sociology, means Marxism for the Indian youth; and American sociology, in the sense of being a scientific discipline to save

the world from Marxism, is the only Sociology for university and college intellectuals. Nature abhors a vacuum; and it has to be admitted that Indian political nationalism has been working so long inside a partial vacuum.

The problem, therefore, is to fill this vacuum in order that knowledge may be full. If the political movement had sucked up all national energies in the past, the present, political condition of India, with an independent stable government, provides no more occasion for such pre-occupation. In fact, no sooner was the new state formed than it had to face the social problem of the refugees on a scale vaster than any country in the world had ever done in history. Apart from its novelty suddenness and vastness, there was an intellectual unpreparedness for its solution. But in the process of rehabilitation, which was a hard one and is not yet complete, much sociology had to be learnt for the first time. The old economics, too, had to be unlearned by the new State in the context of a low standard of living, unemployment, under-employment, high propensity to consume, slow or no capital accumulation, low productivity with an insupportable rate of increase in population, which are the characteristic features of the so-called undeveloped economy. Even with this pressure of social and economic urgencies, the government's attitude towards economic problems can hardly be called sociological. The Five Year Plan has been called realistic; but the stern realities it deals with are integral social problems. Truly speaking, standard of living, the nature and stage of economic development, the relation between village economy and city economy are sociological concepts.

At the time of writing, elections are taking place. A change of government no doubt involves politics; but if anything more fundamental than that is attempted, as for example, amendments to the Constitution, or change in the structure and function of the state, then the impulses behind these attempts must needs be stronger than what can be mustered by political parties as they are understood today. They will have to represent, aye to be, genuine social forces. In short, independent India's national movement will have to be social now; that is, the Indian state will have to reflect the basic social changes more fully and clearly than it has been able to do so far. It must needs hasten the process of converting the community into a society. Instances of such processes will occur easily to the Indian reader. The evolving status of women, labourers and peasantry vis-à-vis their orthodox protectors and masters, the dynamics of urban economy impinging on country economy, the

emergence of scheduled castes and tribes, the conversion of the refugees into citizens, the removal of the sense of denial, inferiority, guilt and frustration that overwhelms large elements of the Indian people, the rising tide of population in the context of arrested, un-industrialised economy, the impact of Asian nationalism and of Atlantic civilisation on Indian modes of living, thinking and feeling, the influence of technology, all these and many more are at once the symptoms of and themselves the changing social forces. They cannot be treated any more on the political level. Nor on the merely economic level either, if by economics is meant the economics of academic circles. Only institutional and historical economics can be helpful. Such economics is only economic sociology or sociological economics, because institutions are social phenomena; and the history of colonial countries has been a mixture of economic exploitation with racial arrogance on the one hand and social inertia on the other, and it is going to be the story of economic and racial equality impelling drastic social changes in the near future. The historical problems of India are intrinsically sociological. Therefore, knowledge of Sociology is at once a corrective of the inadequate national movement in the past and its regulator in future. Hereby the function of Sociology as a principle of collective action is indicated.

In the wider canvas of international relations, the sociological implications underlie the political connections. India's foreign policy is more than a political policy. India's attitude towards China, South-East Asia and the Middle East is ultimately governed by factors like Asian feeling, which is at least as much cultural, economic and social as it is political in the sense of being a collective protest against old and new imperialisms. It is certainly a joint effort to consolidate political independence, but it is also a cooperative endeavour to facilitate social change throughout the area where social backwardness was and still is the rule. Excluding Japan, China and Soviet Asia, India's social changes have been faster than in the rest of Asia. This fact is registered in the word secularism, which really means independence of social change from the governance of religious factors. In a closed society (or community) mysticism is a revolutionary social force; in an open society (a society *per se*), that is a society on which outside, exogenous social forces are acting to expose the inside contradictions and stimulate the endogenous forces, religious factors act as nuclei of resistance to social change. India, being a society that has been opened, that is, which is now becoming a society at last, recognises this social fact through its new state.

It is this recognition by the Indian state that makes India's foreign policy sympathetic to the Muslim Middle East and Egypt. Similarly, India's support of the new China in the Security Council and elsewhere is essentially motivated by the recognition of the fact that the dynamics of social change in China are the same as those of India. It is the same problem of simultaneous anti-feudalism, anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, the same problem of better living on all levels of social existence. Even the emphasis on culture-contacts between India and China without the medium of martial conquest, which otherwise is not a persuasive argument, is social in character. Foreign policy is not so much an extension of domestic policy as it is a reflection of social change.

One could apply this to India's policy towards the U. S. A. At present it may be called ambivalent. On the one hand, it is fear of American domination and on the other, it is a recognition of the need for American aid. The fear of domination, both political and economic, arises from a sub-conscious realisation of the fact that the higher tempo of American culture and civilisation will bring about a faster change than what the Indian state can bear and the Indian society tolerate. The other attitude towards the U. S. A. springs from a conscious realisation of the fact that the U. S. A. stands for faith in man, in the collective man's experimental ability to create opportunities that will be seized by individual men and women to bring about change in their status and modes of living, which is the essence of social change and the meaning of social engineering. In the case of the U. S. S. R., India's foreign policy is also that of a free country that has chosen to be free from entanglements implicit in the fact that Soviet Russia is one of the two power blocs. Beneath the surface, however, lie two sets of attitudes: one, those which centre in the vested interests of private and corporate property rationalised into the doctrine of free enterprise; and two, those which cluster round the feeling, and sometimes the conviction, that the tempo of socio-economic change has to be double quick in order that India may come up in the race of social progress. In the case of the U. S. A., it is the fear of a too rapid technological change and a subtler but none the less real economic domination by an outside power, while in the case of the U. S. S. R., it is the fear of a too rapid social change coming from inside the society and attendant upon the rise of a new class hitherto quiescent. The negative attitude in either case is fear of social change as such. But the positive attitude is one of appreciation of the common secret of the success of both countries, namely, faith

in man's ability to raise his status. The political aspect of India's foreign policy, which is called neutrality, is only another name of the above ambivalence in the Indian social attitudes.

Intrinsically, it is a problem of India's culture-assimilation. That India had to have international status, contacts and treaties with the necessary paraphernalia was determined two centuries ago when the West came to India via England. To be charged with nationalism, which is a Western concept, to demand parliamentary representation on the British model, to have adopted English and to be acquainted with English literature, politics and economics, to remain economic subject of the British Empire, to swear by the English common law, and for so long, and not to have international connection after freedom would not have been possible. It would have undone the work of history. Now that the English political rule is over and the English economic domination is being amended and controlled, or is entering into the new phase of partnership with Indian enterprise, or into competition with another foreign power that is only the exaggerated form of the familiar Western power, the time for assessing the nature of the Western influence as a social force has arrived. The assessment is still superficial. It is claimed that the East and the West are not different; it is asserted that the East is only the undeveloped West. The unity of history is not yet questioned; the specificity of history is not yet established. Yet, there seems to be an awareness of the fact that India's culture-contacts should assume some form of secular humanism which will be the result of knowledge and constructive social energies and which will be the cultural substitute of war and exploitation, the two hitherto well-known methods of cultural penetration. With this cultural problem understood, the sociology of India's foreign policy becomes intelligible. India's non-participation in power politics is at once the natural deposit of her contact with the West and her gradually emerging attitude towards Western culture, which is no longer one of pure adoration or pure contempt. India hopes to non-participate in power politics by participating in the formation of a universal culture, for which India's genius is particularly fitted. It is obvious that this hope cannot be fostered by the study of politics and economics, even international relations and international economics, unless they are saturated by the sociological approach.

Cultural participation and contribution can proceed smoothly under two conditions. The first is that the economic development does not forge too far ahead of the socio-cultural change. Much of the modern

world's ills has arisen out of the wide disparity between the two, and India cannot afford to ignore that lesson. It does not mean that the economic forces will cease to create disparity. For a long time to come their pull will be greater. There is the desire of an arrested economy to overtake the march of events elsewhere, and there is also the desire not to remain the producers of raw materials for the industrialised Western Europe and the U. S. A., even of Japan. The expression of these desires is definitely stronger than the feeling for cultural and social change. Foreign investment will stimulate the desires; the keenness for improved standard of living through rapid industrialisation and the realisation of the inadequacy of the present system of agriculture to maintain the level of existence of an increasing population will feed them. They can be checked only when Indians will appreciate that industrialisation cannot come in its full tide before the old social system is completely exhausted and the new social order is ready for it. Because, the real difficulty of an undeveloped economy is not financial or technical; it is the chronic rigidities of the older economic system and their consequence, the low level of production. And the economic system of India is a peculiarly socio-economic system, like that of other countries in South Eastern Asia and China where communities are forming into a society. So the problem is to find out ways and means for the balanced progress of industrialisation. If industrialisation means the reduction of social economy to 'economy' as such, which is the same thing as the 'profit' or 'business economy' of common parlance, then the emphasis on the sociological basis, process and implication of the economic change should be strong.

There is a cultural means too. It has to be handled properly. If done so, it can be effective. Indian culture is a specific entity, being the sum of certain traditions which have grown out of the assimilation of many traits and retained their general character down the ages. The relative permanence is neither good nor bad, but the character can be useful or useless for a directed social change. That character is essentially social. The six or sixty systems of Indian philosophy do not betray it, but the Indians lived before they philosophised. And it was a fairly rich existence ranging from the sensual to the spiritual. The bond was mainly social bond; the status and the process were mainly social status and social process; the *dharma* was ritualistic, that is cultural. So singular and exclusive was the sovereignty of society, so effective was the social control over individuals that the need for having a state or a church was not as strong as it was elsewhere, that even those who had cultivated

their soul could not leave society before they had fully lived it through. In a sense, Hinduism is only a way of social living; and the *sannyasis* and the monks who have no names and no homes are only ideal types of unattached existence. The Indian Muslim community is based on the same social principles as the Hindu. To put it briefly, India has had only society to the neglect of other agencies of control, which only heightens the tragedy of the modern neglect of Sociology. This general character may restore the balance and correct the disparity that is sure to come in the train of a rapid industrialisation, when the Industrial Society will have been born. The danger, however, is that of revivalism. It can be averted on the intellectual level by a scientific study of the Indian social and cultural processes behind the political or dynastic changes, which have so long remained the subject matter of scientific Indian history and thus deprived it of the sense of history.